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Non, ce n’est pas la terre plus que la race qui fait une nation. La terre fournit le substratum, le 
champ de la lutte et du travail; l'homme fournit l'âme. L'homme est tout dans la formation de 
cette chose sacrée qu'on appelle un peuple (Renan, 1882, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?) 
 
A country without haste. Here a small village, there a small village, colourful houses, rich blue 
and green. Gentle hills. In between, emptiness filled with emptiness (from fieldwork notes in 
Moldova, May 2013). 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Today migrants are increasingly seen as potential ‘philanthropists’ or even as the ‘instigators’ of 
development transition in their countries of origin. This thesis explores, via an original multi-
perspective bottom-up approach, how the discourse of migrants' contribution to development 
is constructed and put into concrete practice in the case of Moldova. The young republic is one 
of Europe’s lesser-known countries and yet, with its intense recent experience of migration, it 
presents a fertile territory for in-depth study of the migration–development dynamic, with 
special reference to the role of migrant associations. More specifically, the heart of the thesis 
investigates, with a transnational lens, representations and negotiations of migrants’ collective 
development efforts, firstly among migrants, secondly among development actors, and thirdly 
the aid-relationships between the two.  
 The thesis engages with the literature on the relationship between migrants’ transnational 
development practices and transnational power hierarchies, highlighting the role of 
international development policy discourses and initiatives from an interdisciplinary 
perspective. It aims to contribute to the broader theoretical discussion on linkages between 
transnational collective practices of Eastern European migrants living in EU countries and the 
development transition in the Eastern European 'neighbourhood'. Using a variety of field 
methods including multi-sited ethnography, the data collection took place over a period of one 
year – following the ‘discourse on migrants’ contribution to development’ in the transnational 
social field of migrant civil society and in the transnational field of development organisations 
across seven European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Moldova, Switzerland and 
the UK. 
 The findings reveal significant differences between migrants and mainstream development 
agencies on the issues of Moldova’s transformation process, development practices and on the 
notion of ‘ideal’ development partners. Migrants’ collective transnational development 
practices appear as a dynamic process shaped not only by the current and understudied 
Moldovan migration features and based on various socio-economic and cultural indicators, but 
also by the country’s Socialist past and its marginalised place within Europe. The results also 
show unexpected relationship patterns between migrants and state institutions and aid-
agencies, in which the latter two rely on migrant associations to carry out their newly-created 
migration–development policies and programmes. And an overall discomfort was found among 
aid-workers in engaging Moldovan migrants as their partners, expressed in double standards 
applied to migrants in ‘aidland’.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The Republic of Moldova is not exactly what one would call a press darling:  
 
“If there are any reports at all from this landlocked country, whose location most Europeans 
don’t even know, they highlight intense poverty, illegal organ trading, human trafficking, civil 
war and communism. Something about wine too" (Lonely Planet: 2010:7). 
 
Indeed, this small country the size of Belgium – situated between Romania and the Ukraine – is 
little known and unspectacular. There are no breath-taking mountains, no sea or raging rivers. 
This is precisely one reason why Moldova is spectacular in my eyes. Since I ‘risked’ a visit to 
Moldova the first time – as a Swiss Newspaper entitled an article on travelling to Moldova (Le 
Temps 2012) – I have become attached to this place at the presumed margins of ‘Europe’, 
wherever we claim to fix its eastern borders1. While visiting social projects around the country 
on several trips during the years 2005-2009, in different positions as a consultant to 
development agencies and as a researcher, I felt what I call the ‘omnipresence of absence’. I 
could feel the absence of the working-age population – of men and women alike, especially in 
small rural communities. Yet, no aid worker was openly addressing the issue of Moldova’s large-
scale emigration. It occurred to me that, although a host of academic, policy and civil-society 
publications consider migration as an ‘integral part’ of broader social change, and migrants as 
‘agents for social change’, mainstream development agencies remain ambivalent about the 
phenomenon of mass emigration, its effects on the overall country and the incorporation of 
migrants into their development work. This observation intrigued me and provoked my curiosity 
to dig further into this topic. More precisely, in my thesis I focus upon the complex picture of 
representations and negotiations of Moldovan migrants’ collective involvement in development 
initiatives.  
  In this first chapter, I introduce my thesis, which is inscribed in the broader research topic 
of the intra-European migration–transformation nexus. First, I briefly map the discursive and 
geographical background of my research. This is followed by a summary of my overall research 
design, the main aims and key research questions, and a justification of the relevance of the 
research topic. I round off this scene-setting chapter with a brief outline of my thesis.  
                                                          
1 The sense that Moldova has somewhat altogether fallen out of today’s European map is encapsulated in the title 
of the geographical board game – ‘Where is Moldova?’ 
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Figure 1.1: Impressions from Moldova 
 
1.1 Research Background  
 
1.1.1 The discursive background of the migration–development debate 
First, it is widely accepted that social remittances – the transfer of ideas, behaviours, values and 
norms between migrants’ destination countries and places of origin – are an important aspect 
of social change in migrants’ countries of origin (Levitt 1998). The economic, human and social 
benefits of migrants’ initiatives for their countries of origin are fairly well-documented, and 
there is now a voluminous literature dealing with the various forms of transnational activities of 
migrants (e.g. Lacroix 2016). Secondly, as a leitmotiv of the ongoing rather positive 
interpretation of the linkages between migration and development since the late 1990s, 
migrants are seen as potential ‘philanthropists’ or even as the ‘instigators’ of development 
(Newland 2010a; Page and Tanyi 2015). This optimistic framing of the migration–development 
nexus has further provoked a growing academic and policy interest in migrant associations’ 
3 
 
development initiatives and in their potential to alleviate poverty in their countries of origin2 
(Lampert 2014). And thirdly, since the transnational turn in the 1990s, migrant associations have 
increasingly been considered as members of ‘transnational civil society’3, or as actors within 
transnational spaces (Faist 2000). They have become a familiar motif in debates within different 
disciplines where a spatial framework that privileges the transnational is commonly deployed 
(Mullings 2012). For all of these three reasons, a range of international development agencies 
have launched migrant association-led programmes and policies aiming at maximising their 
development potential via financial and technical support, and at bringing the associations’ 
activities into the development establishment; for instance, their social or educational projects. 
Yet, policy efforts to incorporate migrant associations as ‘partners’ into official national and 
international development raise a number of questions about the actual degree of practical 
inclusion of such associations into the international development field, or what is commonly 
referred to as ‘aidland’4. These questions include: How is development imagined among 
migrants and their associations? How are the entanglements between the migrant associations’ 
strategies and international development agents shaped? My thesis aims to address these 
questions by exploring Moldovan migrant associations’ involvement in formal development 
policies and practices.  
 
1.1.2 The geographical terrain  
The Republic of Moldova presents a thought-provoking case study in reference to both 
development and migration. Moldova is the poorest country in Europe (World Bank 2014)5. It 
was estimated that in 1999, nearly 50% of the population of Moldova lived below the poverty 
line. Even if Moldova has undergone profound economic and political transformation since its 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, its economy remains weak, and the country’s 
political situation is fragile, especially in the light of the ongoing insecure situation in the 
neighbouring Ukraine. Hence, it is no surprise that Moldova is the top recipient of EU financial 
support per capita in the EU-neighbourhood area, and that the international donor community 
is strongly present in the country.  
                                                          
2 I prefer to use the term ‘migrant association’ instead of terms such as ‘home town association’ (HTA), frequently 
used in the academic literature (e.g. by Lampert 2014), as this ‘home place’ usage by associations is not always a 
town.  It may be a district, region or a country. Moreover, some of the migrant associations not only support bilaterally 
their ‘home’ but also the ‘home’ of others.  
3 I opt for what seems to me the easiest definition of civil society, namely the space between the state, the market 
and the family (cf. Gellner 1994). 
4 A number of academic publications on the topic of development use ‘aidland’ in their titles (e.g. Mosse 2011). 
5 According to the Human Development Index, Moldova is currently ranked 117th out of 178 countries, behind many 
West African and South American countries (UNDP 2014). 
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Moldova is also an interesting case regarding migration. After gaining its independence, 
Moldova has witnessed out-migration on a large scale, to an extent that it has become a serious 
impediment to political, social and economic modernisation (Robila 2014). Estimates of the 
number of migrants range up to 50% of the economically active population, or one third of the 
total population (Mosneaga 2012). This means that over one million people have already left 
the country (UNDP 2011). Furthermore, Moldova is the world’s second recipient of remittances 
per capita, and remittances account for 43% of the country's GDP (IMF 2014). Moreover, the 
country currently occupies third place among the world’s fastest shrinking countries, after Syria 
and the Cook Islands (UNFDPA 2015). 
Even if Moldovans migrate both eastwards and westwards, I concentrate on migrants living 
in Western and Southern European countries, as there has been a considerable increase in 
recent years of ‘Western’ destinations of Moldovan migrants, including in the countries in my 
study: France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK. This increase has been accompanied by 
a rise in formal and non-formal networks, organisational activities, and grouping of activities 
under umbrella-like schemes in these countries (Cheianu-Andrei 2013).  
 Lastly, given the massive scope of migration that significantly alters the country’s 
demographic structure – with entire villages depopulated – numerous Moldovans have either 
emigrated themselves or they are personally part of migrant networks through their relatives 
and friends. Everybody I have encountered on my fieldwork in Moldova could either share with 
me their personal experiences of migration or the migrant stories of families and friends – be 
they my female neighbours in a typical Soviet suburb of Chisinau, whose husbands, sons or 
brothers were working at that time on construction sites in Sochi for the Olympic Games; the 
high-flying young professionals in the head-quarters of international organisations (IOs) in the 
capital, who narrated their experiences as international students in Western Europe or in the 
USA; male employees of rural NGOs, some of whom had experienced slavery-like working 
conditions in the agricultural sector in the Ukraine or in Russia; female aid-workers who 
experienced exploitation in the Middle East or in Southern Europe as domestic workers; elderly 
shopkeepers spontaneously sharing their past migration experiences; or rural children who are 
beneficiaries of development projects describing to me their family situations with either one or 
both parents living abroad. In a nutshell, with an exceptionally high number of international 
migrants, Moldova constitutes an interesting case for studying migration – a fairyland for 
migrant researchers so to speak. Hence, it surprises me that Moldova is also somewhat of a black 
hole in the European map of migration studies, with the exception of the topics of financial 
remittances and the 'children left behind'.   
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 These brief remarks on the discursive and geographical background of my thesis form the 
starting point for the overview of my research design and the relevance of the research topic. 
 
1.2 Research Structure, Main Aims and Key Research Questions 
 
1.2.1 Main aims and overall research structure  
On a meta-level, the thesis seeks to contribute a better understanding of the relationship 
between transnationalism and transformation in the intra-European migration context. 
The main aim of this thesis is to capture the complex picture of representations and negotiations 
of Moldovan migrants’ collective involvement in development initiatives among migrants and 
among development actors, and to get a better understanding of the ways in which the 
relationships between the two are shaped in practice. 
 I explore Moldovan migrant associations’ development-oriented activities and their 
involvement with the development establishment by drawing upon a multi-perspective and 
multi-dimensional approach, and a set of qualitative research methods. The overall thesis 
structure consists of a triad of three main research dimensions, on which my analytical 
framework is subsequently built. Figure 1.2 shows my overarching research design. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Overall research rationale 
Within this triad, I seek to hear the polyphonic voices of all actors involved in order to reflect 
upon migrants’ involvement in development initiatives and to assess their mutual relationships. 
I aim to understand the multiple subjectivities that all actors involved bring forward within the 
three different dimensions as a collage of a variety of scales: individual, organisational and the 
policy level. I analyse both sets of actors, the migrant civil society and the development actors6, 
                                                          
6 I define the official international development aid system (Development) as ‘a chosen array of policies, interests, 
procedures, relationships and resources that form a system dedicated to international development cooperation’ 
(Fowler 2005: 1). By ‘development actors’ I mean all individuals and institutions that act with the intention to 
contribute to development. This includes governmental departments for international development, including the 
Moldovan government, multilateral agencies and international and local development organisations (NGOs).  
 
Dimension 2:  transnational field of 
development actors 
 
Dimension 3: aid-relationship dynamics 
Dimension 1: transnational field 
of Moldovan migrants 
6 
 
as non-static entities, underlining their own dynamics and multiple rationalities and belief 
systems. To this end, I conceptualise both actors as multi-sited, multi-layered and multi-scaled 
transnational social fields, spanning across a variety of time-space contexts. Thus, my research 
is highly transnational and constructed within a multi-sited approach, as I will trace the 
transnational social field within which migrants appear not as foreigners to be differentiated, or 
natives in a specific geographical context, but as actors that connect one another through their 
collective engagement with transnational development processes and policies. Consistent with 
my research triad, the main aim of the thesis is disaggregated into the three research 
dimensions. 
Dimension 1:  the transnational field of Moldovan migrants 
In the first and central dimension of this thesis I aim to identify what visions of Moldova’s 
transformation migrant associations support, whose interest these visions serve and how they 
are negotiated among migrant leaders. By assessing how collective social interventions of 
migrants are performed in practice, I bear in mind that these might depend on the migrants’ 
overall socio-economic situation and degree of incorporation in the receiving societies. 
Furthermore, through the examination of migrants’ viewpoints on their contribution to 
Moldova’s transformation, I am particularly interested in gaining new insights into the 
transnational development practices of migrants that exist, but which have thus far escaped the 
interest of official development actors. Therefore, I engage with a heterogeneous sample of 
collectively engaged migrants, beyond the ‘best and brightest’ migrants who commonly feature 
in research on migrants’ development-oriented activities in other geographical contexts. That 
being said, the subjects of my study are also those migrants and associations who ‘do not do 
development’ according to the development discourse; the habitually ‘silent members’ of the 
Moldovan migrant community – the low-skilled migrants. In a more literary style, besides 
Favell’s ‘Eurostars’ (2008a) – the highly skilled free-movers between the ‘Eurocities’, I equally 
encompass the invisible stars, who do not shine in the skies over the ‘Eurocities’ in this thesis – 
Brussels, London, Paris, or Rome – but who are nevertheless there, as distant stars for family 
members and vulnerable groups in Moldova.  
Dimension 2: the transnational field of development actors  
Although there exists a considerable strand of anthropological and sociological literature on the 
mobile international humanitarian professionals working in developing countries (e.g. 
Bergmann 2003; Fechter 2012), the aid-practitioners’ accounts on my research topic have been 
strikingly absent in the debate so far. The ‘key development actor’ of the migration–
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development debate is often narrowed down to a set of impersonal policy documents produced 
by large multinational development agencies and to broader development theories (cf. de Haas 
2010). Therefore, ‘the key development actor’ is often rather a ‘discursive object’ than a 
‘subject’. Guided by my bottom-up research rationale of multiplicity, and by my ethnographic 
approach, I engage in the second research dimension with the lens of development policy 
makers and aid-practitioners working in international or local development agencies in Western 
European headquarters or in Moldova7. I explore their viewpoints on migrants’ development 
initiatives, so as to get a better picture of how Moldovan migrant associations are imagined and 
constructed as agents of transformation of their home country, and how these imaginations are 
translated into concrete policy-actions and programmes in Moldova.  
Dimension 3:  the aid-relationship dynamics 
In my view, the life-worlds of the two social actors, the migrants and development actors, have 
been conceptually kept for too long as ‘worlds apart’. These life-worlds, I assert, unfold most 
expressively in their micro-relationships in joint development settings. With this in mind, I seek 
to get a better knowledge of the relationship patterns between the two social actors as they 
unfold in concrete development practice. By addressing both the discursive level and the level 
of actual everyday development practice, I aim to trace the discrepancies between the dominant 
policy discourse and the practices of integrating migrants’ development efforts into the 
professional field of development.  
1.2.2 Key research questions 
In accordance with the three research dimensions, the three overarching research questions 
guiding my ethnographic research ask: 
Dimension 1:  the transnational field of Moldovan migrants 
How is the development policy and practice of actively involving migrants in development 
efforts perceived and negotiated among Moldovan migrants? 
 
The sub-questions in this first research dimension are: 
· What are migrants’ visions of Moldova’s transformation? 
· Who is engaged on a voluntary basis in collective transnational social practices regarding 
age, education and gender?  
· How do migrants define their role as agents of transformative change in Moldova? 
                                                          
7 My understanding of development practitioners and aid-workers follows that of Rosalind Eyben: "Development 
practitioners are people working in the international development sector – in bilateral and multilateral agencies, in 
international NGO, as staff member or consultant. They might be also located in a private sector consulting company 
or a philanthropic foundation" (2006: 4). 
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· What forms of collective transnational engagement do migrant associations implement, 
and how are these forms shaped by migrants’ everyday lives? 
· If the associations and networks are involved in development initiatives, how do they decide 
about strategic and organisational matters with regard to their concrete involvement in 
development donor programmes? 
 
Dimension 2:  the transnational field of development actors  
How is the ‘policy idea’ of involving migrants and their organisations imagined within the 
transnational field of development? 
 
· How do development actors (including local NGOs and the Moldovan state) view migrants 
and their associations; their activities, members and their role as development actors? 
· Are they seen as partners or beneficiaries?  
· How is the policy category of migrants’ involvement negotiated and sustained among 
development policy makers and practitioners? 
 
Dimension 3: the aid-relationship dynamics 
How are the aid-relationships between migrants and development actors shaped in 
practice? 
 
Here, I put a special emphasis on the degree of migrants’ integration into the development 
field. In line with Faist, who states that “only by integrating migrants into policy circuits on 
various governance levels can the migrants’ potential in terms of remittances and solidarity be 
realised” (2007: 15), I ask: 
· How are migrants integrated into the field of transnational development policy? 
· How do migrants and development actors experience their collaborations? 
· Are migrants and their associations just ‘invited’ to participate or do they have influence on 
the decision-making processes of development policies and initiatives? 
 
With these questions in mind, I turn to the next section, in which I highlight the relevance of my 
research topic.  
 
1.3 Relevance of the Research Topic 
The statement that Moldova is not exactly a press darling can also be applied to the broader 
academic world across the humanities and social sciences. As we are at the 25th anniversary of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union at the time of writing, numerous books and edited collections 
on post-socialism are hot off the press, but one usually fails to find any contributions on 
Moldova. Moreover, the topic of migration more broadly is often absent in ethnographies of 
post-communist transformation.  
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Moldovan migration is also commonly missing in collective contributions on current 
dynamics and transformations of intra-European East-West migration in the post-communist 
era – such as on topics of circular migration within the EU and between the EU and its Eastern 
neighbours (e.g. Triandafyllidou 2013). As a non-member of the European Union, Moldova is 
also absent in the dynamic and fast-growing field of migration research on EU post-accession 
migration from Central and Eastern Europe8 (e.g. Engbersen and Snel 2013; Glorius et al. 2013, 
among others). In short, Moldova has largely escaped the attention of qualitative migration 
researchers, and current Moldovan migrant realities remain in many ways unexplored. 
As in other Eastern European countries, most of the studies completed before the 
enlargement of the European Union focused mainly on large-scale demographic trends or the 
political framing of migration, and less had been undertaken on the micro, ethnographic level 
(Favell 2008b). Additionally, until now, research on Moldovan migration has covered a very 
limited range, and has focused almost exclusively, on the above-mentioned topics of children 
left behind (e.g. Robila 2014; Vanore et al. 2015) and on financial remittances with a quantitative 
approach (e.g. Mahmoud et al. 2013; Piracha and Saraogi 2012). Both have been a constant 
academic and political fixture for some time now. Besides these aspects of Moldovan migration, 
we know very little about the Moldovan migrants’ everyday experiences, their potential agency 
and their cross-border social ties spanning between the Western and Southern European 
destination countries and Moldova. That being said, I attempt to connect areas of study, which 
have remained seperate, notably Moldovan migrants’ everyday lives, which I consider central 
for understanding migrants’ transnational engagements, and the migrants' impact on Moldova’s 
transformation. I aim to bring a fresh look at Moldovan migration beyond the dominant research 
focus on remittances and children left behind.  
Because migration is a dominant feature of contemporary Moldova, there has been a 
considerable interest in the country in migration–development programmes within the 
framework of the ‘Extended Mobility Partnership in the EU-Neighbourhood Area’. Currently, 
Moldova is the country with the highest number of EU migration-development initiatives (EU 
2013a). In the words of a research participant working for the EU: "In Moldova we gained the 
most experiences – it's our test case". Furthermore, since the year 2005, the support of migrant 
associations is one of the priority areas of the migration-development component within the 
European Union (EU 2013a), with Moldova being a priority country. In this context, Moldova and 
its development partners have recently started to launch ‘diaspora-building’ activities of 
‘accessing’ and ‘mobilising’ migrant associations’ activities for Moldova’s national development 
                                                          
8 The countries are those included in the EU’s enlargements in 2004 and 2007, also referred to as the ‘EU-10’: 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
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strategies. During my fieldwork stay in Moldova there was a dynamic process of ‘top-down’ 
‘diaspora-building’ efforts. This turns the Republic of Moldova into an ideal case study for 
exploring aid-relationship dynamics between migrants and international development actors. 
Initiatives to engage migrant associations as new international development partners are, 
however, based on limited knowledge. Little has been written on post-socialist or post-
communist countries in respect to transnational collective activities carried out by migrants in 
general and on Moldovan migrant associations in particular (cf. Vullnetari and King 2011). 
Presently, there are three pieces of research on specific aspects of Moldovan migrant 
associations available. The first one is a comparative study focusing on associations based in 
Italy, Israel and Russia (Schwartz 2007), commissioned by IOM Moldova. The second study 
focuses on the top-down state-led mobilisation of the scientific diaspora, which addresses the 
‘knowledge-transfer’ between migrants and the Moldovan scientific community (Varzari et al. 
2014). The third study maps more broadly the Moldovan migrant community, and partially 
encompasses migrant associations (Cheianu-Andrei 2013). 
In general, the academic focus on transnationalism and development so far has mostly been 
on the diffusion of development practices between Western European countries and the U.S.A. 
on the one hand, and less developed African, Caribbean and Asian countries on the other 
(Grabowska and Garapich 2016). Due to the tight conceptual relationship between the social 
remittances literature and the ‘migration–development nexus’, social development practices 
contributing to the transformation in migrants’ countries of origin within Europe have received 
much less attention (cf. Vianello 2013b). However, according to Castles, “The notion of social 
transformation signifies profound structural modifications of social relations” (2016: 19). This 
transformation in the context of CEE countries from communist and centrally planned 
economies to democratic systems with free market conditions is geographically uneven, with 
some ‘leftovers’ from the communist era, and with delayed convergence with Western 
democratic countries in many spheres of life. These conditions can create context-dependent 
gaps for social remittances which can be captured in transnational social spaces (Faist 2000) or 
transnational social fields (Glick Schiller 2005), for instance within the Moldovan migrant 
community in Western European countries.  
Furthermore, besides the lack of research on the topic of ‘mobilising’ migrants from this 
geographical context in regard to their capacities to become ‘voluntary or professional 
development workers’, there is also a research gap in the area of specific historical and cultural 
aspects. For example, there is a void in taking into account that, in contrast to other post-
communist countries, Moldova was never an independent state prior to the dissolution of the 
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Soviet Union in 1991. How a fairly new national script shapes the enrolment of migrants in 
national development efforts remains unexplored. 
By and large, the academic literature focuses on well-established migrant communities – as 
there is a common assumption that only well-established migrant communities of a large size 
maintain transnational collective practices worth studying. For instance, numerous studies exist 
of co-development projects, in the cases of migrant communities with a longer migration history 
and larger emigration populations – e.g. Nigeria, Morocco, the Philippines or Mexico, among 
many others (e.g. Østergaard-Nielson 2011). Another research strand focuses on migration 
communities that some migrant researchers rightly or wrongly label as ‘culturally highly 
associative', for instance Ghanaian migrants. The Moldovan migrant community does not fall 
under these categories. Therefore, how the somewhat optimistic view surrounding diaspora-led 
development policies and programs works in practice with less established, less experienced, 
and smaller communities like the Moldovan migrant community, has been sidelined thus far.  
Moreover, besides the topic of ‘the children left behind’, the current discourse on the topic 
of migration and development in Moldova is highly constructed from an economic perspective 
(Lücke et al. 2007). Some authors stress the need to better understand the social dimensions of 
migration, such as migrants’ collective social forms, that this relatively new intra-European 
migration has taken, or the impact of emigration on the social fabric of Moldova more broadly 
(cf. Pinger 2009). I attempt to fill this research gap by bringing forward the micro dimension of 
Moldovan migration, like the migrant’s own perspective on the broader migration–development 
debate. I assert that, in the light of new development policy trends, such as the ‘migration-
centred approach’, this bottom-up approach becomes even more relevant.  
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the relationship dynamics between migrants and development 
agencies in concrete aid-practices have been largely absent in the dominant top-down approach 
in much research on the role of migrant associations in the migration–development nexus. This 
is an area where little empirical work has been done on the ethnographic level (Mullings 2012).  
Ultimately, I argue that with the exception of particular geographical contexts, for instance 
Caribbean or African migration (e.g. Lacroix 2016; Mercer et al. 2009), there are only a few 
studies that take a transnational approach of exploring empirically migrants’ development 
interventions in their countries of origin. The majority of research addressing migrant 
associations and their border-spanning activities is either conducted within wider studies of 
migrant transnationalism, and therefore does not constitute a specific focus, or it evolves from 
research that concentrates on migrants' associational life in the receiving societies (e.g. 
Pirkkalainen et al. 2013). 
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1.4 Thesis Outline  
The thesis is structured in nine chapters. In Chapters 1-3, the research rationale, context, 
methods and key theoretical concepts are introduced. This is followed by two longer mixed 
chapters of both background description and my own empirical material. In Chapter 4, I engage 
with Moldova’s development transition, and with three interacting key-factors that set 
Moldova’s development transition apart from other former Soviet countries: the country’s mass 
emigration, its complex identity building, and its slow social and economic development. I also 
illustrate how the migrants’ experiences of the Soviet era and the country's current marginalised 
place in Europe shape migrants’ development activities. In Chapter 5, I address in more detail 
the main characteristics of current Moldovan emigration and its potential impacts on migrants’ 
collective development efforts. In the Chapters 6-8 I discuss my findings around the three main 
research dimensions. Firstly, in Chapter 6 I debate the role of migrant associations as 
transnational actors in promoting positive change in Moldova and the evolving policy strategies 
of Moldova and its key-development actors towards its emigrants. In Chapter 7 I analyse how 
migrants’ collective transnational development practices are performed in practice. The focus of 
Chapter 8 is put on the micro-relationship dynamics between migrants and aid-agencies in joint 
development settings. Finally, I move to the conclusion and discussion in Chapter 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
In this chapter I situate my research in its theoretical terrain by providing an overview of the key 
concepts I will subsequently apply. I engage with the growing literature on the relationship 
between migrants’ transnational practices and transnational power hierarchies, highlighting the 
role of international development, policy discourses and initiatives. The three main sections of 
the chapter are consistent with the overall theoretical framework located at the intersection of 
three interrelated bodies of literature. The first section deals with the broader discourse on the 
migration–development nexus. Secondly, I look at the literature that conceptualises migration 
and transformation as a social process. This is followed by an analysis of the contributions of 
scholars to the study of migrants’ transnational social activities. Here I explore the way that the 
analytical concept of transnationalism contributes to a deeper understanding of the pathways 
connecting the actors within and between the two transnational social fields; the migrant civil 
society and international development. The illustration below gives a schematic overview of the 
main structure of theoretical framework:  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework 
 
 
Migration and Development: the 
current policy discourse: political 
and ideological shifts, theoretical 
discursive shifts 
 Breaking out of linear views: 
social dimensions of migration 
and transformation; looking out 
and going beyond the ‘discursive 
subjects’ of the migration-
development discourse 
Breaking out of dichotomic 
views: the transnational lens 
in migration studies; 
transnational social practices  
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2.1 The Rise of the Celebatory Discourse of Migrants’ Collective Engagement in Development 
 
Recent years have seen a growing interest from academic researchers in a range of disciplines, 
such as geography, anthropology, and economics, as well as from development policy-makers, 
into the linkages between migration and development. My overarching research focus is 
situated in this theoretical landscape. I first address the rise of the newly discovered interest in 
the role of migrants and their associations as transnational subjects.  Second, I briefly sketch the 
state-of-the-art on the rapidly evolving debate on migration and development. To this end, I 
draw on theoretical approaches within the broader academic literature on the migration–
development nexus, on the analytical concept of transnationalism and on theories of 
development.  
 
2.1.1 Theoretical discursive shifts 
After an earlier phase of neoclassical economic optimism about the migration–development 
nexus in the 1950s and 1960s, a considerable pessimism in the 1970s and 1980s, mostly 
expressed by the emigration of the skilled or ‘brain drain’, was predominant in the discussions 
on the topic of migration and development (de Haas 2012). Migration in this latter optic was 
believed to mainly increase inequality in sending countries and communities because migrants 
tended to be skilled, employed and better educated. Consequently, remittances and other 
benefits of migration also disproportionally accrued to the already better-off (Portes 2009). 
Additionally, international migration was considered a sign of development failure. From this 
perspective, migration was conceptualised as “a territorial or geographical exit upon failure of 
the state or other institutions to deliver well-being and human security” (Faist 2008: 22). 
In the late-1990s, after this sceptical period, governments from the Global South and North 
and international aid-agencies began to place renewed hope in migrants as their ‘new partners 
and shareholders’ in development (de Haas 2010). This has coincided with the rediscovery of 
remittances as a ‘bottom-up’ source of development finance, and of migrants’ development 
contributions by means of skill transfers (Le Bras 2012). This shift is well illustrated in the change 
of language used for skilled migrants; from ‘brain waste’, ‘brain drain’, or le pillage des cerveaux 
(the pillaging of brains), to 'brain gain', 'knowledge-circulation' or ‘skill transfer’. As Raghuram 
puts it “[…] migration has been rediscovered as a key intervention apparatus in facilitating 
development, offering a route to mitigating deepening inequalities” (2009: 103). The 
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rediscovered policy and academic interest in migration’s positive role for development is usually 
highlighted by an illustration of numerous conferences and reports on the theme, and has 
increasingly become a 'development-migration machinery' (Raghuram 2009). Examples of this 
‘machinery’ include the establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development in 
2009 and the UN Human Development Report on Mobility and Development in the same year 
(Piper 2009). 
De Haas (2010) maintains that this positive interpretation of the migration–development 
nexus should also be seen as a part of a more general paradigm shift in social and development 
studies. He maintains that the emphasis within social theory is focused on ‘agency theories’, 
meaning that individuals are seen as capable to diversify, secure and improve their livelihood 
and to overcome structural barriers to development. This leads to a more optimistic assessment 
of migrants’ development potential. Also, this shift means that there is a certain discredit of the 
structuralist approach. Regarding development, this leads to a less negative interpretation of 
dependency and to a more positive value of the global incorporation process of regions and 
countries in the Global South – a process of which migration is an integral part (de Haas 2012). 
A number of conditionalities, however, have to be met in order for migrants’ economic and 
social remittances to effect positive transformations in migrant-sending countries (e.g. Lampert 
2014; Skeldon 2012).  
 This paradigm shift in social and development studies has provoked a lively academic debate 
about the overall role of migrants and their newly imposed responsibilities for development of 
their home countries on the one hand, and a robust critique about the neglect of institutional 
structures on the other (e.g. Glick Schiller 2012; Vammen and Brønden 2012). It has been argued 
that migrants’ initiatives are added values, but not a substitute for aid, and that they should not 
be a compensation for developmental mismanagement and global inequalities (Castles and 
Miller 2009; Lampert 2014; Skeldon 2008, to name a few). Other critical voices have added that 
there is also a ‘moralistic overtone’ of the assumption that migrants should support their 
nation’s development (Bakewell 2007: 33), especially taking into account the fact that they often 
experience de-skilling, low-waged work and racism in the receiving countries.  
 In sum, collective migrant actors such as migrant associations have come to increasingly 
occupy the imagination of both academics and development policy-makers as a result of a shift 
in more recent years in the broader theoretical discussion on the topic of migration and 
development: from a negative perception of migration to the view that migration is a positive 
contribution to development. 
Yet, the bipolar terminology of phrases such as ‘impact of migration on development’, or 
'contribution to development', has been increasingly criticised as reifying migration theoretically 
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as something separate from development, or as a 'thing apart' that can be used to promote 
development (Skeldon 2012). Rather than looking at migration separately as an independent 
variable, in the sense of being ‘cause’ or 'outcome', it should be viewed as “[…] an endogenous 
variable, an integral part of change itself and a factor that may enable further change” (de Haas 
2010: 253). Reflecting on this, I opt for a conceptual approach that underlines the mutual 
interconnection between migration and transformation to explore migrants’ transnational 
development engagements. This means I view migrants’ transnational practices as stimulated 
and fostered by many of the globalisation processes to be found in the broader literature on 
globalisation. In turn, as Vertovec (2009) states: "[…] such transnational migrant practices 
accumulate to augment and perhaps amplify such transformational processes themselves" 
(2009: 161). Entangled with this view, Faist (2007) argues that there is currently a semantic 
change in viewing not only remittances and return migration as a way of transferring resources 
across borders, but that the migrants themselves are increasingly painted as ‘mobile persons’ – 
travelling back and forth. He goes on to say that: “All of the new terms such as co-development 
point to the emergence of new transnational agents, such as migrant associations whose 
members may be engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border practices […], the story is 
not about migration and development anymore, but about transnationalism” (2007: 9).  
 On a meso-scale, migrant associations have come to increasingly occupy the imagination of 
both academics and development policy-makers in the positive interpretation of the broader 
migration–development nexus. I further use the term migrant associations throughout the 
thesis to refer to “those associations, both formal and informal, set up by migrants that relate 
to a village, town, a region or Moldova as a country” (Mazzucato and Kabki 2009: 232). Second, 
I define a migrant association when at least half of its members or half of its board members are 
of Moldovan migrant origin (either foreign-born themselves or having at least one foreign-born 
parent, thus including first and second generations). By informal networks, I refer to those 
migrant collectives which have no name or constitution, that do not charge membership fees, 
and that have relatively loose connections among their members. Lacroix (2009) uses the term 
‘development networks’ in a similar way, to describe migrant organisations involved in projects 
for the improvement of villages of origin. These networks are made up of highly diverse 
structures, “from informal groups of individuals from the same village, to genuine migrant NGOs 
[…] with same forms of leadership and the same ability to articulate the discourse and adapt the 
sense of international development” (Lacroix 2009: 1666).  
 One of the main reasons for the increased interest in migrant associations and networks as 
actors of social change in the context of transnationalism is that they are increasingly perceived 
as transnational grassroots organisations representing local communities (Smith and Guarnizo 
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1998). The overall recognition that transnational networks are also produced by multiple actors 
‘from below’ has made other types of organisation visible, including the ‘migrant civil society’ 
and the ‘diasporic civil society’ (Portes et al. 1999). From this theoretical perspective, migrant 
associations are viewed as members of ‘transnational civil society’, and they have become a 
familiar motif in debates in geography, anthropology and development studies, where a spatial 
framework that privileges the transnational is commonly deployed (Mullings 2012). In Mullings’ 
words: “associations of transnational migrants, the building blocks of ‘migrant civil society’ and 
‘diasporic civil society’, seem to fit neatly into this imagined geography of transnational civil 
society” (2012: 423).  
Furthermore, a considerable number of anthropological studies since the late 1990s 
addressed the topic of the economic and social importance of migrants’ individual and collective 
engagement with families and communities back home. In the last decade, great emphasis has 
been placed on studies that address migrant associations and their transnational activities 
within the wider research context of migrant transnationalism. In Faist’s opinion: “Most 
empirical studies on transnationalisation and development from a sociological or 
anthropological point of view focus on association and organisations, a line of research which 
needs to be continued” (Faist 2007: 11). My intention is to continue this line of research, 
focusing on collective transnational practices as my main unit of analysis within both fields: the 
transnational social field of migrants, and the transnational development field.  
 
2.1.2 Political and ideological shifts 
 
The optimistic perspective on the development potential of migration has also a strong 
ideological and normative dimension (Faist 2008). It is commonly known that any shifts in the 
ideological underpinnings of social and economic policies in the donor countries are usually 
bound to spill over to principles of aid. The regime of management, for instance, has become 
the leading semantics of and for the social, including the spheres of international social 
development and migration. In Foucault’s (2000) opinion, managerialism can be seen as the 
dominant form of governmentality, that is a conglomerate of techniques and rationalities for 
ruling others and the self. The political tendency of managerialism and neoliberalism towards 
privatisation of social welfare and social services has meant that concepts such as 'community', 
'civil society' and ‘participation’ have become a principle of Development. De Haas (2010) argues 
that the rise in interest in migrant associations constitutes an expression of this privatisation 
trend known as the self-help principle. As civil society actors, the migrant associations fit well 
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within this current development paradigm advocated by governments and large development 
agencies.  
 Moreover, there is also a normative dimension in the discourse surrounding migrants’ 
collective development initiatives, namely that networks and associations are considered to 
have a wider social impact on development of the countries of origin, than the purely ‘private’ 
remittances sent home to family members (Newland 2010b; IOM and MPI 2012). The dominant 
development policy discourse assumes that values need to be changed among migrants in order 
to persuade people to get more involved ‘collectively’ into ‘development-shaped engagements’, 
rather than to invest solely in their ‘private family matters’ (cf. Lampert 2012). Migrants are 
expected to become members of associations that do not directly benefit families and friends, 
that operate without a commercial gain and are not intended to achieve political power 
(Mullings 2012). To quote a publication on this topic: “Private remittances are largely used for 
short-term, daily consumption rather than productive investments that can fuel sustainable 
economic growth” (IOM and MPI 2012: 131).  
Lastly, the underlying normative politics are also evident in the current discourse of 
‘consequentialism’ or ‘root causes’ within development studies, which argues that the lack of 
development in the South or East can lead to undesirable immigration to countries in the North 
(Duffield 2006). In these terms, underdevelopment is viewed as a security threat for developed 
countries. Fuelled with an increasing anti-immigration public discourse in Western Europe, 
development aid funds are increasingly used to ‘contain’ migration flows from the Global South 
(Hettne 2009). That being said, apart from the outlined ideological underpinnings of social and 
economic policies in the donor countries, principles of aid in regard to migration are also 
embedded within the broader migration policies of donor countries. According to Laveneux and 
Kunz (2008), migration–development policies were introduced as an instrument of migration 
policy rather than the other way around. This means that development policies are not to 
disturb broader migration policies of a receiving country.  
  
2.1.3 The latest trends: disrupting the development mantra with ‘different kinds of dialogues’ 
 
I find it a challenging task to follow up the rapidly evolving discussion surrounding the migration–
development discourse and the development policy approaches on the issue. In this subsection, 
I provide a brief overview of the most important new trends in the practical and theoretical 
framings of the issue.  
 Some scholars have recently taken a position of moving away from the above-described 
optimistic view of the migration–development nexus, while key development actors continue to 
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view migration as positive for development. One of these more sceptical scholars is de Haas who 
maintains: “Now that the migration and development pendulum has swung from sheer 
optimism to sheer pessimism and back again, it is time to nudge it steadily towards the middle” 
(2012: 22). Indeed, there has been recently a ‘nudging’ of the pendulum in terms of setting 
expectations of migrants' engagement for development right. Drawing from my primary 
ethnographic data, I argue in Chapter 8 that one reason for adjusting the expectations is the 
development practitioners’ ‘first practical experiences’ made with migrants as their partners in 
joint project and programme settings. So far, this standpoint has been neglected in the debate. 
Partly, this is because the aid-practitioners’ viewpoints on migrant associations’ involvement 
into aidland have been absent in the dominant top-down approach in much research on the 
topic9. Nevertheless, programme descriptions and strategy papers of international and bilateral 
agencies highlight a substantial growth of interest in the migration–development field, including 
in migrant association-led policies. This is articulated with a higher priority given to the topic 
within development strategies of numerous bilateral and international development 
organisations, as well as with a rise in budgets for migration–development programmes (e.g. EU 
2013b; EU/UNDP 2013; SDC 2014). My key argument is that the ‘nudging of the pendulum’ or 
even a ‘backswing towards pessimistic views’ among scholars does not necessarily reduce the 
interest of development actors in the migration development field. This observation contradicts 
scholars who proclaim that the overall boom in migration and development is over, and that the 
peak of interest in the migration–development discourse has passed (e.g. Vammen and Brønden 
2012). Rather, I argue that the ‘nudging of the pendulum’ points to an overdue shift of 
conceptual, geographical and thematic perspectives taken by multilateral organisations, 
governments and development agencies on migration and development, that coincides with a 
recent overall paradigm shift in international development, which I outline below.  
 Firstly, In Chambers’ (2012) opinion, after a period in which diversity and downward 
accountability, expressed for instance with participatory aid-practices, has gained some terrain, 
the current nomos of the transnational field of development is increasingly ‘delivery oriented’ 
and organised according to the principle of ‘value for money’. This discourse and practice of 
international mainstream development is top-down with strong control measurements, 
standardisation and upward accountability. It mainly focuses on ‘things’ – infrastructure or 
regional administrational support, and less on ‘people’. This shift can also be observed in the 
analytical approach of the migration–development nexus, in which currently a change of 
                                                          
9 With the exception of some mandated studies (e.g. DFID 2007; de Haas 2006) and studies on co-development 
projects in which the institutionalised dialogue between migrant associations and development NGOs – almost 
exclusively in the receiving context – has been examined (e.g. Marini 2014; Østergaard-Nielson 2011).  
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concepts, language, values, and methods can be observed (e.g. EU/UNDP 2013). From the years 
2000 to 2011 the main focus of most migration–development programmes was put on what is 
commonly known as the development mantra (Kapur 2004): remittances, diasporas as actors 
for home country development, circular migration and brain-gain programmes (including return 
programmes) (e.g. EU 2011; SDC 2014). Most programmes implemented in the Moldovan 
migration–development field are still inscribed in this ‘mantra’. At the moment of this writing, 
however, we find ourselves on the discursive level in the so-called ‘broadening the traditional 
agenda’ (EU 2011: 1), or ‘the way forward: beyond the traditional agenda’ (EU 2011: 1). The idea 
of this new agenda is to move from the dominant focus on remittances to the social and human 
impact of migration and on migrants, their families and communities by applying the ‘migrant 
centred-approach’ (EU 2013b). This agenda includes: addressing the needs created by 
emigration flows in countries of origin, protecting human rights of migrants during their transit 
process, and South-South migration, among others (EU 2013bc).  
 The focus on ‘things’ rather than ‘people’ comes along with the approach of engaging non-
state actors in aid modalities for better development outcomes and governance, commonly 
known as the ‘multi-stakeholder approach’, as well as with de-centralisation programmes 
(Eyben 2013; EU/UNDP 2013; SDC 2014). An illustrative example for this trend is the second 
programme-launch of the EU-UNDP ‘Joint Migration and Development initiative’ aimed at 
strengthening the contribution of migrants to development by reinforcing its local dimension, in 
which migrant associations and networks are planned to figure as policy consultants for regional 
administrations (EU/UNDP 2014). The shift back to the ‘regions’ and the ‘migrant-centred 
approach’ is accompanied with new programmes that can be summarised as 'Know before you 
go' services. These are support measures for potential migrants that prepare and inform them 
prior to their departure, so that they can migrate ‘cheaper’ and ‘safer’ and consequently ‘return 
better and smarter’ (e.g. EU 2013a). This tendency demonstrates that the previous sedentary 
bias à la ‘keep the people where they are’, practised by aid-agencies, is slightly changing (cf. 
Bakewell 2007)10. Yet, as I will show in Chapter 8, migrants’ distance to Moldova and its key-
development partners and their corresponding attributed role, either as partners, beneficiaries 
or as consultants, is more contested in development practices than commonly assumed in the 
migration–development policy literature (e.g. UNDP 2012).  
 Another trend is to interrupt the Development Mantra of remittances, skill transfers, 
diaspora and return through various types of dialogues with migrants: the systematic dialogue 
                                                          
10 My personal perception of the current European public and policy discourse surrounding the so-called ‘refugee 
crisis’ and ‘security concerns’ is that governmental aid-provisions are once again increasingly legitimised by keeping 
people where they are.  
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(IASCI/Nexus 2014); the structured dialogue (SDC 2014); the positive dialogues (EU 2013a); the 
constant dialogue (EU/UNDP 2011); the South-South dialogue (GFMD 2011); or a continued 
dialogue (BRD 2014), to name a few. Some aid-agencies also support others in their dialogues 
with migrants. The SDC for instance, seeks to help shape the political dialogue on migration at 
the international level (SDC 2014). However, In the course of my research, when exploring the 
aid-relationship patterns between migrants and aid-workers in concrete real-life situations, for 
instance in workshops and meetings, I came to understand that there is much talking about 
migrants and very few talking with migrants. In Jean-Paul Sartre’s words it is rather a ‘dialogue 
of mutes’.  
 To summarise this brief outlook on the newest round of the migration–development nexus; 
the two essential new characteristics are a less ‘euro-centric’ focus, and an enhanced ‘migrant-
centred’ approach. It will be interesting to follow how these new aid-approaches trickle down 
into migration-development practice in the near future.  
 
2.2 Looking Out and Going Beyond Linear Views: The Social Dimension of Migration and 
Transformation 
 
In this section I remain within the broader theoretical framework of the migration–development 
discourse, and I opt for a multi-perspective and processual definition of both social phenomena 
– migration and transformation. In line with various authors stressing that migration and 
transformation have not been separately analysed sufficiently within the migration–
development nexus (e.g. Glick Schiller 2012), or that the social dimension of migration and 
development has been neglected in the current economic and positive approach (e.g. Raghuram 
2009), I focus on the social perspective of the migration–development nexus. I interrogate the 
predominantly linear economic (and managerial) assumptions behind this discussion by defining 
migration and development as a co-involved social process, and by reintroducing migrants’ own 
perspective on the topic. 
 
2.2.1 The social dimension of migration: blurring binary categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migration  
 
In general, the migration and development discussion is still dominated by the deep-rooted 
belief that economic growth can deliver social justice and development (Matsas 2008). From 
this perspective, mainstream development actors view migration chiefly from a financial, 
controllable and linear viewpoint – as an option for national economic improvement. Moreover, 
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even if migrants are seen now as ‘subjects’, rather than ‘objects’, they are still predominantly 
viewed as economic actors in the sense of a ‘homo oeconomicus’, and only to a lesser extent as 
socio-political actors (Raghuram 2009). This means that the main migration driver is usually 
limited to the improvement of migrants’ income (Matsas 2008). Furthermore, migration is 
perceived as something that can be under all circumstances globally contained, controlled and 
‘managed’ (Matsas 2008). In that sense, migration has become in mainstream development 
practice, or what Foucault calls ‘a political technology: used to manage and control processes’ 
(2000: 58). In de Haas’ opinion (2010) one reason for this still-present one-dimensional 
economic viewpoint on the migration–development nexus is that the current positive economic 
debate has evolved rather separately from general migration theory. That being said, drawing 
from migration theories, I emphasise the social dimension of migration and I place the migrants 
and their experiences as knowledge producers at the centre of the debate. I point to social 
dimensions that are marginalised in the lens of the positive view and excluded in economic 
considerations, such as migrants’ transnational community structures as well as social and 
cultural aspects shaping their transnational development interventions. More specifically, I first 
consider the social dimension of migration as referring to the 'social developmental dimension', 
which is related to issues such as the accumulation of social or human capital that migrants may 
gain through the migration process itself, or by means of their transnational development 
practices (e.g. Piper 2009; Østergaard-Nielson 2011). Second, I reflect on the generational and 
other relations such as gender relations, as part of the social dimensions that are often neglected 
in the positivist view of the migration–development nexus in general, and in studies of migrant 
association-led development in particular (Dannecker 2009; Vullnetari and King 2011). The 
advantage of my bottom-up approach, that brings forward the micro and ethnographic 
dimension of migrants’ transnationalism, is exactly to generate dynamic processes, such as 
generational or gender aspects and ‘temporalities’ in regard to migrants’ trajectories which are 
difficult to grasp with a simple quantitative query. 
Secondly, according to King (2012b) and (Sayad 1991), I conceptualise migration on a macro-
level beyond the typology of as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in terms of the dominant perception of 
‘migration as a problem’, but as an intrinsic element of globalisation itself, and as an integral 
part of broader social changes. Migration per se, however, is not a static social phenomenon. As 
Portes stresses: “Migration is, of course, change and it can lead, in turn, to further 
transformations in sending and receiving societies” (2010: 1544). From this perspective, I 
analyse Moldova’s large out-migration and its self-undermining dynamics, which affect the 
entire social fabric of the country and its capacity for transformative societal change. Another 
reason for conceptualising migration as an integral part of social transformation is given by the 
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geographical scope of my research. East-West migration flows within Europe are intrinsically 
linked with Eastern Europe’s post-communist political and economic transformations. As 
Engbersen et al. stress: “Once these countries embarked on a process of democratisation, 
economic reforms and European integration, the economic ‘earthquake’ determined by 
declining state subsidies and inflation ultimately led to the impoverishment of large cohorts of 
the population” (2010: 19). This is also true for the Republic of Moldova, even if the country is 
not (yet) fully integrated in the European Union. 
 Thirdly, Moldovan migration is diverse in terms of its migration patterns: such as permanent, 
temporary, circular, transnational and individual types of migration (Mosneaga 2012). As King 
(2012b) maintains, the dichotomised field of migration studies, inherent with artificial dualities 
of migration types, such as ‘temporary’ versus ‘permanent’ migration, needs to be blurred, as 
such dichotomies hinder a full understanding of migration. Drawing on this idea, I demonstrate 
in Chapter 5 that the temporality of Moldovan migration needs to be questioned in order to get 
a better understanding of the migrants’ collective transnational practices. Many Moldovan 
labour migrants, for instance, extend their stays for undefined periods for various personal or 
structural reasons, thus disrupting the classical binary categories of temporary versus long-term 
typologies of migration11. Furthermore, I argue that the Moldovan migrants’ ‘high intentionality’ 
of anticipated onward migration and/or return migration, strongly impacts upon migrants’ 
notions of attachment, their collective transnational social practices and their aspirations to 
become part of mainstream migration–development programmes. Hence, I conceptualise 
migration on an individual level as a dynamic ongoing process, taking into consideration that the 
meaning of migration is not fixed and the reality of migratory behaviour can be situational. As 
we shall see in Chapter 7, this is rightfully so for many Moldovan migrants; i.e. changing 
migration status from undocumented to documented, ‘constant re-orientation’ as a result of 
onward migration and changing life-situations. Therefore, I take into account that migration can 
vary over a lifetime between something that emerges out of desperation and lack of 
alternatives, something which is chosen in order to access money or for other individual reasons 
(Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Ossman 2013). Subsequently, I bear in mind that the frequency 
and intensity of migrant transnational collective practices can equally vary in response to 
different factors. These factors include time constraints, difficult financial circumstances, the 
                                                          
11 This also applies to Moldovan students and young professionals, who have not always a clear idea about their 
duration of stay. 
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lack of trust in institutions and people back ‘home’, and changing structural constraints in the 
receiving or sending context that can limit migrants’ transnational practices (e.g. Lacroix 2016; 
Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Pirkkalainen et al. 2013; Tilly 1978). Further, in Chapter 8 I consider in 
more detail the opportunity structures of the aid-industry, consisting of conventional 
mainstream development aid-practices, such as the ‘result-based’ and ‘delivery-oriented’ aid-
practices that can compromise migrants’ involvement in the development field and their access 
to symbolic, organisational and material resources within hierarchies of aidland. That being said, 
throughout the thesis, I intend to strike a balanced way of exploring Moldovan migrants’ 
transnational collective practices and their involvement in the development field through the 
lens of migrants’ individually lived experiences, cultural and social aspects, and structural 
aspects shaping migrant associations’ development efforts. 
Lastly, although I will trace the transnational social field within which migrants appear not as 
foreigners to be differentiated, or natives in a specific geographical context, but as actors that 
connect to one another through their collective engagement in transnational development 
processes and policies, I would like to note the definition I use for the normative and politically 
connoted concept of integration. I apply Berry’ s (1996) understanding of integration, as a social 
process divided into two dimensions, structural and socio-cultural integration. The structural 
dimension encompasses how migrants are integrated into societal structures (e.g. education, 
the labour market), and the social dimension refers to integration into the social networks of 
the majority population in the host society, including emotions of belonging. 
 
2.2.2 The social dimension of development transitions: what kind of transformation?  
 
Like migration, I view the collapse of the Soviet Union and Moldova’s ongoing transformation 
from a multi-disciplinary approach, thereby adding my voice to the call of other authors for such 
an approach in the study of transnationalism and transformation (Glick Schiller 2012; Vullnetari 
and King 2011, among others). I presently outline some of the literature on post-socialist 
transformations that deals with the fluid and contested nature of transformational change. 
Consistent with the literature on the anthropology and sociology of transition that generates 
discussions on the ways in which transition is talked about and negotiated, I include the 
perspective of migrants’ subjective experiences into the dominant macro-perspective of 
international development, consisting of structural adjustment, transitions to liberal market 
economies and so forth. Piper (2009) argues that if development means improved living 
standards for everyone, the multidimensional perspectives of migrants have to be better 
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considered within the migration–development discourse. Hence, similar to migration, I opt for 
a non-normative approach to development according to de Sardan (2005), and I theorise 
development as a social process – a process that is “multidimensional with different meanings 
for different actors involved” (Dannecker 2009: 120). In Chapter 4 I discuss how migrants’ 
personal perceptions and experiences of Moldova’s developmental transformation influences 
their transnational charity practices and their aspirations to become a part of the Western 
mainstream development establishment. Moreover, the migrant associations provide a site for 
interesting and lively debates about the question of ‘transformation’ of their ‘home’ countries 
(Mercer et al. 2009). Yet, in the excitement over migrant associations as new agents of 
development, the variable ‘different perceptions of development’ has been side-lined so far. 
How the migrants themselves view development and negotiate visions among each other is 
rarely seriously taken into consideration in academic discussions on the topic. One reason for 
this, according to Raghuram, is the fact that “migrants must reinforce the normative assumption 
about the teleology of development, if they are to be folded into hegemonic discourses of 
migration–development” (2009: 112). As a result, they become the passive subject of migration–
development policies. Those who do not subscribe to it, because they may have a different 
perception of transformation, are invisible or absent from the official migration–development 
discourse (Raghuram 2009). By including Moldovan migrants’ rationalities and the values that 
have been missed out in the debate so far, I show in Chapter 4 that social transformation is more 
complex than Western European and American development actors, who have never 
experienced ‘actually existing socialism’, might wish it to be (e.g. IMF or World Bank), and that 
migrants’ interpretations of development and development practices can be different to those 
promoted by the development industry (Long 1992). Thus, I seek to disrupt one of the core 
assumptions of many development actors, namely that ‘social change is a technical and 
controllable process’ (Mosse 2005: 209), as well as the development agencies’ instrumental 
view of policy as form of a rational problem-solving, which makes them often simplistic about 
the social life of their ideas and blinds them to the multiplicity of rationalities and values of the 
people (Moss 2011). To this end, I build on anthropological studies that have dealt with multiple 
ways in which the past enters the present, with the complexity of processes of social change, 
and the creation of various possibilities for different people (e.g. Hörschelmann and Stenning 
2008; Schlögel 2005). Verdery (1999), for instance, defines transformation in post-communist 
countries as a form of novel adaptation. According to her, the relation between macro-
structures and everyday practice is that the collapse of one-party states and administered 
economies broke down macro-structures, thereby creating space for micro-worlds to produce 
autonomous effects that may have unexpected influence over the structures that have been 
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emerging, or that the international community (particularly the IMF, World Bank and the 
European Union) would like to see emerging. In the language of Habermas, “the disintegration 
of the system world has given freer rein for life worlds to stamp themselves on the emerging 
economic and political order” (1998: 67). These new ‘life-worlds’ present a possibility for local 
improvisations that may press either in novel directions – in the Western development actor’s 
conception of transformation towards a ‘European choice’ – or on the other hand towards a 
return to socialism. This theoretical approach seems particularly appropriate in the case of 
Moldova, where “the very issue of what constitutes Moldovan national identity is implicitly 
laden with certain political hues, according to which Moldovans may see their development of 
the country through a socio-cultural and linguistic lens” (Katchanovski 2004: 33). I will argue that 
the country’s socio-political division can have far-reaching consequences for the migrants’ 
potential contribution to their country, for the efforts to mobilise migrants around a coherent 
'notion of homeland’, and for the building up of sustainable relationships between the state and 
the migrant community. However, I find it crucial not to reduce Moldovans, regardless of where 
they live, to purely geo-political or historical passive marionettes, unable to have their own 
opinions, torn between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’, as they are commonly described in the 
literature produced by Western European scholars. Therefore, in order to explore migrants’ 
transnational development practices, I try to strike a balanced interpretation of Moldova’s 
Soviet past, the country’s transition period from its independence in 1991 up to now, and the 
migrants' own agency.  
 Furthermore, migration and transformation are both social phenomena that unfold in time 
and space. Both the elements of ‘time’ and ‘space’ are often neglected in the frameworks of 
nation-bound transformation policy-making in Eastern Europe. As Augé (2012) rightly stresses, 
the idea of globalisation, which is defined, among others, by the extension of the liberal market 
economy, neglects aspects of time and space. The logic of a globalised (neo)liberal market 
economy is rigidly fixed in the present. Taking up on Augé's opinion, I argue that the top-down 
neo-liberal logic of Moldovan development policies with its macro-perspective of structural 
adjustment and liberal market-economics, imposed on migration–development programmes, 
does not only neglect the (socialist) past, but it also masks global power dynamics in a broader 
geographical scope. I view one of the key obstacles to theoretical advancement in the intra-
European migration–transformation debate in the lack of looking at both phenomena, migration 
and development, from a wider perspective of Western and global power, wealth and 
inequality. For this reason, I look in Chapter 4 beyond the Moldovan national container space as 
an ‘integral spatio-temporal isolate’ (Marcus 1998: 178), separated from surrounding Europe, 
as commonly conceptualised in transformation policies of mainstream development. Another 
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core argument for this approach is the application of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1973). 
The analysis of migrants’ interviews required me to broaden out the national-bound analytical 
perspective, and to consider migrants’ interpretations of Moldova’s development 
transformation beyond the nation-state borders of Moldova. In these terms, I include further 
transnational social spaces, such as world systems theories and reflections on globalisation and 
Europe (Hettne 2009; Morawska 2012; Walby 2009).  
This takes us now the last part of this section, namely the introduction of the typical ‘migrant 
interlocutor’ of the donor community – or the discursive subject of migration–development 
policy and research.  
 
 2.2.3 Challenging the ‘entrepreneurial self’ as the dominant ‘discursive subject’ of the 
migration–development discourse 
 
First, In the reshaping of social politics that has taken place throughout Western societies in the 
last few years, with its ethos of the ‘active society’ and managerial thinking, ‘the entrepreneurial 
self’ has become a model of neoliberal and managerial subjectivity (Foucault 2000). In Sennet’s 
understanding (1998), the ‘entrepreneurial self’ rationalises life according to market 
imperatives, and knows how to seize opportunities by being flexible, polyvalent and mobile. This 
model of managerial thinking imbricated in the character of the 'entrepreneurial self' has 
become the main mode of governmentality in the welfare sphere of Western societies and in 
the development field. Consequently, the ‘entrepreneurial self’ has also become the ‘discursive 
subject’ in mainstream migration–development policies and programmes, in which the 
calculative nature of migrants is emphasised, while simultaneously neglecting other human or 
social aspects (e.g. IASCI/Nexus 2014). This once more underlines the importance of (re)-
introducing socio-cultural dimensions into the debate, for instance the migrants’ personal 
migration experiences.  
In the current delivery-oriented and result-based mainstream development practices, the 
high skilled migrant is considered as the most suitable to ‘deliver’ development. Moreover, the 
key-figure migrant is ideally a temporary or seasonal migrant, due to the assumption that 
temporary labour migrants do not present integration challenges for receiving societies, that 
they transmit more financial remittances, and the belief in circulation of ideas and knowledge, 
which is also connected to a short-term version of migration (Faist 2008). According to Page and 
Mercer (2012), the ‘discursive subject’ is mostly portrayed as ‘a hard-working international 
migrant living in the Global North but retaining active and meaningful connections to a home 
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place in the Global South’ (Page and Mercer 2012: 2). Moreover, the ‘ideal migrant’ is male, 
entrepreneurial, and preferably a member of the ‘scientific diaspora’. ‘Them’, the migrants who 
do not belong to this in-group of ‘diaspora’, because they are not high-skilled migrants or 
because they are not willing or capable to contribute to development of their home country, are 
usually left out in the current debate around migrants’ transnational developmental practices.  
I do not dispute the fact that ‘highly-skilled’ migrants are considered to be the ‘ideal 
development partners’ because of their access to potentially lucrative business knowledge and 
networks (Mullings 2012). Yet, as highlighted in Chapter 1, I have built my research rationale 
around the multi-perspectivity of representations, negotiations and performances of migrants’ 
transnational engagement for development. Thus, I aim to widen this narrow perspective by 
adding the viewpoints of the usually excluded in the policy and academic debates, and I also 
include the ‘other migrants’, for instance women and ‘low-skilled migrants’. I illustrate in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 7 that ‘them’ are as capable as the ‘leader-type entrepreneurial self’ of 
having ideas about Moldova’s transformation, and of carrying out transnational projects 
towards socially transformative ends in the country. 
Second, the dominant theorisation of migrants as autonomous self-entrepreneurs, who 
make rational choices in response to specific motivations such as status-seeking or self-interest 
(Page and Mercer 2012), leads to another assumption underpinning migrant association-led 
development policies – that all migrants would aid those at ‘home’ if they are given stimuli, 
regardless of their potentially difficult life-circumstances or their cultural backgrounds (Clarke 
2010; Weinar 2010). Because of the assumption that more migrants would automatically 
become involved in ‘grassroot transnational aid’ (Portes and Landolt 1999: 543), if only they 
would know how to become voluntary development workers, a dominant concern within 
mainstream aid is that most of the migrant associations lack information on how to become 
involved in developmental activities (e.g. Newland 2010a). Yet, development policy 
interventions and academic contributions on this topic are not limited to how to provide 
information to migrants in this regard, but they also aim to educate the ‘discursive subject’ on 
how to spend his/her financial and time resources ‘more efficiently’ (e.g. IOM and MPI 2012; 
Varzari et al. 2014). In Chapters 4 and 7, I go beyond this ‘educational’ view. I shift the dominant 
questions of how to change the behaviour of the ‘discursive subject’ to questions of why, 
respectively why not, and how Moldovan migrants of different gender and class positions 
engage in transnational development practices.  
Lastly, further challenging the dominant tropes of the migration–development discourse, I 
embed my elaboration of how the state and its development partners paint their absentees in 
Simmel's categories of the ‘outsider’ and the ‘stranger’ (1992a). The concepts of the ‘outsider’ 
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and the ‘stranger’ have been frequently applied in studies on migrants’ integration into the host 
society context, but not with respect to the relationship between migrants and their home states 
(e.g. Kreutzer and Roth 2006). In harmony with Simmel, who states that an ‘outside’ in the sense 
of not being part of society is theoretically and empirically impossible, I conceptualise migrants’ 
absence from their home country as a concurrence of being simultaneously inside and outside 
(Simmel 1992a). I will apply both concepts to Moldovan emigrants in relation to ‘official’ 
Moldova and the broader Moldovan society. In Chapter 8, I argue that one of the reasons for 
the ongoing discomfort with migrants in aidland is precisely this ‘concurrence’ of migrants being 
simultaneously ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the Moldovan society. I find the category of the ‘stranger’ 
a useful template for challenging the discursive subject of the entrepreneurial self and for 
moving beyond the binaries of migrants’ supposed engagement ‘here’ for development ‘there’. 
I argue that the key characteristic of the position of actively engaged Moldovan migrants 
towards their home country as ‘strangers’ is that they are ‘both...and’ in regard to ‘here’ (the 
host country) and in regard to ‘there’ (Moldova). They are near and far at the same time in 
reference to both societies (Simmel 1992b). Together with the concept of the ‘outsider’, that 
emphasises the importance of distance in relationships, I show in Chapter 8 that in the last 
couple of years there has been a slight shift in the ways of how the Moldovan government 
portrays its absentees, from ‘outsiders’ to ‘strangers’, which subsequently impacts on new 
migrant association-led policy programmes and on migrants’ recognition as partners or policy 
consultants.  
 
2.3 Breaking away from Dichotomous Views of ‘Here’ and ‘There’: Transnational Social 
Practices 
 
In this final main section of this chapter, I unpick three dominant and persisting dichotomies in 
the migration–development nexus: the migrants’ performances ‘here’ and ‘there’, the North-
South or West-East divisions within international development, and the theorisation of ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ transnational migrant associations and networks. I point to particular conceptual 
limitations and I address the two main sets of concepts I draw on: the transnational lens as a 
suggestion for a more geographically multidimensional approach to my research topic, and the 
concept of transnational social practices. 
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2.3.1 Breaching the binaries ‘here’ and ‘there’ and of ‘West-East’: the transnational social 
fields of migrants and development 
 
In the current formulation of the migration–development nexus, migrants ‘here’ are usually 
supposed to support development in countries ‘there’ (Matsas 2008). The spaces for 
development and of development, however, are already mixed up, and migrants 'here' might 
need development, while migrants ‘there’ may be agents of development ‘here’ (Mercer et al. 
2009). Thus, migrants’ engagement with development is bound up with social relations across 
space and the different experiences that people in different locations bring to the question of 
how to improve the place that is ‘home’. Hence, migrants’ collective activities allow for “an 
interesting analysis of the spatiality of civil society at local, national and transnational levels that 
may breach North-South divisions” (Mcllwaine 2007: 1253). For instance, migrant associations 
and networks may refuse to pigeonhole development as something that is located in their 
countries of origin, but rather claim that they engage in development of their fellow citizens, 
wherever they live (Mercer et al. 2009). By this means, migrant associations can destabilise the 
hegemonic spatial framework of development that pits an already developed ‘West’ against the 
developing ‘Rest’ (Dannecker 2009). In line with migration scholars, I suggest that the 
relationship between migrants and the field of international development needs to adopt a 
more nuanced notion of space in terms of a theoretical reframing of the spatial separation 
between migrants’ engagement ‘here’ and ‘there’, and a less disjointed configuration of the 
spatiality of North-South or West-East divisions within international development (e.g. Glick 
Schiller 2012, among others). The current most popular suggestion for unbundling these 
dichotomies and for analysing the complex inter-linkages beyond the North-South and West-
East divides is the transnational approach (e.g. Portes et al. 2007). 
In contrast to large organisations, such as multinational companies, that had been the object 
of earlier research on transnational studies (Vertovec 2009), the transnational turn in the early 
1990s pursued an approach that brought migrants ‘back in’ as important social actors by 
emphasising their agency (e.g. Basch et al. 1994). Firstly, in order to get a better understanding 
of the migrants’ perception of Moldova’s transformation (research dimension 1), I place my 
study within this scholarly work of migration researchers that focuses on migrants’ transnational 
social practices and their organisations (Glick Schiller et al. 1999; Guarnizo et al. 2003). In this 
literature, migrant transnationalism is often broadly referred as “the process by which 
transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic 
and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through 
which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders” (Basch et al. 1994: 6). 
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The main focus of these studies centres around the following aspects: on migrant associations’ 
members located in migrant-receiving countries, on aspects of migrants’ identity formation, on 
the meanings of home, on the relationship with home-country politics, on the impact on the 
migrants’ receiving countries’ context, and on the degree and forms of migrants’ collective 
activities (Portes et al. 2007).  
 The acceptance of migrants’ simultaneous belongings implies among other things that 
integration in receiving societies and commitment to origin societies are not necessarily 
substitutes anymore. Migrants’ transnational engagements are no longer viewed as a 
‘distraction’ of their capacity to fully integrate into the ‘mainstream’ society of their country of 
residency (Pries and Sezgin 2010). Rather, they are mutually influencing one another, in a 
dynamic and reciprocal process (cf. Bilgili 2014)12. As Erdal and Oeppen maintain: “We argue 
that the nature of interactions between the two are both constituents of a social process, and 
that the nature of interactions is further shaped by the human and personal considerations of 
key actors – the immigrants and those with whom they interact” (2013: 14).  
 By emphasising at the meso level, the Moldovans’ collective transnational communities and 
their patterns of practice, as the main protagonists of my research, spanning over two or more 
countries, I aim to investigate migrants’ notions of attachment to their home country, their 
manifold types and degrees of integration in the transnational field of migrants’ engagement, 
encompassing different geographical locations of receiving contexts and Moldova itself. With 
my understanding of transnationalism, namely Glick Schiller’s (2004) and Vertovec’s (1999), I 
explore in Chapter 7 how ways of belonging to different localities – to Moldova, the host society 
or to the transnational space of the migrant community – influence ‘ways of doing development’ 
and vice-versa in a dynamic reciprocal way. Viewing Moldovan migrants’ attachments from the 
perspective of the places they create – as transnational communities of practice, allows me to 
understand their transnational ties and engagement with the host societies as different 
processes, rather than reducing the analysis to a simple dichotomy of ‘complementary’ or 
‘contradictory’ in terms of integration (cf. Erdal and Oeppen 2013).   
 Secondly, from a civil-society angle, the transnational turn in the early 1990s is reflected in 
approaches like ‘transnationalism from below’, which is the result of grass-roots activities 
conducted by migrants across national borders in civil society (e.g. Smith and Guarnizo 1998). In 
Portes’ opinion, the “notion of transnational activities should be restricted to initiatives by 
members of civil society, be they organised groups or networks of individuals” (1999: 189). 
                                                          
12 For a general overview of the interplay between integration and transnationalism see Erdal and Oeppen (2013) or 
Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004). 
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Other authors propose to distinguish between ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ transnationalism, signifying 
respectively global economic and nation-state practices at one end and networks of 
relationships between migrant communities and people and places in origin societies at the 
other end (Basch et al. 1994). In the same vein, others distinguish between ‘migrant-led’ and 
‘state-led’ transnationalism (Østergaard-Nielson 2011). Most studies on migrant associations 
and their initiatives directed towards their home countries focus on the narrow relationships 
within the transnational civil society of migrants and/or between migrants and their local 
counterparts in their countries of origin (e.g. Lampert 2014; Mazzucato 2009). In order to 
overcome these conceptual limitations, and rather than viewing these two phenomena – 
‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ transnationalism – as opposites, I emphasise in my research the recognition 
of these two forms as mutually constitutive (Bauman 1998). I identify the significance of 
international and state-led development organisations, such as the World Bank and other 
agencies of capitalist globalisation, by conceptualising them as ‘broad transnationalism’. These 
transnational agents determine and implement development policies in Moldova and carry out 
most of the international migrant association-led programmes. To this end, I define 
transnationalism as ‘sustained ties of persons, networks and organisations across the borders of 
multiple nation-states, ranging from little to highly specialised forms’ (Faist 2010: 13). This very 
broad definition allows me to theorise the actors in both research dimensions – the 
transnational field of Moldovan migrants and the transnational field of development – as 
transnational agents that act within and between two different transnational social fields. 
Thereby, I build on Faist’s notion of transnational field, in which “transnational spaces comprise 
combinations of ties and their substance, positions and networks of organisations that cut across 
the borders of at least two nation states” (Faist 2010: 21). By applying this notion of 
transnational field, I seek to delineate the genesis of Moldovan migrant associations as 
transnational social formations, as well as the particular macro-societal context in which these 
associations operate, such as the international development aid system. As a result, I view the 
transnational social practices of migrants within their associations as a form of participation in 
transnational fields (Guarnizo et al. 2003). In that sense, migrant associations are not just actors 
of transnational practices in transnational fields but they are also important actors in shaping 
access to social capital and networks that allows me to understand individuals’ perceptions of 
transnational practices and their performances of these practices more clearly (Vertovec 2009). 
This transnational lens enables me to trace the transnational social field within which migrants 
appear as actors that connect one-another through their collective engagement in transnational 
development processes and policies.  
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Thirdly, in order to better understand the internal logic of interpretations, negotiations and 
performances around transnational aid-practices within and between both transnational social 
fields, I additionally draw on Bourdieu’s field theory (2001, 1985). According to Bourdieu both 
social fields are created by relational positions of actors who are involved in the struggle over 
power and symbolic resources; e.g. struggles over the right mainstream aid-practices within the 
development field (1985). Thus, I seek to get a better understanding of the experiences of the 
actors’ transnational practices within both fields, how within the field logics (nomos), categories 
of policies and practices, such as ‘the migrants as social transnational actors’ arise, and how they 
are defined. Simultaneously I attempt to analyse field-specific symbolic, organisational and 
economic resources. These resources include, for example, the ability of individuals, such as 
migrants and their associations, to participate in multiple localities (Amelina and Faist 2012). 
That being said, I further aim to understand how the genesis of unequal social positions are 
reconceptualised between the two transnational fields. 
Additionally, in the context of the micro-relationship dynamics between migrants and 
development actors in development practices; my third research dimension, I draw on the 
anthropological literature on development, especially the work of Chambers (2012), Eyben 
(2006, 2013) and Green (2011), who have focused in their work on relationship patterns within 
international development more broadly.   
Lastly, for taking into account the ethnic, religious, gender and class positions within one 
cross-border setting – among migrants and the international development field – and between 
the two transnational fields, I back up my analysis with sociological and anthropological 
literature, which addresses these transnational concerns in other geographical contexts. For 
instance, I draw on literature that focuses on the micro-politics among associational members 
as well as relationship patterns, or ‘broker-roles’ between the migrants and their counterparts 
in their home countries (i.e. Lampert 2012; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). These studies are key 
for a better understanding in regards to:  
- forms of hierarchies occurring within transnational social formations, among the 
transnational migrant community and between migrants and elites at home, including 
aspects of trust and prestige (Goffman 1967; Luhmann 1968; Sztompka 1999); 
- the nature of these linkages in regard to class alliances and generational aspects (e.g. Clark 
2010); 
- how migrant associations and networks can reproduce social inequalities and support 
concerns of elites, rather than the immediate concern of those living at home or in the host 
society (e.g. Lampert 2014; Mullings 2012).  
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2.3.2 Deconstructing the concept of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrant associations: from unitary social 
actors to transnational social practices   
 
Although I opt in my research for the transnational concept as my key analytical category, I deem 
it important to briefly stress a few theoretical considerations in regard to the use of the 
descriptive category of ‘diaspora’. Firstly, because the migrant research participants were 
frequently referring to ‘diaspora’ in their narratives on their transnational associational life. And 
secondly, transnational approaches have not yet found entry into the development policy 
debates to the same degree as diaspora. Furthermore, ‘diaspora’ and ‘diaspora organisations’ 
have become political notions, meaning that the term ‘diaspora’ is employed in development 
policy publications and in most of the academic literature on the topic of migrant association-
led development (e.g. Newman 2010b). As there has been much theorising and disagreement 
about the term of ‘diapsora’, I will use it throughout my thesis in its descriptive sense, whilst 
acknowledging the contested notion of it (Brubaker 2005). Like migration is per se neither 
‘good’, nor ‘bad’, I seek to unpack the categorisation of diaspora as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, 
following Vertovec’s (2006) concise title “Diaspora good? Diaspora bad?”, in one of his papers. 
For Brubaker (2005), a diaspora consists of three essential characteristics: dispersion from a 
territory of origin; homeland orientation, which might, or might not, involve the desire or 
feasibility of return; and boundary maintenance, by which the diaspora defines itself against 
others, particularly dominant groups or host societies. In recent years, however, there has been 
an important shift in the meaning of diaspora in the academic and policy context. Although 
diaspora refers to cross-border social processes, the concept has often been used to denote 
religious or national groups living outside an (imagined) ‘homeland’ (Cohen 1997). In the 
‘classical’ way, diaspora has been applied to explain forced migration and violent dispersal, as in 
the case of the Jews or the Armenians. This usage of diaspora implied a return to an imagined 
or real homeland, while “adapting to the environment and institutions of its host society” 
(Esman 2009: 14). Furthermore, the long time-horizon distinguished diaspora from 
transnational communities, such that there had to be ‘time to pass’ before a migrant community 
became a diaspora (e.g. Dufoix 2008).  
Today, the understanding of diaspora has drastically expanded to become a ‘container-term’ 
for concepts such as: diasporic communities, individual members of a diaspora, ethnic 
communities, migrant organisations, transnational social field, and so on (see King 2012a for a 
more nuanced description of these shifts of meaning). Not surprisingly, in the development 
policy discourse nearly every migrant belongs to a diaspora (e.g. IOM 2012). Thus, diaspora is 
often synonymously used with the notion of ‘ethnic minority’ or simply ‘migrant community’ 
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(Sheffer 1986). In Brubaker’s opinion, this “universalisation of the diaspora, paradoxically, 
means the disappearance of the diaspora” (2005: 3).  
Apart from being a migrant, however, there remain further conditions to be met in order to 
become a diaspora-actor of development policy. These include a capability to contribute to 
development in the country of origin, a willingness to act in economic and social terms, and a 
need for the migrants’ ties to be beneficial for development (Weinar 2010). In Chapters 7 and 8, 
I explore how this notion of ‘beneficial ties’ for development is interpreted and negotiated 
among development actors and migrant leaders.  
In sum, the development policy and development civil-society’s broad understanding of 
diaspora includes communities of migrants outside their country of origin willing to contribute 
to development of the home country by their material and emotional commitment (Weinar 
2010). Subsequently, this understanding of diaspora is applied to diaspora organisations and 
networks (e.g. IOM and MPI 2012). On a meta-level of analysis, these ‘diaspora organisations’ 
are commonly portrayed as ‘unitary actors’ or as a ‘static social field’ (Mavroudi 2007). This static 
social field is engaged as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on how the migration policy, the 
development policy, and academic scholars assess their activities directed towards their 
countries of origin. As ‘bad’ civil-society actors, they are often portrayed as pregnant with 
political implications in a rather negative way. They are seen as the ‘Janus face of diaspora’, 
engaged in particular political interests, and they are viewed as unbeneficial by and for their 
country of origin (Gamlen 2011). On the other hand, the majority of theorisation in the research 
context of transnational civil society hinges on a number of positive claims (Raghuram 2009). 
These claims commonly underpin the migrant association-led programmes of international aid-
agencies. Among others these are:  
- the equivalation of migrant associations with concepts such as ‘social capital’ ‘social 
remittances’ and ‘participatory development’, which leads to the assumption that the 
migrant associations are all ‘good’ civil-society actors contributing to a normatively ‘good’ 
development (Orozco and Rouse 2007); 
- conceptualisations of migrant associations as democratic grassroots organisations 
representing all migrants from a certain community living in the receiving country (Ionescu 
2006); 
- expectations that migrants are closer to the beneficiaries than formal development 
organisations, and that the money channelled through them is more likely reach local 
communities with less bureaucracy (Mazzucato and Kabki 2009).  
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In the light of these positive theorisations on a meta-level of analysis, it is no surprise that a 
range of standardised ‘one size fits all’ diaspora programmes have been put in place across 
Western Europe, aimed at enrolling migrant associations in development efforts (Mazzucato 
and Kabki 2009). Yet, these rather shaky assumptions lead to politics which neglect the fact that 
ethnic communities themselves are divided by class, religion or politics among members of the 
‘same’ group. Thus, it seems problematic to think of migrant associations as apolitical entities 
freed of internal divisions, power hierarchies and exclusions (Anthias 1998). This is particularly 
true in the case of Moldovan associations, given that a 'Moldovan identity' remains unsettled. 
Thus, I suggest that in the case of Moldova, a purely ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ lens as a main category 
of analysis for the Moldovan migrants’ collective social engagement is an inadequate approach. 
Another problem looms on the horizon in regard to the proper academic application of the 
definition of diaspora in the case of Moldovan migrants, namely, the specific characteristic of 
historical continuity across at least two generations (Dufoix 2008). It is rather unlikely that this 
characteristic applies to Moldovan migrants, bearing in mind the relatively recent Moldovan 
migration in the countries under study. In Chapter 7, I explore whether Moldovan migrant 
leaders consider themselves a diaspora, and if they label their associations ‘diaspora 
organisations’.  
 Having stated these conceptual limitations, rather than viewing the Moldovan migrants and 
their development activities as the static entity of a ‘development diaspora’ (Brinkerhoff 2008), 
as commonly described in development policy, I opt in Chapter 7 for a more processual 
definition of the migrant transnational space as an instance of a mobilisation process of 
transnational practices (i.e. Anthias 1998; Mavroudi 2007, 2015; Sökefeld 2006). I emphasise 
migrants’ estimates of power relations, inclusions and exclusions in the process of their 
‘diaspora formation’ and their definitions of connectedness to Moldova. Borrowing Mavroudi’s 
definition, I define diaspora as a “process in which space, place and time are not static but 
continuously used, imagined, and negotiated [by migrants] in the construction of both bounded 
and unbounded identities, communities, and nation-states” (2007: 473, 476). I draw on this 
definition because it overlaps with the concept of transnational field that similarly puts the 
emphasis on the social processes that cross international borders (Faist 2010). 
Additionally, Page and Mercer (2012) suggest to emphasise theories of everyday life, so as to 
better understand the development politics of migrant associations and networks. In their 
opinion, "diasporas are better understood as ‘communities of practice’ in which actions are 
conceptualized as part of a wider social system based on embodied knowledge acquired through 
socialisation, technology and the habituation of particular lifestyles" (2012: 1). The common link 
of theories of practice is the goal of transcending the dualism between individuals and larger 
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social structures by treating the two in relational terms. Secondly, these theories emphasise the 
importance of the ‘everyday’ in understanding social life (particularly those of Bourdieu 1985, 
1990; Lave and Wenger 1991). In the case of my research, the ‘everyday’ includes, for example, 
the everyday practice of social collective remittances, and the practices of negotiating and 
performing development engagements. The assessment of Moldovan migrant associations as a 
category of transnational social practice requires taking into account the fact that the migrants’ 
economic and social behaviour is embedded in the social structures – the migrants’ 
transnational field, the sites of migrants’ development interventions in Moldova, and the 
transnational development field in which some of them act (Page and Mercer 2012). By drawing 
on theories of practice within the transnational field of Moldovan migrants, I seek to take into 
account these social structures which enable or constrain the ‘discursive subject’ of the 
migration–development nexus and influence its agency (Amelina and Faist 2012; Bourdieu 1990; 
de Certeau 1984). Using this approach enables me to shift the theorisation that engagement in 
development policy is a purely individual choice, neglecting possible political, economic and 
social constraints (Weinar 2010). Moreover, this theoretical perspective fits well with my 
methodological approach of ethnography, and allows me to reconcile the idea of the specific 
transnational field logic (Bourdieu 1985), and it offers potential to consider broader identities 
beyond ‘naturally felt ethnic roots’, including those which are regional, religious and positional 
(Anthias 1998).  
Likewise, I conceptualise the transnational field of international development as a 
transnational field of practice, and I define the cross-border activities initiated and conducted 
by international development actors as transnational practices (Bourdieu 1990; Wenger 1991). 
I put the focus of my analysis on the deconstruction of the development practice of ‘migrants’ 
collective engagement’ at the centre-stage. Because this policy category is still quite new, I am 
guided by authors who have undertaken a similar approach in their research on other key 
development aid-modalities, such as on ‘participation’ or ‘civil society’ (e.g. Chambers 2012; 
Cornwall 2002; and Mosse 2005, 2011). Similar to Sökefeld’s idea of a ‘life-time’ or ‘critical event’ 
that can mobilise transnational practices (2006: 277), I follow in Chapter 6 the key moments in 
the social life of the development practice of ‘Moldovan migrants as collective actors for 
development’. I illustrate how the development community of ‘practice’ sustains the social life 
of this category within its national and transnational practices, such as seminars, workshops, 
meetings, toolkits, handbooks and so on (Bourdieu 1990; Wenger 1998). Reflecting on this, and 
similar to my approach towards migration, transformation, and migrants’ associative 
transnational social practices, as social processes, I view the development categories ‘of 
involving migrants’ as the result of aid-actors’ transnational development practices and not as a 
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fait accompli (Arce and Long 2003). Given the spatial diffusion of innovation in the transnational 
field of development, conventional mainstream migration–development practices become 
delocalised and increasingly separated from original territorial bases. I illustrate how the globally 
defined development category of ‘migrant associations’ involvement in development’ leads in 
the Moldovan context to considerable mismatches between migrants’ needs to carry out their 
philanthropic initiatives and standardised top-down programmes.  
Vice-versa, in order to assess how the input of international organisations (broad 
transnationalism) influences the practice of migrant associations (narrow transnationalism), and 
to get a better understanding of how the norms and initiatives created at the development 
policy level impact the collective developmental practices of migrants, I equally draw on 
Sökefeld’s social movement approach. He suggests turning towards social movement theory and 
a framework that concentrates on mobilising structures and practices (2006). In his opinion, “[...] 
specific processes of mobilisation have to take place for a diaspora to emerge” (2006: 265). By 
taking inspiration from this specific field within social sciences that is fundamentally concerned 
with the question of how people get mobilised for collective purposes and actions, I analyse in 
the Chapters 6 and 7 the Moldovan migrants’ aspirations and motivations to become involved 
in collective development initiatives, and I explore how the incentives of development agencies 
to ‘organise the Moldovan migrants for development’ impact upon migrant associations’ 
practices of ‘doing development’.    
 After this outline of the theoretical scaffold of my thesis, I turn now to the data collection. As 
we shall see, the next chapter provides a more concrete insight into the different life-worlds of 
migrants and development actors, which became most tangible through my multi-sited 
ethnographic approach. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological approach which I adopted to carry out the study. 
First, I set out the overall research design, focusing on my choice of a qualitative methodology, 
the fieldwork rationale, ethnography and multi-sided data collection. Second, I turn to a 
description of how the research was implemented, addressing the sample, access to research 
participants, and sites. Third, I discuss the main data collection tools and the data analysis. In 
the last section I reflect on the ethical dimensions of my research and on my multiple 
positionalities in the field. The specific challenges encountered in the course of this mobile, 
multi-sited research in relation to the complex research design – the multi-perspective analytical 
framework resulting in a wide variety of research participants, and the multiple fieldwork sites 
– will run as a central theme throughout the chapter. Since there is no room for an account of 
the numerous detailed descriptions of the variety of settings and activities in which I have been 
engaged during ethnographic inquiry, I accompany this chapter with photo-collages so that the 
notions of ‘being there, done that’ can be pictured by the reader from my viewpoint (cf. Hannerz 
2003). 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
3.1.1 Qualitative methodology 
 
My research is designed as a multi-sited ethnography with a transnational approach, drawing 
on a set of qualitative research methods. Given the research aim of making the views of 
Moldovan migrants and policy actors seen and heard from a multi-perspective optic, I used in-
depth data collection such as participant observation and in-depth interviews. The different 
qualitative methods I drew on were integrated through the approach of grounded theory, 
following Glaser and Strauss (1973), Strauss and Corbin (1996), and Clarke (2005). 
Qualitative research generates a ‘thick description’ that moves beyond the kind of ‘facts’ that 
are collected through quantitative research methods, for instance using survey instruments 
(Marcus 1998). It allows the researcher to identify and comprehend relationships that emerge 
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from the web of specific events (O’Reilly 2009). This qualitative research technique of ‘deep 
hanging out’ was the primary tool for data collection to understand the webs connecting 
migrants to larger social and political worlds (i.e. the development world), and conversely, to 
understand how this world is imagined and shaped by migrants. Furthermore, qualitative 
research enabled me to go beyond the discursive analysis of policies and to explore migrants’ 
and development actors’ interpretations and ideas about transformation and migration, and to 
assess how they differ from one another. This understanding is pivotal to grasp the full meaning 
of transnational development practices performed by both sets of actors. In-line with Giddens 
who writes that “All social systems, no matter how grand or far-flung, both express and are 
expressed in the routines of daily social life” (Giddens 1984: 36), the ethnographic rationality 
revealed the messiness on the ground. It allowed me to explore how interpretations surrounding 
migrants and their transnational development interventions are shaped in development 
practice and how this practice deviates from official policy discourse. Moreover, it offered me 
the practical advantage of detecting temporal aspects of collective practices, such as processes 
of organisational change or individual life-changes (for instance changes in migrants’ legal status 
or their length of stay in their countries of residence), which shape migrants’ ways of ‘doing 
development’.  
  In order to better understand migrants’ transnational development practices in all its forms, 
I engaged with a transnational methodological framework. Given that the two main 
transnational social fields – the migrant civil society and the development establishment – 
encompass multiple locations and generate a multi-sited terrain of interactions and relations, 
the study is based on a multi-sited ethnography. Thus, in order to explore the practices within 
and between these transnational settings, I was following over a period of one year ‘the 
discourse on migrants as development partners’ in the international field of key-development 
actors and among migrant civil society representatives, applying Marcus’ well-known 
theorisation (1995)13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Marcus’ idea of multi-sited ethnography proposes to document and investigate a combination of flows of people, 
things, metaphors, plots, stories, allegories, lives, biographies and conflicts (1995). 
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3.1.2 Fieldwork rationale: from Berlin and London…to Chisinau and Tiraspol…to Paris and 
Rome  
 
3.1.2.1 Fieldwork phases  
 
In the course of my fieldwork migrants often quipped that ‘If you want to study Moldovan 
migrants, then you need to travel a lot!’. Indeed, I travelled a lot over a period of one year. I did 
not, however, travel to Africa or the Middle East, where migrants often referred to in their 
narratives on Moldovans as being scattered to the four winds. I stayed in Europe, but also 
followed the second group of ‘travellers’ in my research: the ‘travelled rationalities’ as Moss 
calls them, that is the development ideas and expertise travelling from the West to the East 
(2011: 5). That being said, I have embedded myself into the transnational space of migrants’ civil 
society and the aid industry, in order to explore how and why actors within both social fields act, 
think and feel the way they do (Wacquant 2003).  
 As highlighted above, my empirical data draws on a set of qualitative research methods, 
chiefly on participant observation and in-depth interviews. I conducted interviews with 44 
migrants, 30 aid-workers and civil servants, and with 10 key informants (84 in total). The data 
collection took place over a period of one year in the transnational field of the Moldovan migrant 
civil society and in the transnational social field of development across seven countries: Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Moldova, Switzerland and the UK. The fieldwork was carried out in four 
main fieldwork stages: 
1. The pilot interviews apart, I began my fieldwork in March 2013, by residing in migrants’ 
communities living in Germany and the UK and among Swiss and German development 
agencies over a period of two months. This fieldwork phase informed my first and second 
research dimensions: the migrants’ collective transnational development practices and their 
understanding of involving their organisations into aidland, and the aid-workers’ view of 
migrant associations in international development policy and cooperation. 
2. Emphasis during the second fieldwork stage, in Moldova, was put on aid-agencies and state 
institutions based in Moldova as well as on migrants’ projects implemented there. Over a 
period of four months, I collected data in the international donor community in Chisinau and 
among civil servants of relevant state institutions. Fieldwork sites in Moldova represented 
the district of Chisinau, where the majority of IOs and NGOs are located, and migrants’ 
communities of origin, where most of the migrant-led development projects are carried out, 
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across Moldova, including the frozen-conflict zone of Transnistria and the semi-autonomous 
region of Gagauzia14.  
3. The third fieldwork stage (5 months) was carried out in the Moldovan migrant community in 
the Greater Paris area and in Italy, predominantly in the regions of Veneto and Emilia 
Romagna and in the wider Rome area. Simultaneously, while living in Paris I collected data in 
headquarters of IOs and international aid-agencies and in the migrant community in Geneva. 
This research stage informed all three research dimensions, including the third dimension: 
the aid-relationship dynamics between migrants and development actors.  
4. The last short fieldwork phase (one month) consisted of a follow-up research among the most 
relevant European development actors in Brussels and migrant leaders in the UK. 
 
3.1.2.2 Fieldwork breaks 
 
An important part of my mobile research consisted of ‘fieldwork breaks’ between the fieldwork 
phases and between the different geographical sites. Given that a key-principle of grounded 
theory is an on-going dialogue between theory and empirical research, I used these breaks to 
reflect on the collected data and to transcribe some of the interviews (Strübing 2004). Apart 
from the broad primary data analysis and writing-up in form of what I called ‘notes from in-
between’, my reflections also included considerations as to whether or not I needed to conduct 
further fieldwork on a particular issue which I did not give sufficient attention, if I needed more 
time in one site, or if I should ‘move on’ to the next geographical site (Hannerz 2003; Strauss 
and Corbin 1996). The notes from ‘in-between’ and discussions with my supervisors helped me 
in making these decisions. Without entering into the wider discussion on diverse ethnographic 
styles ranging from ‘over-theorisation in contemporary ethnography’ (e.g. Marcus 1998: 19) to 
‘too under-theorised’ work (e.g. Fitzgerald 2012), I found my solid theoretical framework a 
helpful orientation for navigating me through the sites across Europe. Figure 3.1 shows an 
overview of my fieldwork rationale, including the geographical distribution of my two main 
qualitative research techniques: semi-structured in-depth interviews and participant 
observation. The map illustrates how the subjects and objects of my study unfolded like a mosaic 
of fragmented places scattered throughout Europe. Notwithstanding, the sites belonged to a 
relational concept of space, linked together by the discourse of migrants’ role in Moldova’s 
                                                          
14 See Figures 3.1 and 4.1 for a detailed map of Moldova. 
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transformation; or, according to Marcus, by “[…] an explicit, posited logic of association or 
connections among sites that in fact defines the argument of the ethnography” (1995: 105). 
 
Figure 3.1: Geographical distinction of research sites on fieldwork activities 
 
3.1.2.3 Mobilities 
 
My multi-sited approach, encompassing several countries and several regions within some 
countries, required mobility. With the exception of Moldova, the sites were all within reachable 
distance by fast trains such as the Eurostar, train Italo, TGV or ICE, connecting cities within three 
hours: London-Paris, Paris-Brussels, Geneva-Paris, Bologna-Rome, or Frankfurt-Berlin15. All 
                                                          
15 I received partial funding for my travel expenses from the University of North-Western Switzerland (FHNW).  
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through my fieldwork, my mobility was highly appreciated by research participants. The 
migrants, in particular, perceived it as a sincere effort and interest in them personally, and in 
their country of origin, especially when by chance I had talked to their friends or colleagues in 
other European countries or visited their communities of origin in Moldova.  
 On a more abstract level, the increase of multi-sited research spanning several localities 
provoked an awareness in me of the extant literature on specific concerns of this trend, 
particularly on the definition of a site (e.g. Gupta and Ferguson 1997), the handling and quality 
of relationships (e.g. Nadai and Maeder 2005), temporal aspects of multi-sited fieldwork (e.g. 
Marcus and Okely 2007), and more recently, on the challenges of team research undertaken 
simultaneously in different geographical sites (Shinozaki 2012; Vargas-Silva 2012). 
Understandably, the less exiting ‘practicalities’ of translocal and transnational studies are rarely 
mentioned in textbooks or research reports. Yet, the logistical challenges meant for me, a ‘single 
researcher’, significant extra effort. To constantly arrange accommodation, to do travel plans 
and to ‘regain’ local access to research participants was time-consuming. Moreover, the mobile 
research necessitated not only a physical mobility, but also an ‘intercultural flexibility’. The 
geographical scope of the research involved interactions with a wide range of individuals and 
organisations across different cultural settings. In order to engage with research participants in 
an ‘ethnographically sensible’ way, I needed to develop the ability to switch and adapt to 
different social settings within the transnational topography of migrants and development 
actors. My personal advantage had been that I am a ‘familiar stranger’ in all of the seven 
geographical sites and contexts, and that I disposed the necessary degree of language and 
intercultural skills as well as an acquaintance with research participants, ensuring that the 
specific techniques of inquiry were appropriate to the social and cultural context in which they 
took place (cf. Kemp and Ellen 1995). The intercultural and practical challenges apart, the multi-
sited and transnational approach presented several advantages for informing my overarching 
research topic. In the next section I address these advantages.  
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Figure 3.2: Mobility 
 
3.1.3 Transnational approach and multi-sited ethnography 
 
Globalisation has catapulted sites across the world ever closer together through various 
economic, political and social pathways. Therefore, Marcus argues that we need to document 
world-wide networks in which linked sites are embedded in order to give voice to a wider range 
of actors, and to ensure that ethnographic projects have salience beyond anthropological circles 
(1998). According to this author, multi-sited ethnography involves documenting how large sets 
of forces impinge on local sites; it does not automatically mean doing fieldwork in multiple sites 
(Marcus 1998). The relations which constitute international development as a global project are 
situated within such world-wide networks. In Green’s opinion, these aid and development 
relationships are: “[…] materialised through conventions and practices of networking, regional 
and international meetings, and organisational hierarchies which scale up from the sub-national, 
via the national and the regional, to the global apex” (2011: 22). In the light of this, multi-sited 
ethnography opens up space for moving beyond site-specific research and contextualising 
political responses to personal or collective experiences of ‘doing development’ across different 
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countries. A multi-sited research design enabled me to explore a variety of networking 
characteristics within these different geographical areas as one social field interacting with 
another transnational field; the migrants’ collective practices.  
Given my research aim, I equally engaged with the transnational methodological approach. 
The approach points exactly to the fact that my research participants are positioned in social 
fields of connections extended across nation-state borders (Vertovec 2009)16. Amelina and Faist 
(2012) have argued that this transnational approach has not always been taken very seriously. 
In my research field, for instance, the mandated research on Moldovan migrant associations 
highlighted in Chapter 1 are solely based on data collected in the migrant receiving countries 
(e.g. Cheianu-Andrei 2013). The activities carried out in Moldova have been left out so far. Thus, 
my emphasis on the multiple linkages within the transnational field of the migrant civil society 
sets my study apart from a purely comparative study on migrant associations in different 
destination countries; e.g. the study undertaken by Schwarz (2007) in the context of Italy, Russia 
and Israel. Although comparison is an integral dimension of my research design, it takes on “[…] 
the form of juxtapositions of phenomena that conventionally have appeared to be (or 
conceptually have been kept) ‘worlds apart’” (Marcus 1995: 102). Furthermore, accentuating 
the relationships that unfold across several receiving countries, enabled me, on the one hand, 
to access and subsequently interview a core group of active migrant leaders living in different 
countries, who maintain strong transnational social networks across several migrant host 
countries and who are engaged in the political, economic and cultural life of Moldova. This group 
was also highly involved in the feeding into emigrant policy making, which I will discuss in 
Chapter 6. On the other hand, it also allowed me to access migrants who are less engaged in 
‘home politics’ living in different places than the just-described migrant leaders; for instance, 
female low-skilled migrants. The interviews and comments by these migrants revealed 
interesting patterns of transnational development practices, which I would not have been able 
to detect by interviewing the transnational migrant leaders alone.  
My study is rather ‘located’ than ‘local’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1997); I aimed to obtain a thick 
description of the processes and relationships in both trans-state social spaces and between 
them, and rather thin descriptions in regard to the cultural and social life of the geographical 
localities (Marcus 1998). My objective was not to achieve a full understanding of discrete actors 
and geographical bounded communities, such as for instance the ‘entire culture and social life 
of Moldovan migrants living in Italy or France’. Even so, these aspects were taken into 
                                                          
16  Yet, as in most multi-sited studies, the multiple linkages in this study were not only transnational, but also translocal 
and local (cf. Hannerz 2003). 
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consideration whenever possible, because they endowed me with a clearer picture of the 
dynamics unfolding within cross-border social practices. 
Lastly, following up on my discussion on whose knowledge I want to place on my research 
agenda in Chapters 1 and 2, I round up this section with a very brief epistemological 
consideration of what knowledge I wanted to gain. Emphasising multiple linkages meant that 
my research was attuned to relational rather than essential differences (Bourdieu 1990), and 
that is what dialogic and interpretative rather than objectivist (Geertz 1988). Furthermore, 
working on and in a country with frequent political changes, including a frozen-conflict zone, my 
research is not exclusively about human beings and their situations, but also about situations 
and their human beings (cf. Goffman 1967). Given the situational aspect of my study, I am aware 
that I arrive only at a partial, contextualised knowledge – a snapshot in time. The fact that this 
knowledge is by definition partial and incomplete, however, does not mean that it can never 
attain the status of real knowledge (Geertz 1973). To deny this and only adopt an extreme 
relativist position would run against my interest to engage with political power structures and 
to uncover whose knowledge and what kind of knowledge counts by means of the ethnographic 
bottom-up approach. 
 
Figure 3.3: Transnational connections  
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3.2 Sample, Design and Sites  
 
3.2.1 Sample group and access  
 
Ethnographic research involves careful access that is not something achieved once and for all, 
but has to be negotiated and renegotiated across the different groups for different topics 
(Strauss and Corbin 1996). As highlighted in Chapter 2, I emphasise the social dimension of 
migration in my study, by placing migrants and their experiences as knowledge producers at the 
centre of the debate. To this end, I engaged with a heterogeneous sample of collectively 
engaged migrants: variable ages, genders, family situations, migratory experiences and 
strategies as well as occupational backgrounds, ranging from low-skilled to high-skilled 
occupations. This allowed me to gain an understanding of migrants’ views on my research topic 
from diversified perspectives; from female care-workers in rural Italy, politically active migrants 
working in the City of London, students in Paris, members of the transnational ‘diaspora-council’ 
in Rome and Geneva, and so on and so forth. Prior to my fieldwork, I had already identified and 
contacted via email and telephone migrants living in the UK, Switzerland, Rome and Bologna, 
through acquaintances from my former visits to Moldova, or through the internet. As I 
proceeded through my fieldwork, I used the snowball-sampling method to create new 
relationships by drawing on existing ones (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). Further contacts were made 
by attending church ceremonies or events carried out by migrant associations in France, Italy, 
Germany, Switzerland and the UK. This way of proceeding allowed me to encounter migrants in 
many different social settings and to reach the intended variety of research participants, 
including migrants who are not collectively engaged in activities directed towards Moldova17.  
I negotiated my initial access to Moldovan associations through an association census. This 
census was commonly known among research participants as simply the ‘migrant association 
list’. The list travelled with me for over a year. A Moldovan scholar introduced me to the list, 
while I was preparing my research outline. Later on in Moldova, I also met the author of the list. 
From the first contact with a migrant leader in London to the last interview conducted under 
Bologna’s arcades, every research participant was referring to the ‘association list’. Yet, as nearly 
all aspects of life in Moldova are politicised, so also is the list. It is not just a list, but filled with 
ideological and political implications, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 6. Therefore, in 
order to avoid the risk of sample limitations presented by means of contacting exclusively 
associations from this list, I also included associations that did not figure on the list through 
                                                          
17  For a detailed sample description see Appendix 1. 
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recommendations of key-informants from previous field-work stages, or through my own 
internet research. The main selection criteria for the Moldovan associations has been their 
involvement in any of the newly created formal association-led development programmes 
implemented by development agencies (e.g. the IOM, UNDP or EU-organisations), and logistical 
considerations (e.g. combining interviews with development actors and representatives of 
migrant associations who were located near one another). I identified further organisations 
through interviews with association members and programme managers of migrant association-
led programmes, including those associations whose projects have been rejected by the donor-
community. Doing so allowed me to see if migrants and aid-institutions have different 
understandings of development practices. Moreover, in order to assess the scope of 
transnational practices that prevail outside the formal development programmes, I had selected 
migrant associations and networks within close distance to the first group of migrant 
associations participating in development programmes and policies. 
Through my professional activities in the social development sector in Moldova and my 
academic consultancy activities in the migration–development field, I already had secured 
contact to my second group of research participants: relevant key-experts in the development 
field: project managers of programmes carried out by the IOM, UNDP and the EU-UN joint office, 
key persons in migration-development-led policies of bilateral development agencies, and 
representatives of NGOs based in Moldova. I further identified members of this research group 
on relevant websites while doing my review of key-development programmes prior to my 
fieldwork. The first contact was usually established via email prior to sending the general 
information sheet and further information. I then recruited other aid-professionals chiefly 
through a ‘cross-border’ snowballing technique. In retrospect, to do my first initial fieldwork 
stage among the development actors in Germany and Switzerland turned out to be a good 
decision. They were extremely cooperative in informing their respective local counterparts in 
Moldova and their broader networks within headquarters of international organisations about 
my research, and in announcing my arrival in Moldova. Because of an increase in investment in 
new migration–development programmes in Moldova, there had been a dynamic process of 
setting up new infrastructures and office-spaces among various international aid-agencies and 
within governmental structures during my fieldwork. This also meant that some offices were not 
fully operating at that time (e.g. no internet addresses, no business phone-numbers). Therefore, 
it was crucial to have prior contacts and local gatekeepers, who provided me with the private 
mobile numbers of the heads of these offices. Moreover, access to representatives of Moldovan 
state institutions was generally only possible via their private mobile numbers.  
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 For exploring the relationship patterns between migrants, their local Moldovan counterparts 
and the donor community in concrete development settings, I applied a matched sample 
approach developed by Mazzucato (2009)18. It consisted of four small-scale project settings: the 
support of a school, the installation of a sanitation system in a village, the provision of 
equipment to a local hospital, and the organisation of a food-festival promoting a healthy life-
style. One project was implemented in Chisinau, the others in villages – one in the centre, one 
in the east and one in the north of Moldova19. I selected one project during the first fieldwork 
stage in the UK. The other three were selected in Moldova from where I followed the activities 
back to the associations that carried them out in Paris, Geneva and Berlin. The use of these in-
depth ‘transnational case studies’ allowed me to “close-in on real life situations and test views 
directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice” (Flyvbjerg 2004: 58). The ‘matched 
samples’ offered a valued combination of the horizontal data analysis – mainly based on 
interviews and participant observation – with a vertical analysis of an in-depth ethnographic 
case, and thus fitted ideally in my overall body of ethnographic methodology (Charmaz 2006). 
The additional advantage of this method consisted of the triangulation of results and of the 
disclosure of complexities of transnational co-operation patterns that would not have emerged 
in interviewing one actor only; for instance, it provided me with the possibility to link up what 
has been said by one actor with the direct counterparts revealing what the research participants 
actually do (cf. Mazzucato 2009).  
Lastly, in order to mitigate the concern of multi-sited field studies in regard to a too-narrow 
focus on the mobile subjects (Appadurai, 1996) – in this case the highly mobile migrants engaged 
in development projects, as they contribute most to turning the combinations of sites into 
coherent fields – I also included the ‘non-mobiles’ in my sample, such as key persons in Moldova 
and in the migrants’ destination countries: representatives of relevant local and national 
institutions and individuals involved in the four matched samples (e.g. teachers, a social worker, 
a mayor, and the beneficiaries of development projects).   
In conclusion, getting in contact with Moldovan migrants was surprisingly easy and 
immediate, and facilitated by the fact that they were all highly interested in taking part in my 
research. Possibly, this can be explained with the lack of public and academic interest in Moldova 
in general and in Moldovan migrants in particular (see Chapter 1). My interest in migrants’ 
                                                          
18 Mazzucato defines her method as the ‘simultaneous matched sample methodology’ (SMS) (2009: 216). Unable to 
do simultaneously research in different sites on my own, I reduced the method to a ‘matched sample approach’, and 
I included donor organisations in my units of analysis, which do not figure in the original version. 
19 In both cases, the selection was based on a geographical dispersion so as to see if there are regional factors 
influencing negotiations and arrangements between the actors involved, and on the thematic orientations of the 
activities carried out.  
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chiefly volunteer-run activities was highly appreciated, especially by participants who felt a lack 
of recognition for their efforts by the host society or by the Moldovan state, and by individuals 
who felt tired of being ‘reduced’ to objects in some of the deficit-oriented public discourses on 
integration, and to a lesser extent as transnationally active social subjects and actors. By and 
large, since my first encounter with Moldovan migrants – a charity event for deprived Children 
in Chisinau, held in a trendy wine-bar in London’s city centre – I have been moved by their 
kindness and generosity, and by their openness and trust to share with me their personal 
viewpoints on Moldova’s developmental transformation, as well as their often drastic stories: 
stories of separations, unfulfilled migration plans, homelessness upon arrival in their destination 
country and stories of exploitation. I am convinced that my privileged dialectic ‘insider-outsider’ 
role in relation to both research groups was an advantage in building up access and trust. The 
fact that I neither belonged to the Moldovan migrant community nor to the host society, for 
most of the time, was an advantage. For instance, my obvious ‘double outsider role’ vis-à-vis 
Moldovan migrants and the host society allowed me to generate honest accounts on Moldova’s 
and the destination country’s national or local structural context, which were both commonly 
described by migrants as constraining. Conversely, somehow detached from the cultural 
context, access and trust to development workers was considerably facilitated by my self-
disclosure as having once belonged to the transnational community of aid-workers. Yet, contrary 
to what I had anticipated prior to my fieldwork, access to undocumented migrants living in Italy 
or France and to other migrants in vulnerable life-circumstances turned out to be much easier 
than access to busy development professionals in Brussels and Geneva. Despite my former 
‘insider role’, I only succeed in meeting these research participants via personal contacts in both 
cities. All in all, throughout my research, programme-coordinators of international aid-
institutions based outside Moldova were most reluctant to my research20.  
 
3.2.2 Sites 
The contours of the mosaic of places across Europe and in Moldova as illustrated at the 
beginning of this chapter emerged from my research design and the research process itself, as I 
traced informants across multiple sites that turned out as relevant in the light of the research 
questions (Marcus 1995).  
Firstly, my fieldwork phase in Moldova was marked by the deductive approach of my thesis, 
pertaining from a lack of up-to date-research on Moldova’s mass emigration as an integral part 
                                                          
20 The reasons for rejecting an interview were, among others, time constraints or an expressed lack of knowledge 
about Moldova and its development transformation, or reservations about the topic of migration. 
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of Moldova’s transformation reality more broadly. The main objective of this approach was to 
get a better picture of how the phenomena of migration and transformation are revealed in 
today’s Moldova, and to explore the specific challenges and issues raised by Moldova’s mass 
emigration. It allowed me to get a better understanding of the structural context in which 
migrant associations’ development efforts are supposed to be ‘plugged in’. For investigating 
how Moldovans outside the capital experience transformation and migration, I left the ‘aid-
bubble’ that often disconnects aid-workers from their beneficiaries living outside Chisinau. A big 
advantage in investigating migration as embedded in the societal structure of today’s Moldova 
beyond the development actors’ representations was that I had been offered free-of-charge 
support (personal driver and translator) by an international charity. This allowed me to gain 
time, because access to certain regions, i.e. Transnistria, is rather difficult. Meanwhile, some 
villages in in the far north of the country or in the southeast have more frequent bus connections 
to Paris, Kiev, or Bologna than to Chisinau, where I was staying21.  
 Secondly, as highlighted earlier, I did fieldwork in the per se ‘transnational field’ of the built 
environment of development key-players outside Chisinau: in Brussels and Geneva, where the 
majority of international and Moldovan migrant association-led development programmes are 
based (for instance IOM, UNDP), while simultaneously focusing on German-speaking countries. 
Contrary to other European countries such as the UK, Spain or the Netherlands, the involvement 
of migrant organisations in development policy is less advanced in Germany and Switzerland, 
and they have just recently moved beyond the discursive political level (Hilber and Braulina 
2012)22. Moreover, Switzerland is currently after the European Union the second largest 
provider of funds for migration–development programmes in Moldova (SDC 2013). 
Thirdly, similar to my deductive approach of looking at Moldovan migration and 
transformation in Moldova, I first wanted to get a better understanding of the understudied 
contemporary Moldovan migration features and of migrants’ daily lives. I conducted 
ethnographic research in the transnational field of migrants’ civil society in Italy and France; 
more precisely, in the Greater Paris area and in Italy, predominantly in the regions of Veneto, 
Emilia Romagna and in Rome. In both countries, there has been a dynamic process of mobilising 
migrant associations in the last few years. According to the ‘migrant association list’ there are 
55 associations in the Emilia-Romagna region, 21 associations in Rome, and 25 in the Greater 
Paris area. In both countries, there were at least four organisations involved in formal 
                                                          
21 There exist direct bus connections between rather small Italian cities, like Castelfranco (Veneto) or to small 
neighbouring communities of Geneva, but no direct connections to villages in Moldova.  
22 There are numerous factors determining the relatively late implementation of this policy field in Germany and 
Switzerland, for example the predominant emphasises on ‘voluntary return programmes’ by official development aid 
agencies (Hilber and Braulina 2012).  
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association-led development programmes. The main reason for having selected Italy as a 
research site was to analyse if there is a relationship between the size and concentration of the 
Moldovan migrant community and the intensity of migrants’ collective transnational patterns, 
because the largest number of Moldovan migrants in Western Europe live in Italy; nearly half a 
million according to research participants, and 149,231 according to Caritas (UNAR 2013)23. The 
majority of them live in the region of Emilia-Romagna (17%), Veneto (21%) and in the Rome area 
(11%). On a national level, the Moldovans present the seventh largest migrant group in Italy and 
the second fastest growing migrant population after the Tunisians (UNAR 2013)24. I selected 
France because of an increase in associational activity of Moldovan migrants in the country. 
Similar to Italy, the Moldovan migrant population in France has considerably grown in the last 
five years. It is estimated that about 20,000 Moldovans live in the Greater Paris area alone, out 
of ca. 48,000 who are registered in France (Office National des Statistiques, January 201325). In 
addition, I selected migrant associations in UK, Germany and Switzerland which participate in 
formal migrant–development programmes, or that carry out transnational philanthropic 
activities according to the selection criteria outlined above. According to the German Federal 
Office of Statistics, there are 51,521 officially registered Moldovans living in Germany 
(Ausländerzentralregister, 31.12.2012). Four Moldovan associations are taking part in a joint 
UN-EU programme on involving migrant associations in development efforts, and two more 
associations are engaged in other programmes. The UK is attractive, because most of the 
migrant associations in the wider London area (six according to the association census) are 
involved in transnational charity, and they also co-operated with British or international 
development agencies at the time of my fieldwork. The drawback was that the number of 
Moldovans living in the UK compared to Germany is lower (circa 31,000 according to Mosneaga 
2012). The number of Moldovan migrants living in Switzerland is rather small, too, but constantly 
growing (ca. 10,000) (Bundesamt für Statistik 2012). The analysis of migrant associations based 
in Geneva presented, however, an excellent opportunity to explore the links between the 
migrants and the development actors. Furthermore, the two associations in Geneva maintain 
various connections to Swiss development NGOs.  
Generally, in large cities like Rome, Berlin, Paris or London, Moldovan migrants live scattered 
across the city, mainly in the peripheries. In Paris, for instance they live at the portes (last 
                                                          
23 It is estimated that within the biggest migrant group in Italy (approximately 1 million Romanians), ca. 30% are 
migrants originally from Moldova. Because many migrants figure as Romanian citizens in official national statistics of 
foreign residents, the above-indicated numbers of Moldovans living in these countries are on average minimum three 
times higher.   
24 From 2010 to 2011 the number of Moldovan migrants rose on a national level by 24% and in Rome by 52%! (ISTAT 
2012). 
25 Other estimates point to ca. 50,000 Moldovans living in the Paris area (IOM 2012a). 
54 
 
underground tube stations): Porte de Clignancourt, Bobyigny, Porte de Bagnolet, etc. However, 
there is a concentration in some of the outskirts of these cities, such as for instance in Villneuve-
Saint-Georges, where ca. 5,000 Moldovans live (Mosneaga 2012)26. Because the majority of 
studies on migrant associations and their responses to charity and donations are concentrated 
in urban centres, where the ‘best and brightest’ migrants live, I also included those who live in 
smaller cities, or rural areas of their destination countries, so as to avoid what I would call 
methodological urbanism. These sites emerged through snowball sampling and through 
contacts with friends who live in smaller cities, such as Novellara, Italy. My ethnographic inquiry 
in these locations offered me valuable information about transnational philanthropic practices 
carried out by chiefly ‘low-skilled’ migrants that have thus far escaped the attention of migration 
scholars and the development industry. Vice-versa, by including migrants from urban areas in 
Moldova, I tried to avoid what Meuss calls in the Romanian case methodological ruralism – a 
rural bias in the interpretation of Romanian migration mainly connected to the Romanian 
countryside, while neglecting urban areas of departure (2012: 1775).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 The Moldovan village of Corjeuti is a not-untypical example. Out of its 8000 inhabitants, 5000 live in Villneuve-Saint-
Georges, outside Paris (Cheianu-Andrei 2013).  
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Figure 3.4: Fieldwork sites 
 
3.3 Methods and Analysis  
 
Migrant associations’ involvement in development is a multifaceted topic, which is best 
researched through a mix of different methods. For this reason, I drew upon a range of 
qualitative data collection techniques, which I describe below. 
 
3.3.1 Primary data sources 
 
3.3.1.1 Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
 
I used semi-structured in-depth interviews, following Witzel (1985). These problem-centred 
interviews consist of a general broad initial question, approximately five key-questions and then 
ad hoc questions27. I found this method very suitable for my research, because it allowed me to 
                                                          
27 The sequence of the questions does not imply a hierarchisation of the questions (Witzel 1985).  
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focus on four or five particular key-aspects of my research topic in greater detail, and to apply 
open-ended questions that allowed participants to express what they could add to the overall 
topic. This enabled me to open up new perspectives and questions I had not thought to explore, 
and which I used in subsequent interviews. As mentioned earlier, I carried out 84 face-to-face 
semi-structured in-depth interviews: 44 with migrants (30 who were also representatives of 
associations, 8 who were not collectively engaged); 30 with civil servants and aid-workers, and 
10 with key informants (e.g. representatives of local political administrations across the 
illustrated seven sites or of the social sector in Moldova). The interviews were conducted in 
English, German (including Swiss German), Italian, French, Romanian and Russian language. 
With the exception of 20 interviews in Italy and Moldova, for which I had a translator, I 
conducted all of the interviews myself. Drawing on my previous work-experience in the Eastern 
European development NGO-scene, I have been concerned with the different positioning of the 
research participants within both types of organisations – the migrant associations and 
development organisations. In some cases, I interviewed two representatives of the same 
organisation in the sense of triangulation, which revealed interesting insights in regard to intra-
organisational power dynamics, such as gender relations and different viewpoints on my 
research topic. Moreover, I tried not to focus exclusively on presidents of NGOs, or local heads 
of aid-agencies in Chisinau, because of a potential risk of them seeking to impress outsiders in 
order to aspire to receive funding. This can result in gaining superficial data. Therefore, 
whenever possible, I preferred to conduct interviews with project co-ordinators, who yielded 
more information about concrete activities and possible challenges. 
Most of the interviews (81) were recorded; in the three cases when this was not possible, 
detailed notes were taken during and after the interview28. Consistent with grounded theory, I 
have always engaged in ethnographic observation during the encounters with the interviewees. 
I supplemented the interviews with post-scripts, in which I described the interview-settings, the 
course and the atmosphere of the interview (flows in the narratives, disturbances) and the socio-
demographic data of research participants (age, gender, professional occupation, migration 
status, duration of their stay in the host country, etc.; cf. Strauss and Corbin 1996). Sometimes, 
migrants brought other family members, mainly their adolescent children, to the interviews 
settings, which provided the interviews with a ‘group-interview’ character. This also enabled me 
to see if there are generational gaps between Moldovan migrants and their children in their 
representations on the researched topic.  
                                                          
28 Surprisingly, given the post-communist context of my study, most research participants immediately agreed to 
being recorded. 
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An average interview lasted about ninety minutes, and it was usually followed up by a further 
un-recorded discussion. In some cases, the informal follow-up exchanges with programme 
managers took on the form of a ‘mini’ consultations, in which participants referred to my 
disclosure as a former consultant in the field. I found these discussions usually very fruitful and 
rewarding, as they gave me the opportunity to show appreciation for the time given to an 
interview, and not take the research participants’ contributions as granted. However, this also 
meant that the meetings took, on average, three hours. Vice-versa, the following-up of 
interviews at migrants’ homes turned often into ‘family happenings’ with guests, subsequent 
dinner and joint photo-sessions. The number of migrant research participants declining to be 
interviewed was insignificant. Altogether, only three migrants refused to be interviewed, due to 
illness or because they were out of town. All other migrants immediately agreed to take part in 
the research29.  
 Dialogue with, listening to and learning from the research participants unavoidably involved 
meetings. These meetings took place in a variety of locations, always suggested by research 
participants themselves, as I found it important that they were familiar with the surroundings 
for sharing information with a stranger30. The interviews with migrants were usually carried out 
in cafés, premises of migrant associations, at migrants’ workplaces, in local political or 
administrational locations, or in migrants’ homes31. The different interview settings are a good 
illustration of the variety of research participants; for instance, the locations suggested by 
Moldovans in Paris ranged from typically urban bohemian-bourgeois cafés in the city’s most 
trendy quartiers proposed by students, to hyper-modern offices of high-skilled migrants in the 
financial district of la Défense, to the migrant associations’ locations in a typical maison 
d’associations (French community centres collectively hosting local associations), to migrants’ 
homes in the outskirts of Paris, mostly suggested by low-skilled migrants. The same description 
applies to other localities; e.g. in London where I conducted interviews in the ‘holy-halls’ of 
international financial institutions in Canary Wharf and in migrants’ homes in working-class 
North-East London (see Figure 3.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29  In some places in Italy and in Moldova people approached me for being interviewed, and I had to decline their 
offers because of time constraints.  
30 Prior to the interviews, I have always ensured that the proposed locations were suitable surroundings for the 
research participants, providing an atmosphere of confidentiality and trust. 
31 Four interviews with migrants were conducted on their return visits in Moldova (see Figure 3.1).   
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Figure 3.5: From centres to peripheries  
 
 
The interviews with development actors were conducted on their project-sites (e.g. premises 
of local NGOs and community centres) or in a variety of different ‘office worlds’, depending on 
the international status of the aid-organisation and the functions of research participants within 
the organisations (e.g. premises of IOs, and programme offices in the donor countries – see 
Figure 3.6). Besides the often only partially furnished and functional ‘office worlds’ in the aid 
environment in Chisinau, I also carried out interviews in hotel lobbies, and in my landlady’s 
kitchen in a Chisinau suburb. Further interview settings included soulless canteens of 
international or bilateral aid agencies and UN-Headquarters in Geneva, Brussels, Frankfurt or in 
old ‘soviet-style’ canteens of schools and an orphanage in Moldova’s countryside supported by 
migrants or development agencies. 
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Figure 3.6: Office worlds 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Participant observation 
 
As in most ethnographic studies, participant observation played an important role in informing 
my research topic (Emerson et al. 1995). To explore the migrants’ and aid-workers’ development 
activities directed towards Moldova meant to find out where there is action, and to try to 
participate in these actions. On the whole, I engaged and observed in a wide variety of actions 
and events, ranging from official strategic policy-meetings, such as the UN international high-
level dialogue, to street-level events, such as picnics organised by migrant associations (in total 
48). As illustrated in Figure 3.1, I divided the activities in three groups. I participated in 13 event 
addresses to migrants and development actors; e.g. programme launches and international 
conferences (e.g. the GFMD-Civil society days, an IOM-Diaspora conference, etc.). In-line with 
Emerson et al. (1995), I paid special attention to the patterns of collaboration between the two 
sets of actors in the given setting; ways of expressing themselves, misunderstandings, silencing 
or suppressing alternative discourses and possible forms of contestation, division of tasks which 
organised these events, and the research participants’ space for personal interpretations in 
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reporting these events. To this end, I confronted the participants with the final written activity 
reports, so as to crystallise the different viewpoints around outcomes of conferences, 
workshops and/or on a specific topic. Doing so allowed me in an ideal way to pursue my chosen 
multi-perspective approach. The joint-meetings also enabled me to observe the relationships 
between migrants and development actors more immediately, and to witness within these 
temporary sites if new relationships between development actors and migrants had been 
created. 
With regard to migrant associations, I attended meetings of formal migrant associations and 
informal networks, such as board meetings of migrant associations, charity events, cultural and 
political activities carried out in the receiving countries, and project meetings between migrants 
and their counterparts in Moldova (in total 25). And lastly, because of my former contacts in the 
aid-industry and new contacts built-up in the course of fieldwork, I was able to access the 
development agencies’ ‘inner sanctum’, to step into their ‘black boxes’ and to conduct 
participant observation in their strategic policy meetings, conferences, workshops and 
presentations of studies (in total 10). This allowed me to explore the actual policy-making 
process and to follow key moments of the social life of the development category ‘migrants as 
partners for development’, as highlighted in toolkits, handbooks and the like. 
Additionally, I accompanied international aid-workers and their local counterparts on their 
fieldtrips to project-sites in remote areas of Moldova. This form of ‘participant field trips’ 
provided me with unique insights of how the topic of emigration is perceived among aid workers 
and their Moldovan counterparts, which I could not have generated through interviewing the 
aid workers alone. Further, in accordance with Eyben (2006) and Green (2011), I reflected on 
my own practice as a consultant for the German Bilateral-Development agencies’ migrant 
association programme, in which I had taken the role of an ‘observant participant’, actively 
involved in two consultant-workshops in March 2013.  
In general, apart from the efficient ‘cross-border’ snowball-sampling, which allowed me to 
proceed smoothly with my ethnographic inquiry, my engagement in these activities presented 
further ideal entry points to my new geographical fields. For instance, upon my arrival in 
Moldova, I attended a joint-workshop for a new migration-development programme-launch 
with migrant representatives, development actors, and state representatives, in which I could 
engage in conversations with potential new research participants. In a more advanced stage, I 
selected these ‘temporary sites’ according to their relevance for my research topic; e.g. specific 
social development activities directed towards Moldova, and/or according to logistical reasons; 
e.g. participation at a board meeting of a migrant association while being in Geneva for 
encountering development actors.  
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Figure 3.7: Participant observation  
 
3.3.1.3 Ethnographic walks  
 
A further method of inquiry consisted in ethnographic walks à la ‘flâneur’, alone or accompanied 
by research participants32. By systematically strolling the streets as a ‘flâneur’ I participated as 
an engaged observer in the life of a place. In these terms, walking is an act of discovery and 
exploration, a constant experiment to create our own personal maps of the places and pathways 
of the urban land scape that we stumble across (Hessel 2013). I applied these ‘flâneries’ or 
ethnographic walks as a means to get a better understanding of the life-worlds of Moldovans 
from variegated places across Moldova, of the life-worlds of migrants and of aid-workers 
situated in the humanitarian landscape, or in what Duffield (2006) calls the ‘aid archipelago’ in 
Brussels, Geneva and Chisinau. The walks in Moldova strengthened my ability to engage with 
Moldova’s complex transformation as it is lived and experienced by a variety of individuals, 
allowing me to grasp the heterogeneity of my post-communist research field, and to understand 
                                                          
32 The word ‘flâneur’ has developed through Baudelaire and Walter Benjamin and other writers in the sense of a 
philosophical response to the urban landscape (Hessel 2013).   
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how the past is present. Vice-versa, exploring the different landscapes of migrants’ living 
environment provided me with a more nuanced insight into migrants’ social realities, their life 
circumstances and the broader public perception and attitude towards Moldovan migrants33. 
And last of all, on a more personal level, the ‘flâneries’ were a welcome means for balancing out 
the fast rhythms of moving across my geographical sites. They offered me a change from the 
linear way of travelling with high-speed trains from city A to city B, subordinating the landscape 
with their speed, so that nothing is left out of it. The slow rhythm of walking permitted me to 
see the landscapes, and to take photographs. How I used these photographs for the exploration 
of my research topic is explained in the next subsection. 
 
Figure 3.8: Ethnographic walks 
3.3.1.4 Visual methods 
 
In O’Ralley’s understanding, visual methods relate to the study of visual media and material and 
using it as a way of incorporating ‘a visual lens into mainstream ethnography’ (2009: 221). I 
                                                          
33 Some of these walks took place in sensitive environments; i.e. certain suburbs of Paris and in the surrounding 
forests, where migrants live in caravans or improvised sheds without electricity or running water, in deprived 
neighbourhoods in Chisinau and Rome, and in the frozen-conflict zone of Transnistria, where my walks got interrupted 
by the police. 
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included the study of visual methods (video footage, etc.) in my analysis of relevant documents, 
and I defined ‘visual methods’ as the proper use of visual media. I drew on these methods in 
order to understand how meanings are made in and through the visual within transnational 
practices (Pink 2007). For instance, I took pictures of key-events of migrant associations or of 
joint migrant-development actor-events. Furthermore, I used photographs in interviews as a 
means of documenting and enlarging my collected ethnographic statements and observations 
in post-communist Moldova (Ball and Gilligan 2010). For this purpose, I predominantly used the 
photographs of the contested and multifaceted identity politics in Moldova’s public space 
(official billboards, signs, graffiti, reminiscences of the past, and so on), and those related to the 
visibility of emigration (e.g. advertising for emigration-programmes). Exploring the photographs 
with the research participants provided the interview setting with a less rigid atmosphere, and 
permitted more open expression. 
I also drew on the participatory photography method (Pink 2007) to deepen my 
understanding of the migrants’ self-reflections on their collective social engagement in Moldova. 
For instance, some members of associations took photographs of their projects during their 
visits in Moldova. This allowed me to ‘see’ their humanitarian engagement through their eyes, 
as a ‘third’ visual perspective along with the development actors’ documentations, and my own 
personal impressions from the projects.  
Given the legal and ethical issues to consider with the use of media and photography (for 
instance the respect of anonymity of the research participants, or copyright-issues), I used these 
methods only if full consent was provided by the research participants (Ball and Gilligan 2010). 
In retrospect, however, I completely underestimated my own visibility. In the course of 
fieldwork, I became myself increasingly visible on social media platforms, especially on websites 
run by migrant associations or on their Facebook pages. Because pictures of previous meetings 
circulated, this meant that I had to openly disclose, when directly asked, who else I had 
previously met and in which conference or meeting I had participated, without evoking what 
had been said in the best possible diplomatic way. In sum, the photographs supported me 
throughout my research:  
· in conducting fieldwork, particularly in the orientation-phases, when I was confronted with 
a flow of new information, which I found difficult to record in detail;  
· in the analysis of my data; for the design of the thesis structure;  
· in the writing-up to evoke memories of different places, and of activities in which I 
participated  
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· and in visualising the different life-worlds and realities encountered on my fieldwork, difficult 
to express just with words. 
 
3.3.2 Secondary data sources 
 
3.3.2.1 Analysis of relevant documents 
 
For investigating how the involvement of migrant organisations in development is reflected in 
policy plans and activities, I conducted an inductive content-analysis of relevant development 
policy and programme documents, according to Mayring (2008): i.e. EU Council conclusions, the 
EU-Partnership framework, UN resolutions on international migration and development, the 
IOM’s Small Grant Mechanism Programme, and diverse programmes implemented by bilateral 
development agencies. I also analysed the key-actors’ main handbooks, manuals, toolkits, 
training-material, reports of workshops and visual and audio ‘testimonies of migrants in action 
for development’ (DVDs, CDs, audio-presentations, documentary films) produced by key-
development actors. Likewise, I analysed the migrant associations under study according to 
Mayring (2008): the associations’ key organisational characteristics, their degree of formation 
and form of creation, as well as their number of members. My analysis was also based on 
information derived from video-footage, media reports of conferences, photos, articles, and on 
accounts of the migrants’ philanthropic engagement in the Moldovan national press (e.g. the 
printed diaspora-newspaper ‘Gazeta Basarabiei’). 
Fieldwork also included searches in archives and libraries, such as for instance the 
‘Médiatheque Abdelmalek Sayad’ in Paris, the library of the IOM headquarters in Geneva, or the 
‘l'osservatorio della immigrazione’ in Bologna34. Yet, this archival data collection did not yield 
much, either because of a lack of data or because the relevant material was also published 
online. In contrast, the numerous unpublished secondary materials I collected throughout my 
fieldwork – sent or handed out by research participants – proved to be very relevant for 
informing my research topic. It consisted of working papers on official emigration policies, jointly 
produced by migrant representatives, and of the key-donors’ unpublished material, such as staff 
working papers, and unpublished communication and policy briefs on new approaches of my 
research topic.  
                                                          
34 I collected relevant information such as statistics on migration and development, the migrants’ legal status, use of 
remittances, the nature of their employment abroad and information on the broader associational or voluntary sector 
in the countries under study.  
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Furthermore, as the internet is a significant instrument for transnational migrant 
communities, used in what Kissau and Hunger call ‘the construction of shared imagination’ 
(2010: 246), I also spent some fieldwork time in the ‘digital transnational field’. I have attempted 
to portray categories of practices emerging from the migrant community’s morphology, by 
analysing ‘face-to-interface relationships’, thematic orientations, self-description or group 
boundaries on websites run by migrant associations or on specific ‘Diaspora’ internet platforms, 
such as ‘diaspora.md’ or ‘Moldova.org’, in social medias, blogs, etc.  
 
3.3.3 Grounded-Theory and Reflexive Analysis 
 
As stated above, I started to analyse my data according to the principles of grounded theory 
during my fieldwork breaks (Glaser and Strauss 1973). Grounded theory reinforces the 
importance of understanding general theory in relation to empirical data. In these terms, I 
reflected on the data through the three theoretical lenses outlined in Chapter 2 (Clarke 2005). 
This approach suggested useful techniques for coding empirical data. To this end, I analysed the 
interview transcriptions and coded them with the Atlas. ti 6.2 Programme (similar to NVivo) to 
support my process of working out the general themes and categories that emerged from the 
semi-structured interviews. I found the open-coding techniques and structures (visual models 
to explore the interconnectedness of themes) useful in regard to easy access to the data using 
groupings and the possibility to attach notes to particular segments of texts. As it was essentially 
inductive, it yielded both expected and unexpected analytical categories (Charmaz 2006). This 
technique, however, was time consuming and limited to the analysis of what had been said in 
interviews35. Therefore, the information gathered through participant observation, my 
fieldwork notes and the earlier-highlighted four matched-samples, which I incorporated into the 
overall body of empirical data, gave me the opportunity to work out ideas more in-depth and to 
go beyond of what was said in the interviews (cf. Strübing 2004).  
Besides achieving a scientific saturation according to grounded theory, meaning no more 
relevant categories or insights were revealed, I also felt towards my fieldwork completion 
somehow a ‘personal saturation’ and fatigue. Being constantly on the move, having to respond 
creatively over a longer period of time to people’s grounded concerns in numerous 
encounters36, and having to attentively observe my immediate surroundings in different 
geographical contexts, had drained a lot of my energy. 
                                                          
35 Due to time constraints, I limited the computer-based analysis to 40 interviews.  
36 These included fieldwork assistants and a web of fieldwork supporters consisting of friends and colleagues who 
hosted me in different fieldwork locations. 
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3.4 Ethical Considerations and Positionalities 
I round off this chapter by sketching some reflections on the ethical dimensions of my research 
and on my multiple positionalities in relation to the research participants. Prior to entering the 
'field', I had reflected on the linked issues of trust and encouraging participation, confidentiality, 
informed consent, and anonymity. My personal understanding of conducting ethical 
ethnography is premised within an ethics of trust. This means I understand ethnographic 
research as the establishment of reciprocal relationships built on mutual trust and rapport 
(Emerson et al. 1995). Building trust and confidence also consist of providing the research 
participants with relevant information in order to ensure their informed consent of my intrusion 
into their lives (Charmaz 2006). Because of my understanding of ethnography as a mode of 
reciprocal engagement, rather than looking at Moldovan migrants and development actors 
purely as ‘informants’ or ‘subjects’, I viewed them as research participants, which provides my 
research to some degrees with a participative research character. This practice required me to 
have an open attitude to unexpected perspectives, and to develop research approaches that 
minimise the extent to which I intrude my assumptions into the research process (Rubin and 
Rubin 1995). Indeed, some of the research participants took an active part, directly or indirectly, 
in contributing to the research process; for instance, through sharing their unpublished policy 
briefs or photographs of their development projects, and by keeping me up-dated via telephone, 
skype, email, and social media, about the evolution of their activities, and/or about the general 
political situation in Moldova more broadly, beyond my last fieldwork stage. Hannerz calls this 
form of participation in multi-sited research a ‘polymorphous engagement’ consisting of 
“interacting with research participants across a number of dispersed sites, keeping touch with 
some of them in person or per email over a certain period of time and collecting data from a 
disparate array of sources” (Hannerz 2003: 212)37. Vice-versa, the more I engaged with the 
communities under study, the more I became myself increasingly part of the transnational 
networks by linking aid-workers with one-another, putting in contact migrant associations with 
similar interests across different countries and migrants with donor organisations.  
I ensured confidentiality of the research participants to the best of my ability in the research 
process and also in the course of the writing up. I only conducted interviews when full consent 
was given by the respondents. Yet, in my understanding, ethical research goes beyond signed 
                                                          
37 When designing my research project, I initially contemplated to return to Moldova at the end of my field work, in 
order to see how certain migration–development schemes had evolved in the meantime. Based on the quality and 
quantity of my data collected up to March 2014, and the fact that I stayed in frequent contact with several participants 
in Moldova, who kept me regularly updated, I decided that this last fieldwork stay was not necessary anymore.   
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consent forms and agreements of confidentiality. Rather, it is a matter of building up a 
relationship of trust in which the participants are given the feeling of being heard throughout 
the research process. For instance, some migrant leaders in Germany were reluctant to 
participate in my research, because of their previous negative experiences with a journalist who 
did not treat their data with confidentiality. This meant that I first needed to build up trust and 
to find the right tone for assuring them that I will treat the data in a professional manner. 
As I did not want to rely exclusively on ‘formal consent’ interviews and participation, but on 
a range of information garnered throughout my research, I found it even more important that I 
conducted ‘conscious ethnography’ that is sensitive to the research participants throughout the 
entire research process in regard to respect and confidentiality (Clarke 2005). Because I was 
doing fieldwork in a politically charged environment consisting of dedicated and often 
charismatic individuals who had passionate and/or adversarial relationships with other groups 
or formal Moldovan policies, I found this responsible ethnographic attitude even more relevant. 
Besides the politically sensitive subject matter of the topic, and the post-communist context of 
‘distrust’ among some participants, which I will describe in more detail in the next chapter, 
another challenge was the size of Moldova’s development scene. The local and international 
development scene in Moldova is fairly small. Everybody knows everybody and everybody has 
worked for everybody. This is also true for the members of the small but dynamic migrant civil 
society who are in contact with one another across different host societies and who maintain 
strong ties with Moldova’s political decision makers. Although the size of the community was an 
advantage in gaining access to research participants, it required a flair for dealing with delicate 
matters, such as ‘personal politics’ or the earlier highlighted inquiries of: who else have you met 
and talked to? The small size of the community also meant that, after having gained a sense of 
familiarity with migrant leaders, to a point at which I easily knew before meeting them in which 
direction the political discourse will take off, I had reached a satisfactory point of fieldwork 
completion. Given the sensitivity of the information collected, I always used pseudonyms in 
interviews to protect the participants’ anonymity.  
And last of all, before entering the ‘field’, I put a lot of thought into issues of positionality, 
arising from my multifaceted research design. I thoughtfully anticipated power dynamics 
between the research participants and me that might originate in national belonging, such as 
my privileged situation of being able to move freely within Europe, age, gender and social status 
(Shinozaki 2012). As I proceeded in my fieldwork, however, I came to understand that my 
multiple positionalities, pertaining from research participants as variegated as Moldovan taxi-
drivers and artists in Paris, English ‘expats’ in Brussels, German aid-workers, female Moldovan 
care-workers, Russian Orthodox Priests, and Italian administration employees, among others, 
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were impossible to categorise and summarise. Thus, I concluded, with Anthias (2008), that I had 
multiple social positionalities, constituted in a situational manner. The only invariable constant 
within these fluidities was my dualistic ‘insider-outsider’ role, highlighted earlier in this chapter. 
Reflecting on this, I agree with Marcus who maintains that: “A resolute multi-sitedness in 
ethnographic terms tends to challenge and complicate in a positive way the hyper emphasis on 
situated subject positions by juxtaposition and dispersion through investigation in more complex 
social spaces than many recent varieties of poststructuralist theory on culture and identity have 
allowed” (1998: 19). In conclusion, I found the reflections and considerations of the complex 
construction of subjectivities an important part of my overall fieldwork preparation. They 
provided me with a certain self-confidence, less in regard to the actual positions as they 
emerged during fieldwork, but as a means to critically engage with a ‘self-reflexive fieldwork 
practice’ more broadly – “[…] a way of remaining mindful and accountable” (Haraway 1997 
quoted in Hörschelmann and Stenning 2008: 359).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Encounters at the Fringe of Europe: Moldova’s Development Transition  
 
In this long chapter I engage with the Republic of Moldova and its development transition. 
Drawing on the migrants’ and development actors’ perspective on the country’s post-Soviet 
development path, I set the scene for Moldova’s economic, social and political context in which 
migrant associations and development organisations engage, and under which current 
emigration occurs. The view of both research groups on Moldova’s transition is central for 
further assessing their developmental engagement in the country as well as their mutual aid-
relationships. Throughout the chapter, I refer at several points to two seemingly simple 
questions which I have already partly referred to in Chapter 1, namely: Where is Moldova? And 
what is Moldova? I use these two questions as a guideline for thinking in terms of spatial and 
temporal openness for investigating Moldova’s development transition and its socio-spatial 
configurations within Europe.  
 I first provide an overview of the main economic, political and social challenges that Moldova 
is facing in its current development transition. The focus is put on three key interacting factors, 
which set Moldova’s socio-political and economic development transition apart from other 
former Soviet countries: its slow social and economic development, its large-scale emigration, 
and its search for national identity. Further addressing my findings with the analytical optic of 
multi-perspectivity, I then introduce the migrants’ perception of Moldova’s post-Soviet 
transformation path up to now. This also includes migrants’ considerations on the Socialist past 
and their thoughts on their home-country’s place in today’s Europe, which both shape migrants’ 
collective transnational development practices. In the last section, I sketch Moldova’s post-
Soviet transformation and migrants’ transnational practices from a wider geographical 
perspective of intra-European spatial configurations. I discuss my findings on the country’s post-
Soviet transformation and its intense migration through the lens of intra-European 
interconnectedness, an aspect that has particularly emerged from my multi-sited fieldwork 
across several different European countries, and that was already running as a central theme 
through Chapter 3.  
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4.1 Main Characteristics of Moldova’s Transformation 
4.1.1 Introducing Moldova: economic and political reforms 
I now introduce Moldova and I map the country’s most important and recent economic and 
institutional reforms.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Republic of Moldova is rather little-known, and few Western 
Europeans know about the country’s existence or its geographical location. Some authors even 
call it ‘the forgotten country’ (e.g. Löwenhardt et al. 2001: 605). This fact was also commonly 
stressed by migrants. Below, Christina highlights a positive aspect of originating from a fairly 
unknown country: 
Christina (housewife, 29, London): If I tell people where I come from they don’t know where 
Moldova is. Some even think it’s an imaginary country, a fantasy land like ‘Syldavia’ in the 
adventures of Titin [laughs]. Or, they think we are from Malta or the Maldives! And because 
people don’t know anything about Moldova, they also don’t have a negative picture about 
Moldovan migrants.  
However, in the course of my research, the answer to the simple question of Where is Moldova? 
proved to be highly contested among research participants, especially with regard to the 
country’s place in relation to Europe. As we shall see later, the various answers to this question 
impact upon migrants’ interpretations of Moldova’s development path, and upon their 
collective humanitarian practices. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Geographical location of Moldova 
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According to the latest national statistical report, Moldova has an estimated population of 
4.2 million inhabitants, including the approximately 400,000 who live in the de facto Russian-
controlled breakaway region of Transnistria (CBS-AXA 2011). The UNDP (2014) estimates 
Moldova’s population, including Transnistria, as smaller, around 3.9 million. Over half of 
Moldova’s population (59%) lives in rural areas, which makes Moldova the country with the 
lowest rate of urbanisation in Europe (UNDP 2011). The major ethnic groups in Moldova are 
Moldovans (35%), Ukrainians (25%), Russians (30%) and the Gagauzes, a Turkish ethnic group 
(5%) (ETF 2010).  
In the Soviet era, Moldova’s economy was strongly interlocked with the Soviet economic 
system. Unsurprisingly, after the country’s independence in 1991, Moldova witnessed a sharp 
economic decline, especially in small rural towns and communities that were structurally 
dependent on a small number of enterprises during Soviet times (Marcu 2014). In the early 
1990s, a number of economic reforms, implemented as part of Moldova’s complex shift from a 
closed, centrally planned economy to a more open market economy, were undertaken – such 
as the mass privatisation of economic concerns, and land reforms in the agricultural sector 
(Ratzmann 2014). The creation of small private farms provided protection for workers from the 
now-closed industries. However, these measures have not arrested the deterioration of living 
conditions for the majority of the population, which still depends largely on subsistence farming 
(Ratzmann 2014).  
 Furthermore, the Russian economic crisis in 1998 hit Moldova especially hard, because the 
largest part of Moldova’s exports was sent to Russia (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009). Even 
today, the country’s economy still heavily relies on the Russian and CIS-market. Finding 
alternative markets is an economic and political necessity for Moldova; so, in November 2014, 
the country signed a free-trade association agreement with the European Union. Yet, the 
adoption of EU quality and technical standards of agricultural products poses a hurdle for 
Moldova, and the country’s economic growth remains mainly based on the consumption of 
foreign goods, purchased with migrants’ remittances. The IMF (2013) even reports that the 
economic situation has not improved in the last four years, due to the recession in the wider 
Euro zone, further hampering Moldova’s small and weak economy. Especially the health, 
education and social protection systems have suffered from the recent economic troubles, 
which resulted in a decrease of living conditions for the already most vulnerable groups, such as 
disabled people or the elderly (World Bank 2014). In sum, Moldova’s economy is far from being 
robust (Expert Group 2014b). 
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The Republic of Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, with a GDP per capita of 2,037 
USD (World Bank 2014). In 1999, nearly half of the Moldovan population lived below the poverty 
line. In the following years, the country enjoyed steady growth and economic stability, and by 
2012 the poverty level for the total population had decreased to a quarter of the population 
living on less than 2 US dollars a day (IMF 2014). Yet, this was again largely due to the inflows of 
remittances which underpinned both the macro-economy and many families’ livelihoods. At the 
same time, the disparities between the rural and urban populations had been constantly 
increasing (IMF 2014)38.  
 A specific feature of Moldova’s poverty is the fact that unemployment alone does not provide 
a full explanation for poverty, suggesting that the wages are often below subsistence level 
(UNDP 2014). The monthly average wage of 200 Euro is the lowest in Europe (BTI 2013). 
Considering that the living expenses are comparable to Italy, it is understandable that many 
Moldovans face difficulties in meeting their daily needs. Below, Angela narrates the challenges 
her daughter and son-in-law face:  
Angela (NGO-worker, 52, Chisinau): My son-in-law is a policeman. He earns a 4000 lei a month 
(approximately 200 Euros). At the moment, he can’t afford to rent a proper flat. So, they live 
together with his cousin in a tiny room, and they share the kitchen and toilet with other people. 
I always tell him to go abroad for a year, for instance to Russia, so at least they can save money 
for a flat. On the long term, I don’t know what he can offer her.  
 
Moldova’s structural and economic constraints also impede migrant associations’ development 
interventions in the country. The following example illustrates how migrants’ development ideas 
and initiatives can be obstructed by the country’s low economic and social development:  
Svetlana (factory worker and artist, 55, Munich): The hardship of life decided our activities. We 
made our first return trip to Moldova in 2008. Ten years after the country hit rock bottom, but 
the situation was still very depressing. We wanted to start our activities – joint scientific exchange 
programmes between Germany and Moldova. But as I said, life decided. We realised that we 
needed to wait with our exchange projects. We needed to help the vulnerable people in the 
villages first.  
 
 Last of all, endemic corruption and bureaucracy remain other major concerns. Despite laws 
to promote governmental transparency, corruption is prevalent in almost all areas (BTI 2013). 
The improvement of rules for small and medium enterprises, for instance, comes up against 
some rent-seeking efforts connected to political parties (Parmentier 2010). Moldova’s on-going 
unfavourable legal framework and investment climate, the administrative hurdles and the poor 
regulatory environment present barriers for migrants in several regards. For instance, for 
                                                          
38 For instance, in 2013, 38% of children from rural areas lived below the poverty line, compared to 13% in urban 
areas (UNDP 2014). 
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migrant associations’ development interventions in the country, and especially for the creation 
of NGOs or the opening up of social-businesses. Three migrant leaders intended to create NGOs 
in Moldova for the implementation of their humanitarian projects, but failed, because of the 
costly and time-consuming hurdles. Likewise, Moldova’s structural deficit obstructs migrants’ 
contemplated return, or their private business investments (Marcu 2014)39.  
 Because of Moldova’s low level of economic and social development, the country is the top 
recipient of EU financial support per capita in the EU-neighbourhood area, with a net total of 
465 million Euro, equivalent to 10% of its GDP (Caritas 2013). The European Union is the most 
important development partner. Other key partners are Austria, the Bretton Woods institutions, 
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA, and the UN (Caritas 2013). The donor community’s 
emphasis is put on the improvement of institutional capacities, structural adjustment, 
transitions to liberal market-economies and rapprochement to the EU (2013a). Other large-scale 
aid-programmes target agricultural reforms, the water and sanitation infrastructure40, 
healthcare shortcomings, social assistance reforms and the educational sector (Caritas 2013; 
LED 2013; SDC 2014).  
While the reform process was painfully slow during the first decade of transition, since the 
mid-2000s, Moldova has come to be the ‘darling’ of the EU. On my fieldwork in Brussels, the 
country was heralded as a 'success story' in implementing its programmes, especially in the 
fulfilment of its requirements in the EU-Eastern Partnership Programmes that lead to the 
Association Agreement signed in November 2013 (EU 2013c). However, I argue that the 
country’s reputation in the donor community has lately taken a knock. The ‘official’ rhetoric of 
Moldova’s frenetic efforts in the progress towards transformation, and the references to 
Moldova as ‘the model student’ within the EUs merit-based approach, were still omnipresent in 
the narratives of participants engaged in the implementation of state policies, for instance in 
the EU-visa-liberalisation process launched in 2010, or in migration–development policies, as we 
shall see in Chapter 6. Vice-versa, the migrants’ accounts and the estimates of participants 
working for international aid-agencies or for Moldovan NGOs were of a different tune – one of 
a growing disappointment with the Government’s track record until today. In their view, 
Moldova’s reforms were most progressive in the headlines of local newspapers and websites. 
Because of their discontentment with the Moldovan government’s slow improvements in its 
economic, social and political reforms, some aid-workers are coming to doubt their engagement 
                                                          
39 This is one reason why some return migrants open up their small or medium businesses across the Romanian 
border, where legal frameworks are more favourable (Marcu 2014).  
40 Only 62% of Moldova’s population has access to save drinking water (UNDP 2014).   
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in the country. The quote from Pius, an aid-practitioner, exemplifies the growing unease within 
the international aid community about their engagement in Moldova: 
 
 Pius (aid-worker, 42, Chisinau): Moldova has always been poor, ok, but considering the sum of 
external funding and investment, the situation in this country should be far more improved by 
now. Sometimes I ask myself: What are we doing here? Is it right to support the education of 
young people so they can find jobs abroad? Is that really our duty? Maybe it is good to educate 
them, so they have at least an education when they go abroad, and they might be less exploited.  
 
And Max refers to social inequalities that rose more sharply in Moldova than in any other post-
communist country (Munteanu 2000):  
Max (aid-worker, 63, Lucerne): In the past, I have worked in several African countries and in the 
Middle-East, but how can I say this: I find Moldova the most difficult country to work in. Ehm the 
poverty in the villages, especially the situation of people who don’t receive any support from 
abroad, and the huge wealth-gaps gets to me more here than elsewhere. Maybe it is because I 
constantly think: Hey, this is Europe! 
 
 In conclusion, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moldova’s economy collapsed more 
severely than was the case in all other former Soviet republics, experiencing a loss of foreign 
markets, low labour productivity, inflation and an increase in the public deficit (Ratzmann 2014). 
This occurred despite the country implementing a range of economic reforms in order to meet 
the challenges posed by transition, especially in the areas of de-politisation of state institutions, 
and in combatting endemic corruption (EU 2013b). Moreover, since 2009, the global economic 
crisis has had negative effects on the country’s small and open economy, highly vulnerable to 
external economic stress (UNDP 2014). Keeping in mind that a number of conditionalities need 
to be met in order for migrants’ development engagements to positively impact on 
transformation in Moldova, I argue that migration–development programmes should not divert 
the attention of the government and external development actors from the country’s 
institutional and structural deficits (cf. Skeldon 2008). As we shall see later, the current trend of 
placing the responsibilities for development firmly on migrants not only obstructs Moldova’s 
development process but also migrants’ contribution to Moldova’s transformation.  
In the next subsection, I document a second important factor that sets Moldova’s post-
communist transition apart from other countries of the former USSR, namely the socio-political 
division of the country, commonly referred to as the ‘Moldova’s identity dilemma’. 
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Figure 4.2: Moldova – a land full of contrasts 
 
4.1.2 Moldova’s search for identity  
4.1.2.1 Multiple development orientations  
The Republic of Moldova is a post-Communist country with distinctive regional divisions (King 
2010). As a classic borderland, it has been moved back and forth between Russia and Romania 
in the past – while the western part of Moldova belonged several times to Romania, the East of 
the country always remained a part of Russia. In contrast to other CIS countries, Moldova had 
never been an independent state prior to the USSR. In 1991, at the beginning of the transition 
period, the existence of an ethnic or civic Moldovan nation was hotly disputed (King 2001). The 
dominant elite factions favoured ‘reunification’ with Romania and denied the existence of a 
separate Moldovan nation. The debate over the formation of a nation-state absorbed a lot of 
political energies and resulted in considerable polarisation of the population. Even today, the 
‘Moldovan identity’ remains unsettled, and the country exists as “a strange twilight – politically 
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independent but culturally and socially tied to its Romanian and Russian neighbours” 
(Katchanovski 2004: 12). In Mihail’s words:  
Mihail (entrepreneur, 55, Bologna): I don’t think we have a national identity, because there isn’t 
really a Moldovan nation. We are a population, not a nation, and this population is divided. It will 
be a very long process before we achieve the status of a nation with a common national identity.  
 
Migrant leaders who were fighting for the reunification with Romania in the early 1990s, chiefly 
intellectuals, frequently used the allegory of Moldova as a branch of the ‘Romanian tree’ that 
had been violently cut-off by the Russians. For them, the Republic of Moldova is an uprooted 
population from Romania – an abstract political concept. Or, a nation that simply does not exist. 
As Dima explained: 
(Dima, 47, taxi-driver, Paris): Moldova doesn’t exist. There are no Moldovan parties and there is 
no Moldovan politics – only geopolitics.  
 
The issue of Moldova’s identity-building in relation to the Romanian identity is too complex to 
explore in depth41. Instead, I would like to address how the young country’s struggle for identity 
results in a strong socio-political division of the country, obstructing current reforms.  
 Moldova is administratively and socio-politically divided into three parts: the Romanian- 
speaking main part of Moldova42, the semi-autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia 
(GagauzYeri) in the South43, and the non-recognised independent territory of the Transdniestre 
region (also called Transnistria), which is largely populated by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians 
(see Figure 4.1). The severity of Moldova’s economic downturn after its independence was 
strongly interlinked with the secession in 1992 of Transnistria, where most of the country’s 
industrial capacity was situated during Soviet times. Transnistria tried to secede from Moldova 
in 1991, as it did not want to belong to an independent nation of Moldova or to Romania. The 
political conflict became violent in 1992, when the Transdniestrian secessionists, supported by 
Russian troops, declared their region independent from Moldova. The separation of the 
province meant that the Chisinau government lost control over the country’s Eastern border, as 
well as its main energy and industrial production. Though the territory still belongs officially to 
the Republic of Moldova, some authors consider Transnistria already as a Russian protectorate, 
because of the heavy presence of Russian soldiers, and the fact that 75% of the budget derives 
                                                          
41 For an overview of this highly politicised issue see Heintz 2005. 
42 Moldova’s official language changed from Moldovan to Romanian in 2013. Russian is the official language in 
Gagauzia and Transnistria.  
43 Semi-autonomous means that the Gagauz have for instance their own president (Başkan), police force and 
education system.  
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directly from Russian subsidies (Expert-Group 2014a). Despite numerous rounds of talks, 
coordinated by the OSCE and regional neighbours, Transnistria remains to this day a de facto 
non-recognised region by the international community.  
 Besides its status as a ‘frozen conflict zone’, Transnistria is also commonly known as the 
‘Soviet-Disneyland’, the ‘Open-air Lenin museum’ or as “a black hole of the global economy, a 
hotspot of organized crime, trafficking and bootlegging” (Protsyk 2010: 36). Indeed, it is a 
geographical site of commemoration and symbolic representation of communism, ensconced in 
nostalgia. Tiraspol, the capital of the breakaway Republic, for instance, is the only place in 
Europe that still uses the hammer and sickle on its flag. On my trips into the territory I have 
noticed hardly any traffic on the colossal boulevards – framed by monumental Soviet 
architecture designed by party planners for a busy town. The oversized infrastructure reminded 
me of an empty façade in a historical play. My personal impression of emptiness has a good 
reason. More than half of Transnistria’s population of approximately 800,000 has already left 
the small strip of land, mostly for the Ukraine, Russia or the Middle East (UNDP 2014). Given the 
high intensity of emigration, some participants ironically stressed that at some point migration 
will solve the ‘frozen conflict’, because sooner or later nobody will be left in the territory. 
However, during my fieldwork in 2013, tensions between Moldova, Russia and Transnistria were 
building up, and they reached a new peak in 2014. With the Russian annexion of Crimea in 2014, 
and with the on-going crisis in the Ukraine, Moldova feels Russia’s doctrine of enlarging its 
territory towards the West to be stronger than ever.  
 A second obstacle to a ‘united’ Moldovan development transition is the tendency of Gagauzia 
to get closer to Russia. The Gagauz are christianised Turks, and they migrated to Moldova in the 
19th century with the aid of the Russians, in order to avoid religiously motivated persecution by 
the Ottoman Empire. Since then, Gagauzia, demonstrates a strong pro-Russian political 
orientation (Katchanovski 2004). Two years ago, for instance, the Gagauzian assembly voted to 
join Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in the Eurasian Economic Union (EurasiaNet.org 2014). Like 
Transnistria, Gagauzia is filled with Soviet relicts and nostalgic slogans, making it impossible to 
escape the reminiscences of the past. Out of a total population of approximately 160,000 
inhabitants, an estimated 80% of the economically active population works abroad, 
predominantly in Turkey, Russia and the Ukraine (Parmentier 2010). Interestingly, when I visited 
development projects carried out by migrants in Gagauzia, some research participants were 
referring to social institutions, e.g. children’s homes or infrastructure projects, as being 
supported by locals living in Transnistria. The participants’ accounts of collective donations by 
Gagauz living in Transnistria as ‘coming from abroad’ is a good illustration of the complex and 
unsettled issue of Moldova’s state territory. In these cases, I suggest opting for Pichler’s (2009) 
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approach of transterritoriality, respectively of ‘trans-territorial practices’, which captures more 
adequately these forms of collective aid-giving, than the concept of transnational practices. The 
examples of Moldovans living in Transnistria and their support considered as ‘coming from 
abroad’ illustrates well the added complexity of these two territories on the compound 
understanding of Moldovanness. In the words of Antonia, a Gagauze:         
Antonia (chairwoman of a local NGO, 58, Comrat): I can’t say that I am Moldovan, but I would like 
to live in an independent Republic of Moldova. Yes. And why not a future EU-membership? But 
please without the help of Romania. I can’t support this idea. I don’t want us to belong to 
Romania, because we culturally rely on Turkey and Russia.  
With the uncertain developments in neighbouring Ukraine, it is most likely that ambiguities 
about the Russian-speaking entities in and around Moldova will remain, and that these two 
regions, determined to follow the opposite direction of the official ‘pro-European 
transformation path’, will continue to absorb a considerable amount of political energies in 
Moldova’s capital.  
 In conclusion, I would like to quote Gellner, who stresses that “nationalism is primarily a 
political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1983: 
1). In these terms, “the unsettled nature of the essentials of nationalism is at the crux of the 
Moldovan dilemma” (Katchanovski 2004: 32). The country remains a nation divided, and its 
search for identity continues to delay the much-needed social, political and economic reforms.  
 In the next subsection, I illustrate how Moldova’s ongoing struggle for socio-political identity 
also slows down the development of a coherent structural and ideological engagement with its 
emigrants, and the creation of mechanisms to enhance migrant associations’ capacities as 
development actors. 
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Figure 4.3: Emptiness and reminiscences of the past 
 
 4.1.2.2 Moldova’s fragile political equilibrium: emigrant engagement towards a contested 
notion of ‘home country’ 
 
A crucial moment for Moldova’s chosen transformation path towards the European Union and 
for its engagement with Moldovan citizens living in Western Europe has been the ‘Twitter-
Revolution’ in November 2009. After disputed parliamentary elections and civil unrest in the 
capital, the Communist Party, in power since 2001, was replaced by a new coalition government, 
the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), a four-party coalition.  
 Migrant leaders frequently highlighted that migrants in Western and Southern Europe were 
a key vehicle in this political turnaround. They played a crucial role in mobilising votes for the 
‘Alliance’, and in initiating public anti-government protests across Western Europe, including in 
the cities under study: Geneva, London, Bologna, Rome and Paris. The finding that migrants 
considerably contributed to the electoral outcomes by means of political transnationalism, such 
as distant voting and associational political activism, supports a quantitative study by Mahmoud 
and his colleagues (2013), in which the authors conclude that migrants in Western Europe were 
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a decisive factor in overthrowing the last ruling Communist government in Europe in 2009. Yet, 
as a result of the country’s socio-political division, Moldova’s political equilibrium remains 
fragile. My fieldwork in Moldova took place in spring 2013, at a politically sensitive time, when 
the pro-European government in Chisinau had collapsed due to internal disputes. The May 2013 
public opinion poll, with 39% support for the Communists, suggested that the opposition needs 
only to be patient to turn the country’s direction again towards ‘Eurasia’ (CIVIS/IPP 2014). 
Additionally, the last parliamentary elections in November 2014 were tightly won by the Pro-
Western parties. The Socialists, seeking ties with Russia and the Russian-led Customs Union, 
however, stay the strongest party in the country (Expert Group 2014b). Although the political 
deadlock during my stay in Moldova could be solved, I argue that the country’s political 
instability slows down the building-up of policies designed to engage with emigrants and to 
support and encourage their development projects. Below, Esperanta explains the lack of 
planning reliability in the creation of new migration–development programmes: 
 
Esperanta (aid-worker, 35, Chisinau): At the moment, we are blocked with our projects, because 
nobody in the government feels responsible for us anymore. Nobody knows what will happen if 
we have early governmental elections, and certainly not if the Communists come back into power. 
No one will tell you what they will do, let’s say in three months, because you can’t predict or plan 
anything in this country.  
Esperanta refers to the fact that recent emigration policies, for instance the newly created 
Bureau for Relations with the Diaspora of the State Chancellery (BRD), aimed at ‘accessing’ and 
‘mobilising’ migrants, and migration–development programmes carried out by international aid-
agencies within the framework of the EU-Mobility Partnership Programme, are financed by 
Western development institutions (e.g. EU 2013a). In 2012, the ‘Bureau for Relations with the 
Diaspora’ replaced the ‘Bureau for Interethnic Relations’ (BRI), chiefly oriented towards the 
migrant community east of Moldova, which until then was the government’s formal body for 
emigrant engagement. Although the BRI is still functional, the development industry’s focus of 
interest and funding is nowadays put on the Bureau for Relations with the Diaspora44. According 
to research participants, a change in the country’s direction towards the East would have 
resulted in the closing down of the Bureau or in a considerable re-organisation, and the Bureau 
for Interethnic Relations would have gained in importance. Igor explains the practical 
implications of the fragile political equilibrium in 2013:  
Igor (programme manager, 39, Chisinau): If we are lucky, we will still be planning in a year. But if 
the political direction changes, we are not planning anymore, because there will be again less 
funding and less interest in migrants living west of Moldova. So, we just don't know.  
                                                          
44 I will henceforth refer to the Bureau for Relations with the Diaspora simply as the Bureau.  
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In general, I have observed that the increasing enthusiasm with which state institutions have 
engaged with Moldova’s absentees since 2009 is already somewhat dwindling. One reason for 
their early disenchantment is that the newly-built foundations for emigrant engagement are 
bound to give way at any time in Moldova’s unpredictable political climate. The country’s 
political instability can provoke abrupt changes of official diaspora policies, according to the 
swings of directions of the declared transformation path, either towards the ‘East’ or the ‘West’, 
and consequently on the migrants ‘in sight’, either living east or west of the country. For this 
reason, the majority of development participants involved in the building-up of state-led policies 
for emigrant engagement remain hesitant in their long-term strategic planning.  
Furthermore, several authors maintain that, in order to build stronger and more sustainable 
links between migrant communities abroad and their ‘homeland’, a coherent state identity is an 
advantage (e.g. Collyer 2013). As I have highlighted earlier, the degree to which this identity 
resonates for Moldovans is quite critical. I argue, therefore, that Moldova’s socio-political 
division of the country not only delays the country’s social and economic development, but it 
also negatively impacts upon efforts to incite migrants around a coherent ‘notion of homeland’, 
and upon the inclusion of migrants’ development efforts in formal ‘nation-led’ transformation 
programmes. Moreover, the changing orientations in the government’s socio-political interests 
also impact on the migrants’ and aid-organisations’ trust in the government. Given that 
migrants' collective activities are most likely to succeed if trust is shared by migrants, aid-
organisations and state institutions, the establishment of partnerships between the state and 
migrants is somewhat troubled, and migrants’ aspirations to contribute to Moldova as their 
homeland is impaired. These considerations have not yet been taken into account in the 
academic literature, nor in consultancy reports on programmes aiming to leverage the migrant 
associations’ engagement for Moldova’s development (e.g. IASCI/Nexus 2014). 
Lastly, in my view, politics is ideally not only about interests but also about the need for 
people to identify with a common project. I think it is precisely the lack of an identification with 
a ‘common Moldovan project’ that obstructs the institutional fostering of ties between migrants 
and their home country. A national narrative or ideology is a positive determinant for migrants’ 
attachment to their home country that can encourage the creation of positive synergies 
between migrants and state institutions (e.g. Collyer 2013). The fluid definition of what Moldova 
exactly is and the missing common ‘Moldovan project’ obstructs migrants’ ideological 
integration into a cohesive national narrative of Moldova. Unfortunately, I deem both the 
development industry and the emigrants badly equipped to deliver from the outside a common 
Moldovan national narrative. Moreover, disputes over territorialities and over how many official 
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cultural and linguistic regions there actually exist in this multicultural country further hamper an 
incorporation of emigrants into an additional symbolic Moldovan region. Such a symbolic 
Moldovan migrant region could strengthen emotional ties between the country and its citizens 
abroad. Like, for instance in the Swiss case, where the emigrant community is officially referred 
to as the ‘Fifth Switzerland’, in addition to the other four main linguistic and cultural regions: 
German, French, Italian and Romansh. In all these respects, bearing in mind that Moldova’s 
survival is guaranteed to a large extent by external funding, either by remittances or foreign aid, 
and as long as the money flows towards Moldova, the government might actually not feel the 
need to define a ‘common Moldovan project’, nor to include its absentees into a common 
national narrative. Despite (or precisely because) of the fact that the poor Republic of Moldova 
will not be transformed through remittances alone, the current model ‘of surviving’, backed up 
by remittances, works perfectly well for the elites.  
 I now turn to the third reason for Moldova’s difficult transition, namely the country’s large-
scale outmigration. I briefly illustrate how the substantial emigration manifests itself in today’s 
Moldova and how it affects the country’s entire social fabric. 
Figure 4.4: Moldova’s struggle for identity 
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4.1.3 Migration as an integral part of development transition 
 
In this section, I take up the theoretical discussion on migration as an integral part of Moldova's 
development transition outlined in Chapter 2, and I sketch the role of Moldovan emigration in 
the country’s transformative societal change. Second, I discuss my findings on the impact of 
migration on the meso level – the migrant associations and aid-agencies active in the social field 
of Moldova. As there is to my knowledge no qualitative in-depth study on this issue in the 
Moldovan case, I primarily draw my analysis from the empirical data collected in Moldova. A 
more detailed account of the country’s main emigration characteristics will be provided in the 
next chapter. 
 
4.1.3.1 The role of emigration in today’s Moldova 
East-West migration flows are intrinsically linked with the post-communist political and 
economic transformations in Eastern Europe (Engbersen et al. 2010). This also applies to 
Moldova, where migration is a key factor of demographic transformation and social change. The 
quote below from Diana, a social worker in a rural village, illustrates the intensity of Moldova’s 
post-1991 emigration: 
Diana (social worker, 46, Şipca): I give you an example of our reality here: in my niece’s class, 
there are eighteen children, and the parents of sixteen children work in Italy, Spain, France, 
Romania, the Ukraine and Russia. Ten children live with their grandparents, two with their elder 
siblings and the others are either with their fathers or their mothers, depending on who is still 
around.  
 
The Russian financial crisis in 1998 marked the migration peak. As a result of the economic 
hardship a large fraction of the population migrated abroad in pursuit of better work and wealth 
opportunities (Mosneaga 2012). Although the country experienced one of the most significant 
emigrations proportionally to its total population in Europe, figures of the number of Moldovan 
migrants are extremely vague45. It is estimated that half of the economically active population 
has already left the country, or one third of the total population (see Chapter 1). This means that 
the number of Moldovans working and living abroad is between 800,000 and around 1.4 million 
(Mahmoud et al. 2013). Numerous surveys indicate that Moldova’s emigrant population is not 
expected to decrease. To the contrary, a survey of residents in eleven CIS-states concludes that 
35% of the remaining Moldovans is planning to migrate abroad (Gallup 2013). Moldova scored 
                                                          
 45 Statistical data on Moldovan emigrants are not only problematic because many Moldovan migrants use their 
Romanian passports abroad, but also because a registration at the embassy is not compulsory, and third, Moldova 
has only limited control over its Eastern borders because of the unresolved conflict with Transnistria.  
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highest among the countries under study46. The results of other studies are even more alarming. 
A UNICEF survey (2013), for instance, shows that up to 90% of the high-school students want to 
emigrate after completing their education. Furthermore, the UNFPA (2012) estimates that 
within the period 2012-2050 the population aged 60 and above will increase by 20%, while 
simultaneously the total population will decrease by another 450,000 individuals, due to the 
shortfall of birth rate and continuing emigration. The exodus of labour force, mainly because of 
low salaries, is particularly evident in rural areas. A key-informant, member of the ‘National 
Federation of Employers in Agriculture and Food Industry’ stated: 
 Vitali (engineer and unionist, 34, Balti): In eight years, we will find ourselves in a situation with no 
qualified workers in most regions of Moldova.  
 
  According to a UNICEF study (2013), the absence of agricultural workers is also the main 
reason for a growth of child labour since 2008. This has been confirmed by research participants 
working in the educational sector who reported that children increasingly replace the missing 
workers as cheap agricultural day labourers. Furthermore, brain- and skills-drain affect both the 
public and the private sector. The number of Moldovans with an academic background, for 
example, has dropped from a total of 30,000 in the early 1990s to less than 2,500 in 2007 (ASM 
2009).  
More than two million people in Moldova live in households that receive remittances (IOM 
2012a). For half of these households, the amount of received remittances represents at least 
70% of their income (Görlich and Trebesch 2008). The remittances are mainly used for daily 
consumption, such as food, clothes, medicine and the education of children (48%), or directed 
to investments in buildings (Piracha and Saraogi 2012). As a consequence of the substantial 
emigration of Moldova’s population, remittances have become the major source of external 
finance in Moldova – about eight times as high as foreign direct investment, which makes the 
country one of the world’s top remittances recipients (see Chapter 1).  
To conclude this brief summary, just as across Western Europe the arrival of immigrants has 
caused various political and social challenges, notably in terms of social cohesion, so too the 
departure of a significant number of Moldovans has triggered – in a reverse sense – significant 
challenges for the social fabric of the entire country. This ‘reversed logic’, compared to 
immigration nations, is also highly evident on a practical day-to-day basis, for instance in 
documents that were handed out to me by employees of social institutions or schools assisted 
by migrant organisations in Moldova. While in immigration nations documents list, for instance, 
                                                          
46 Other countries under study were Armenia, Georgia, Russia and the Ukraine. 
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from where beneficiaries of social schemes or parents of pupils originate, the lists in Moldova 
show where to beneficiaries have migrated after receiving assistance, and in which countries the 
parents of pupils live. 
 
4.1.3.2 Emigration and development projects  
 
On my earlier trips to the Republic of Moldova, mainstream development agencies remained 
always ambivalent about the phenomenon of mass emigration, which I referred to in Chapter 1 
as the ‘omnipresence of absence’. The first objective of my fieldwork in Moldova was, therefore, 
to investigate whether and how the aid workers’ perceptions and responses to the social and 
economic challenges of Moldova’s emigration had changed in the last few years. While my 
previous impression of the ‘omnipresence of absence’ was strongly confirmed, I have noticed a 
considerable shift in the responses of aid-practitioners to the omnipresent social reality of 
emigration – from disregard to openly faulting migration for all sorts of circumstances: 
development mismanagement, social and moral degradation, the weak economic situation, and 
so on. I see one reason for this change in the fact that, in the meantime, emigration impinges 
on every political, social and economic sphere of the country, including on the aid-practitioners’ 
daily work. Dora describes the implications of Moldova’s significant out-migration on her work: 
Dora (consultant, 42, Chisinau): You can’t design and implement projects focusing on one pillar 
of the society anymore, for instance on the youth, because statistically around 8 out of 10 of 
these young people will leave the country after university. So, we need to adjust the architecture 
of our projects, and we ehm need to design multi-generational projects, otherwise there is no 
continuity in our work.  
 
 Other development IOs and NGOs and migrant associations have adapted their programmes 
and projects to the demographic change caused by migration. A volunteer network of teenagers, 
for instance, whose members I met in Transnistria, is a striking example of a micro ‘win-win-win’ 
situation for teenagers, beneficiaries and migrants alike. It is somewhat different from the well-
known classical macro ‘triple win’ situations for migrants, countries of origin and destination 
countries, commonly cited in the literature on the migration–development nexus (e.g. Newland 
2010b): 
 Marta (39, chairwoman of an NGO, Tiraspol): We don’t have an infrastructure for children or 
teenagers here, so we ehm created this volunteer network for teenagers, and we ehm, train them 
and give them meaningful occupations. For instance, they put on theatre for the remaining 
children in the villages, or they help the elderly. Their parents all live abroad, and they are happy 
to know that their children don't just hang around while they are not here. And the children and 
elderly in the village are happy, too, because they are entertained or helped. And the teenagers 
like our training and the certificates they get.   
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 As we saw earlier in the example of a village school class, migration also heavily affects the 
country’s educational system. In the year 2012, more than 20,000 pupils left the education 
system, either to emigrate with their parents or for family reunification (UNDP 2014). Below, 
Anastasia, chair of a migrant association, explains how migration affected her project in the 
education field: 
Anastasia (tour guide and translator, 46, Berlin): Last year, we visited the school we were 
supporting. All our sponsored equipment was still there: tables, books, everything. But there were 
few pupils and staff around. The director was happy to show us that nothing has been stolen. But 
it was so depressing to see that he was sitting there almost on his own, and that the material we 
financed was not used. So, how can I say this, the project didn’t go well, because of the 
demographic catastrophe happening in this village.  
 
 While accompanying aid-workers and migrants to their project-visits in different parts of 
Moldova, one journey took us to a vocational school, in the far South of the country that is jointly 
supported by an international NGO and a migrant association. The director of the school, an 
elderly woman, guided us through the large, cold and mostly empty buildings. Later, while sitting 
behind her ‘directorial desk’ in a fur coat, she described to us the difficulties her school is facing; 
for instance, three young teachers had just recently left for African countries, because of the 
low salaries and the poor infrastructure in the area. Also, she had to reduce the curriculum of 
the sewing class, because the only remaining nearby Italian employer (a textile factory of a 
luxury fashion label) needs only one sewing-style. Given that the substantial emigration 
considerably challenges the country’s demography, it is not a surprise that every social 
development project that I have visited, including interventions implemented by migrant 
associations, dealt directly or indirectly with the social phenomenon of migration: 
§ in the choice of their activities, labelled as ‘mitigating the negative impact of emigration’, for 
instance by means of programmes addressed to ‘children or elderly left behind’, or by new 
‘Know before you go’ services for potential migrants (see Figure 4.5)47; 
§  in the high fluctuation or frequent loss of local staff or ‘reliable counter-partners’, reported 
by chairs of migrant associations and aid workers; 
                                                          
47 These programmes illustrate the shift from the development industry’s sedentary bias to an acknowledgement of 
migration in the Moldovan case, discussed in Chapter 2 (cf. Bakewell 2007). 
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§ or by addressing vulnerable groups, especially young families in rural villages, who do not 
receive remittances from family members abroad and depend on financial support (e.g. 
Caritas 2013);   
 Because of the social effects of migration and the high number of ‘potential migrants’, a 
distinction between programmes labelled as ‘migration–development programmes’ and other 
social development projects carried out in the social field became in the course of my research 
often redundant.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: ‘Keep my world together!’: Information campaign for parents planning to move 
abroad (TdH 2014) 
 
  To conclude, aid-practitioners working in Moldova, and not directly involved in migration–
development programmes, view Moldova’s large-scale emigration as increasingly problematic 
for the country’s socio-political and economic development. The common bottom line of their 
narratives is what Augé describes as the ‘black version of mobility’: social and economic 
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instability (2012: 30). Even if nowadays the development industry widely recognises emigration 
as a constitutive fact of Moldovan life, and some agencies have adapted their programmes, 
Moldova’s large-scale emigration remains a highly controversial issue in the headquarters of 
international development agencies and state institutions48. Although migration-induced social 
change in sending countries and regions tends to be more far-reaching than in receiving societies 
(Portes 2010), my main point of critique of the approach of the Moldovan government and its 
development partners to migration-development is the lack of understanding and emphasis on 
the amplitude of emigration, and the resulting scale of the social impact on the country’s 
development. Reflecting on this, in order for migrants’ collective social remittances to effect 
positive transformations in Moldova, more support for communities and authorities in 
mitigating the consequences of the large-scale migration should be provided; for instance, by 
setting up support structures for schools or communities. This would also benefit migrant 
associations’ capacity to overcome structural constraints in their development projects or to 
potentially reshape structures. These remarks on Moldova’s economic, social and political 
transformation form the starting-point for my investigation of migrants’ views on their home 
country’s development transition. With Kearney’s statement that “the causes and consequences 
of continued internal as well as international migration lie at the heart of the contemporary 
development problems” (1986: 331), I now assess migrants' opinions on Moldova’s 
development challenges.   
                                                          
48 With the exception of migrants’ remittances as much-needed financial support on the individual and national level. 
Overall, the discomfort with emigration was most persistent in the headquarters of relevant aid-agencies outside 
Moldova (e.g. Brussels, Geneva). 
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Figure 4.6: Moldovan emigration 
 
4.2 Stagnation and Degradation: Migrants’ Visions and Revisions of Moldova’s Development 
Transformation  
 
There exists a number of regular surveys conducted by policy institutes on how residents of ex-
soviet countries view the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g. Gallup 2013). Yet, to my knowledge, 
little attention has been paid to the migrants’ perception from post-communist societies on 
their home-countries’ development transition in policy surveys or in the anthropological and 
sociological literature strand of post-socialist transformation. That being said, I now present my 
findings on migrants’ perception of their home-country’s development transformation from a 
subjective experience viewpoint. Further, in line with the conceptual framework, I draw on 
Verdery’s (1999) understanding of the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a critical event viewed 
as refractions generated by the intersection of global/local processes, in which Moldovan 
citizens, living in or outside the country, are implicated in the transformation that takes place. 
With the assumption that migrants’ perception of Moldova’s post-communist reality underpins 
their collective transnational charity practices and their aid-relationship patterns with state or 
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development actors, I emphasise those categories which I deem particularly relevant for further 
investigating the aid-relationship between migrant associations and state or development 
actors in the chapters that follow.  
 
4.2.1 Degradation, the culture of distrust and the ‘immature’ Moldovan society 
4.2.1.1 Migrants’ visions of Moldova’s transformation 
The migrants’ narratives on their home country’s current situation are more or less consistent 
with the results of the latest opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Sociological, Political and 
Psychological Analysis (CIVIS) and the Institute of Public Policy (IPP). In this poll, 85% of the 
respondents are unhappy with government policies, especially in the fields of employment and 
salaries (95%), pensions (90%), living standards (88%) and corruption (87%) (CIVIS/IPP 2014). 
Consistent with this opinion poll, all migrants in my sample strongly expressed their discontent 
with the political life in the country. They narrated that the government, the judiciary and the 
business sector are too closely connected via personal loyalties, and that politicians are too 
preoccupied with internal political disputes, instead of promoting the country’s further long- 
waiting reforms. As Diana told me:  
Diana (care-worker, 45, Paris): Moldova after 1991 was like a book with white pages, and how did 
we fill these white pages? With nothing. We have achieved nothing. Look at the Baltic States, they 
also used to be part of the Soviet Union, but they have achieved something. Their politicians have 
done something for their people. Our politicians have done nothing for us. Nothing.  
 
Along with migrants’ frustration of originating from a country with no or few substantial 
accomplishments since its independence, compared to other former USSR republics, anger over 
Moldova’s wide social inequalities, considered a result of the kleptocratic political system, 
proved to be another core issue. As Vitali recalled sadly:  
Vitali (priest, 48, Paris): This summer, we wanted to go on a family holiday to Moldova. And as 
every year, our association collected together with another association toys for children, clothes 
and other material for vulnerable people in the villages. But this year, after three days I told my 
wife: let’s leave. I could not handle the misery anymore. It was too sad to see how people become 
greedy and unfriendly because of all the misery. I can’t see why these people need to live like 
that, except of corruption and mismanagement. Nothing has been done to change the situation. 
Nothing. So, ehm this year, I could not bear it any longer, and we spent the rest of our holidays 
in Romania. It was beautiful [smiles sadly].  
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 Another finding consistent with the opinion poll conducted by CIVIS/IPP (2014) is that the 
majority of migrants consider that the economic situation of the country has worsened 
compared to the previous four years. Dana noted in this regard: 
Dana (social worker, 46, Rome): Honestly, for my family back home the situation is worse than 
four years ago. The inflation and the prices are the problem. When I come back from Italy, I always 
complain how expensive the supermarkets here are…tomatoes, petrol, a lot of things are more 
expensive than in Europe. I don’t know how people survive without families abroad.   
 
All in all, fundamental divergences between the migrants’ estimates on their home country’s 
development transition and the above-mentioned positive official policy discourse on Moldova’s 
transformation achievements were found. Even if some migrants recognise the government's 
latest efforts in undertaking reforms, their enthusiasm about the political change in 2009 has 
vanished, and they significantly recast their optimistic expectations of the country’s future 
development, since in their opinion, a political change did not occur, nor did it lead to the 
expected ‘positive transformative change’. Natasha expresses her frustration over the 
government’s promised ‘new path’, by referring to migrants' collective efforts undertaken in the 
‘Twitter-revolution’ in the year 2009: 
Natasha (shop-assistant, 48, Paris): We considerably influenced the political change in 2009, but 
there has been no change among the political elites so far. The only change I can see is that they 
all put their small EU-flags next to their office computers, but they still confuse politics with their 
private businesses.  
 
Whilst the dissatisfaction with the Moldovan government is negatively related to the 
perception of the EU by Moldovan citizens living in the country (CIVIS/IPP 2014), the majority of 
migrants do not associate their frustration about the government with the EU or other Western 
development partners. On the contrary, their discontentment with the government’s track 
record up to now positively enforces their identification with and their intention to approach 
the EU. Moreover, the geopolitical East-West divide is not significant within the migrant civil 
society in the countries under study. This finding is consistent with the latest voting polls of 2014, 
showing that the migrant community in Western and Southern Europe voted 92% for the pro-
European party, while in the country itself it was 50% (Expert Group 2014b). It also echoes 
Marcu’s (2014) observation that the migration experience in EU-countries enhances Moldovans’ 
‘pro-European orientation’, and their sense of belonging to Europe. Conversely, a strong 
promotion of ‘the Slavic choice’ is central to the organisation of the Moldovan migrant 
community in Russia (Schwartz 2007). This once more illustrates that the ‘diaspora forming’ is 
quite diverse in terms of its political stance towards Moldova, which addresses the very essence 
of the ‘Moldovan national identity’, and confirms the fact that migrant civil society organisations 
92 
 
and initiatives can be organised along different, often conflicting principles (see Chapter 2). 
Below, Vasili shares his viewpoint on the nearly consistent conception of transformation 
towards a ‘European choice’ within the migrant community in the countries under study:  
 Vasili (physicist, 39, Paris): The identity cleavage plays a less important role in the diaspora than 
in Moldova. I think that there is something like a common identity among migrants. Back home 
there exists no common identity, but among the migrants, I think, yes. Of course, there are 
exceptions. But, ehm in Moldova, it’s very complicated at the moment to achieve a shared 
common identity that suits both camps.  
 
Some migrants also cynically stressed that, regardless the outcomes of official EU-adhesion 
politics, Moldovan citizens will enter the EU anyhow through the ‘back door’, by means of 
acquisition of Romanian citizenship49. Yet, even if the ‘pro-Russian’ versus the ‘pro-Western’ 
orientation within the migrant community under study is not significant, different visions of 
Moldova’s future still exist; either as an independent Republic (as a member, or non-member of 
the EU) or as a part of Romania. The first group of migrant leaders, chiefly composed of former 
communists, imagines Moldova’s future as a ‘neutral’ state in Eastern Europe. Svetlana, 
president of a migrant association in Geneva, belongs to this group:  
 Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): I don’t want Moldova to become a member of the European 
Union, and I don’t want my country to join the Russian Union. Moldova should remain 
independent. Right now, I don’t see any advantages in all of these EU-agreements. They don’t 
change anything for us. The prices are still rising back home, and we don’t depend on the EU. It’s 
the Russians who deliver our gas, and they buy our goods. So, why do we need a membership?  
 
The second group, composed of young migrants and former intellectuals who were fighting for 
the reunification with Romania in the early 1990s, wish for Moldova to become a full member 
of the European Union, either as an independent state or as a part of Romania. The following 
quote by Alina, a young migrant leader, reflects this logic: 
 Alina (student, 28, Paris): I hope that Moldova will one day become a member of the European 
Union, because then the country will finally change for better. Then, a hospital will be a hospital, 
a shop will be shop, and a court will be a court. Nothing more, and nothing less. 
 
 In my view, the voices of the one third of highly active migrant leaders supporting a 
reunification with Romania have not been seriously taken into consideration in the academic 
literature on Moldovan migration, nor in the development policy discourse (e.g. Cheianu-Andrei 
2013; Mosneaga 2012). Also, their standpoint was never openly taken-up by representatives of 
IOs and state authorities in seminars and workshops addressed to the Moldovan diaspora. Most 
                                                          
49 Around 550,000 Moldovans possess a Romanian passport and further 150,000 applications are pending (IOM 
2012a). 
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probably, this is because their ideas about their home-country’s future do not fit into the ‘official 
development path’ of Moldova as an independent Republic and member of the EU, and 
consequently, they do not reinforce the “normative assumption about the teleology of 
development” (cf. Raghuram 2009: 112)50. Also, these migrants’ aspirations to be reunited with 
Romania shows that development visions of migrants can be less inscribed in nationalistic 
thinking than those of governmental authorities and their development partners, who pursue a 
nation-state approach. The fact that migrants’ imaginations of Moldova’s future equally capture 
regional scenarios, beyond the national territory of Moldova, confirms Hörschelmann and 
Stenning’s observation on post-socialist countries more broadly (2008). These authors highlight 
that new imaginations of place draw on plural histories, and that there is a need for temporal 
broad-mindedness in research on post-socialist change, which allows appreciation of competing 
interests with a longer time span than socialism and ‘transition’. Because these migrants lost 
their battle in 1992, their attitudes towards Moldovan state institutions and their development 
partners are negative, and they prefer to improve the life of vulnerable individuals in Moldova 
by acting outside the official development establishment.  
 In conclusion, the main argument brought forward is that migrants’ disenchantment with 
Moldova’s difficult and slow development transition and its inefficient political system 
negatively affects their motivations and aspirations to contribute to the country’s formal 
development by means of their associations. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 6, their 
disappointment with state authorities also negatively influences their expectations on state-led 
support structures for their transnational engagement. Hence, migrants’ unfulfilled hopes for 
positive change in 2009, and their frustration over the government’s lack of political 
commitment in improving the life of Moldovan citizens is anything but favourable for an 
optimistic outlook of migrants’ engagement in state-led development.  
 
4.2.1.2 Degradation and distrust  
The majority of migrants regards Moldova's transition path not as a fast-forward track to 
positive change, but rather as a slippery slope of stagnation or even as degradation. In their 
opinion, some sectors, such as the outdated educational sector, is degrading in its quality 
because of corruption. This results in the creation of what some migrant leaders called a ‘lost 
generation’, characterised by a lack of values and of a comprehensive education, and instead 
motivated only to get anything for money. Migrants also referred to degradation in relation to 
                                                          
50 This also applies to pro-Russian migrant associations in CIS-countries, who are left out in the current official 
Moldovan migration–development debate.  
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the phenomenon of mass emigration. Some migrant leaders consider emigration as 
deteriorating the already non-favourable situation in most parts of the country, such as the 
emptying out of entire villages. In this context, all migrants highlighted the lack of political will 
to tackle the social and demographic challenges caused by emigration. This was expressed in 
each interview. Susanna succinctly summarised migrants’ disappointment with domestic 
politics:   
 
Susanna (au-pair, 28, Aarau): People were so hopeful in 2009 that something will change, but 
now everybody is disappointed. When I watch the news, it is like a thriller. Politicians are coming 
and going, and they don’t do anything. There are villages where almost everybody has left for 
Italy. These people are working hard, because they want their families to have a future. But if you 
work hard in Moldova, it’s not appreciated. It doesn’t bring you any further. 
 
In general, migrants regard Moldovan emigration as a necessary part of the transition, and some 
think it will even benefit the country in the long term. But, for the time being, the dominant view 
is that it chiefly allows elites to preserve their positions of privilege and to consolidate the 
existing class structure, rather than initiating positive transformative change. Thereby, migrant 
leaders commonly expressed their anger about the state’s estimates on the size of the Moldovan 
emigrant population, which they deem much more substantial than the official statistics. In their 
view, the state authorities do not want to reveal the exact number of emigrants, because it 
would show that they failed in their efforts to provide positive change in Moldova51. 
Furthermore, the lack of political will to improve the country’s situation was often underlined 
with examples of a missing recognition of Moldova’s own human resources. These examples 
pointed out that prestige objects in Chisinau, such as the airport, or the ‘mallDova’ (a shopping 
centre), have been entirely built by Turkish workers, or that the main roads in Moldova are under 
construction by Italian workers, while Moldovans need to leave the country to work on 
construction sites in Italy or Israel. Migrants see a further reason for the political disinterest in 
providing public work opportunities to Moldovan citizens in the ‘culture of distrust’ (Sztompka 
1996) – a Soviet cultural legacy, that undermines migrants’ hopes of professional achievement 
in their home-country:  
Kiril (trainee in a consultancy firm, 28, Geneva): If somebody has a good idea, another person 
with more money and power can stop you. That’s why it is so difficult to realise your own ideas 
in Moldova. There is still a lot of communist thinking. For instance, you should not be better than 
others! And there is a lot of jealousy. If your neighbour has a bigger house here, people think ok, 
                                                          
51 These migrant leaders were often referring to the latest Civis/IASCI Report (2014) that quantifies the number of 
Moldovan migrants living in Italy at only 72,000. Indeed, this seems unrealistic, compared to other estimates of 
600,000 (e.g. Mosneaga 2012).  
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so what. But in Moldova the motto is, if the neighbour’s house is bigger than mine, I need to have 
a bigger house, too, even if the difference in height is one brick.  
 
Sztompka (1996) claims, in the case of Poland, that many barriers on the road towards Western-
style democracy are due to the deficiency of cultural resources, such as recognition of personal 
achievements or trust. The just-mentioned ‘culture of distrust’ pervades Moldovan society at all 
levels of social life. Especially the migrant leaders who had no other choice than to leave 
Moldova around the Russian crisis in the late 1990s, view the Moldovan authorities with a 
particular distrust. In their opinion, ‘Moldova is a disaster’; or as Dima, a former senior manager 
of the national border guard, aptly describes their standpoints52: 
Dima (taxi-driver, 47, Paris): I am a well-informed optimist, and that makes me a pessimist. 
Believe me, things will remain the same. There will be no change.  
 
For these migrants, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the following years were a time 
of disillusions, and they feel particularly abandoned by the state. This was often expressed in 
the allegory of having needed to leave the ‘Moldovan house’, similar to Bachelar's (1981) 
metaphor of the ‘house of childhood’. Like the house of childhood, these participants described 
the ‘Moldovan house’ as providing insufficient shelter and protection. It does not stand as a 
shelter in relation to the journey and the path, which seems insecure. This is expressed as a root 
cause of the inferiority complex of many Moldovans, regardless of where they live:  
Alina (care-worker, 52, Novellara): Moldova is like, ehm, an empty and abandoned house. It’s full 
of dust and moisture, because nobody takes care of it. That's why I needed to leave. I never 
wanted to abandon my homeland. But there was no other choice.  
 
The migrants’ impressions of having been abandoned by the state in the past results in a 
complete rejection of any relationship-building with state and development institutions. 
Moreover, their bad memory of Moldova’s overall condition at the time of their departure 
around the Russian crisis, makes them generally pessimistic about their own role in initiating 
transformative change in Moldova: 
 Dragomir (construction worker, 48, Paris): If we needed to leave Moldova because the state didn’t 
offer us anything in the past, then it is not logical that all of the sudden it cares about us, and that 
we should be patriotic like all these billboards tell us to be, and to send our money back. This is 
hypocritical. When a state ehm, gives something it will also receive something. If the state doesn’t 
                                                          
52 I am aware of the fact that the most pronounced negative images of desperation and degradation in Moldova might 
also be personal justifications of some participants’ decision to migrate, especially of those who’s situation abroad is 
extremely difficult. 
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care about us, and we need to leave, then it can’t expect unilaterally that we will send our money 
back. This is a little bit crazy. 
 For these reasons, I think it is crucial to take into account the economic, political and social 
situation of Eastern European societies at the time-point of migrants’ departure in the aftermath 
of the Soviet era. It influences how migrants look back at their home country, their trust in state 
institutions and their aspirations to become part of formal development policies. Our attention 
should not be reduced to the critical moment of the dissolution of the USSR. This standpoint is 
still somewhat neglected in the broader academic literature on the Eastern European migration–
development nexus.  
 In sum, the examples of specific events, such as the hardship of the Russian financial crisis in 
1998, or the relative deprivation after the ‘revolutionary elation’ in 2009, show that Moldovan 
migrants’ culture of distrust is not only a legacy of socialism. This finding endorses Sztompka’s 
observation in the case of Poland in the mid-1990s, namely that distrust is equally related to the 
aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, “as a result of widespread anomie, new risk environments 
and the inefficiency of political elites” (Sztompka 1996: 37). As we shall see in Chapter 6, distrust 
also plays an important role in the associational life of migrants, especially along the lines of new 
Moldovan post-communist class structures. Briefly put, and in-line with Luhmann’s (1968) claim 
that a confident outlook is an important prerequisite for trust, migrants who are pessimistic 
about their home country’s future do not trust the government.  
 
 
4.2.1.3 Moldova – an immature society  
 
A further strand of narratives that emerged from the interviews with migrants about their home 
country’s transformation, independent of their socio-economic status, age, or length of 
migration experience, are considerations of their home country as an immature society: 
 
Maria A. (care-worker, 46, Novellara): Look at all these diffuse messages you see everywhere on 
Moldova’s streets. All of these billboards, telling us in big letters to love our country and to stay 
in the planet’s most beautiful capital, Chisinau! And right next to it, there are posters for work-
abroad programmes with the faces of Moldovan VIPs and politicians working for the same 
government. What should we think of all that?  
These narratives were commonly accompanied with notions of temporalities, such as ‘growing 
up’, of ‘becoming a mature society’, or of ‘achieving the status of a mature nation’. Further, the 
idea of ‘growing up’ was often mentioned together with a ‘change of mentality’, or with 
‘becoming more open-minded’, in the sense of acquiring values understood as ‘European’: 
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 Nicolai (unemployed, 31, Padova): I see two scenarios for change in Moldova. Either people 
change, or they don’t. If they don’t change we become a country without inhabitants, and we 
will face a big crisis. In that case, Moldova will be taken over by Romania, I mean not taken over, 
but asked to be taken [laughs]. But I think, if people will start to grow up, to behave like open-
minded adults, respect one another’s property and each-others’ businesses like here, and if 
ehm we can eliminate the corruption, then, I see a small chance for medium-sized businesses 
to develop.  
 
All in all, even if migrants stressed that their home-country still has a long way to go on its 
development path, they see light at the end of the tunnel. The most optimistic statements on 
Moldova’s prospects are those pointing to a timeframe of one or two generations for positive 
changes to happen, and for the Moldovan society to ‘grow up’. For the time being, they place 
their hopes on the new generation of the Moldovan elite, chiefly on the small number of 
returnees, trained and educated abroad. Time will tell if they can speed up the implementation 
of the country’s needed reforms. Ion, however, laconically recognised:  
Ion (translator, 34, Paris): The future Moldova will be a European country in all possible senses of 
the terminology. I think today is a very crucial moment in our history, because the new generation 
who has been educated after the URSS, ehm, starts to show their teeth. Today, the situation is 
already different from 10 years ago, because these young people were not around then. 
Unfortunately, the first round of these promising people, on which we had some much hope, has 
already been absorbed by the system, too.  
 
 Vice-versa, migrants’ analogy of Moldova as an ‘immature’ state is also strongly present in 
the narratives of aid-practitioners and in the official European development discourse on 
Moldova. In these discourses, the country is branded as a ‘less mature’ political subject that can 
‘move closer’ to Europe through acceptance of neo-liberal democracy with the aid of the ‘more 
mature European member states’ (e.g. EU 2013a). Reflecting on this, I think the notion of a 
‘mature’ society or state needs to be revisited. As Walby maintains, “there are degrees of 
'societalisation', never fully formed societies” (2009: 451). This suggests to replace the idea of a 
static society with a more process-oriented notion of ‘societalisation’. Moreover, it invites us to 
abandon assumptions that the politics of ‘societalisation’ or change only saturate a given 
national territory. Rather, they coexist and cross-cut each other in cooperation and/or 
competition, as we will see in the next subsection.  
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Figure 4.7: Contested public messages 
 
4.2.2 Unravelling the past and regaining confidence through transnational development 
practices 
 
Another category that emerged from the interviews with migrants on their home country’s 
transition is their negative memory and lived experiences of the Soviet past. According to 
Montanari (2001), a dominant national feature of Romania and Moldova is a resignation and 
passivity of not reacting against their destiny – a sort of suffering without rebellion, present in 
national myths and Romanian popular art. History taught Moldovans to be patient, because 
every saviour in the past turned out to be an exploiter; from the Hungarians and the Turks to 
the Russians (Ammassari 2001). The historical and cultural legacy of having been oppressed in 
the past is strongly present in the migrants’ narratives on their personal experiences lived during 
the Soviet Republic of Moldova. Below, Laura expresses a typical view on this matter:  
Laura (journalist, 37, Bologna): In the past, so many advisors have broken our nation apart, have 
oppressed and humiliated us. We are in need of optimism and confidence for the future, and we 
want to prove that we are able to do something, even if we live abroad.  
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 The migrants’ negative feelings about the Soviet past proved to be an important determinant 
for cultivating active transnational links with Moldova. For some migrant leaders, the 
transnational field of migrant civil society offers a space for rising up from their felt oppression 
by the Russians. Consequently, their transnational development practices are a means to let the 
past be the past, and for regaining confidence. The following quote illustrates that the feeling of 
having been oppressed in the past and the resulting low self-esteem is still deeply rooted in the 
personality of many Moldovan migrants, even if they consider themselves professionally 
successful and well-integrated:  
Vasili (physicist, 39, Paris): My personal motivation for my associational engagement is to take a 
sort of revenge. Ehm, not a personal revenge, but ehm a revenge for my country, because 
Moldovans have been badly treated for a long time. We were always seen as second-class 
citizens, and I want to show that this is not true, that we are capable of doing things, and that we 
are capable of doing these things well.  
These migrants not only stressed that Soviet Imperialism had diminished their self-esteem, but 
they also highlighted that some of their co-citizens compensate their negative experiences made 
in the past by means of their collective engagements, for instance through their own self-seeking 
practices: 
 (Oleg, 44, project-coordinator, Padova): We are like the typical character in Gogol’s stories, the 
simple-minded peasant, the small man who wants to gain more dignity after years of oppression. 
I think this is the reason why so many organisations have been established. Migrants are engaged 
for gaining personal advantages over others, because of their inferiority complex vis-à-vis the 
Russians, who have stamped us as second-class citizens during Soviet times. Ehm, how can I say 
this, by having their own associations, and by calling themselves ‘presidents’, they boost their low 
self-esteem. 
The memory of the Soviet past can also shape the forms of migrants’ collective activities. It is, 
for instance an aspiration to move beyond cultural activities carried out in the host countries 
towards more transnational-oriented activities:   
 Dragomir (construction worker, 48, Paris): We need to show others that we are able to organise 
development activities back home, activities that go beyond festivals. We need to show them 
that we are not here to sing and dance the whole day. It would be catastrophic to only do that, 
because it would mean that those are right, who have put us down; those, who have withheld us 
from developing and from having a normal life for many years.  
This interesting finding of migrants’ transnational collective practices as an articulation of 
dealing with ‘their’ Soviet past, goes beyond the few well-known assumptions about collective 
practices of post-socialist migrant communities; e.g. their lack of institutional trust or the 
expected symbolic practices of ‘Soviet nostalgia’, which some migrant associations put on in CIS 
countries (Schwarz 2007). That being said, the participants’ stances vis-à-vis ‘Soviet nostalgia’ 
are in sharp contrast to the associational life of the migrant community living east of Moldova. 
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Their vanishing point of history is all about ‘Soviet nostalgia’. This finding resonates with Arce 
and Long’s (2000) standpoint that an ethnography of development must be multi-vocal, multi-
sited, but also increasingly concerned with people’s counter-tendencies. My reflexive multi-
perspective approach allowed me exactly to do that, and to see the dynamics of migrants’ 
development engagement as forms of re-assembling practices from individually lived 
experiences of the Soviet past, and not just as a reaction to best-practice ‘diaspora mobilisation 
programmes’.  
 In conclusion, the majority of migrants engaged in transnational social practices regard 
themselves as having been oppressed in three regards: by the Russians, by a kleptocratic 
Moldovan government throughout the transformation period, and most recently also by 
capitalist Europe, as we will see shortly. Migrants’ negative interpretations of the distant past 
and the more recent past signifies for some of them a meaning-making resource for a 
transnational development engagement today. In that sense, the power of the past can be a 
driving motor for assisting Moldova in its development transition53. The top-down neo-liberal 
logic of Moldovan development policies neglects these aspects of time, as I have argued in 
Chapter 2. It disregards the importance of understanding the ways in which the past is culturally 
constructed and selectively applied in migrants’ contemporary transnational social practices (cf. 
Verdery 2005). And lastly, migrants’ aspirations to (re-)gain confidence by means of 
transnational development practices show that the development policy perception of the 
migrant ‘shareholders’ as confident self-entrepreneurs, who make predominantly rational 
choices for their future, is too restrictive (see Chapter 2).  
 
4.2.3 Migrants’ perception of Moldova within Europe’s socio-economic configurations  
  
 Along with the issue of migrants’ personal experiences with ‘Russian colonialism’ came 
considerations of Moldova’s role in contemporary Europe. A minority of migrants, chiefly those 
older interviewees who were partly socialised in the Soviet Republic of Moldova, view capitalism 
and its associated European or US institutions, such as the World Bank or the IMF, suspiciously. 
They question the development path of EU-rapprochement, and the EU’s genuine interest in 
Moldova, which in their accounts lays solely in Moldova’s unique asset of cheap labour ‘just 
around the corner’. In Michael’s opinion: 
                                                          
53 The ways the younger generation expressed the Soviet past considerably varied. Therefore, I find it difficult to 
determine the extent to which migrants’ development engagement - as a means of unravelling the past - continues 
to be determinant in migrants’ future associative life.  
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 Michael (entrepreneur, 55, Bologna): The Italians want cheap labour in Moldova for their textile 
firms, and they can have that in Europe, in our country. They don’t need to go to Bangladesh for 
that anymore. And honestly, I think it’s basically the same if we get exploited here, in Italy, or in 
Moldova.   
 
 Thereby, many migrants highlighted that the ‘West’, and in particular the EU, is only interested 
in Moldova’s low-wage workers, eager to work long hours in difficult and tiring jobs, which the 
local work-force in EU member-states is not willing to do. Romina expresses a typical view on 
this issue:  
 Romina (secretary, 49, Rome): Today, Moldova is not able to export anything to the West, except 
cheap labour. Is the EU really so interested in us? I am asking myself this question over and over 
again. I think the EU wants this visa liberalisation agreement because the member-states lack 
cheap labour. We don’t have anything else [...]. I think for once it is not about geopolitics. It’s 
about economics. 
 
 Migrants also openly questioned new migration policies by highlighting the fact that legal 
changes within Europe, such as the new visa regime, will not automatically remove the 
sociological reality of hierarchies and exploitation within Europe. Rather, they are further 
widening uneven national development. The prevalence in migrants’ narratives of social 
inequalities generated by Europe’s economics of labour demand stands in sharp contrast to the 
accounts of the second group of research participants, the representatives of IOs and 
government institutions, who rarely related Moldovan migration and transformation with wider 
issues of power, wealth and inequality within Europe54. 
 Furthermore, migrants who have a rather anti-stance towards the global present also have a 
negative attitude towards development organisations representing institutions of global or 
Western capitalism, including Western European bilateral development agencies. Consequently, 
their sceptical attitude towards these organisations impacts negatively upon their aspirations to 
integrate their development activities into mainstream migration–development programmes. 
They are simply not interested in teaming up with the development establishment. Yet, no aid-
worker employed in international aid-agencies nor the civil servants were aware of some 
migrants’ strong ideological stances, or even of their refusal to integrate their transnational 
activities into official aid-land. 
 To conclude in a scholarly interpretation, the overwhelming majority of migrants, including 
those who generally view the EU and other western institutions positively, consider Moldova’s 
future economic prospects and its high outward migration with historical-structural models, 
                                                          
54 Out of 44 migrants, 38 referred to this issue, compared to two aid-workers, which shows the discredit of the 
structuralist approach in the second research group, resulting in a less negative interpretation of dependency, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (cf. de Haas 2012). 
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more precisely with the dependency theory (cf. Morawska 2012). The common bottom-line in 
their narratives is that their home country has been historically subordinated and exploited by 
the Russians, or even uprooted from Romania, and it is currently incorporated in new macro-
structural forces, namely in global or Western capitalist markets. This results once again in 
exploitation and not in co-operation, as migrants would wish for their home country.  
 The migrants’ and development actors’ often divergent notions of Moldova’s transformative 
changes illustrate that post-communist ‘transformation’ is happening on a terrain on which 
multiple and heterogeneous visions of Moldova’s place within capitalist Europe exist, and that 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Moldovans, regardless of where they live, re-position 
themselves vis-à-vis various intervening parties, old and new solidarities and divisions (cf. 
Verdery 1999). Thus, taking migrants’ accounts seriously also means to pay more attention to 
how Moldova’s transformation and international migration are integrally related to the 
operation of the global capitalist market (Morawska 2012). Additionally, as outlined above, 
Moldova is a mainly rural country, and the common belonging of Moldovans is highly related 
with Moldova’s rural villages. In Montanari’s terms “the culture of the village is the ethnic and 
spiritual structure of the nation” (2001: 9). While this image is idyllic and pleasant, building on 
this ideological state narrative raises central questions about the ‘survivability’ of Moldova in a 
globalised world. Therefore, it seems to me that the small and young republic with its unsettled 
national identity will face considerable challenges ahead, especially considering that this global 
world is composed of competing states, and that nationalism has become a sociological and 
geopolitical necessity in the modern world to maintain a state’s grip on its survival and progress 
(Gellner 1983). Migrant leaders who live in European metropoles (i.e. in Paris and London) were 
particularly sensitive about this issue. Hence, the analysis of Moldova’s transformative change 
framed in terms of the dominant national development discourses is too narrow, and more 
considerations on the country's much-needed rediscovery of its place in an interlinked world 
would be necessary.  
 
 
4.3 Shifting Gazes: Moldova’s Transformational Change from the Perspective of Intra 
European Interconnectedness   
 
 
I round off this chapter with one topic that emerged directly from my transnational fieldwork 
across different European countries, namely Moldova’s transformation and emigration beyond 
the national container space, as an integral part of Europe’s social transformation. By shifting 
the gazes to looking at today’s Europe as a fragmented space with the lens of 
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interconnectedness, I attempt to address Moldova’s post-Soviet transformation and emigration 
beyond East-West typologies and topologies. Consistent with the above-applied perspective of 
looking at Moldova’s transition beyond the socialist past, I now explore the dynamics of 
transformation of post-socialist Moldova with a greater spatial openness.  
 
4.3.1 Moldova's development transition as integral part of Europe’s transformation 
 
Schlögel (2005) maintains that, in post-Cold War Europe, once considered as the space of ‘the 
East’ and ‘West’, we nowadays find a territory of fragments, enclaves, and islands. These parts 
and pieces are fitting themselves together to form a new Europe. This renewal also implies forms 
of disintegration, and I think we should pay more attention to these very real fragments, and to 
accept these disintegrated localities as an intermediate stage of the European transformation. 
Because the ensemble is still a promise for many European citizens, our picture of Europe would 
be incomplete if we ignore the possibility or even the existence of European ‘black holes’, like 
Moldova or Belarus – places that have somewhat lost their time and power.  
 The degree to which a place is connected within the socio-spatial configuration of this 
unfinished Europe, and its likelihood for impacting on others globally, has particularly attracted 
my attention on my fieldwork across disparate places. Mobility and interconnections are a 
reality for the financial, political and cultural centres in Europe – the ‘Eurocities’ (Favell 2008). 
Or, as Augé (2012) maintains, today, the ‘global’ is perceived as the ‘interior’ of the world-
spanning economic and communication system and the ‘local’ as its ‘outside’. In these authors’ 
view, cities are transforming according to an image provided for the outside world, by assuring 
the circulation of capital, investment and tourists. This vision is embodied in some of the 
fieldwork sites, the ‘Hub-like’ interconnected cities: London, Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, Rome or 
Geneva – places with high inward and outward mobility of various types. Places that are oriented 
towards a different outer-world: the financial world, the diplomatic world, or the world of 
tourism.  
 Chisinau stands in sharp contrast to these busy Eurocities woven by international relations, 
attracting and hosting the world. With the exception of migrants’ circular mobility, I have only 
noticed one-way mobility – outward mobility. Thus, when travelling to Moldova one follows 
automatically, according to Marcus (1998), the people – the migrants, as there are, with the 
exception of aid-professionals and a few businessmen, no other group of travellers moving back 
and forth to Moldova. The absence of a tourist information centre in the capital city speaks for 
itself. Another striking example of Moldova’s image as an ‘off the beaten path travel destination’ 
104 
 
is the fact that the total number of visitors (including business travellers) to the entire country, 
over a period of one year, is equal to the number of visitors to the Eiffel Tower in two days 
(38,000) (National Bureau of Statistics  2013; tour-eiffel 2015). While the circulation of people is 
considered as a symbol of globalisation and contemporary capitalism (Augé 2012), the striking 
absence of mobility ‘towards’ Moldova emphasises once more Moldova’s ‘otherness’. Yet, 
bearing in mind the migrants’ accounts on the relationship between their home country’s 
transformation and capitalism, Moldova’s one-way mobility is an expression of globalisation and 
(neo)liberal market economy, too. The country’s ‘otherness’ is not simply a separate ‘exotic’ 
phenomenon, but an integral part of today’s European socio-political and economic reality.  
 Lastly, a shift in the boundaries of the geographical understanding of Moldovan 
transformation and transnationalism also calls for more acceptance that places and spaces in 
Western and South Western Europe are transformed by Eastern European migrants, too. 
Moldovan migrants, for instance, play a transformative role in the life of European cities and in 
their geography of encounters (Valentine 2008). Such spaces of encounter include public places 
being part of my fieldwork: examples are the central bus station in Berlin (ZOB), the ‘Giardino 
della Montagnola’ in Bologna, the Piazza ‘Unità d’Italia’ in Novellara, or the outskirts of 
Villeneuve-Saint-Georges near Paris.   
  
 
4.3.2 Regaining space: (re-)connecting Moldova with Europe through transnational 
development engagements 
 
I now investigate how Moldova’s marginalised place in Europe influences migrants’ 
transnational collective practices and their aspirations to get engaged in their home country’s 
development. To this end I respond to the initial question: Where is Moldova?  
 Firstly, in the literature and in the majority of research participants’ accounts, Moldova is 
located at Europe's Eastern periphery. Some parts of the country are even considered as the 
periphery of the periphery (e.g. Protsyk 2010). The document ‘Rethink Moldova’, an official 
government policy brief, describes in its introduction that Moldova is “a country with an 
antagonized society, isolated on the external arena […]” (GoM 2010: 3). Further, in the light of 
the Ukraine crises, Moldova’s commonly described location at the ‘turbulent borders’ of Eastern 
Europe – torn between the East and the West, has recently taken on a whole new meaning. 
Secondly, the image of Moldova as a remote and relatively non-descript place in the Eastern 
borderlands of Europe is contested by migrant leaders who consider their country of origin as a 
bridge between different European cultures and languages: Slavic, Latin and Turkish. In their 
opinion, Moldova is a melting-pot of European cultures – a crossroad where the East meets the 
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West. And thirdly, for some participants Moldova is neither the cultural heart of Europe nor its 
periphery, but rather ‘an almost but not quite European other’. This viewpoint was articulated 
with statements such as ‘the Moldovans have their own views and value systems’, or that ‘she 
has migrated to Europe’. Thus, while it is obvious where Moldovans migrate to in this study, 
namely to ‘Europe’, it is not very clear from where exactly they come. These different 
interpretations of Moldova’s socio-spatial configuration within Europe can impact upon 
migrants’ forms of transnational development engagement. Three narrative strands emerged 
from the interviews with migrants on this issue.  
 Firstly, migrants who perceive Moldova as a cultural crossroads of Europe are generally 
optimistic about the country’s prospects and confident in their ability to contribute to positive 
change in Moldova by means of their transnational collective engagement: 
 
Kiril (IT-engineer, 38, Paris): Even if we are not yet a member of the EU, I want to show the 
members that we have things to share, like ehm our rich cultural heritage and our 
multiculturalism. Our country is still left out in many European programmes for NGOs. But I want 
to show Europe that we exist. Yes, that’s my aim. With our activities, I want to show that it’s not 
only political or geo-political ideology that creates a country, but also culture, and ehm grassroots 
projects, like we do. And that we can move things together. 
 
 Secondly, the fact that Moldova is not exactly a press-darling in the migrant receiving 
countries under study, generates two trends. First, the little attention the country receives in 
the public discourse can foster specific forms of relationships between migrant associations and 
Western European NGOs. Liliana explains: 
Liliana (34, freelancer, Paris): I don’t exaggerate, but we have done consulting for French 
development NGOs who wanted to get engaged in Moldova, and they really don’t know anything 
about our country. One was a big international NGO and people there knew everything about 
Africa, but when it came to Moldova, there was all of the sudden a big silence. Ehm, that’s why I 
thought that our association could create more links, and connect NGOs here better with 
Moldova.  
 
The quote shows that the unpopularity of the Republic of Moldova can motivate migrant leaders 
to become bridge-builders for development NGOs in their host countries and to bring Moldova 
to light. The role of migrant associations is, however, not restricted to connecting development 
NGOs with Moldova. For some migrant leaders, their collective development practices are also 
a means of (re)-connecting their home country with Europe more broadly. Their motivation for 
creating active transnational development links with Moldova is to belong to Europe, which is 
regarded by the majority of migrants as a territory of ‘progress’ or ‘open-mindedness’, as 
discussed earlier.  
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 The second trend evident in the second narrative theme is that some migrant leaders were 
annoyed about Western Europeans’ general disregard vis-à-vis Moldova. The perception of 
Moldova as ‘isolated outsiders’ at the territorial edge of the EU is considered as (re-)enforcing 
parochialism, rather than helping to improve the socio-economic situation in their home 
country. In their view, the public neglect of Moldova and its attributed backwardness preserves 
provincial practices in Moldova and within their migrant community. This impairs the capacity-
building of migrant associations in promoting change and development in Moldova. Below, a 
migrant leader expresses her frustration with Europe’s fixation of Moldova as a remote Eastern 
flank: 
 
Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): We are a territory in Europe, but we are talking about a country 
that has never had a say, and as long as Europe treats us as some sort of province, without a 
genuine interest in us, the backward provincial practices in Moldova and in our diaspora, will 
continue. I don’t think there will be positive changes like this. Some of our migrant leaders will 
just continue to create associations for their own self-seeking interests, like politicians pursue 
their own interests in Moldova, because nobody pays the country any real attention.  
Thirdly, similar to migrants who emphasise Moldova’s marginal location and who aim to 
create links between development NGOs in their host-countries and Moldova, participants who 
describe Moldova as a significant ‘European otherness’ engage in activities aimed at supporting 
development NGOs to better understand the ‘Moldovan way of functioning’; for instance, in 
matching them with potential ‘trustful’ and ‘ideal’ Moldovan counterparts:  
Natasha (shop-assistant, 48, Paris): Most of the Western NGOs don’t know how to judge our 
people, because they don’t know the system. And sometimes, they don’t even know that you 
need to check, double check and triple check with whom you want to work in Moldova. And we 
want to help them with that.  
 
A small number of migrants consider the underestimation of Moldova’s ‘otherness’ by 
mainstream development actors as unprofessional. Consequently, they reject their 
development interventions in the country, and they are not interested in teaming-up with such 
formal development actors. Svetlana expresses a typical view on this issue: 
Svetlana (factory worker and artist, 55, Munich): We often visited German development 
programmes near the hospital that our organisation supports. One was a training seminar by the 
German ministry on how to write job applications. I was standing there and I thought: Do I see 
this right? This is very unprofessional. It doesn’t work like that in Moldova at all. This is all 
nonsense! Please stop! You can't teach people how to apply ‘European-style’ there. It’s a 
completely different system.  
 
 The different interpretations of Moldova’s location and its cultural specificity can create 
specific forms of migrant transnational development efforts, or impede an engagement 
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altogether. These types of transnational practices can be understood as a mixture of migrants’ 
compensation for an experienced ‘backwardness’ and a growing feeling of uneasy about their 
home country’s image as an out-of-the-way place. That being said, besides the displayed 
motivation to (re-)gain confidence vis-à-vis the country’s past by means of development 
engagements, these development forms are a means of (re-)gaining space. Moldova’s 
marginalised place in Europe and its post-Soviet legacy are, therefore, both important 
determinants for migrants’ transnational development practices.  
 The motivations of some migrant leaders to re-connect their home country with Europe 
through their transnational development practices, alludes to the need of paying more attention 
to issues of ideological and territorial fixations of this rural post-Soviet country. Migrants’ 
perceptions of Moldova as being cut-off from contemporary Europe shows, that territorial and 
ideological fixations, other than the commonly known nationalistic resentments, are highly 
relevant in today’s Europe. Although it is widely accepted that these fixations can play an 
important role in generating specific forms of emigration, for instance individualistic forms of 
student migration towards Western Europe (e.g. Engbersen and Snell 2013), the fact that 
ideological and territorial fixations can equally generate collective transnational development 
practices has not been addressed in research so far. Thus, I propose to situate Moldovan 
migrants’ transnationalism and transformation within a broader intra-European research 
approach. Contrary to recent research on Ukrainian migration dynamics, in which the analysis is 
placed in a wider framework of regional integrations within the European Union and between 
the European Union and its Eastern neighbours55, the phenomenon of Moldovan migration has 
not been addressed with a similar broader intra-European perspective. It is within such 
interpretation that I see further research on the topic of transformation and migration in 
Moldova. Hence, I suggest to shift our way of looking at Moldovan migration in the geographical 
area under study – as an integral part of ongoing transformational change within Europe, instead 
of purely restricting it to an essential key-factor of Moldova’s post-Soviet development 
transition.  
     These reflections take us now to two residual interlinked questions to which I have not yet 
found satisfactory answers. First, what role will Moldova and other countries play in the future? 
I refer here to countries that have somehow ‘fallen out’ of today’s Europe, and where the ditches 
of opportunity structures are widening. And second, at a time of economic crisis and the 
fractioning of power structures in the ‘Global North’, can migrants and development actors play 
a role in contributing positive change in these somehow forgotten European landscapes in the 
                                                          
55 E.g. Vianello (2013b) on circular migration between the Ukraine and Italy, or Iglicka and Gmaj (2013) on circular 
migration patterns between the Ukraine and Poland.  
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first place? These questions point to the general role that development actors and migrants can 
play in fostering stability, prosperity, and solidarity within Europe. Doubtlessly, there is further 
scope for in-depth research on how the migration–transformation relationship takes shape in 
these disintegrated CIS-countries in today’s Europe.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This long chapter has mapped Moldova’s post-Soviet development transition from three 
different perspectives: the official development discourse and from the viewpoints of migrants 
and aid-workers.  
 Firstly, I have investigated Moldova’s main development characteristics, and how the country 
underwent radical changes in every sphere of social, economic and political life, by engaging 
with the three interacting key factors that set Moldova’s development transition apart from 
other former Soviet countries: its slow social and economic development, its complex national 
identity building, and its mass emigration. Additionally, I have demonstrated that the high 
expectations raised in 2009 of a fast-track EU-integration process turned out to be unrealistic, 
and that reforms aimed at the country’s transition to a market economy have been slowed down 
by persistent economic and financial difficulties, corruption, and by external factors, such as the 
growing tension in the region (EU 2013c). My concluding argument was that Moldova’s 
regulatory environment remains poor, offering both aid-organisations and migrant associations 
a rather unfavourable environment for their development activities. This brings us now to the 
first key-finding of this chapter: 
Official development policy to support the country in its attempts to gain more out of migrants’ 
initiatives and to mitigate its negative consequences, is bound to fail, if it ignores the country’s 
structural weakness – under which migrants are supposed to contribute to development by 
means of their associations.  
Therefore, migrants are unlikely to make a significant contribution to the development 
transition in Moldova unless the root causes of ‘underdevelopment’ are simultaneously 
addressed.  
 Secondly, I have illustrated that the lack of a true development process is further activated 
by the socio-political division of the country. I showed that in Moldova’s post-socialist era there 
is a need to reconsider the notion of ‘home-country’ when exploring migrants’ visions of 
development and their emotional and material ties with Moldova. While the development 
industry remains attached to a nation-state approach, assuming that its inhabitants are sharing 
a common set of values, norms and identity, we saw that Moldova as a ‘home nation’ in the 
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sense of a unifying entity is disputed among migrants. Although the country’s socio-political 
division is less contested within the migrant community under study, it still hinders an efficient 
bundling of migrants’ efforts into state-led development policies.  
Moldova’s struggle for identity slows down Moldova’s national reforms, the creation of a 
common future imagination of the country, and the building up of a coherent structural and 
ideological engagement with its absentees.  
 Thirdly, I have provided an insight into the magnitude of Moldovan emigration as being itself 
an important obstacle for the country’s development transition, affecting the country’s entire 
social fabric, including development projects carried out by aid-agencies and migrant 
organisations.  
We saw that, although discourses on migration and development have moved back to the centre- 
stage of development policy in Moldova, there has not been a significant change in mainstream 
development actors’ ambivalent perceptions of the country’s mass emigration, and adequate 
structural policies to mitigate its negative effects are still missing. 
   Fourthly, my findings brought to light that migrants’ visions of Moldova’s development 
transition can be different to the officially declared development path. Discrepancies were 
found between the official discourse of Moldova as being a ‘success story’ and the negative 
accounts of migrants and some of the aid-workers on the government’s track-record up till now. 
Furthermore, some migrants’ negative stances towards Western institutions and their distrust 
in the state – as a consequence of their negative experiences in the aftermath of the dissolution 
of the USSR – run counter to the mainstream development path of EU-rapprochement, and 
obstruct the relationship-building between migrants and state institutions. 
The migrants’ frustration over the governments’ achievements in its development transitions up 
to now, their dwindling expectations of positive change since the political turnaround in 2009, 
and their rather bleak visions of the country’s future, negatively impacts on migrants’ 
institutional trust in state institutions, and consequently on migrants’ aspirations to integrate 
their development activities into mainstream migration–development programmes.  
 Moreover, I showed how migrants’ experiences of the Soviet era and the transformation 
period impact on their transnational activities. We saw that the Soviet era is not only still present 
in the landscape of some parts of the country, but also in migrants’ collective development 
practices towards Moldova.  
Thus, another key finding of this chapter is that forms of migrant collective transnational 
engagements are shaped by Moldova’s past – as a means to raise up from an expressed feeling 
of oppression during the Soviet era.  
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 Lastly, in addition to my suggestion to consider Moldova’s transformation with a temporal 
openness, I have opened up the national container perspective of Moldova, and I have shared 
some broader reflections on Moldova’s transformation and migration with the lens of spatial 
openness. By approaching Moldovan migration not only as an integral part of Moldova’s post-
Soviet development transition, but equally as a part of Europe’s transformational change, I 
pointed to the need to reframe the geographical framework of studying contemporary dynamics 
of Moldova’s transformation, its migration, and migrants’ transnationalism. 
Not only is Moldova’s past selectively applied in migrants' contemporary transnational collective 
practices, but so too is the country’s social, political and economic marginalised place within 
Europe. 
Migrants’ feelings of having been second-class citizens under ‘Russian colonialism’, the 
disappointment about the government’s poor achievements in its post-Soviet transition, plus 
the growing feeling of capitalist exploitation within contemporary Europe are all important 
determinants for generating forms of migrant development engagement. These three entangled 
factors are neglected in both the academic literature on Moldovan migration and in the policy 
discourse on transformation. Therefore, the analysis of Moldovan migrants’ development 
practices should not be limited to migrants’ skills and their associations’ capacities as defined by 
the development industry (e.g. IASCI/Nexus 2014). Such a limited approach would obscure the 
complex array of cultural and social determinants operating across different spatial and 
temporal scales. 
 With this thought in mind, I turn in the next chapter to the main characteristics of Moldova’s 
recent but intense emigration since the country’s independence in 1991, and to how the state 
portrays emigrants as development partners. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Discontinuities within Continuities: 
Main Characteristics of Moldovan Migration 
 
 
The present chapter addresses in more detail the main characteristics of current Moldovan 
emigration. I first provide the reader with an overview of the key features of Moldovan 
migration. I emphasise, according to the title of this chapter, the discontinuities of Moldovan 
migration that coexist with classical patterns and forms of Moldova’s post-communist out-
migration. As it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse in depth the multi-faceted 
nature of Moldovan migration, I particularly investigate the increase in the diversification of 
migration types and destination countries. Secondly, drawing from my empirical data, I discuss 
new trends of current Moldovan emigration, which in my view are understudied and thus not 
sufficiently considered in the Moldovan migration–development policy discourse. I concentrate 
on four interrelated migration characteristics, which I argue, significantly impact on migrants’ 
collective transnational development practices, either because they are considered as an 
impediment for migrants’ aid-practices, or because they generate specific forms of transnational 
aid-giving. These are: actual or anticipated onward migration, lack of socio-cultural integration 
in the host-country, return migration and family reunification. That being said, the first two 
sections of this chapter provide the basis for my discussion in Chapter 7 on how past, present, 
and anticipated migration experiences unfold in migrants’ transnational development practices. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I address the discursive subject of the ‘key-migrant’ of the 
Moldovan migration–development debate. Here again, I accentuate the discontinuities in the 
ways in which the Moldovan state and its key-development partners portray emigrants, shaping 
particular forms of emigrant policies and programmes. 
 As we shall see all throughout this chapter, not only is Moldova a country full of contrasts, 
but so too is its migration. In particular, the interpretations of aid workers, civil servants and 
scholars on migrants’ realities and their capability to collectively contribute to Moldova’s 
development are highly controversial.  
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5.1. From Sadova56 to Padova: Key Features and Development of Moldovan Migration  
 
I now address the most important characteristics of Moldova’s intense emigration since the 
country’s independence from the USSR in 1991. I focus mainly on those features which I consider 
particularly relevant for migrants’ transnational development practices. 
 
5.1.1 Essential characteristics of Moldovan migration  
 
The emigration of Moldovan citizens to neighbouring countries is not a phenomenon of the last 
25 years. Before the end of the Second World War the whole of Central, Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe was characterised by migration movements (Engbersen et al. 2010). Yet, in 
contrast to other countries in the region, such as Poland or Romania, the territory of today’s 
Republic of Moldova had always been a migration-sending area. A strong propensity of the 
population to move away was observed from the 1970s onwards. For instance, farmers of the 
Moldovan Kolkhoz left regularly as seasonal labourers to work in the fields of the Ukraine, or 
Moldovans migrated to Russian cities such as Moscow or St. Petersburg to pursue careers as 
academics or as functionaries within the Communist Party (Gigauri 2006). In the literature on 
Moldovan migration, this emigration of seasonal agricultural workers and the so-called 
‘inteligenzija’ is usually referred to as the ‘old diaspora’ (Görlich and Trebesch 2009). In the 
majority of publications on Moldovan migration, however, this type of emigration is commonly 
left out (e.g. Borodak and Tichit 2014; Vanora et. al. 2015)57.  
Emigration considerably intensified after the country’s independence in 1991, and thus 
marks, in my view, a first discontinuity in Moldovan migration in terms of scale, structure and 
destination countries. In the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Moldovan emigration, like that from other new East-European borderlands, was small and of an 
ethnic character (Schwartz 2007). The majority of Moldovans moved for family reunification to 
other states formerly belonging to the USSR, such as to the Ukraine or Russia. A large part of the 
country’s Jewish community emigrated to Israel (‘return of the Bessarabian Jews’), the United 
States, or to Germany within the so-called ‘Spätaussiedler programmes’ (Deutsches  
                                                          
56 Sadova is a small village in the Călăraşi district, located in the centre of Moldova. The name ‘Sadova’ derives from 
the Russian word сад (garden), which alludes to the former image of Moldova as ‘the garden of the Soviet Union’. 
The inhabitants of Sadova migrate predominantly to Padova and the wider Veneto region. 
57 This is especially the case amongst non-Moldovan scholars and highlights how quickly one can jump at phenomena 
considered a novelty (e.g. large-scale post-communist emigrations) without embedding them within a historical 
approach (e.g. internal migration within the USSR). 
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Auslsänderzentralregister 2012). Because Jewish migrants left permanently with their families 
and did not maintain strong ties with Moldova, their migration differs from the slightly later 
wave of labour migration that started in the mid and late 1990s (Mosneaga 2012).  
 Secondly, because approximately 85% of all migrants left the country in the mid to late 1990s, 
especially around the Russian economic crisis in 1998, the current literature on Moldovan 
migration almost exclusively deals with this economic migration wave (ETF 2007). At that time, 
Moldova’s desolate situation and the lack of opportunities in the job market forced many 
Moldovans to leave their country (see Chapter 4). Since then, besides structural determinants 
(e.g. Moldova’s unfavourable economic investment climate), Moldovans also migrate for a 
variety of other reasons, including more personal reasons (Marcu 2014). For the majority of 
migrants, including most of my migrant participants, however, to go abroad was not their own, 
individually-made decision, but a necessity to support their families. Even if there exists today a 
new wave of a more individual migration, the common goal that spurs many Moldovans to leave 
their country is the pursuit of better wealth and work opportunities in order to increase their 
incomes. As Anastasia briefly and concisely puts it: 
Anastasia (tour-guide, 46, Berlin): Moldovan migrants are hard-working and good people. They 
just want to earn money, so they can solve their problems back home.  
 
 As highlighted in the previous chapter, one of the most outstanding characteristics of this 
post-socialist migration wave is its scale – to an extent that it has become a serious impediment 
to political, social and economic modernisation (IOM 2012a, among others)58. Furthermore, 
there has been an increase in Western European destination countries (mainly Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, France, UK). Romanian-speaking Moldovans still predominantly migrate to Italy, Spain, 
France or Romania (approximately 42%), while the Russian-speaking population mostly opts for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (IOM 2012a). In 2011, 35% of all Moldovan 
migrants lived in Russia, and about 8 % lived in Belarus and the Ukraine (IOM 2012a). The Gagauz 
ethnic-minority are particularly drawn towards Russia and Turkey (IASCI/CIVIS 2010). An 
important reason why many Moldovans opt for CIS-countries as their destination is that the 
migration costs to reach these countries are relatively low (Rusnac et al. 2011). This explains 
why, besides the socio-cultural proximity, migrants in CIS-states are chiefly from the poorer rural 
regions, while those going to France, Italy and to other EU countries such as Spain or Portugal 
are mostly from urban areas and financially better off (IOM 2012a). The lowest share of migrants 
                                                          
58  Conversely, immigration is low. In 2011, 2% of the population were immigrants in Moldova; chiefly from Turkey, 
the Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Azerbaijan, the US and Belarus (IOM 2012a). 
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(9.3%) comes from the capital Chisinau, where people are usually wealthier and better educated 
(Mosneaga 2012).  
 Two further factors influenced the destination choice of the migrants who left Moldova at 
the end of the 1990s. The first factor is access to ethnic networks. For instance, ethnic 
Moldovans could draw on their Romanian ancestry and apply for a Romanian passport, which 
considerably eased their departure towards Western Europe (Marcu 2014). Consequently, these 
migrants figure as Romanian citizens in official national statistics of foreign residents, which 
makes it difficult to know the exact number of Moldovans living in these countries (see Chapter 
3). For instance, it is estimated that 87% of Moldovans use their Romanian passports in the UK, 
49% in France and 24% in Italy (Cheianu-Andrei 2013). Secondly, while the Romanian border had 
been closed during Soviet times, its re-opening in the early 1990s offered unprecedented 
opportunities for shuttle trade, and gave Moldovan merchants access to a growing network of 
Romanian migrants who were already working in Western Europe (Arambaşa 2009)59. In the 
meantime, the just-described classical two-fold migration patterns, resulting from socio-cultural 
and geographic proximity, as well as economic factors, have softened.  
 Internal migration has been significant all through Moldovan migration’s development. The 
Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs (2013a) maintains that 10% of the population moved 
internally in the last ten years. Accordingly, several research participants reported having moved 
to one of Moldova’s two major cities, Chisinau and Balti, before moving abroad60. Yet, internal 
migration is strikingly absent in the in the academic literature on Moldovan migration, or it is 
downplayed, especially by non-Moldovan authors who consider it as insignificant (e.g. Hagen-
Zanker et al. 2009). Possibly foreigners do not consider the two cities as attractive migration 
destinations. Participants implementing migration–development programmes in Moldova, 
however, reported that internal migrants are confronted with the same challenges and engage 
in the same migration practices as international migrants (e.g. lack of Romanian language skills, 
sending remittances). 
Typically, the men of my sample worked in sectors such as transport, construction, or retail 
trade, and the women are employed in the service sector, in the care sector, and in 
housekeeping (Marcu 2014). Approximately 300,000 Moldovans are seasonal migrants. The 
majority of them are men from rural areas, mainly from the North and South of the country. 
                                                          
59 The cross-border trade was halted when Romania joined the European Union in 2007, which resulted in stricter visa 
and customs regulations.  
60 This echoes King’s general observation that: "Many migrants move both internally and internationally, one type of 
move followed by the other" (2012b: 8). 
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These migrants work on construction sites in Russia (72%), or as seasonal migrants in Italy, either 
in the agricultural sector or as construction workers (Mosneaga 2012).  
Another distinctive feature of Moldova’s emigration is that it continues to be significantly 
gendered. Women are more likely to migrate to Southern EU countries, whereas men are more 
likely to migrate to CIS-countries (Robila 2014). This gendered distribution is explained by the 
sectors in which migrants are employed. The construction sector in Russia or the Ukraine 
provides employment opportunities for men, whereas women are more likely to find 
employment in the service or care sector in Italy, Spain or France. In some villages, over 75% of 
women have left home to work in the domestic and care sectors in these countries (Lücke et al. 
2007). That being said, a specific character of Moldovan migration is that the presence of 
dependents in a household does not influence the decision to migrate nor its duration. This 
implies, among other things, that many children grow up without one or both of their parents 
(Danzer and Dietz 2009). With at least half of the Moldovan migrants being women, concerns 
by NGOs have been raised with regard to the care of children and elderly left behind, as I 
discussed in Chapter 461.  
Furthermore, Moldovan migration still comprises a considerable share of undocumented 
migrants (Mosneaga 2012)62. For instance, a majority of migrants are engaged in irregular 
employment and live without proper documentation as ‘tolerated’ undocumented migrants in 
CIS-countries (EU Assessment Mission to the Republic of Moldova–EU Moldova Visa Dialogue 
2013). At the same time, emigration towards the West significantly altered from a largely ‘illegal 
migration’ to a period where most Moldovans travelled with Romanian passports on ‘free 
mobility’ since the visa-liberalisation in April 2014. Prior to the year 2014, migration policies, 
such as intergovernmental agreements with Italy, helped to regularise migrants’ status and to 
improve many migrants’ lives63 (Vietti 2010). While in theory the new visa-regime positively 
affects migrants because it facilitates their and their families’ free movements, in practice many 
Moldovans still cannot afford an international passport for travelling visa-free to the Schengen-
area. And for those who can afford it, administrative obstacles, for instance work restrictions in 
EU-member states, persist. Also, since the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis, migrants are 
                                                          
61 The considerable number of studies on the issue of children and the elderly left behind have produced highly diverse 
and controversial outcomes, ranging from positive or limited effects on the well-being of these individuals (e.g. 
Vanore et al 2015) to negative effects (e.g. negative psychosocial health outcomes, non-compensation of the financial 
remittances for the loss of physical proximity, e.g. Robila 2014; UNICEF 2008). The different results of these studies 
were frequently and publicly disputed by representatives of IOs and research institutions in workshops and meetings 
I attended in Chisinau. 
62 It is estimated that more than 40,000 undocumented Moldovan migrants live in Italy (Mosneaga 2012).  
63 Since 2007, especially with the ‘Flussi Decree’ in Italy, many undocumented Moldovan migrants could legalise their 
status, mostly women (Vianello 2013b). 
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faced with new challenges in finding work-opportunities in countries where generally 
employment opportunities have shrunk (e.g. in Italy or France). As Ivan puts it: 
 
Ivan (factory worker, 41, Novellara): It has always been difficult for us. In the past we had 
problems with our papers and documents. Now we have problems in finding jobs.  
 
 Another discontinuity within the continuity of Moldovan emigration is the implementation 
of the new agreement on the EU-Visa-liberalisation, which reflects the broader global trend of 
instrumentalising migrants for political ends in a new intensified way. In the participants’ 
opinion, Moldovan migrants have become a ‘soft power tool’ for Russia and the European Union 
alike, so as to keep the country on their respective normatively ‘good’ transformation paths. 
After Moldova had signed major agreements with the EU in spring 2013, which covers amongst 
other issues free trade, Russia increased its presence and pressure on Moldova. For instance, it 
put legal pressures on the presence of the approximately 450,000 Moldovan immigrants in 
Russia, making for a considerable share of the country’s total remittances (Expert Group 2014a). 
Russia’s announcement to expel them made Chisinau nervous about a large number of 
‘unwelcome’ low-skilled returnees who do not fit into the governments’ typology of the ‘desired 
return of talents’, as we shall see in the next chapter. According to research participants involved 
in the implementation of the EU-Visa-liberalisation Action Plan, the new visa-scheme was signed 
surprisingly fast. Given that 2014 was an election year, and that tensions in the neighbouring 
Ukraine were growing, I share the participants’ common argument that the speeding up of this 
process had been a charm offensive by the European Union to keep Moldova on the right 
‘European path’. 
Last of all, I would like to highlight one distinctive feature of Moldova’s emigration more in 
detail, namely that a significant proportion of those leaving the country are relatively well 
educated. Prior to migration, a third of migrants were employed in the public sector – in the 
education or health systems, or in local government (IOM 2012a). This confirms the particular 
characteristic of Moldova’s poverty highlighted in the previous chapter, namely that Moldovans 
usually do not lack employment opportunities in their own country, but the salaries are very 
low. Yet, the jobs migrants have in destination countries rarely correspond to their 
qualifications, and the majority of Moldovans abroad are employed in hard, low-skilled and low-
paid sectors –  usually referred to in the literature as 3D jobs: dirty, dangerous and demanding 
(Castles and Miller 2009)64. The phenomenon of de-skilling, understood as being highly qualified 
but employed in low-status and low-paid jobs, is always prominently emphasised in the 
                                                          
64 Approximately 8% of migrants work in the profession according to their education (Cheianu-Andrei 2013). 
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introductions of scientific articles and in consultancy reports on different aspects of Moldovan 
migration (e.g. Robila 2014)65. Yet, to my knowledge, it has never been scrutinised. Because de-
skilling proved to be a vital determinant for migrants’ collective development practices, I will 
briefly discuss some persisting myths on this issue.  
Consistent with current research on Moldovan migration, the majority of migrants in this 
study have undergone de-qualification (e.g. Marcu 2014). Yet, in-line with Korobkov's and 
Zaionchkovskaia’s (2012) findings on high-skilled Russian migrants, most of the well-educated 
participants had already experienced de-skilling in Moldova, especially in the immediate 
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when a large number of Moldovans lost their jobs. 
For many of them the lack of job opportunities in their respective professional fields, or the low 
wages now on offer, provoked their decision to migrate in the first place. Hence, de-qualification 
is not ‘something’ that only occurs abroad, as often suggested in the academic literature (e.g. 
Borodak and Tichit 2014). Secondly, while it is not my intention to undermine the emotional 
effects that de-qualification can have on a person, I find it important to note that it is not a 
migration-specific issue. It is at present a reality for many inhabitants in some host-countries 
under study (e.g. in Italy). In Anna’s words:  
Anna (translator/writer, 45, Rome): Italy does not offer good job perspectives for young people 
and intellectuals. From this point of view, we are very well integrated (laughs)! Because all of my 
Italian friends are also unemployed, or in jobs not in-line with their qualifications. 
 Thirdly, participants also stressed the relationship between the phenomenon of de-skilling 
and cultural aspects, chiefly Moldovans low self-esteem, which is regarded as a form of ‘new 
subordination’ (see Chapter 4). In their view, one determinant for the widespread de-skilling 
amongst Moldovan migrants consists of their ‘high adaptability’ to any kind of jobs, as well as 
frequent professional reorientation, often without efforts to find employment prospects in their 
original professions or to negotiate better work conditions. And last of all, participants employed 
in international aid-agencies in Moldova considered the ‘high return intentionality’ of migrants 
as an impediment for migrants’ up-skilling. They narrated that qualification programmes for the 
recognition of diplomas were in many cases unsuccessful. Evening courses addressed to 
Moldovan nurses in Paris, for instance, to validate their professional qualification were not 
sufficiently attended, because many women do not anticipate staying for long, even if in most 
cases they do extend their stays.  
 
                                                          
65 E.g. Moldovan medical doctors working as gardeners in France or Italy, or academics working on agricultural 
estates in Spain. 
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5.1.2 Diversification of destination countries and migration types  
  
Although my sample is not statistically representative, I have found striking discrepancies 
between participants’ accounts on current migration trends and the existing literature on 
Moldovan migration. While some of the typical established migration patterns of temporary or 
seasonal migration are still discernible, relatively new fragmented patterns of onward migration, 
permanent migration, or forms of individualistic migration, for instance student mobility, have 
also emerged in the Moldovan case, blurring classical typologies of migration. This development 
of Moldovan migration is somewhat missing in the ‘classical patterns’ emphasised in the 
majority of recent academic articles and consultancy reports on Moldovan migration related 
topics. These, I argue, are still in the grip of the ‘Earn and Return rhetoric’, based on what I call 
the ‘typology of Moldovan migration of 2007’, because most authors refer to the literature 
published around or before 2007 (e.g. Vanore et al. 2015). 
 Firstly, one important missing discontinuity in Moldovan migration patterns is the widening 
geographical spread of the destination countries. My findings on this topic endorse Marcu’s 
estimation (2014) of a softening of the classical ‘two-fold East-West migration pattern’: poorer 
Moldovan men largely destined for low-skilled jobs in manual labour markets in Russia or the 
Ukraine, while wealthier and better educated men aim for medium-skilled jobs in Western 
Europe; women are mostly found in the care and home services sector in European Union 
countries. Even if these patterns still exist, I argue that in recent years the geographical 
landscape of destination countries has become more polycentric. The EU countries receiving the 
greatest numbers of Moldovans are Italy (22%) and Romania (18%), followed by France, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, while at the same time the Balkans, Israel and the 
Middle East (particularly Saudi Arabia and Lebanon) have also gained ground (Cheianu-Andrei 
2013)66. While in the ‘2007 migration typology’, France, Spain and Italy still figure as classical 
destination countries for the wealthier Moldovans (e.g. Vanora et al. 2015), participants 
reported that nowadays high unemployment rates in these countries make them less attractive 
for this group of migrants, and therefore they try to migrate directly to Canada, the US, or to the 
UK. The following quote illustrates this trend.  
 
Angela (care-worker, 32, Novellara): There are still many, many who leave the country, but now 
a lot of qualified Moldovans don’t come to Italy anymore, they go where there is better work: to 
                                                          
66 Due to the large number of destination countries, several participants answered the question of Where is Moldova?, 
raised in the previous chapters as follows: Moldova is everywhere, because Moldovans are all over the world.  
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Canada, to the US, or the UK. There are still the ones who already have family here who come, 
but there are fewer and fewer who arrive, and there are also people who leave quite early. 
 
The broad geographical spread of host-countries is related to the growth of a culture of 
migration, meaning that individuals follow in the path of others who previously migrated from 
Moldova to a common destination-country, by heavily depending on social networks. According 
to Cheianu-Andrei (2013), on average 60% of Moldovan migrants selected their migration 
destination according where they already knew friends and relatives. Drawing on my findings, I 
argue that the increase of Moldovan migrants in EU-member states has also enlarged the 
personal network of those individuals who formerly migrated to the East, and thus perpetuates 
on-going out-migration or circular and cross-border mobility towards previously atypical 
destination countries67. Although this trend has never been highlighted as such in the literature, 
I find that in the last few years, the growing migration networks promote a softening of the 
classical ‘double-edged migration pattern’. A concise example is the growing number of men, 
who through personal networks, increasingly migrate to EU member-states (e.g. France, 
Germany) for the same jobs, having formerly worked on construction sites in Israel and Russia 
(Mosneaga 2012). Vice-versa, in-line with Mosneaga (2012), the analysis of participants’ 
accounts on current migration trends shows an increase in the number of women working in the 
service sector in Russia, for instance in the hotel business.  
 A second important discontinuity within the on-going Moldovan migration is the 
diversification of migration patterns towards a mixed migration. My findings endorse Cheianu-
Andrei’s (2013) observation of an increase in processes of settlement. While emigration to 
Western Europe or to the United States out of communist Eastern Europe was normally one-
way and permanent (Vianello 2013b), the post-1995 Moldovan migration wave is still 
predominantly described in the majority of academic literature as temporary or circular, side-
lining processes of family reunification or ‘delayed return’ (e.g. Bordak and Tichit 2014; Varzari 
et al 2014). Within this ‘2007 typology of Moldovan migration’, it is commonly stressed that 
temporary migrants represent a growing share of Moldovan migrants, at 70% (e.g. Piracha et al. 
2012). Yet, most definitions of temporary migration are based on migrants’ expressed wish to 
return one day to Moldova, mostly based on Lücke and his colleagues’ findings of 2007, which 
showed that Moldovan migrants do not intend to settle permanently in their destination 
countries. As I will argue later in this chapter, in the meantime many migrants actually do want 
                                                          
67 In all of my fieldwork locations, research participants came from a variety of different places in Moldova often 
through their personal networks, including locations in the North and South of Moldova with a typical high share of 
migration towards CIS-countries.  
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to settle permanently abroad, and thus we need to characterise Moldovan migration as a mixed 
migration. I will argue that the dominant idea of temporary migration, understood as "resulting 
sooner or later in return migration, in contrast to permanent migrants who may make return 
visits [to Moldova] from time to time" (King 2012b: 7), needs to be revisited in the Moldovan 
case. Furthermore, a high share of undocumented migrants often overstayed their visa and thus 
were trapped in their destination countries, often for years, unable to move transnationally 
while hoping to be regularised. Their migration changed to permanent migration without the 
privilege of being able to return to Moldova on a regular basis or options of other forms of 
migration, for instance circular migration (e.g. Vianello 2013b). In sum, many Moldovan labour 
migrants extend their stays for undefined periods, due to various personal or structural reasons, 
thus disrupting the classical category of temporary migration.  
  Thirdly, a new group of migrants can be identified, composed of young migrants, mostly high-
skilled professionals, students or graduates, unmarried and with no or fewer family obligations 
of sending remittances. Interestingly, while the current literature on new categories of migration 
in the research context of Central Eastern European (CEE) migration countries heavily 
concentrates on this relatively new type of young individualistic migrants, the young educated 
and mobile elites are mostly absent in the academic literature on Moldovan migration (for CEE 
migration see for instance Engbersen and Snel 2013). This second migration wave of Moldovan 
migrants in Western Europe is characterised by individuals in the 18-29 years-old age group 
(45.3% according to Cheinau-Andrei 2013). They are mostly young high-skilled adults, who work 
in different professional, academic and arts sectors, or they are students, who join their parents 
for University education abroad. Although this group of migrants is still smaller than the first 
wave of Moldovan migrants who migrated to Western Europe around the mid-1990s and many 
Moldovans still leave their country in order to escape poverty or to prevent their families from 
enduring poverty, this group of migrants is growing (Mosneaga 2012). Also, migrants belonging 
to this second migration wave always described themselves as somewhat different from the first 
wave of migrants who migrated to Western Europe, by stressing that they emigrated in average 
15 years later than the members of the first wave, responding to the new post-communist social 
conditions, and that they start their migration careers with different aims and perspectives from 
the members of the first migration wave. All of the above-mentioned characteristics match well 
with Sayad’s (1977) concept of the ‘second age’ of Algerian migrants in France (1977). Therefore, 
according to this author, I continue to refer in my thesis to this migration wave as ‘the second 
wave of Moldovan migrants’ in Western and South-Western Europe. Further drawing on Sayad’s 
concepts of different ages of migration, migrants from the first wave, who migrated mostly for 
economic reasons, and the ‘second wave’ of migrants, not only differ in regard to their time of 
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arrival in the host-countries and their socio-economic characteristics, but they also rarely 
interact with one another, as we will see in the next chapter. Overall, then, I find that the scope 
of migration types has become broader. This diversification – reflecting a general global trend 
towards mixed migration (King 2012b) – is not yet sufficiently depicted in the academic literature 
on various aspects of the Moldovan migration, that reduces the description of Moldovan 
migration to the ‘first wave of Moldovan migrants’ within EU member-states. Therefore, like the 
spread of destination countries and migration patterns, I suggest that this second wave of 
migrants needs to be better considered in the literature on Moldovan migration. 
  In summary, this sketch of recent Moldovan migration to Western Europe since the mid-
1990s shows that, like many other migration movements, there exists a wide variety of 
migration patterns and destination countries. Moldovan migration can best be described as 
‘multi-faceted’: geographically polycentric and socio-economically varied, extremely intense, 
largely economically driven, and dynamically altering towards a mixed migration. Even if 
estimates about the further development of emigration are ambivalent regarding destination 
countries and their respective labour markets, emigration is still evolving in numbers, and not 
expected to decrease in volume (Mosneaga 2012). Lastly, my literature review has shown that 
the majority of scientific articles on Moldovan migration are still inscribed in what I call the ‘2007 
migration typology’, emphasising the predominant migration type of Moldovan migrants as 
‘temporary’, neglecting the recently started diversification of migration types, as well as the 
fairly new second wave of Moldovan migrants in Western Europe.  
 
5.2 Moving Beyond ‘the Earn and Return Typology’: Four Current Moldovan Migration 
Realities   
 
I now highlight in more detail four current features of post-communist Moldovan migration, 
each of which seems to significantly influence migrants’ associational life and their collective 
development practices. These four features are: actual or anticipated onward migration to other 
destination countries, lack of socio-cultural integration in the host countries under study, return 
migration, and family reunification. Because research on Moldovan migration has heavily 
concentrated on estimating the number of migrants, on remittances, and on the challenges of 
parental migration on Moldovan families and children left behind, there is a striking lack of 
qualitative, in-depth research on these current migration characteristics. Given the limited data 
available, the following investigation is mainly informed by my own primary data – the estimates 
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of research participants, including accounts from informal talks, in conjunction with their 
statements on migrants’ transnational aid-giving.  
5.2.1 “I am ‘here’ only temporarily, but I don’t want to go back ‘there’ forever”: high (intentional) 
onward migration and constant reorientation  
 
A first understudied migration trend that I argue significantly influences migrants’ collective 
transnational development practices is actual or anticipated onward migration towards more 
economically successful countries, or return back to Moldova68. As outlined in Chapter 2, 
individual migration experiences are usually more complex than the classical understanding of 
Moldovan migration as an ‘earn and return migration’ in a linear, one-way movement from A to 
B, and then back to A. This is particularly the case if migrants move from one destination country 
to another, or if they anticipate future onward migration either direct to another country or 
after a period back in Moldova, like many research participants do. Though my sample cannot 
be claimed to be representative, I have found that there is a strong tendency of intentional 
onward migration, especially from South-Western Europe to other European countries or 
temporarily back to Moldova. Many participants had already lived in other countries than where 
I encountered them, notably in former CIS-countries like Russia, or in Central European countries 
where they replaced locals who had migrated westwards (i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic or 
Romania). The opposite trend was also mentioned, namely that Moldovan families living in 
crisis-ridden South-West Europe, where employment opportunities have shrunk, relocate to 
Russia (e.g. from Italy, Spain and Portugal)69. With the exceptions of student and marriage 
migration, every high skilled migrant in my sample, as well as every participant in the UK and in 
Switzerland70, previously had worked in other European destinations. 
 From a biographical perspective, onward migration results in what research participants, 
independent of their socio-economic status, age and gender, articulated as having had ‘multiple 
lives’: different places of residency, various professional occupations, and fluid family 
constellations, often accompanied by moments of rupture and disruption. This echoes Sennett’s 
(1999) observation of the contemporary ‘over modern flexibility’ of individuals as having ‘fluid 
lives’. Migrants' ‘constant reorientation’ in new and often complex life circumstances were most 
                                                          
68 I am informed by King’s definition of onward migration “[...] when a move from A to B is succeeded by a move to 
country C” (2012b: 9).  
69 During my fieldwork in 2013, Russia was still an attractive alternative to South-Western Europe, because of a 
constant rise in Russian salaries (Iasci /CIVIS 2010). The Ukraine crises in 2014, however, drastically weakened the 
country’s economy. Thus, it is unlikely that this trend will continue, because the social costs of migration to Russia 
might do not account for the economic advantages anymore. 
70 This is presumably an expression of higher initial migration costs to these two countries compared to other 
destination countries under study. 
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apparent when family members lived simultaneously in disparate places. Dragomir’s trajectory, 
a former professor of mathematics, shows a not untypical migrant life-path biography. 
 
Dragomir (construction worker, 48, Paris): I already had many lives (laughs)! I first went to 
Romania, where I was working in a supermarket together with my fiancée, and then she went 
back to Moldova. In the meantime, we got married and our son was born. That was the time 
when I was without them, working in Poland on a pony farm, for let’s say two years, before I went 
to Mestre [Italy] to work in a hotel, for about five years [...] When I lost my job, I went back to 
Moldova for ehm only a short time, but by the will of destiny, I met my second wife there. And 
finally, a friend of mine told me that there is work in France, and that’s why I am here now, and 
if everything goes well, my second wife will join me soon.  
 
The trajectory of Marina, a social worker who lives in Rome, is another example of the 
fragmented character of many participants’ life-stories. She migrated first internally with her 
husband from their village of origin to Chisinau. Whilst her husband later moved to Moscow and 
then to the Czech Republic, Marina stayed in Chisinau and worked full-time, while their daughter 
grew up with Marina’s mother in the village. Twelve years later, she migrated to Rome, while 
her husband had migrated from the Czech Republic to Poland71.  
 The writer and intellectual Benjamin Fondane (1898-1944), known as the ‘the Odysseus of 
Bessarabia’, aptly summarised the potential effects that onward migration can have on 
migrants’ lives. In the early-middle 20th century, he migrated to Paris together with many 
Romanian intellectuals and artists, mostly Jews. At that point Moldova was a part of Bessarbia 
(Greater Romania), and strong cultural affinities between Paris and Bucharest – the ‘Paris of the 
East’ – existed. Seventy-three years ago, he vividly described in his oeuvre, ‘Le voyageur n’ a pas 
fini de voyager’ (1943) (The traveller who has not finished travelling), the emotional state 
expressed by migrant participants: a feeling of constant departing without the prospect of 
arrival, integration or recognition. This state of mind is precisely one reason for the migrant 
leaders’ quest for recognition within the local or transnational migrant community, rather than 
in the host-society, which consequently impacts on migrants' associative development 
engagement, as we shall see in Chapter 7.  
 Onward mobility, especially if it is only imagined, can cause sensations of being ‘stuck in time’ 
with no immediate plans to go somewhere else. In migrants’ narratives, this ‘stagnation’ was 
commonly stressed together with worries about missing the right time to begin again.  
 
Mihael (engineer, 29, Orléans): I am here only temporarily, but I don’t want to go back there 
[Moldova] forever [...] I am often scared to miss the moment for moving on, or to get stuck here, 
                                                          
71 Four migrants living in Italy and France, with whom I stayed in contact during the writing-up, have in the meantime 
moved to another country.  
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although it is not too bad here. But I would like to go somewhere else, because I never imagined 
staying here forever, but at the moment I don’t know where I would like to go [...]. I don’t know, 
sometimes I think it has also to do with luck, and not only with choices, but then you feel 
responsible anyway, especially when you think that you should have moved on earlier. 
 
The postponement of ‘onward’ movement disconcerts some migrants. Simmel described this 
feeling with the ‘stranger’, namely that: "[…] although he has gone no further, has not quite got 
over the freedom of coming and going" (1992: 764).  
 A significant distinction between onward or serial migration of middle or high-skilled 
migrants and the majority of Moldovan labour migrants, is that the latter do not regard their 
second migration as leading beyond the duality of their immigrant situation72. Ossman (2013) 
for instance maintains that: “Serial migrants’ narratives indicate that they generally feel settling 
in a third country as a liberation from the double bind of immigration” (2013: 4). She goes on to 
say that subsequently serial migrants refer less to their home-country but more to their first 
migration experience. This is clearly not the case for Moldovan migrants, regardless of their 
socio-economic status. In contrary, my findings indicate that actual onward-migration, 
combined with the feeling of ‘always departing and never arriving’, reaffirms migrants’ 
attachment and their sense of belongingness to Moldova.  
 This finding has implications for migrants’ collective transnational aid-giving. Firstly, and 
consistent with authors who maintain that a strong sense of belonging to the country of origin 
is central for migrants’ home-country engagement (e.g. Collyer 2013), migrants’ strong feelings 
of attachment to Moldova positively affect their desire to engage in transnational aid-practices; 
for instance, to fulfil their needs to belong to the local or transnational migrant community, or 
for maintaining transnational links with individuals ‘back home’. Conversely, their actual or 
anticipated onward migration can also hamper a long-term collective commitment, for example 
the creation of associations and umbrella-like schemes. In this respect, participants commented 
that it is rather unlikely that migrants create associations or that they strongly engage in 
collective charity giving, if they intend to stay somewhere only for a limited period of time. 
 
5.2.2 “I am a lone wolf”: socio-cultural integration and emotions of belonging(s) 
 
The composition of the Moldovan migrant community varies by the host countries under study. 
As it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to assess in detail the migrant community in each 
                                                          
72 In general, I deem intra-European onward migration of low-skilled European labour migrants less considered in 
migration research than the onward migration of the European managerial class, the mobile elite, or however we 
want to name them (see Favell 2008 or Kreutzer and Roth 2006 on this topic).  
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of the countries, I emphasise those findings which I found to be determinant for migrants’ 
collective humanitarian practices across all host-society contexts. 
5.2.2.1 The Moldovan migrant community – an invisible community discretely growing  
In general, migrants considered the attitude of the host-society towards them positively73. The 
traditional characteristics of Moldovans as being humble and adaptable also applies to 
Moldovan migrants, described as ‘patient’ and ‘good cooperative workers’. In brief: 
 
Dima (taxi driver, 47, Paris): Generally, we are seen as humble, skilled and hardworking labourers 
abroad. Voilà. We don’t cause any problems. 
 
Accordingly, migrants characterise themselves as a ‘discrete’ and ‘invisible’ migrant community 
in Western and South-Western Europe – visible as a migrant community, but invisible as 
Moldovans. The Moldovan migrant community can also be described as a discretely growing 
community in the countries under study. Partly, this is because the national statistics do not 
show the trend of an increase in numbers of Moldovan migrants, since many Moldovans use 
their Romanian passports in Western Europe74. 
 While some migrants revealed pride in the rather positive attitude towards Moldovan labour 
migrants, others are slightly weary of their image as calm and modest workers. They pointed to 
its downside, by stressing the cultural aspect of Moldovans’ low self-esteem, considered as a 
result of Moldova’s turbulent past, in which they needed to adopt to various invaders, as 
highlighted in Chapter 4. In these terms, migrants’ ‘high-adaptation’ due to a lack of self-esteem 
is regarded as a negative virtue. Moreover, given the invisibility of the Moldovan migrant 
community as such75, participants narrated that their associative activities remain mostly 
unnoticed in the host-countries, too. In their view, their image as a migrant community of 
modest demeanour negatively affects their chances to receive institutional and financial support 
from local authorities for their associations: 
Natalia (lecturer and businesswoman, 42, Rome): We will only be a diaspora and get more funding 
for our activities if we are recognised as a migrant group in the countries of residence. But like 
                                                          
73 With the exception of some Italian cities (e.g. Padova, Novellara), where female migrants described their image as 
negative: e.g. as threats to marriages and families, or as financially abusing Italian men.  
74 An illustrative example of this ‘discrete growth’ are bus connections between Geneva and Moldova. Three years 
ago, there existed one weekly bus connection between Geneva and Moldova via Bologna (in order to fill the empty 
seats). Today there are three weekly direct bus connections between Geneva to Moldova.  
75 With the exception of Novellara, Italy, with a proportionally larger number of Moldovan inhabitants than in other 
locations under study, where locals refer to ‘Moldoveni’ as pars pro toto for all Eastern European migrants, even if 
they are aware that many of them are originally form other Eastern European countries.  
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here in Italy, where many Moldovans live, local administrations often don’t even know the 
difference between Romanians and Moldovans. That’s why it’s difficult for us to get any support.  
Comparable observations were recorded in other locations, in which participants referred to 
other migrant communities as being more self-confident, and thus more successful in their 
fundraising activities than the Moldovans. Natasha shares her experience from Paris:  
Natasha (shop-assistant, 48, Paris): Take the Romanians for example. They are more courageous, 
and they know better their rights and how to stand up for themselves. They talk in a different 
tone and they are better heard. They are not as shy as we are. I see that all the time here, when 
I look at their associations. They are more present and they get better funding.  
 
Furthermore, in Villeneuve-Saint-Georges (near Paris), local authorities and migrant associations 
jointly aimed to improve migrants’ living conditions (e.g. language courses, improvement of 
their housing situations). For this reason, several meetings were held, but no follow-up actions 
were taken. As I have been told by all parties involved, the postponement of this collaboration 
had to do with the image of Moldovan migrants as calm and patient, putting the more ‘visible 
migrant communities’ on top of the community’s agenda, instead.  
 And last of all, the atmosphere within the migrant community is far from being harmonious, 
and intra-group tensions exist. Very broadly, migrants’ collective experiences abroad are 
narrated as double-edged: on the one side as a pleasant experience of belonging to a ‘loyal 
flock’, and on the other side as being part of a competitive environment, where everybody tries 
to take advantage of each other76. Interestingly, these intra-group tensions are less related to 
intra-ethnic divisions, for instance between Romanian and Russian speaking Moldovans, as one 
would assume. Rather, they are a result of new class-formations that have emerged in post-
communist Moldova, spilling over to the migrant community, either among migrants of the 
same migration wave or between the different waves of emigrants, as noted earlier. As I will 
discuss in more detail in the next chapter, migrants of different classes have little in common 
besides their shared Socialist past and their personal migration experiences, and they generally 
do not mix in the same host-country, nor in the transnational space of migrant civil society. 
However, I find it important to note that the reasons for the lack of inner solidarity within the 
migrant community should not be reduced to new post-socialist class structures, but should 
equally take into account the class structures that already existed during Socialism. A commonly 
neglected aspect in academic research on post-socialist migrant communities is the fact that 
                                                          
76 A common mentioned example in this respect was that female migrants claim high commission fees from their co-
citizens for work places in the care and home services sector. 
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lack of solidarity is not a new phenomenon that appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union. As 
Boian (2001) maintains in the Romanian case, a coherent solidarity during Socialism is a myth. 
There has always been a lack of inner national and social solidarity during Socialism, which 
according to the author was built on a fragile societal system that had cracks and flaws.  
 On the other hand, in line with Jenkins’ distinction between an ‘inner’ and an ‘external’ 
definition of identity (2004: 23), the identity of the Moldovan migrant community, and its image 
in the receiving countries, has always been stressed in differentiation to the Romanian identity 
in general, and to the Romanian migrant community in particular. During my fieldwork, strong 
negative media reports in the countries under study on Eastern European migrants, often mixed 
with an anti-Roma discourse, were omnipresent. Eastern European migrants, and particularly 
Romanians, were repeatedly associated with criminality, and collectively accused of anti-social 
behaviour, for instance of social benefit fraud (e.g. Le Point 201377). Surprisingly, the hostile 
environment towards Romanians does not influence migrants’ aspirations to join Romania, nor 
does it negatively affect migrants’ willingness to carry out joint development activities with 
Romanian associations.78 
 In conclusion, the quote below illustratively shows the unequal images of Romanian and 
Moldovan migrants in the host-countries, and how participants experience these stereotypes in 
their daily lives:  
 
Laura (journalist, 37, Bologna): How can I say this: When I am telling people that I am Moldovan 
then that’s ok, even fine. But if I tell them that I speak Romanian, then that’s not good, because 
people here have a very bad image about Romanians. They associate Romanian with Roma, and 
they turn around if they think you are Romanian. But I would like us to be again part of Romania. 
[...] And ok, we have a lot of Russian things because of the Soviet Union, but if we join Romania, 
we would be more developed, both the country as such and also our associations here.  
 
5.2.2.2 “From the prisons of paradise”: low socio-cultural integration of Moldovan migrants 
  
Although my key interest is the integration of Moldovan migrants into transnational 
development processes by means of their collective development interventions, and not their 
integration into the host societies under study, I deem it important to sketch some aspects of 
migrants’ integration in more detail. Firstly, because it impacts on migrants’ transnational 
development practices, and secondly, because contemporary research on Moldovan migration 
                                                          
77 A typical title I came across during my fieldwork was: ‘Elles viennent de l’Est - Ces mafias qui pillent la France’ (They 
are coming from the East - this mafia that pillages France). 
78 With the exception of Italy, as we will see in more detail in the next chapter.  
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has neglected aspects of migrants’ integration, including the challenges migrants face abroad 
(Mosneaga 2012)79. 
 As suggested in Chapter 2, I find the distinction between structural integration and socio-
cultural integration useful for the analysis of migrants’ own reflections on their integration. My 
findings in this regard can be broadly summarised as consistent with Mosneaga (2012), namely 
that the majority of migrants are rather well integrated into the societal structures of their 
respective destination countries (e.g. education, labour market)80: 
 
Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): If you give Moldovans a flat and work, they are integrated. They 
just want to work. That’s all. 
 
From a more scholarly perspective, Moldovans are in general structurally well integrated, but 
they expressed a lack of socio-cultural integration in the host society; for example, they do not 
consider themselves as emotionally belonging to that society. The reasons for migrants' lack of 
socio-cultural integration were frequently associated with their anticipated onward migration 
and/or return migration. Below, Dragomir and Jure narrate their lack of socio-cultural 
integration, which in their cases leads to loneliness and a feeling of ‘isolation’: 
Dragomir (construction worker, 48, Paris): Most of us are isolated here. I work all day long and 
come back in the evening. I feel very lonely here, very lonely. I would like to go back, because I 
feel so lonely. But I am not going because of my job. But believe me, if I could have work in 
Moldova, which would allow me a decent life, I would immediately pack my bags and leave.  
Jure (electrician and poet, 52, Preganzol): I am not integrated here. I am like a lone wolf, and a 
lone wolf is not happy. I have never asked anybody for support, neither within the Moldovan 
community, nor from the state here. Also, when I was living in Poland, I have always tried to 
manage on my own, by working hard all day long. 
 
Chairpersons of migrant organisations who provide support services for migrants commented 
that many Moldovans do not put much effort into their integration, simply because they do not 
envisage staying for very long, even if their consecutive onward mobility or return to Moldova 
is often delayed. That being said, migrants maintained that ‘temporary residency abroad’ 
combined with feelings of ‘isolation’ generates specific forms of migrants’ associative 
engagements and transnational aid-giving, as we shall see in Chapter 7.  
                                                          
79 Apart from two commissioned studies by the IOM (Cheianu-Andrei 2013; IOM 2012a) and one article by Mosneaga 
(2012), I have not come across any further study on this issue. 
80 Many low-skilled migrants are also not well structurally integrated, especially in the UK, where lack of language 
skills was mentioned as one of the biggest challenges for many migrants (e.g. 73% of migrants living in the UK reported 
insufficient language skills, see Cheianu-Andrei (2013)).   
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 Lastly, my findings indicate that the lack of socio-cultural integration in the host countries 
relates positively with migrants’ sustained attachment to Moldova. Despite Moldova’s complex 
and contested identity as a nation-state, the binding element of the migrant community is its 
strong sense of belonging to Moldova. Even if migrants have been living abroad for several years, 
the pronounced home-land attachment was strongly present in every interview. With the 
important exceptions of complaints about endemic corruption, poverty and inequality, all 
migrants referred positively to Moldova, some even affectionately. Below, Anna, who has been 
living in Paris for fifteen years, narrates:  
 
Anna (housewife and cleaner, 37, Paris): For me, it is like having two mothers: France and 
Moldova. But the world still turns around Moldova. It is still the centre of my universe.  
 
Keeping in mind that the majority of migrants still have family members in Moldova, the strong 
attachment to their country of origin should not come as a surprise. Besides migrants’ 
transnational development practices, their close ties with Moldova are particularly expressed in 
return visits (on average twice a year or more), long-distance communication – such as daily 
conversations via Skype or telephone calls with relatives and families ‘back home’ – as well as 
the fact that Moldovan migrants remit to their families the highest share of their earnings, 
compared to other European migrant communities (Piracha and Saraogi 2012). 
As I have highlighted in Chapter 4, the social construction of Moldova as a migrants’ place of 
belonging is rooted in the narrative of the ‘rural Moldova’ and/or the ‘village’. In Bachelard's 
(1957) opinion, a place is a construct of space, time and memory. The place ‘home’, and the 
category of ‘leaving home’ or ‘or being gone’ is entangled with narratives of ‘leaving the village’ 
– often remembered as an idyllic place full of human warmth. Even the urban migrants refer to 
the image of the village. This is partly because of the maintenance of strong family networks 
between the only two urban areas (Chisinau and Bălți) and the villages, where many migrants 
originate from, and where their parents and grandparents live. The local community as the main 
point of reference of migrants’ place of belonging – their way of referring to their place of origin 
– also shapes the social space of migrants’ collective transnational development interventions. 
Hence, ‘the typical site’ of migrants’ transnational development interventions is precisely their 
local community. This is one important reason for migrants’ low aspirations to integrate their 
development projects into the abstract transnational space of aidland, beyond the community 
level, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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5.2.3 “You cannot jump twice into the same river”: delayed return and return visits 
 
My observation on migrants’ ‘high anticipation’ of onward migration also implies considerations 
of return migration, which proved to significantly impact upon migrants’ collective volunteer-
run development interventions. Therefore, I summarise my findings on both migrants’ 
anticipated return and their physical relocation to Moldova.  
 For Carling and Pettersen (2014), return intentions are shaped by migrants’ attachment to 
their country of origin, relative to that of their country of residence. Moldovan migrants remain 
strongly attached to their country of origin, but they are rather weakly integrated into the host 
society; these are two interrelated factors, which can favour contemplated return. Yet, this 
observation clashes with return migration as an acceptable alternative to a life abroad, which 
involves information and imagination about Moldova as a potential place for fulfilling migrants’ 
life plans. As we saw in Chapter 4, the migrants’ evaluation of their home country’s future is 
pessimistic, and they do not consider Moldova as a place to return to yet. Although all migrants 
in my sample, independent of their gender, age, migration history, and degree of socio-cultural 
integration, anticipate return, the majority of them extend their stays abroad for undefined 
periods, often involuntarily81. The reasons why migrants do not relocate to Moldova include 
personal reasons (e.g. to escape from family or relationship problems), better wealth level and 
work opportunities abroad; also, various structural motives, such as the political instability, the 
low income and the adequate infrastructure, or the relatively new and growing phenomenon of 
family reunification abroad can be reasons for non-return. For these reasons, migrants often 
described Moldova as a place of purely ‘being’ and not ‘becoming’. In Illa’s words:  
 
Illa (care-worker, 36, Novellara): Moldova is the end of the street not the beginning, so if you 
want to achieve something in life, you can’t stay in Moldova. You need to leave. It’s, you know, 
as if life passes you by like a river. You need to move on. 
 
Another frequently mentioned issue was the country’s poor investment climate, often 
paraphrased as a ‘wall’: 
 
Nicolai (unemployed, 31, Padova): I know people who have returned, but after six months they 
are all back in Italy again, because of this wall! Everybody I know has lost their money, while trying 
to run against this wall, and then they come back to Italy with nothing. 
 
                                                          
81 This observation is also backed up by an unpublished survey conducted by a migrant association in Germany, which 
found that, out of 150 migrants, only two envisage a permanent return to Moldova in the next five years.  
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This ‘wall’, endemic corruption and unfavourable cultural factors – notably the ‘culture of 
distrust’ (see Chapter 4) – complicates the creation of new and viable livelihoods upon migrants’ 
return. Susanna told me a typical migrant story of a failed investment plan upon return to 
Moldova, often described as being a disorganised country with lack of opportunity structures82:  
Susanna (au-pair, 28, Aarau): My uncle lived for 10 years in Italy and had saved money. Two years 
ago, he went back to open up a factory for wood processing. He found a place, workers, 
everything, but he could not start his business. There were too many rules, too many papers to 
do, and ehm, all his savings were lost in bureaucracy and bribes. So, he went back to Italy, after 
having spent all his money just for trying to open up the business. 
And Carmen adds: 
 Carmen (member of a volunteer network, 16, Tiraspol): I would like to stay in Moldova and to 
become an influential person. But it is hard here, because Moldova is a very poor and corrupted 
country. My generation needs to work hard so we become richer, and our parents can come back.  
 
Contrary to Carmen’s hope that the Moldovan parents will one day return to Moldova, there is 
a growing public awareness in Moldova that some family member might never return, especially 
when their children who stayed in Moldova, have grown up in their absence:  
 
Carmen (member of a volunteer network, 16, Tiraspol):  13 years ago, our mother left for Italy. I 
am 20 now and grown up. It was hard when she left, especially for our father. But we got used to 
it. Today we all think that she is probably not coming back. Or, let’s say, we don’t know for sure.  
 
 Another frequently stressed reason for delayed return were concerns that migrants would 
feel like ‘strangers at home’, meaning that during a migrant’s absence, places and people might 
have changed in a way that would make it impossible for them to readapt. Svetlana narrates, 
using the same allegory of the river as Illa above: 
Svetlana (factory worker and artist, 55, Munich): Those who have lived fifteen years abroad, they 
have missed out fifteen years. I mean you cannot jump twice into the same river, right? Too much 
water has been running down in the meantime. The river has continued to flow. It’s not the same 
anymore, and anyhow, why should people come back and swim in that river, if the waters are 
deeper where they are?  
 
Migrants’ obstacles to a potential return and to readapt to Moldova’s degrading socio-political 
environment are also recognised by some aid workers:  
 
                                                          
82 This finding endorses Tejada and her colleagues’ results on the main obstacles for the return of high-skilled migrants 
(Tejada et al. 2013). 
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William (Director of an International NGO, 56, Chisinau): Politicians still think that the young 
people who have left Moldova will all come back with another mentality and change the country 
for good. The problem is that they don’t come back. Some of them have not succeeded abroad. 
Ok, they might actually like to return, but because they think their human value, their human 
potential is not sufficiently recognised, they stay abroad.  
 
As William mentioned, the lack of recognition of human capital, highlighted in the previous 
chapter, proved to be another key determinant for migrants’ decision to stay abroad. Some 
participants do not want to return to a context of nepotism and ‘recommendations’ in which 
one’s social capital is more validated than one’s human capital, for instance in the distribution 
of jobs. So, all in all, it can be said that the reasons why Moldovans do not envisage return 
migration in the near future are the same as for their departure in the first place. As Natalia 
summarised:  
 
Natalia (lecturer and businesswoman, 42, Rome): If you want to understand why Moldovans don’t 
want to come back, you need to look within the country, because the reasons why people don’t 
return are the same as why people left in the first place. It’s the lack of decently paid jobs, lack of 
stability, and lack of security for the future. It is not something specific to us, migrants. It is 
something the country needs to solve for everybody. 
 
 Conversely, some civil servants within government ministries and NGOs provided me with an 
overly optimistic and romanticised picture of current and future trends of return migration, 
inscribed in the earlier-mentioned ‘Earn and Return’ rhetoric. In their accounts – often swollen 
with patriotic connotations – migrants are ‘up-rooted’ from their lives in Moldova, nobody wants 
to leave the country for good, and everybody will return sooner or later. Moreover, they think 
that the emigration peak has passed, meaning that ‘those who wanted to leave the country have 
already left’, although the statistics tell another story (see Chapter 1):  
 
Viorica (deputy director of a bilateral aid-agency, 41, Chisinau): I think nobody wants to leave 
Moldova, and nowadays people also leave less. I mean, those who absolutely wanted to leave, 
they have already left. And today many people also want to come back. So, no, I don’t think 
emigration is going to be that big an issue any more in the future, not as it used to be. 
  
While these participants are waiting and hoping for the ‘good Moldovan spirits’ to return, it 
seems to me that they have somewhat lost sight of reality. Despite the on-going European 
economic crisis and recession in the wider Eurozone, the ‘great return’ has not taken place 
(personal communication with Valeriu Mosneaga, May 2013)83.  
                                                          
83 At the beginning of the global financial crisis in the year 2008, a similar ‘big return’ of thousands of ‘low-skilled’ 
migrants had been expected. Aid-agencies and the Moldovan authorities were already assessing the likely social 
impacts and recommended concrete measures (e.g. Expert-Group 2009). Yet, this ‘big return’ never happened.  
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 Though potential return varies by host country, most migrant participants consider it unlikely 
that somebody who has a stable life and a job in Western Europe will soon return to Moldova. 
Although the current crisis affects migrants’ lives, for instance they send less remittances to their 
families, or they have lost their jobs, it does not (yet) catalyse their return in large numbers 
(Marcu 2014). Instead, migrants who are at risk of falling into vulnerable situations in their host 
countries are more likely to search for other work options within Western European countries 
before returning to Moldova. Or, they temporarily return to organise new employment 
opportunities outside Moldova through friends and families. This type of temporary return 
migration à la ‘stop and go’ is, however, not accompanied with the desired ‘development return 
components’ imagined by the state and development actors (e.g. investment boosts). 
 Migrants’ collective development interventions are usually initiated abroad, but their 
implementation requires contacts with a variety of people ‘back home’ and/or home visits. 
Return visits play a central role in migrants’ transnational development practices, alongside 
visiting friends or relatives, holidays and other functions. For instance, migrants use their return 
visits, ranging from a couple of days to two or three months, to prepare, implement or follow-
up their humanitarian projects84. The following situations, in which the implementation of 
development projects was an important part of migrants’ return visits, were reported: getting 
in contact or meeting with present or potential counterparts, donor organisations based in 
Chisinau, local drivers such as local authorities, as well as with migrant leaders living in other 
destination countries; the delivery of collected material remittances (e.g. books, clothes, toys); 
and fact-finding missions to evaluate specific needs for future interventions. In addition to these 
rather obvious reasons, some proved to be rather surprising. The members of a Paris-based 
association, all female care-workers, for instance, hold their annual assembly in Chisinau. Diana, 
the president of the association, told me that while being on their summer holidays in Moldova, 
the members also meet up with their partner organisation, a school for handicapped children, 
and they have a kick-off meeting for the organisation of their Christmas Charity event in Paris85. 
To my surprise, Diana does not organise these meetings because the members of the association 
have more time available during their holidays, compared to their long working-days in Paris. 
Rather, they meet up in Chisinau because of the scattered spatial distribution of the 
association’s members, living in different and often geographically highly dispersed outskirts of 
Paris (see Chapter 3). From an organisational point of view, it is more complicated for these 
                                                          
84 While the functions of such return visits, involving career or investment opportunities, have been the subject of a 
number of studies, I argue that the synergies between return visits and migrants’ development interventions have 
not been considered with empirical scrutiny (e.g. King and Christou 2011 on various functions of return visits). 
85 This also indicates that the members of this association might not meet on a regular basis in Paris.  
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migrants to meet up in Paris, with higher travel expenses involved, than in the smaller city of 
Chisinau, including the surrounding villages, where many of them originate from. 
 The key conclusion of this section is that Moldova is not yet a place to return to. Although 
the majority of Moldovan migrants anticipate return, they do not envisage return migration in 
the near future, due to the country’s difficult development transition, its lack of opportunity 
structures and cultural aspects – such as the lack of recognition of human capital. This 
exemplifies de Haas’s statement that development in migrant-sending regions is a prerequisite 
for return and/or investment rather than a consequence of migration (2012).  
 Furthermore, migrants’ personal experiences of reintegration in Moldova upon their return 
have not been studied in depth, and there is still scope for further qualitative research on issues 
such as temporary return, and the broader relationship between return migration and effective 
transformative change86. This is surprising, given that return-programmes represent a 
considerable share of bilateral agencies’ financial contribution to Moldova’s migration–
development policies, which I turn to in the next chapter. And last of all, similar to other migrant 
communities with a longer migration history, the fact that many Moldovan migrants delay their 
return also means that their intended temporary migration becomes a permanent settlement. 
Therefore, the distinction between the migration types of ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ are in 
reality more overlapping than some researchers and the development industry assume (e.g. 
Piracha et al. 2012). I suggest, thus, to revisit studies which argue that the more time spent 
abroad, the more prone Moldovans are to return (e.g. Borodak and Tichit 2014). This is especially 
so if it is taken into account that one possible consequence of delayed return is migrants’ 
decision to reunify with their families in the host countries, plus the fact that a large percentage 
of migrants have spent on average 15-20 years abroad. It will be interesting to see if these 
migrants will one day return to Moldova or not. But for now, only time will tell.  
 
5.2.4 Family reunification  
 
A fairly new discontinuity in Moldovan migration is the processes of family reunification, and 
the growth of the so-called second generation of Moldovan migrants born abroad. Both research 
participants and a few scholars maintain that these issues will become more relevant in the 
future, especially in France, Italy or Portugal, where migration processes are nowadays culturally 
and institutionally embedded (e.g. Marcu 2014). With an increase in the number of pre-school 
children, family reunification is regarded as an important determinant for the current increase 
                                                          
86 With the exception of Marcu’s (2014) study that partially covers some of these aspects. 
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in Moldovan migration87. Furthermore, teenagers and young adults join their parents who have 
been abroad since they were little. In fact, it was found that a high share of the earlier discussed 
second Moldovan post-communist migration wave in Europe is composed of the commonly 
described ‘children left behind’, who have become young adults in the meantime. These 
youngsters move mostly after completing high school or their university studies. They migrate 
either to continue their university education or to work. For instance, the majority of Moldovan 
students in Italy were born in Moldova and moved to Italy in the process of family reunification 
(Mosneaga 2012). Furthermore, participants stressed specific understudied characteristics of 
family reunification related to the high share of female migration. Family reunification often 
happens without the husbands or fathers of the children, and there are specific challenges for 
live-in care-workers, which relates to their housing situation (see Vianello 2013a, on female 
Ukrainian migrants in Italy). More importantly, with regard to migrants’ collective transnational 
aid-practices, several chairmen of associations pointed to family reunification as not being taken 
seriously into account by the Moldovan state. The complete lack of interest in the family 
perspective in institutional migration-led programs was frequently criticised. To this end, 
migrant leaders are now putting pressure on the Moldovan government to put this issue on the 
migration policy agenda:  
 
Oleg (project manager, 44, Padova): Family reunification is a good example of how little the state 
knows about us migrants. Or let’s say, that they don’t know much about our reality here at all. It 
is a huge topic at the moment, but we needed to come up with it, we had to put it on the agenda.  
 
 One reason for the lack of interest in family reunification is that it clashes with the opinion of 
some researchers and employees of state institutions and aid-agencies who believe that 
migrants do not want to settle permanently in their destination countries (e.g. Lücke et al. 2007; 
Piracha et al. 2012). It also goes hand-in-hand with the alarming demographic indications of the 
country, and a fear of a shortfall of remittances with fewer and diminishing transnational family 
obligations. Indeed, should family reunification continue to grow, Moldova would be financially 
very negatively affected, bearing in mind the high share of remittances in the country’s budget. 
 While migrants reported in their interviews that the children of Moldovan migrants who 
were born and raised in host countries are generally well integrated in society, migrant 
associations reported a high demand for assistance in social support to parents88. The requests 
                                                          
87 Approximately 20,000 children moved abroad for family reunification in 2013 (IASCI/NEXUS 2014). 
88 Very briefly, the narratives on this topic can be summarised according to Colombo and his colleagues (2009) as 
‘different but not stranger’. 
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for information and support on family-related issues were considered by chairpersons as a major 
impediment for the building-up of transnational development-oriented activities:  
 Laura (journalist, 37, Bologna): We are very busy at the moment in supporting migrants with 
questions related to family reunification, such as where should my child go to school, how does 
the school system work here, and so on and so forth. Right now, all of these matters take up a lot 
of our time and resources. And unfortunately, we needed to postpone our umbrella-organisation 
project and other development initiatives we had in the pipeline.  
Given that, to my knowledge, there is no in-depth research on the issues of Moldovan family 
reunification and the second generation of Moldovan migrants in these countries, I find it 
difficult to gauge potential generational changes in patterns of migrants’ collective transnational 
aid-giving; e.g. if the second generation’s ties with Moldova become less significant than those 
retained by the first generation. On the whole, it is probably too early to draw conclusions on 
any genealogical variations on the passing-on of transnational development practices from the 
first generation to the second, because the second generation of Moldovan migrants born 
abroad is still quite young (mostly children or teenagers). Hence, there is doubtlessly scope for 
future qualitative research on the specificity of Moldovan family reunification migration, and on 
the so-called ‘second generation’ of Moldovan migrants.  
Summing up my findings on the four interrelated migration features – onward migration, 
low-socio-cultural integration, anticipated return, and family reunification – I see considerable 
research gaps. Hence, I suggest it is time to shift the dominant research focus from remittances 
and ‘children and elderly left behind’ to the everyday life of migrants. I encourage these fairly 
new migration realities to be considered as key factors worth thinking about in future migration-
led development policy-making. A shift of the research focus towards aspects of migrants’ 
integration is central for a better knowledge of the morphology of the migrant community and 
its capacity to carry out transnational practices.  It is also crucial for providing adequate support 
services for migrant associations and their development contributions, and for preventing 
unrealistic expectations and costly mismatches. Given the closeness of some migrant 
associations to migrants’ everyday life and the challenges they face abroad, they could play an 
important role in addressing these knowledge gaps on the current realities of Moldovan 
migrants, by providing policy makers and researchers with first-hand information. This 
opportunity, however, has not been taken up by the state, nor by migration–development actors 
or researchers. In lieu of partners, the role of migrant associations remains largely restricted to 
‘contact points’ and cheap ‘service providers’ for researchers, consultants and development 
workers alike, as we shall see in the next chapter.  
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5.3. “Misery is in Italy, Poverty in Moldova”: Ideological and Normative Shifts of How the 
Moldovan State and its Key Development Actors Portrays its Absentees   
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to address the viewpoint of the state and its key 
development actors on the Moldovan migrant community, so as to better understand their 
expectations on migrant associations’ integration into the development of Moldova. 
 There have been substantial discontinuities and fractures in recent years in how the 
Moldovan government portrays emigrants on an institutional level. Firstly, the states’ interest 
to engage with its citizens, especially those living West of Moldova, roughly started around the 
‘Twitter-Revolution’ in 2009, when the Communist Party was replaced by the new pro-European 
coalition government. Prior to this, the government regarded the exodus of labour emigrants 
towards Western Europe as unproblematic, because they had not voted for them (Salah 2008). 
Another reason for the government’s complacent position towards its emigrants was that 
migration was regarded as a safety valve for unemployment in Moldova’s difficult economic 
situation throughout the 1990s (Salah 2008). Therefore, the most common response of 
Moldova’s state institutions was to ignore those who had left, according to the saying ‘out of 
sight, out of mind’.  
 Secondly, like in other countries with comparable migration characteristics, migrants were 
chiefly regarded by the state as traitors (e.g. Vullnetari 2013 on Albania). My analysis of the 
secondary data shows that even today we find a negative picture of emigrants, especially in NGO 
and consultancy reports, which is an expression of the overall discomfort with Moldova’s mass 
emigration among development actors (e.g. SDC 2014). The negative image is fuelled by the high 
share of female migrants, provoking an additional negative normative public discourse on 
migrants, associated with the topic of ‘family and children left behind’ (e.g. Robila 2014). 
Consistent with Tyldum’s (2015) observation on Ukrainian female care-workers, there is a 
special widespread stigmata produced in the popular discourse and in some of the studies on 
high-qualified Moldovan women experiencing de-skilling abroad (e.g. Cheianu-Andrei 2013). 
Also, migrants in London, Switzerland and Germany who pursue high-skilled jobs have negatively 
commented on the decision of these women to migrate in order to pursue low-skilled jobs, as 
purely ‘a means for achieving an improved lifestyle at the cost of their families’89: 
 
                                                          
89 The high-skilled men’s decision to migrate, even if they also experienced de-skilling, has been considered more 
rational.  
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Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): I know very well educated and intelligent women who leave 
their families just for buying new curtains. And when they are back, they invite their neighbours 
for tea to show them around the house, to show them the new curtains. And of course, they 
won’t tell anybody that they are living in absolute misery abroad. Really, in absolute misery. 
 
 I have also observed a shift of ‘disloyalty’ towards migrant families, especially towards the 
children of migrants, born abroad. Some participants, chiefly employees of state institutions, 
consider children who have grown up without or few Romanian language skills as the new ‘lost 
souls of Moldova’, and thus they become a blunt pejorative. While migrant leaders highlighted 
a general lack of interest by state authorities and consultants in the issue of family reunification, 
a special growing attention is given to these ‘lost souls’ in reports and recommendations for 
Moldova’s diaspora policy (e.g. Cheianu-Andrei 2013). Recommendations for public authorities 
with regard to migrant associations highlight in a prominent way the importance of culturally 
oriented activities for the children of Moldovan migrants. They suggest to migrant associations 
the promotion of national culture, the donation of books in the Romanian language, or 
Romanian language courses (e.g. Bureau 2014; Cheianu-Andrei 2013). This interest differs from 
the one requested by the chairs of migrant associations, and exemplifies one paradoxical 
approach of state and development institutions on current migration trends and support to 
migrant associations.  
 Thirdly, alongside portraying emigrants as ‘disloyal compatriots’, a second narrative of the 
development community in Moldova is the ‘migrant victim’, omnipresent in promotional 
material of aid-agencies, but highly criticised by migrant leaders (e.g. in videos and leaflets)90. A 
concise example of an evocative portrait of the daily lives of migrants, according to the title of 
this section – ‘Misery is in Italy, poverty in Moldova’ – is a theatre play, which caused high 
emotions among migrant leaders. The play ‘Oameni Ai Nimanui’ (Nobody’s People), created on 
behalf of the IOM, the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, and the Moldovan Ministry 
of Social Protection and Family, was performed in 2012 in different Italian towns in cooperation 
with migrant associations and local cultural authorities (e.g. in Mestre, Padova, Rome and Reggio 
Emilia). Some migrant leaders in these regions, with whom I had watched the play on DVD, 
commented on the play as an unrealistic portrait of migrants’ extreme suffering and exploitation 
                                                          
90 As Foucault (2004) maintains, in most cases, different discourses influence or establish the same social field. 
Furthermore, the discourse of the ‘migrant victim’ is not limited to migrants’ reality abroad, but equally encompasses 
children and the elderly left behind (e.g. SDC 2014).  
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– a ‘humiliation’ of Moldovan migrants altogether, and as a personal affront91. Therefore, they 
refused to take part in its distribution92. 
 Fourthly, the global shift in the conceptual framing of the ‘key-figure’ migrant partner in the 
international migration–development debate, namely the migrant self-entrepreneur, is also 
brought into the Moldovan migration–development context (see Chapter 2). The import of this 
international discursive subject required a considerable shift away from the diametrically 
opposed portrait of the Moldovan ‘migrant traitor’ and vulnerable ‘migrant victim’ of human 
trafficking and other forms of exploitation, exemplified in the theatre play. Tellingly, Vasile said: 
 
Vasile (IT-engineer, 45, London): Certainly, the majority of migrants are not criminals, and just 
because they are illegal, they are not criminals. All of this criminalisation and victimisation was a 
big issue up to recently in Moldova. But now, this discussion has changed, because the state can’t 
criminalise people anymore if they expect money from them. You can’t ask criminals for financial 
support, can you? 
  
Subsequently, the shift in the discursive subject from the migrant traitor and victim to the 
migrant partner for development provoked a change in migration-led programmes: 
  
 Viorica (deputy director of a bilateral aid-agency, 41, Chisinau): Until now, we have concentrated 
our work on issues such as fighting illegal migration and trafficking. But together with our 
partners, we are now getting involved in migration–development programmes. 
 
These migration–development programmes are heavily inscribed in the neo-classical economic 
paradigm, based on rational-choice principles of utility maximisation, personified in the 
discursive subject of the migrant as a self-motivating, ‘responsibilised’ subject and private sector 
actor (e.g. IOM and MPI 2012). This means that the main migration driver is usually limited to 
the improvement of a migrant’s income and savings. The idea of the ‘migrant saver’ and 
‘depositor’ is overly present in programme components of large migration–development 
interventions, for instance in a platform of various support services for migrants (IASCI/Nexus 
2014). In this programme, migration is conceptualised as a business field. It is assumed that the 
Moldovan state does not fully leverage the potential of ‘the economic sector of migration’, and 
Moldova’s dealing with emigrants is seen as a business failure. The solution is thus to fill gaps in 
this market with products for the migrant ‘saver’ and ‘depositor’ to accumulate as much capital 
as possible in order to return and invest it in Moldova (e.g. IASCI/Nexus 2014; PARE 1+1 2013). 
                                                          
91 E.g. the play shows scenes of violence against female care-workers or sex-workers.  
92 This negative portrait does not come as a surprise, bearing in mind that local employees of international aid-
agencies in Chisinau, mainly responsible for the promotion of migration-led programmes, are themselves highly-
skilled Moldovans, or even former highly-skilled migrants.  
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 Lastly, the current way of how the Moldovan state and the development industry constructs 
its absentees is not only a result of international development expertise and best-practice 
mechanisms spilling over to the national context of Moldova. It is also the result of a new 
interpretation by aid-workers and state employees of a ‘transformed diaspora’ or ‘a transformed 
migrant community’. In Portes’ view, the ability of migration to trigger social change in a sending 
or a receiving country depends on three factors: the numbers of migrants involved, the duration 
of the movement and its class composition (2010: 1545). Considering Moldovan migration 
towards Western and South-Western Europe, the factors of class composition and the numbers 
relative to Moldova’s population have been given since the mid-1990s. But its duration is quite 
short compared to other countries. The growing duration of Moldovan post-communist 
migration was frequently taken up by employees of the development industry and state 
institutions. They stressed that Moldovan migration has turned into a ‘transformed Moldovan 
migrant community’, based on beliefs that the situation of migrants has considerably improved 
since the mid-late 1990s. Therefore, they are now ready to be integrated into state-led 
development efforts. This view is expressed in the following two quotes:  
 
Viorica (deputy director of a bilateral aid-agency, 41, Chisinau): Now they [the Government] 
treats the migrants not as a vulnerable category anymore, because they are very skilled now, and 
many of them are very courageous and have good lives now. The most vulnerable people are 
those who are left behind here, without any support from abroad.  
 
Ionela (project officer for a governmental organisation, 34, Chisinau): We have like a new 
diaspora, a new migrant class. These are smart people. Most of our best people have left the 
country, and I think they start to transform the diaspora now, and the image of our diaspora. They 
also create more associations for doing good things here now. And I really think we can now start 
to work with them.  
 
Accordingly, narratives on the ‘transformed diaspora’ were articulated with assumptions that 
migrant associations have improved their professional skills, which allows them to respond 
better to the development interests of the government.Dora’s statement is inscribed within this 
logic: 
 
Dora (consultant, 42, Chisinau): When somebody leaves the country, he is not very interested to 
participate in the decision process of the country. At the beginning, migrants focus on their 
personal interests, to find jobs and to make money. Now the struggle of migrants is not a big 
concern anymore, and they think, ok, now I can participate in the political processes, or maybe in 
an association, where I can use my knowledge. And I think that’s why their associations are also 
more professional now and more consulted by the government.  
 
 Reflecting on this, the development industry’s and state’s perception of the Moldovan 
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migrant community can be compared to Sayad’s concept of the 'third age' of the Algerian 
migrant community in France – as a ‘a true Moldovan colony’, which constitutes itself as a 
‘micro-society’, relatively autonomous with respect to both Moldova and the host-countries 
(1977: 59). Similar to the Algerian case, this ‘Moldovan colony’ is assumed to be largely 
composed of the ‘first generation’ of economic migrants. They are regarded as well-settled with 
an improved standard of living compared to their time of departure, or they are considered as 
well-off members of the second Moldovan post-communist migration wave in Western Europe, 
the high-skilled migrants and students. To this end, some participants assert that nowadays, as 
time has passed, the potential of migrants’ economic and human capital for Moldova’s 
development is enhanced.  
 Undoubtedly, as signalled in Chapter 2, migration is a situational process. The fact that many 
migrants obtained in the course of their migration Romanian citizenship or legal status in their 
countries of residences, has certainly enhanced migrants’ capability to engage in transnational 
development practices. Due to the long processes of regularisation of migrants’ status, for 
instance, return visits to promote development interventions in Moldova were not possible for 
many migrants for a number of years. Yet, as we shall see in Chapter 7, there is a substantial 
discrepancy between the idea of the ‘transformed diaspora’ or the ‘third age of Moldovan 
migration’ and migrant leaders’ self-reflection on the morphological transformation of their 
development community, which they regard as in-the-making, rather than as accomplished. 
Moreover, migrants narrated that the idea of a new ‘transformed Moldovan diaspora’ needs to 
be put in perspective, as it hinges on a number of claims, such as unrealistic expectations about 
migrants’ capacities to contribute to development by means of investments or collective 
development practices. The belief of a ‘transformed Moldovan diaspora’, composed of the 
‘settled and rather well-off migrants’ belonging to both migration waves, masks the reality of a 
relatively large number of migrants who still face difficult challenges in their daily lives93. Migrant 
leaders often stressed these challenges as obstacles for their collective transnational 
development contributions:  
 
 Oleg (project manager, 44, Padova): At the moment, we are still very occupied with some urgent 
challenges of migrants here, and also with their close families back in Moldova. It absorbs almost 
all of our time and energy, and you have to understand that with 1000 Euro or 1200 Euro salary 
a month, and a family back home, you can’t invest money in charity projects. 
 
                                                          
93 E.g. challenges related to labour discrimination or family reunification, lack of choice to migrate in the first place 
and/or the fact that many migrants are forced to extend their stays by compromising their private lives.  
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Although this new interpretation of a ‘transformed Moldovan diaspora’ is a handy working-
concept for the development community and the state, and less fraught with complexity than 
the concept of migration as a social phenomenon, that elides easy categorisation, the abstract 
use of the term ‘transformed diaspora’ in the headquarters of governmental organisations 
conceals the real-life challenges of many migrants who are still struggling94. Further, given the 
lack of research on Moldovan migrants’ everyday lives, the idea of a ‘transformed migrant 
community’ is to a large extent based on assumptions, rather than on evidence.  
 Lastly, as discussed in Chapter 2, on a broader geographical scale, the ‘discursive subject’ of 
the migration–development debate is mostly portrayed as “a hard-working international male 
migrant living in the Global North who retains active and meaningful connections to a home 
place in the Global South” (Page and Mercer 2012: 2). This ideal type features in promotional 
videos and in testimonies of ‘migrants in action for development’. In these, the person usually 
wears a business-suit and carries a business-suitcase, while travelling back and forth between 
his own newly opened business in the country of origin and his workplace in the host country 
(e.g. Flüglein 2012). As such, the ‘ideal Moldovan migrant development partner’ is likewise 
described as a dynamic and mobile male travelling frequently between his country of residence 
and Moldova (e.g. Tjeda 2013). The perspective of participants and researchers on the ‘active 
member of the transformed Moldovan diaspora’ is often a synonym for the transmigrant who 
belongs to “a new class of immigrants, economic entrepreneurs or political activists who 
conduct cross-border activities on a regular basis” (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1212). However, the 
majority of research participants who are engaged in collective development contributions have 
no similarity with this young mobile entrepreneur, or the transmigrant. Most Moldovan 
migrants do not correspond with the ideal type of a transnationally engaged migrant, because 
they are less mobile, less high-skilled, or because they experienced de-skilling. Instead, they 
resemble more the description of aid-workers and employees of state institutions of the 
migrants, who are narrated as less mobile, less collectively engaged for development, and also 
include women. 
 In sum, despite a considerable shift in the perception of migrants as traitors and victims, to 
investors and partners for Moldova’s development, the perspectives of the second group of 
research participants on migrants’ realities and their capability to collectively contribute to the 
country's development remain somewhat paradoxical. Similar to my finding on the state’s and 
mainstream development actors’ ambivalent dealing with the country’s large-scale emigration 
in Chapter 4, there exists a controversial normative public discourse on Moldovan emigrants, 
                                                          
94 See Düvell and Vogel (2006) on the tensions between sociological typologies and state categories in the Polish 
case.  
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which can be best summarised with the famous quote of the Swiss writer Max Frisch (1911-
1991). Referring to Italian guest-workers in Switzerland, he proclaimed almost 50 years ago: “We 
asked for manpower, and people came” (1967: 100). Frisch criticised Switzerland’s attitude of 
welcoming migrants as workers, but not as humans. Still accurate in many ways, Frisch’s 
statement applies in a reversed logic to the description of Moldovan emigrants by aid-workers 
and civil servants – it is commonly accepted for Moldovans to leave their home country as 
labourers to provide for their families’ daily needs, or as remitters to alleviate national poverty, 
and to guarantee the country’s survival. But as human beings, especially as parents, it is still 
inopportune to leave the family and the country behind. Thus, even if the magnitude of 
Moldovan migration is tangible in the public discourse, it does not (yet) fully bring about the 
acceptance of migration as a strategy for achieving social and economic mobility, or an improved 
life-style. And migration is certainly not (yet) recognised in the public discourse to the same 
degree as the notion of the ‘transformed diaspora’ applied by aid-agencies and state authorities 
in the sense of Sayad’s ‘third age’ of Moldovan migration (1977). 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I mapped the main trends of Moldova’s substantial post-
socialist migration. We saw that Moldovan migration is multi-faceted in all of its aspects. It is 
geographically polycentric and socio-economically varied, extremely intense, largely 
economically driven, and dynamic. Further, I have argued that it is currently altering towards a 
mixed migration, and that there is an emerging new second wave of Moldovan post-communist 
migration towards Western Europe, which is not reflected in the academic literature on 
Moldovan migration. I then introduced my findings on four interrelated features of current 
Moldovan migration, which I deem of growing relevance, but which have not been sufficiently 
considered in research on current Moldovan migration, nor in the Moldovan migration–
development policy discourse. These are:  
§ onward migration, accompanied by various challenges for migrants, such as constant 
reorientations in new life circumstances, which I have argued enhance migrants’ sense of 
belongingness and attachment to Moldova; 
§ lack of socio-cultural integration in the host countries under study, frequently expressed as 
‘isolation’; 
§ delayed anticipated return migration, meaning that many migrants involuntarily extend their 
stays abroad for undefined periods due to the country’s difficult development transition and 
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its lack of opportunity structures, which turns a planned temporary migration into a longer 
or permanent stay; 
§ and lastly, processes of settlement, such as family reunification that, like the migrants’ 
delayed return, do not fit into the common description of Moldovan migration as the ‘Earn 
and Return’ reality, which I have argued is mainly based on the ‘2007 Moldovan migration 
typology’. 
This leads us to the first key finding of this chapter, namely that there are considerable research 
gaps on current Moldovan migration trends, including the often-complex individual migration 
experiences of many Moldovans. This encompasses issues of integration and new forms of 
migration pattern, such as actual or anticipated onward mobility, and family reunification. Thus, 
the findings of this chapter shed light on current understudied migration realities that impact 
upon migrants' collective transnational development practices, either because they are 
perceived by participants as an impediment for migrants’ capacity to carry out transnational 
development interventions, or because they generate specific patterns of transnational help-
practices.  
 Secondly, we saw that, in a fairly short period of time, there has been a quite radical shift 
from one extreme to the other in how the Moldovan state and its key development partners 
reflect on the migrant ‘absentees’ since Moldova’s independence in 1991.  
The second finding of this chapter is that there has been a rapid swing in how the Moldovan state 
and its key development partners portrays migrants, from ignoring them, to then viewing them 
as traitors and scapegoats for the country’s demographic and social distress, to seeing them as 
victims, and most recently, to constructing them as economic partners and sponsors for the 
country’s positive change. 
 This fast and multi-stage discursive shift, catalysed by a large number of international 
migration–development interventions in Moldova, necessitated an adjustment of the 
perception of the ‘Moldovan diaspora’ at large, which I found expressed in the widespread idea 
of a ‘transformed diaspora’. While in the published migration research these fairly new patterns 
of Moldovan migration and integration aspects have not yet been seriously scrutinised, the state 
and its key development actors’ understanding of the new Moldovan migrant civil society is built 
on the assumption that changes in migration patterns toward a more long-term migration have 
already occurred. It is believed that this ‘new Moldovan diaspora’ is now composed of the 
settled and more well-off transmigrants belonging to the first post-communist migration wave, 
or to the second, who have undergone less de-skilling than the first group of migrants. In my 
view, the idea of this new ‘transformed diaspora’ is based on assumptions rather than on 
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evidence, and leads to politics which neglect the everyday practices and economic relations in 
which migrants’ transnational humanitarian practices unfold. 
The third key finding of this chapter is that the state and development policy makers regard the 
transformation of the Moldovan migrant community as a fait accompli, in the sense of an 
established Moldovan migrant community according to Sayad (1977), ready to be integrated 
into the country’s development. But research on the daily lives of migrants is still in the grip of 
the somewhat outdated typology of temporary migration inscribed in the logic of the ‘Earn and 
Return’ model.  
Even if gaps between migration realities and policies are common in almost every country, I find 
the Moldovan case a particularly striking example in this regard.  
To this end, the fourth main conclusion is that it is important to introduce the missing present – 
the current various aspects of migrants’ every-day lives, experiences and challenges. 
 As highlighted in Chapter 2, some authors maintain that the current international debate on 
migration and development has evolved rather separately from general migration theory, which 
according to them leads to the present one-dimensional economic viewpoint on the global 
macro discourse (e.g. de Haas 2010; Skeldon 2012). In the Moldovan case, I assert, migration–
development policies evolved not only separately from research on Moldovan migration, but 
research on Moldovan migrants simply lags behind the highly active international migration–
development scene in Moldova. This leads to unrealistic expectations on migrants’ impact on 
the country’s developmental transformation by means of return, investments and migrant 
associations, and can cause costly mismatches in services and programmes provided to migrants 
and their associations.  
The fifth key finding of this chapter is that in discussions surrounding the enhancement of links 
between Moldova and the migrants, the fact that Moldovan migration patterns are currently 
transforming, too, has been side-lined. This leads to irritation among all actors involved, and 
fuels the existing contested views on Moldovan migration in general, and on the migrants’ world 
in particular.   
 These remarks on the how the state depicts its absentees form the starting point for my 
investigation into how Moldova and its development partners encourage migrants to get 
organised for development. As we shall see, not only is Moldova’s transformation and migration 
ambivalent, but so is the newly created support structure to engage with migrants and their 
associations.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
‘Channelling the Good Spirits’:  
Moldova’s Engagement with its Emigrants and Migrant Associations 
 
 
This empirical chapter tells the story of Moldova’s evolving policy strategies towards its 
absentees, the role of migrant associations as transnational actors in promoting positive change 
in the country and their involvement in the process of emigrant policy making. The foundation 
and activities of migrant associations can be analysed from a variety of perspectives. Whilst 
much of the current research on migrant associations explains migrants’ collective practices by 
highlighting their cultural characteristics, the political opportunity structures in migrant host 
countries and migrants’ political participation in the destination countries (e.g. Pirkkalainen et 
al. 2013), less attention has been paid to the structural support for migrant associations 
provided by the countries of origin and their international development partners. This chapter 
focuses on migrant associations’ transnational development interventions with specific 
reference to Moldova’s new opportunity structures for emigrant engagement.  
 The chapter starts with a schematic overview of Moldova’s evolving migration–development 
policies towards its emigrants, applying the analytical template of the macro policy rhetoric of 
migration as a positive contribution to development, as explored in the Chapters 2 and 5. Special 
focus is given to the creation of institutionalised forms of migrant association-led policies and 
programmes. This will be followed by an overview of the characteristics of Moldovan migrant 
associations and their capacity to carry out transnational development projects. The last section 
discusses migrants’ views of Moldova’s efforts to engage with migrants, and on their personal 
experiences of participating in emigrant policy making. The main emphasis is put on the 
discrepancies between migrants’ aspirations and their needs to carry out collective 
transnational development efforts and the newly set up state-support structures. 
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6.1 Moldova’s Creation of Policy Mechanisms for Migrants’ Involvement in Development  
 
In the first part of this section, I provide an overview of Moldova’s evolving migration–
development programmes and policies. Secondly, I explore in more detail the institutional 
mechanisms aimed at supporting migrant associations’ development engagement.   
 
6.1.1 Reaching out to migrants for Moldova’s development  
 
Although Moldova has experienced one of the most significant emigrations in proportion to its 
population in Europe, its migration policies lagged for a long time far behind. The country’s 
laissez-faire attitude to migration policy changed around 12 years ago due to external pressure 
from the country’s key development partners. Since then, the legislative and executive powers 
reviewed their policy and reorganised the government institutions responsible for its 
implementation. In 2003, the government adopted a decree concerning the migration policy 
concept of Moldova, with the main objective to strengthen control mechanisms of migration 
and to optimise its management (IOM 2012). The new legal framework also included a number 
of bilateral migration-policy agreements in the field of social protection and flexible citizenship 
laws between Moldova and countries with a high share of Moldovan migrants – such as Portugal, 
Italy and Romania (Mosneaga 2012). Further advances in the migration domain were made with 
the launch of the visa action plan in 2010. Since then, the government has passed an impressive 
42 bills for the Bureau for Asylum and Migration to fight illegal immigration and to improve 
border security and asylum policy, which currently present the largest share of Moldova’s official 
aid-assistance in the migration field (EU 2013d). Participants from relevant state authorities and 
IOs frequently cited these new bills as a big success story. However, only 92 refugees and 76 
asylum seekers were registered in Moldova in the year 2013, which suggests that these migrant 
groups do not present a major social challenge for the country (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the 
Republic of Moldova 2013b)95.  
 In contrast, though emigrants currently represent at least 30% of the country’s population 
and have long and firmly contributed to the socio-economic expansion of Moldova, important 
knowledge-gaps on the Moldovan migrant community persist (see Chapter 5). For instance, 
there are still significant variations in estimates of the number of Moldovan emigrants, despite 
                                                          
95 The number of immigrants has even decreased (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova 2013b). The 
number of refugees figured constantly between 80 and 90 in the last few years. According to participants working for 
the Bureau of Asylum the sharp rise in refugees within wider Europe throughout the year 2015 did not affect Moldova. 
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large foreign-aid investments in commissioned research on ‘Diaspora mappings’ (e.g. Cheianu-
Andrei 2013; Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova 2013b)96: 
  
 Viorica (deputy director of a bilateral aid-agency, 41, Chisinau): We don’t know the number of 
emigrants. Maybe 850,000 to more than 1 million? This is a concern. How many emigrants do we 
have? How many have returned? We don’t have valuable statistics for that. We don’t know these 
things.  
   
 Despite limited information on Moldovan migrants, state institutions gradually started to 
consider migrants as actors for promoting positive change in Moldova. Initial attempts to court 
the migrant community were launched at the policy seminar ‘Diaspora and Homeland 
Development’ in 2008, organised by the IOM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the EU 
Department of European Integration (MFAEI) (IOM 2008). Since then, Moldovan migration–
development policies have followed the trends of the global help-industry, outlined in Chapters 
2 and 5. They aim to create political, legal and social conditions to allow emigration to have the 
largest possible impact on Moldova, and they revolve around the ‘development mantra’ 
consisting of the three main themes: economic aspects of remittances for poverty alleviation, 
the improvement of linkages between the government and its diaspora, and the return of skilled 
migrants. 
 The first priority area of migration–development programmes was stimulating return 
migration. Various return and investment schemes financed by the Swedish Public Employment 
Service (2014) and other international aid-agencies as well as the government programme PARE 
1+1, a programme for attracting remittances into Moldova’s economy, were established (e.g. 
Hilfswerk Austria 2013; IASCI/Nexus 2014; PARE 1+1 2013; SDC 2013). All research participants 
prominently highlighted ‘return and investments’ as a way of enhancing migrants’ contribution 
to Moldova’s development. Yet efforts to motivate migrants to return were in most cases 
unsuccessful, either because migrants were not interested in permanent return, or because the 
small businesses set up by migrants with the support of ‘return and investment programmes’ 
often failed (see Chapter 5). Moreover, the argument that migrants return with ‘enhanced’ 
human capital, prominently stressed in the development policy literature, proved to be illusory 
in the Moldovan case, partly because the majority of migrants experienced de-skilling abroad. 
Participants leading programmes on this topic observed very little ‘up-skilling’ or ‘brain gaining’, 
                                                          
96 The improvement of statistical data is part of the 'Strategy on Migration and Asylum within the EU Action plan' (EU 
Assessment-mission to the Republic of Moldova-EU Moldova Visa Dialogue 2013). 
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and they estimated migrants' accumulated human and social capital upon return as being rather 
limited97.  
 Another central issue regarding return migration and expected positive change, commonly 
pointed out by migrants, is that while the political elite maintains a strong official policy 
discourse to incite migrants to return, they are not genuinely interested in the actual social 
process of the return of Moldovan citizens. In migrants’ views, the state’s interest in its 
‘absentees’ lays solely in the prompt delivery of remittances. More broadly, migrants’ 
standpoint on return migration echoes that of scholars on economic remittances and their 
impact on social change in migrants’ countries of origin, namely that remittances can help to 
maintain a certain elite in place, while return makes them more vulnerable (e.g. Glick Schiller 
2012). As Dima half-jokingly commented: 
Dima (taxi driver, 47, Paris): Return will only bring change if we all come back in masses. We need 
to come back in thousands, all entering the country at the same time. Only then, something will 
change in our Moldova, because then our politicians will need to do something.  
 
By all accounts, programmes for attracting remittances into economic investments have yielded 
few concrete results. Partly, this is because the Moldovan government and its development 
partners have perpetuated the dominant international policy-category of ‘return’ without 
considering the country's weak socio-political and economic situation and migrants’ reluctance 
to return. 
Secondly, since the state authorities have recognised that " […] return not necessarily is the 
end product of the migration cycle" (Nyberg-Soerensen et al. 2003: 297), and since they have 
accepted that migrants can also contribute to development via transnational modes of 
development efforts, the focus of migration–development policies has significantly shifted and 
is not exclusively tied to the ‘return and investment’ component anymore. Ionela narrates this 
shift:  
 
Ionela (project officer for a governmental organisation, 34, Chisinau): Since the government 
realised that you can’t force migrants who earn money for their families abroad to come back 
and invest here, policies became more diversified. Today, we even have programs on how to use 
the linkages between migrant associations and Moldova. This is a big evolution for us, because 
before that, let's say in 2009, the Government’s policy was limited to import our people back.  
 
 
                                                          
97 Additionally, it was found that migrants most likely to return in the near future, are those with a short migration 
history up to five years. Because their families usually stayed in Moldova, and because of the difficult economic 
situation in some of the host-countries under study, they are rarely able to accumulate sufficient financial capital to 
enrol in investment-led ‘return for development programmes’.  
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Indeed, the situation has drastically changed. Moldova is currently the country with the most 
implemented and experienced migration–development initiatives by the European Commission 
in the EU-neighbourhood area (EU 2013c). Further, my secondary data-analysis of aid-agencies, 
the IOM, and different UN-agencies reveals that, in the year 2013 alone, an impressive number 
of 46 multifaceted migration–development interventions with a total budget of around 26 
million Euros were carried out in the small country. The large amount of donor funding confirms 
my argument brought forward in Chapter 2, that the boom of migration–development 
programmes is by far not over, at least not in Moldova98. 
 Eyben maintains that development policymaking calls for "functional and mostly ‘over-used’ 
but ‘under-theorised’ concepts" designed by the international donor community (2000: 15). A 
concise example of such an ‘over-used’ concept is the strong focus on high-skilled migrants, 
while the diversity of the multi-faceted Moldovan migrant community in all of its aspects is not 
reflected in Moldova’s second round of migration–development policies. Large-scale schemes 
mainly provide services for the discursive subject of the ‘entrepreneurial-self migrant’ to release 
financial capital via migration-related financial products (e.g. saving schemes or insurance 
policies), migrants’ access to funds, or by hosting conferences, job-fairs, and business forums in 
and outside Moldova (e.g. IASCI/Nexus 2014)99. That being said, the majority of migration–
development programmes are tailored for the small group of elite movers, who represent a 
dwindling minority among Moldovan migrants (e.g. Academy of Sciences of Moldova 2009; CIM 
2013; Varzari et al. 2014). An illustrative example of such imported ‘talent-programmes’, aiming 
at bringing the ‘smart diaspora’ back to Moldova – symbolically called ‘home’ – is the Student 
Gala (see Figure 6.1). It addresses high-achieving international students and promising young 
academics, and awards successful candidates with a prize in a festive ceremony in the 
Parliament building. However, the chairwoman of a student association in Paris involved in the 
recruitment process of candidates, explained to me that these programmes did not yield the 
expected results of attracting the candidates’ interests in a future work-place in Moldova. The 
young talents were primarily interested in the symbolic capital of honour and in the free flight 
to Moldova, rather than in a return to Moldova in the near future100 (Student GALA 2015). 
                                                          
98 Not included in this analysis are programmes targeting symptoms of migration-related challenges to which I 
referred in Chapter 4. These address the discursive subject of the migrant victim; children with both parents living 
abroad, also called ‘Euro-orphans’, the elderly left behind (the ‘orphan pensioners’, King and Vullnetari 2006) and 
victims of human trafficking.  
99 These programs are in most cases implemented by bilateral agencies within the EU-Mobility Partnership 
agreement. 
100 Lack of recognition of human capital in a professional context of clientelism and the kleptocratic and inefficient 
political system which has been governing Moldova for decades, as well as hostility of the local society towards 
successful migrants, were the main reasons for not returning to Moldova. 
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Do something today you’ll be      Now it’s Moldova’s turn to talk  
 proud of tomorrow!      about you at home. 
 Apply for the Student Gala     Take part in the competition!  
 
Figure 6.1: Talent-programmes 
 
 Thirdly, on a structural level, a federal institutional approach was created in 2012, aimed at 
coordinating migrant-led programmes and policies in the form of the Bureau for Relations with 
the Diaspora (BRD), to which I have already referred in Chapter 4. The Bureau is directly 
subordinated to the prime minister and partially financed by the IOM, the EU and the SDC (SDC 
2014). Its strategy entails, among others, the improvement of linkages between Moldova and 
the diaspora, the enhancement of migrants’ role as development actors through support and 
coordination of migrants’ activities, and the extension of initiatives for migrants’ integration into 
national development strategies (BRD 2014)101. Concurrently, a year later, a second approach of 
mainstreaming migration into national development planning was launched, in which every 
ministry appointed a deputy minister responsible for diaspora issues (EU 2013a). The 
programme is financially and technically supported by the same development agencies as the 
Bureau (GPMD 2014, IOM 2014). It seems perfectly reasonable to include migration into local 
and national sector policy strategies, for instance into the labour market or social security 
policies, given the magnitude of Moldovan migration and its impact on the social fabric of the 
                                                          
101 Among the first actions carried out by the Bureau was a festival for migrant families in Chisinau and the 
establishment of an interactive internet platform providing information for Moldovans living abroad (e.g. on pension 
funds, on how to open up a business in Moldova) (http://din.md [last accessed: January 2016]). 
152 
 
entire society. However, mainstreaming-programmes are ambitious and demand governance. 
Keeping in mind the limited capacity of Moldova’s public and private institutions and the lack of 
harmonisation between ministries, discussed in Chapter 4, I personally remain sceptical about 
the outcomes of this programme. Furthermore, as a consequence of the sudden boost of the 
state’s interest in its absentees and the high priority given to migration–development issues on 
the political agenda of all major parties since 2010, the just-described programmes and policies 
were developed in somewhat a rush. The hectic atmosphere was ever-present in Chisinau, 
where I observed a dynamic positioning around ‘diaspora-building activities’ among the second 
research group, the civil servants and aid-workers. Everybody was busy in mobilising migrants, 
opening new offices, and hiring new staff. The busy catch-up and the large amount of foreign 
aid, I assert, led to an over-competitive donor-driven environment, characterised by a large 
number of competing individual projects and complex overlapping co-financing structures, 
rather than to a joint advancement resulting in a simple and clear support-structure for 
migrants’ engagement in Moldova’s development102.  
 To summarise this sketch of Moldova’s main development–migration policies, a large 
number of actions aimed at stimulating migrants’ social and financial capital through official 
channels between Moldova and migrants’ host-countries were launched over a very short 
period of time. Furthermore, the two co-existing over-arching visions of diaspora-policy – the 
institutional approach and the migration mainstreaming approach – resulted in an ambiguous 
structure. Therefore, I argue that efforts of national institutional capacity-building in the 
migration-development domain got off on the wrong foot, despite vast sums of donor funding. 
Or, as Vullnetari (2013: 25) aptly describes Albania’s efforts to engage its emigrants, it is about 
"big policies and small outcomes". 
 
6.1.2 Getting organised: overview of migrant association-led policies and programmes  
 
Migrant associations and networks are not new phenomena103. Transnational activities and 
solidarity with sending countries have always existed, and migrants’ role in development 
strategies for their home countries has been the subject of reflection for some time. 
Nonetheless, the firmly positivist discourse on migration and development around the turn of 
the millennium has provoked a renewed academic and policy interest in migrant associations 
and in their potential to deliver development in their countries of origin (Page and Mercer 2012). 
                                                          
102 E.g. in form of a ‘one-stop shop’ that manages all of migrants’ requests in one place.  
103 On my fieldwork in London, I discovered by chance a book about the history of Swiss migrant associations around 
Leicester Square, whose creation dates back to 1685 (Barber 2011). 
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As Faist puts it: "transnational networks and associations of migrants have come to stand at the 
centre of the optimistic visions of national and international economic development policy 
establishments" (2008: 22). This section explores the role attributed to Moldovan migrant 
associations in promoting development by Moldova’s policy establishment and its key 
development partners. 
 Because of the above-stated pressure from Moldova’s key development partners around the 
Twitter Revolution in 2009, the government increasingly supported migrant groups and 
associations. The importance of building a ‘mutual partnership’ between the state and 
Moldovan migrant associations was explicitly stressed at the 2010 conference ‘Rethinking 
Moldova’, where efforts towards engaging migrants’ collective activities were considered as 
directly relevant to the country’s national development plans (Government of Moldova 2010; 
Sainciuc and Cretu 2010). A first step in building a so-called ‘mutual partnership’ between 
migrants and Moldova involved gaining access to migrant associations and networks. And so, 
the story of Moldova's engagement with migrant associations began with a list of migrant 
associations made on behalf of the government. As Umberto Eco (2012) proclaimed, the list is 
the origin of culture; it confers value and guarantees existence. Similarly, migrant leaders 
frequently mentioned the association list as the beginning of their engagement with state 
authorities and their development partners. Below, the author of the migrant association list 
explains the beginning of the government’s interest in migrant associations: 
 
Dora (consultant, 42, Chisinau): My responsibility in 2010 was to find these associations, not only 
in the East, but also in the West, and to make a proper list. Before that, there was no systematic 
knowledge, no ideas about who they are and what they do, and no contacts. It was not organised. 
The Interethnic Bureau had a list of associations, but it wasn't really about Moldovan migrants, 
but more about promoting Moldovan culture in Russia and the Ukraine by former inhabitants of 
the Soviet Republic Moldova. These people left during the Soviet time, and they are not even 
Moldovan migrants104. 
 
 In the same year, 2010, the government and its multinational partners launched programmes 
aimed at ‘accessing’, ‘mobilising’ and ‘grouping’ migrant associations for Moldova’s 
development. This was enacted through technical assistance and financial support for migrants’ 
collective activities. For instance, from 2010 to 2012, 35 migrant associations from France, Italy, 
Portugal and the UK took part in IOM’s Small Grant Mechanism Programme (IOM 2012b). Or, 15 
associations jointly implemented with local partners in the host-countries social development 
                                                          
104 The shift of the state authority’s attention from the ‘old diaspora’, located to the east of Moldova to the ‘new 
diaspora’, west of Moldova (see Chapter 4) created an open conflict about the definition of ‘diaspora’ between the 
two Bureaus, carried out in workshops and seminars I attended on my fieldwork in Chisinau. 
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projects in Moldova within the framework of the EC-UN Joint Migration and Development 
Initiative (JMDI 2014). Moreover, in 2012, 15 migrant leaders from Italy, the UK, Germany and 
France were part of the UNDP’s ‘Mainstreaming migration into strategic policy development’ 
programme (UNDP 2012). Others participated in programmes of national aid-agencies, such as 
the ‘Programme on engaging migrant organisations for their home-country’s development’ in 
Germany (CIM/GIZ 2012), or the migrant-association-led programme by the Hilfswerk Austria 
(2012). Besides the ‘diaspora association component’ of the Bureau, other institutionalised 
forms for migrant associations have been set-up. These include the Diaspora Congresses, held 
every other year which I will address shortly, and the Diaspora Coordination Council, created in 
2012, which has a consultative role in advising the government on migration-related issues. It is 
composed of 50 chairpersons of migrant associations and is divided into thematic working-
groups – for instance return migration, economic transformation of Moldova, human rights 
(Diaspora Coordination Council 2012). And last of all, a transnational virtual space of associations 
is slowly in the making. As a form of social collective action, new web-sites were set up by and 
for migrant associations in Moldova and in the countries under study (IOM 2013; Hilfswerk 
Austria 2013), and migrants increasingly disseminate their collective activities on European 
Diaspora web-platforms, such as the EUNOMAD (2015). 
 Overall, the launch of association-led programs provoked a drive in Moldovan migrants’ 
collective engagement for development in what Sökefeld calls a ‘critical event’ that mobilises 
transnational practices (2006: 277). As Liliana puts it: 
 
Liliana (34, freelancer, Paris): My exact entry into the diaspora was the IOM meeting in Paris in 
2009, to which all migrants were invited to discuss the topic of Moldova’s development. There, I 
met other migrant leaders and I became interested in the activities of other Moldovans in Paris, 
and ehm later I then decided to create an association.  
 
 Migrant leaders particularly considered the IOM Small Grant Mechanism as a catalyst for 
their formal and non-formal networks. My mapping of associations shows a surge in the creation 
of associations and an array of informal groupings around the invitation to tender in 2009, of 
which the association chaired by Rosa is one example:  
 
Rosa (entrepreneur, 45, London): Before they launched the small grant program in 2010, we were 
already sort of thinking for a couple of years of creating an association, and then with this 
happening, I mean when the announcement for the programme came, we created an association, 
so we could apply for the grant. And look now, we are still here! 
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The importance of the mobilisation of migrants’ collective activities confirms Sökefeld’s 
suggestion that "[...] specific processes of mobilisation have to take place for a diaspora to 
emerge" (2006: 265). 
 In conclusion, there is a dynamic field of top-down ‘diaspora building’ programmes aimed at 
enhancing and transforming migrant associations’ potential to input into Moldova’s 
development transition. However, as with other migration–development policy mechanisms, 
the coordination of migrant association-led programmes and policies is poorly synchronised 
across the ministries. Further, the allocated financial and structural support to migrant 
associations, for instance for trainings in project management, never went beyond the initial 
phase. As we shall see in the last section of this chapter, this view is also shared by migrants. But 
first, I address sub-questions drawing from the first research dimension of this thesis: Who are 
these associations involved in development initiatives? What do they do? What is their role? 
And how do they decide strategic and organisational matters?  
 
Figure 6.2: Mobilising the Moldovan diaspora  
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6.2 ‘We Are Not Yet Developed as the Africans’: State-of-the-Art on Moldovan Migrant 
Associations 
 
6.2.1 General characteristics of the associational landscape  
 
The large emigration of Moldovans towards various destination countries around the world has 
been accompanied by a rise in formal and non-formal networks in most of the host-countries 
(Cheianu-Andrei 2013). At the time of writing, the Bureau lists contact with 244 associations 
registered in 39 countries (BRD 2014)105. The most active migrant community in both spaces of 
interventions – Moldova and the host countries under study – is found in Italy, with the highest 
number of Moldovan migrants in Western Europe. In general, the community can be described 
as an ‘emerging diaspora’, made up of small associations with weak organisational capacities. 
Across all host-countries under study, the organisations were established on average six years 
ago and memberships range from 1 to 150 (see above). The vast majority of organisations are 
volunteer-run, and they face typical challenges of voluntary organisations, such as lack of time 
and commitment since active members often run these associations in their free time106. The 
weak capacity of migrant associations is mirrored in their planning strategies and democratic 
decision-making processes. Firstly, only a few associations have a strategic approach to their 
self-help initiatives, except for organisations that implement medium-scale projects over a 
longer time-span (e.g. those that support vocational schools or infrastructure projects in 
different Moldovan districts). This is not surprising, as informal transnational humanitarian 
practices – unlike professional organisations – are by definition more ‘spontaneous’ and more 
‘unorganised’ (Beck 2011). Secondly, chairpersons of associations narrated that intra-
organisational decisions on migrants’ transnational aid-giving are made jointly with board-
members, according to their interests and fields of expertise. However, the accounts from other 
board members from the same associations revealed that decision-making regarding migrants’ 
humanitarian interventions is a privilege reserved only for chairpersons. 
 Consistent with Cheianu-Andrei’s observations (2013), most of the associations under study 
simultaneously engage in the country of residence and in Moldova. The associations’ substantial 
orientation towards transnational social practices is interesting, given the low socio-cultural 
integration of Moldovan migrants’ and the short-term aspect of Moldovan migration in Western 
                                                          
105 It is difficult to determine the exact number of functioning associations because it is continuously changing and 
some associations exist only ‘on paper’. Furthermore, the number of associations is higher because not every 
association figures on the list of the Bureau.  
106 Only five associations out of 30 organisations in my sample hire full-time employees, which indicates that the 
organisations’ overall degree of professionalism is generally low.  
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and South-Western Europe107. This distinguishes the Moldovan associational landscape from 
those of other migrant communities with a lower cross-border engagement (cf. Boccagni 2013 
on Ecuadorian migrants in Italy), or those that took longer to transnationalise their volunteer 
efforts (cf. Laxcroix 2011 on Polish and Indian associations in the UK). I argue that the main 
reasons for Moldovan migrants’ high interest in transnational-oriented activities are: migrants’ 
strong emotional attachment to Moldova, their estimates of great hardship of co-citizens who 
remained in their villages of origin, and their relatively low socio-cultural integration, partly 
because of high anticipated onward or return migration (see Chapter 5). 
 
6.2.2 Main activities 
  
The Moldovan migrant community is characterised by a high diversity of activities, ranging from 
sport and cultural events to development-oriented activities. The majority of the organisations 
under study carry out a mixture of activities. The associations’ interventions in the host countries 
revolve around assisting migrants’ needs in the areas of housing, administrative matters, work, 
and language courses; cultural and sports events; lobbying governments on migrant issues, for 
instance in the domain of pension schemes; and publishing information guides for the social 
integration of migrants (e.g. Budevici et. al. 2013) and diaspora newspapers (e.g. the ‘Gazeta 
Basarabiei’, ‘Moldbrixia’, or the ‘Pro-Diaspora Kids magazine’). Transnational activities are 
directed towards transnational humanitarian interventions and political engagement. Similar to 
other migrant groups, Moldovans’ development contributions are chiefly small-scale initiatives 
(see Lampert 2014 on the Nigerian community). Besides donations of collective financial 
remittances108, for instance for vulnerable families, they centre around the construction and 
renovation of physical infrastructure (e.g. churches, youth centres, bridges, streets, water-
sanitation installations); the support of social and health institutions (e.g. vocational schools for 
vulnerable youth, local hospitals, health-care centres); contributions to communal ‘self-help’ 
initiatives through social activities and awareness campaigns for vulnerable groups as well as 
around the creation of livelihood opportunities for locals in the agricultural domain (e.g. micro-
enterprises, professional training). Migrant associations also collect and send material goods to 
Moldova; i.e. books for school libraries, clothes, toys, medicines, construction material and 
equipment for hospitals and orphanages.  
                                                          
107 Although some migrant leaders view the communal needs ‘here’ as a constraint towards an enhanced 
transnational collective engagement in Moldova, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
108 The term ‘collective remittances’ means in this context "money raised by a group that is used to benefit a group 
or a community with which it is affiliated" (Goldring 2004: 808).  
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 Whilst there exists a transnational group of migrant leaders spanning different host countries 
that maintains strong links with Moldova, and transnational co-operations between migrant 
associations are emerging across host countries, for instance between French and Italian based 
associations, the space of migrants’ development interventions in Moldova remains mostly 
bound to the local community level. My mapping of associations shows that initiatives are rarely 
carried out on a regional or national level, and that only a few associations run activities in 
several communities or districts across the country. In most instances, therefore, migrants 
engage in ‘translocal development’ (Grillo and Riccio 2004), and the project settings can be 
described as ‘translocal spaces’, encompassing the migrants’ locality abroad and their 
communities of origin (Brickell and Datta 2011). 
 The associations are funded by membership fees or donations. In order to finance their 
projects, some apply to calls for tenders by institutions in host countries, for instance by 
municipalities or foundations. Others apply for funds within the framework of the above-
mentioned migration–development programmes implemented by international aid-agencies 
(e.g. the EU/UNDP Joint Migration Development Initiative 2011; IOM 2012b). Apart from the 
unfavourable socio-economic situation in Moldova affecting migrants’ field of development-
interventions, as outlined in Chapter 4, and their often restricted organisational capacity, 
limiting their field of interventions, humanitarian projects are chiefly initiated in response to 
requests made by development NGOs in both contexts, Moldova and the host countries or 
individuals (e.g. potential beneficiaries, friends and relatives who know of specific needs). 
Therefore, in most cases, migrants’ transnational charity engagement is built on personal and 
close relationships such as friendships, neighbourhood relations or kinship within the migrant 
community, the host society or Moldova109. This also explains why migrants’ humanitarian 
interventions are mostly ‘translocal engagements’ and more often a random decision than a 
strategic choice. As Romina explained during a charity event in Rome for an orphanage in her 
community or origin: 
 
Romina (secretary, 49, Rome): Very often migrant associations support different institutions: 
schools or orphanages, mostly in villages where they come from, and where they know people 
who ask them for help, like we do here. If I come from a village, and I can organise something for 
this village that benefits people, then that’s great, isn’t it? 
 
                                                          
109 It is important to note that the local professional aid workers employed in aid-agencies in Moldova also heavily 
rely on personal contacts in their daily project work. Therefore, I argue that the variable ‘personal contacts’ should 
not be viewed as a major determinant of migrant associations’ degree of professionalism compared to Moldovan-
based mainstream development institutions, as frequently implied in the broader academic literature on migrant 
associations and professionalism (e.g. Page and Mercer 2012).  
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 Lastly, the politicised public atmosphere in Moldova, discussed in chapter 4, also spills over 
into the Moldovan associational landscape. The sensitive political terrain in which migrant 
associations are embedded was the subject of an emotional debate among migrant leaders. 
Vasile, president of an association that offers an online discussion platform for Moldovan 
migrants in the UK, narrates how Moldovan politics interfere in migrants’ associative life:  
 
Vasile (IT-engineer, 45, London): In 2008, we started to delete topics related to politics and how 
to get a visa in the UK, in order to direct the discussion more towards our development projects 
in Moldova. But our members accused us of censorship, and of collaborating with the 
Communists. So, we kept the comments. And then later in 2009, after the political change, 
everything was reversed. Then, the embassy told us to remove some of the comments. Even 
today, we still get requests from Moldovan officials to remove topics, which is annoying, because 
it stops us from doing our activities.  
 
In fact, the Twitter Revolution in 2009 did not only provoked a state interest in migrant 
associations located in Western Europe, but it also led to political interference in migrants’ 
associational life in the countries under study. As a direct result of migrant leaders’ involvement 
in the political turnaround of 2009, the pro-Western Alliance parties selected their 
representatives abroad among chairpersons of migrant associations. Consequently, some 
associations not only engage in ‘solidarity’, but are simultaneously involved in Moldova’s 
domestic politics. They organise meetings with political leaders, promote activities for specific 
parties and collect votes and donations. These activities are an essential part of the associations’ 
activities, and are not only run during the election periods. Yet, they are seldom openly declared 
on the associations’ web-pages and social media-groups.  
 
6.2.3 Teaming up for development: inter-associational relationships  
 
All in all, there are no significant differences in the Moldovan associational landscape and in the 
forms of migrants’ collective aid-giving across the countries under study, although there are 
some slight variations. For instance, the second wave of Moldovan immigrants generated socio-
professional diversity, and the newcomers, such as middle or upper-class youngsters, 
established new associations especially in Paris and in London. Furthermore, a somewhat lower 
interest in transnational development activities was observed in France. Presumably this is due 
to the high concentration of student associations, whose activities mainly address the large 
number of some 18,000 Moldovan students110. Interestingly, apart from an increase in the 
                                                          
110 Moldova is member of the ‘International Organization of La Francophonie’ (IOF) and strong links between Moldova 
and France in the educational sector exist (e.g. various student-mobility programs, mostly implemented by the 
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number of newly-created associations, the new wave of Moldovan migration only moderately 
transformed the organisational field.  
 Participants also highlighted the associational structures in the host countries as having an 
influence on their associations. Especially in local environments that are distinctly favourable in 
terms of opportunities for teaming-up with local actors such as development NGOs, trade unions 
and other civil society organisations have strengthened association members’ skills in carrying 
out development efforts. Such favourable contexts for joint aid-giving were found in Italian 
communities, where Moldovan migrant leaders are also members of consultative migrant 
structures (e.g. Novellara, Padova), or locations where development NGOs show an interest in 
Moldova (e.g. in Germany and Switzerland).  
 It is well-known that solid transnational networks of migrant communities are fundamental 
to maximise migrant associations' role as partners in development transition. This is also widely 
recognised in the Moldovan case (Dusciac 2011)111. All research participants stressed a need in 
setting-up umbrella organisations to combine migrants’ experiences and to create strategic 
alliances between the small associations. An example of such efforts is a national network of 12 
associations (Assomoldova) in different Italian regions, established within the framework of the 
IOM Small Grant Programme. Other migrants started their own initiatives to build up networks 
without the support of the donor community. For instance, in 2012, Italian-based associations 
started an umbrella organisation sponsored by small and medium-sized enterprises owned by 
Moldovan migrants. Yet, despite an interest in establishing umbrella associations, the 
community’s networking capacities remain weak, and participants stated that there is scope for 
improvement, citing other migrant groups, for example African diasporas and the Kosovo 
Albanians, as their role models. Nicolai, who is a member of the regional committee on 
immigration in Padova and president of an association explains: 
Nicolai (unemployed, 31, Padova): We are not yet as developed as the Africans with their big 
umbrella organisations. They are much more organised than we are, and they have large projects 
with their authorities back home. We wish to become like them, because in their countries, the 
importance of the diaspora is well recognised. Our community has not yet reached this stage.  
 
                                                          
Alliance Française). The activities run by these associations are mostly related to student life in France (e.g. seminars 
on how to integrate at university, organisational and administrative matters).  
111 To my knowledge, the international donor community does not support an all-encompassing ‘Eastern European 
Diaspora-Platform for Development’ as in other parts of the world, for instance in the case of African migrant 
communities, spanning members of several host and receiving countries (EU 2013b). Possibly, the absence of an 
Eastern-European pendant is due to the lack of common identity among post-Soviet migrants in Western and South-
Western Europe and to the European Union’s Neighbourhood policy priorities. 
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 In general, when working towards Moldova’s development, migrant associations are more 
likely to team-up with civic organisations in their host society than with other migrant 
associations. This negatively affects the creation of umbrella-like schemes and migrants’ inter-
organisational relationships. Migrants’ limited desire to interact with other migrant associations 
is linked to three main aspects: cultural aspects, post-Soviet class structures, and divided 
opinions about the migrant community’s engagement in ‘home’ politics. The internal 
fragmentation within the migrant community can be summarised as follows. First, there is a 
strong association between social trust and volunteering (e.g. Uslaner 2002). Because of cultural 
aspects of distrust, especially when funding needs to be jointly managed, and Moldovans’ 
ambivalent collective experiences abroad, migrants only sporadically create inter-associational 
partnerships (see Chapters 4 and 5).  
 Second, as already indicated in Chapter 5, fragmentation along class lines exists, especially 
between the members of the two post-Soviet Moldovan migration waves, which I 
conceptualised in Chapter 5; migrants who arrived in the mid-1990s and those belonging to the 
second Moldovan migration wave made up of a higher share of people working in the 
professional, academic and arts sectors. Across all host countries under study, classes and age-
groups do not mix within the same migration wave nor between the two, and inter-associational 
relationships happen mainly between the same age or class groups112. This happens in France 
between students and young professionals who belong to the second migration wave, and in 
Italy between low-skilled migrants from the first economic migration wave. If associations do 
team-up for development it is mostly for fundraising initiatives, for example for Christmas 
charities, events around Mărțișor113 or for small one-off solidarity actions114. Moreover, some 
migrant leaders per se reject the concept of partnership-building. Without exception, they were 
all socialised during the Soviet time, in which teaming-up was regarded as a personal weakness 
and failure (Boian 2001): 
 
Natasha (shop-assistant, 48, Paris): I don’t trust them [the migrant leaders], and I often ask myself 
who they actually represent. Themselves? Moldovans? Or the migrants? It is not very clear to me. 
And I don’t know what they really want when they contact us. Can’t they do their things on their 
own?115 
 
                                                          
112 For instance, members of a Geneva-based association, mostly female high-skilled migrants, told me in a board 
meeting that they would never team-up with organisations run by low-skilled female migrants.  
113 Mărțișor is a Romanian celebration on 1 March to honour the coming spring, friendship and love.  
114 An example of this type of solidarity is 'Un visto per una vista' (a visa for a vision), organised by three Rome-based 
associations to sponsor an expensive eye-surgery for a Moldovan boy in Italy.     
115 A highly disputed subject among migrant leaders, which I cannot further explore here, is the associations’ 
legitimacy to represent migrants, ranging from associations as important representatives of all Moldovans abroad, to 
no legitimacy at all. 
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And third, migrants’ involvement in Moldovan politics has been criticised by those who are not 
involved in politics as ‘absorbing too much of their collective energies’, to the extent that it 
obstructs the building of collective efforts towards a more development-oriented engagement 
of their community. In their accounts, the political interference impinges too strongly upon 
migrants’ associative life, and unnecessarily polarises the migrant community. Unsurprisingly, a 
particular negative stance towards this ‘political infiltration’ was observed among those 
migrants who view the political elites as the main culprit for Moldova’s slow development 
transformation116. This observation confirms the argument I put forward in Chapter 2, namely 
that it is much too simplistic to state that migrant associations represent the interests of the 
community from which they are drawn. Bear in mind that ‘common origins’ do not automatically 
produce ‘common individuals’ (Brubaker 2005), especially in Moldova, where a common 
national origin and unity is contested. Yet, contrary to what one would expect in a ‘politically 
divided Moldova’, it was found that the fragmentation of the Moldovan migrant community 
along the lines of migrants’ political visions of Moldova’s future – either as a ‘neutral’ state, as a 
member of the European Union, as a member of the Eurasian Economic Union or even as part 
of Romania –is less significant than the divisions between associations that are involved in 
politics and those that explicitly withdraw from political activities.  
6.2.4 Towards more ‘professionalism’: the importance of capacity building 
The associations’ limited budgets are the main challenge for migrants, restricting their capacity 
to involve transnational development efforts in their aspirations. Furthermore, migrants saw 
scope for improvements in the professionalisation of the associational landscape in terms of 
long-term functionality and organisational capacity-building. Migrant leaders all clearly 
articulated aspirations and emotional commitment to contribute to Moldova’s development, 
and in their view, small gestures of encouragement, recognition and financial incentives 
provided by Moldova’s authorities would stimulate their aspiration to engage in development 
efforts. This finding contradicts policy documents and commissioned research, highlighting that 
Moldovan migrants do not dispose a strong aspiration to contribute to development of the 
home country by material and emotional commitment according to Weinar’s (2010) 
understanding of a ‘diaspora–development community’ (e.g. Cheianu-Andrei 2013; IASCI/Nexus 
2014). As Ion noted: 
                                                          
116 This includes the small number of migrant leaders who were strongly involved in the independence battle in 1991 
to join Romania (see Chapter 4). They believe that the majority of presidents of associations belong to a sponsored 
‘core-diaspora group’, initiated by the state to rule and control migrants’ activities, and thus are solely engaged in 
collective activities because they get paid for their efforts. 
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Ion (translator and writer, 34, Paris): Our contribution to Moldova's development could be bigger. 
Because our initiatives have never been welcomed or supported by the Moldovan state or the 
embassies, they are still small. We have always been kept in this logic of cultural festivity, and we 
have never been encouraged to go beyond that. This is really a pity, because it would only need 
a small shock to activate the large quantity of positive energy that exists in our diaspora. 
 
The most commonly mentioned ‘small shocks’ or incentives, which are believed to increase 
migrants’ associations’ trajectories towards more sustainable engagement, are the facilitation 
of management skills, for instance trainings in operational and strategic project planning, and 
financial allocations. Contrary to the concern of the development industry that migrants lack 
information on how to get involved in formal development initiatives and the need to ‘educate’ 
them, chairpersons generally possess the relevant information and knowledge for decision-
making regarding their development interventions (see Chapter 2; cf. Varzari et al. 2014). They 
considered that more recognition for their cross-border humanitarian engagements by the 
Moldovan state authorities and their development partners to be far more relevant than 
information on how to ‘engage in development’. Oleg commented in this regard: 
 
Oleg (project-coordinator, 44, Padova): We are an active community, and we are highly motivated 
to contribute to Moldova’s transformation. But we are not very well structured. There is a lack of 
substance in our actions. For example, for me an engagement is a process, it is not just one 
project, but a process of consecutive activities. As a consequence of our activities, the diaspora 
should be empowered, in the sense that we have gained new skills to organise the same project 
better the next time. But for this we would need more recognition and funding.  
 
 A last issue associated with migrants’ quest to overcome their associations’ short-termism is 
the need for more funding in the domain of communication and PR-activities. The improvements 
of competences in communication were regarded as an important step towards promoting their 
activities beyond the Moldovan associational landscape. So far, this has been constrained by the 
financial viability of migrant associations, limiting their visibility and positioning within the local 
civil society in migrants' host countries, in Moldova or within the transnational development 
establishment:  
 
Dora (consultant, 42, Chisinau): Associations don’t need to report to anybody what they do, so I 
am sure that they do much more than we know, but the weakness of their communication skills 
is the problem. This could easily be improved with more funding.  
 
 The following conclusion can be drawn from Moldovan migrant associations’ general 
characteristics and their capacity to carry out transnational development projects. The majority 
of associations are small and mainly volunteer-run, and their role in Moldova’s development is 
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still modest due to shortcomings in their organisational and financial capacities. The associations 
are, however, engaged in a variety of transnational aid practices, covering a wide range of areas 
of intervention. Furthermore, a dynamic process of grouping for development within the 
transnational diaspora space can be found, even if internal fractures along the lines of cultural 
aspects, class-formations and political engagement exists. The most surprising finding in my view 
is the high share of transnational-oriented activities run by Moldovan migrant associations, 
despite the relatively short-term aspect of Moldovan migration, compared to other migrant 
groups which took longer to develop transnational activities, and that are generally less 
committed in the domain of transnational philanthropy. Ultimately, migrants stressed that small 
financial and organisational incentives would suffice to enhance their volunteer-run 
development contributions towards a more sustainable development engagement. These 
incentives were expected to be provided by Moldova’s novel institutional support-structures. 
Yet, as announced earlier, the new opportunity structures only partially meet migrants’ needs 
and aspirations of organisational capacity-building. This begs the question of why are migrants’ 
needs not met, despite their involvement in the creation of the new institutions and policies? In 
order to answer this question, it is time to address migrants’ viewpoints on the issue.  
 
 6.3 “No Interest is Better than Fake Interest”: Migrants’ Views on State and Development 
Emigration Policies  
 
In this last section, I investigate migrants’ viewpoints on Moldova’s institutional mechanisms for 
emigrant engagement and their participation in its creation. That being said, I examine the third 
research dimension of this thesis, in which I aim to get a better understanding of the degree of 
migrant associations’ participation in state-led development efforts. Drawing on Tilly’s definition 
of opportunity structures (1978), I explore how migrant associations’ actions are part of a larger 
political process of opportunities and constraints offered by the political environment in 
Moldova. I use migrants’ narratives on the Bureau and the Diaspora Congresses to revisit 
migrants’ perspectives on their participatory involvement in the institutional setting up of policy 
mechanisms. Both of these institutionalised bodies were a crucial momentum for mobilising the 
migrant community, and they are the central mechanisms for the management of relationships 
with the migrant community.  
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6.3.1 Migrants’ viewpoints on the Bureau for Relations with the Diaspora  
6.3.1.1 A ‘fuzzy’ and ‘top-down’ structure  
In January 2012, the Bureau started to implement its ‘diaspora association component’, which 
encompasses, among others, the creation of relationships with migrant associations and an 
increase of their involvement in the development process of the country via facilitation and 
financial support for innovative projects (BRD 2014). A number of migrant leaders fed into this 
new policy-making. The associations’ voluntary engagement included drafting policy 
recommendations, forming working-groups and attending planning workshops organised by the 
international donor community. For instance, in June 2012 migrant leaders took part in several 
workshops for implementing migration mainstreaming into national development policy. 
However, in the meantime, even those migrants who were highly involved in the establishment 
of the Bureau and in other association-led development programmes lost track of who is 
responsible for what. Svetlana highlighted the lack of strategic planning and the uncoordinated 
setting-up of policy mechanisms:   
 
 Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): Today, the government and its partners want to do too many 
things, and I don’t see much coherence. The problem is that the Bureau has started with no clear 
strategy. Everything was done very fast, and because things were not done in a correct way, we 
are finding ourselves now in the midst of this general chaos.  
 In the migrants’ opinion, the Moldovan authorities and development agencies have missed 
the opportunity to create a comprehensive structure for migrants’ development efforts. They 
criticise the lack of a clear overarching structure, which would allow them to fully understand 
the synergies between the Bureau and other relevant state institutions dealing with migration-
development issues, for example with the foreign ministry, or the ministry of social protection 
and its new migration units: 
Rosa (entrepreneur, 45, London): It’s all very fuzzy. We don’t really know what’s going on. The 
Bureau is not formalised in a way that would allow us to know exactly what they do. Ok, their aim 
is to support the diaspora, but if you want to draw a diagram of where the Bureau is, where we 
are, where the other structures dealing with migrants are, you will find it difficult. Because, I 
guess, we don’t have one. 
  
 Another central issue raised in interviews and on internet-platforms is that migrants’ 
participation did not go beyond the planning stage of the Bureau’s activities. Some migrant 
leaders are deeply disappointed that they are not involved in the implementation of the 
‘diaspora association component’ anymore, for example as consultants or as members of an 
advisory board. Some migrants’ narratives on this issue were particularly negative, because they 
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were not assigned the jobs or positions in the Bureau they were hoping for, highlighting that the 
young staff lack expertise on the topic of migration and/or personal migration experiences, and 
are thus unable to fully understand the challenges migrants face abroad. As Vasili narrates: 
 
Vasili (researcher, 39, Paris): They need to understand what the diaspora needs. But how can they 
do that if they don’t consult them anymore? This is a big weakness, and they have this manner to 
act Soviet style. They think they are the masters in Chisinau who know what people abroad need, 
even if they have never been migrants. They are going to implement what they think we need, 
and they will bring their ideas to life, regardless of what we think.  
 
Furthermore, the Bureau’s top-down approach in implementing programmes is described as 
‘made Moldovan-style’, meaning it is one-sided with sporadic communication and a lack of 
common planning with migrants: 
 
Laura (journalist, 37, Bologna): Our communication with the Bureau is very unilateral. If we plan 
something and we invite them to participate, we don’t get a reply. But then we get invitations to 
their projects which they have planned without consulting us. There is no communication or 
planning between the authorities and us.  
 
 Following on from this, even if the authorities and the development agencies made efforts 
in opening up spaces for migrants’ participation by enrolling them into the planning stage of the 
Bureau and in other migrant association-led schemes, it is the elites and bureaucrats of IOs who 
make decisions without further consulting or involving migrants. Therefore, the current form of 
migrants' participation in the creation of the Bureau and in other diaspora-association 
components can be described in Oser’s and Biederman's (2008) words as an ‘alibi participation’, 
where only a low degree of participation is possible, or as an ‘invited space’ – a space where 
migrants are invited to participate but where decisions are made by the inviting elite. That being 
said, there are clear discrepancies between migrant leaders’ aspirations to be engaged in 
development efforts and the new institutional arrangements.  
 
6.3.1.2 “The idea is to search for ideas”: a reversed asymmetrical relationship between 
migrants and state institutions 
A second central category that emerged from migrants’ narratives on the new support 
structures is the notion that ‘the idea is to search for ideas’. This means that migrants support 
the state and its key development partners in finding inspirations for their future migration–
development initiatives. Svetlana touches on this very point:  
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Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): The Bureau has started its activities without us. But now, I don't 
mind it anymore, because I finally understand. The idea of the Bureau is to search for ideas, and 
that's pointless, because we already know what we want to do.  
Migrants often considered their associations as ‘service providers’ for state institutions and 
affiliated aid-agencies, meaning that their associations are at the service of the new 
institutionalised bodies and not the other way around: 
Vasili (physicist, 39, Paris): Things will change the moment they understand that the Bureau 
should be at the service of the diaspora, and not the other way around. Until then, it remains 
Soviet-style: the party or the Bureau leads and imposes its attitudes upon everybody, and we are 
supposed to give and give and to provide and provide as usual. 
 
 In general, migrants perceive their associations as ‘contact points’ for state institutions, 
providing them with the contacts for potential beneficiaries for free. This attitude towards 
migrant associations as cheap and convenient service providers has been roundly criticised by 
the chairpersons, because their associations receive no financial rewards whilst the state 
institutions do. The following example illustrates this point. Two migrant associations in Italy 
initiated, without any financial support, the programme ‘DOR’, a return visit programme for 
Moldovan teenagers living abroad. This concept was consecutively adopted by the Bureau, who 
received funding for the same events, but without further involving the migrant association, for 
instance in the recruitment process of suitable candidates. Ion articulates his disappointment 
about this asymmetrical relationship with state authorities: 
  
 Ion (translator and writer, 34, Paris): I am tired of providing ideas and information for free. The 
government should not only take advantage of us but also support us. We are tired of giving and 
providing all the time without receiving anything. Our story is similar to other development 
programmes in this country. The money goes to ministerial migration managers in Chisinau, 
where it usually disappears for good, and it does not come through to us.  
 
Vice-versa, using metaphorical language, Igor gives his explanation on the current status of the 
relationship between migrants and state authorities: 
 
Igor (aid-worker, 39, Chisinau): The government decides what to share and with whom. Right? 
There is authority, and we respect authority. So, who are these people leading associations? 
These are ordinary people from the streets, right? They are the constituency. They are the parish 
members, and the prime minister is the priest. We don’t deal with the parish. We deal with the 
priest, right? This is the way [name of the organisation] is structured. Ok, we can informally 
consult the associations from time to time, but formally it’s the government’s decision how to 
deal with its constituency. 
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 Nevertheless, a small number of members of new associations established by young 
migrants, with no or few contacts in their Moldovan counterparts, found that some good 
decisions have indeed been made towards the diaspora in terms of joint cooperation. They 
reported positive experiences with the Bureau in the domain of facilitating contacts between 
their associations and potential beneficiaries in Moldova. One migrant association, for instance, 
collected school facilities from a closed-down school in Geneva and the Bureau matched them 
with a school in Moldova in need of the collected material (e.g. chairs, tables, books). While 
these chairpersons are eager to continue their collaboration with the Bureau in the future, the 
majority of middle-aged migrants with long-lasting relationships in Moldova, and who were 
engaged in the policy-making process, remain sceptical of the Bureau’s ability to improve their 
associations’ functioning and their planned or ongoing development interventions. Partly, this 
is because they do not need the Bureau for creating partnerships with Moldovan counterparts. 
Also, in their opinion, the Bureau has become a PR office for promoting the Republic of Moldova 
abroad to enhance the visibility of the little-known country in ‘Europe’s hinterland’ through 
migrants’ activities around the globe, instead of a support body for migrants’ self-help initiatives: 
 
Laura (journalist, 37, Bologna): They don’t facilitate anything, and they don’t pay anything. But 
they profit more and more from a positive image of Moldova gained through our activities around 
the world. I think this is unfair. It’s a PR office for the Republic of Moldova. But we, the diaspora, 
didn’t ask for that.  
 
Indeed, the Bureau’s attention is strongly turned to superficial events, prominently visible on 
social media platforms, such as flashmobs for the Eurovision Song Contest, the ‘celebration of 
the Moldovan flag around the world’, or on the ‘National Day of the Traditional Moldovan 
blouse’117. Tellingly, this confirms migrants’ opinions on the establishment of the Bureau and of 
other diaspora-led policies as a wasted opportunity for building a solid support structure for 
their humanitarian engagement in Moldova, for which they volunteered their time and energy.  
 And last of all, because the research focus on migrant associations is primarily put on the 
opportunity structures in migrant host-societies (e.g. Lacroix 2011; Pirkkalainen et al. 2013), the 
role of official state representations in migrants’ countries of origin in supporting migrants’ 
collective aid-efforts is often overlooked in the academic literature. Although I cannot fully 
explore my findings in this regard, the following observation is put forward.  
 Migrants’ description of their relationship with the state authorities in Moldova as a 
‘reversed asymmetrical relationship’, in which migrants see themselves as cheap service 
                                                          
117 See for instance: https://www.facebook.com/BiroulPentruRelatiiCuDiaspora/?fref=ts [last accessed: September 
2016]. 
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providers, and joint initiatives are mainly initiated by migrant associations, equally applies to 
migrants’ relationships with official Moldovan representatives in the host countries under study. 
Though experiences of partnerships with consular services and embassies strongly depend on 
the individuals running these institutions, migrants frequently highlighted a one-sided interest 
from diplomatic missions in partnerships and limited regard for their transnational aid-giving. 
The analysis of interviews by migrants shows that diplomatic missions have not yet reached out 
to migrant associations and that they have, instead, in some cases incorporated migrants’ 
voluntary-run services into their own work – often without the associations’ consent (e.g. 
information campaigns addressed to potential migrants). Consequently, migrants who made 
efforts in initiating joint-projects with state representatives expressed resignation and 
frustration118, and their unsatisfactory relationships with Moldova’s federal state 
representatives impacts negatively on their motivation to volunteer their time and resources for 
their home country’s development. Generally, it can be said that there is a lack of support from 
Moldova’s diplomatic representations in the host countries under study for migrants’ 
transnational development engagement. I suggest that this consideration be taken into account 
when designing further state-led programmes aimed at increasing the development capital of 
migrant associations for Moldova.  
 In conclusion, the majority of migrants recast their expectations vis-à-vis the new emigrant 
policy mechanisms, because their objectives do not overlap. As Ion noted: 
 
Ion (translator and writer, 34, Paris): The way the Bureau is currently functioning doesn't help to 
increase our relationship with the government. Most of our hopes to receive support for our 
projects have already evaporated.  
 
This finding is consistent with Lampert’s (2014) observation on Nigerian migrant associations, 
whose leaders are equally frustrated at their insufficient access to power and resources in the 
local and national polity, because of lack of financial strength. It needs to be seen if this current 
modality of migrant engagement for development – as a ‘reversed asymmetrical relationship’ 
between migrants and the state with regard to the outlined international development policy 
rhetoric, in which migrants are supposed to be supported – is just a temporary stage in the 
process of building a relationship with the migrant community, or whether it is already 
entrenched as Moldova’s new reality of emigrant engagement. 
 
                                                          
118 This reflects migrants’ dissatisfaction with Moldova’s general consular practices. Furthermore, four migrants 
were particularly frustrated, because their associations lost money in joint co-operations with embassies. 
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6.3.1.3 “The bureau for manipulation of the diaspora”: the category of political control 
 
Different aspects of direct and indirect political control proved to be a central issue in migrants’ 
narratives on the new state-led support structures.  
 Migrants who were involved in the making of the institutional framework were concerned 
that they might increasingly be associated with the government, which in their opinion would 
undermine their impact and role as transnational civil society organisations in Moldova, and 
their ability to create beneficial alliances with the Moldovan development NGO scene. The 
following quote illustrates the dilemma faced by some migrant leaders: 
 
Oleg (project-coordinator, 44, Padova): We are sort of feeling a political pressure now. We all 
have our views and non-views, but we don’t want to get instrumentalised. We are part of the civil 
society and not of a specific party, but it has become complicated, because if you have once swum 
in somebody's pool, you need to swim like them. Even if we don’t want to engage in politics, our 
relationship with the authorities became strange, ehm too politicised.  
 
 Secondly, migrants who were engaged in the setting-up of support structures strongly 
advocated a diaspora ministry, for example via policy briefs and agreements with the Diaspora 
Council. They were unpleasantly surprised by the decision to create a Bureau which is 
subordinated directly to the prime minister within the state chancellery, arguing that this form 
of dealing with ‘diaspora affairs’ allowed for more government control than a diaspora ministry 
(Diaspora Coordination Council 2012). For this reason, migrants sometimes named the ‘Bureau 
for Relations with the Diaspora’ the ‘Bureau for Manipulation of the Diaspora’ – a state body for 
the direct control of the diaspora space to influence and harness migrants’ activities for political 
interests.  
 Thirdly, another commonly stressed example of a direct means of state control of the 
migrants’ transnational space was the migrant association list highlighted earlier. In some 
migrant leaders’ views, the simple listing of associations became a tool of political control of 
migrant civil society – and an attempt to discipline migrants’ collective activities119. Therefore, 
they want their associations’ names to be removed from the list. 
 
Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): I feel like our organisation is a contact point. Everybody wants 
contacts all the time, and the other day the Bureau wanted the list of our high-skilled members. 
I don’t want our organisation on that association list anymore. I think they just want names. It’s 
not correct what they do with that list. It feels like they want to control us.  
                                                          
 119 Generally, the category of ‘political control’ has been more determined among migrant leaders who migrated 
around the Russian crisis in 1998 than among migrants belonging to the second Moldovan migration wave. This 
confirms my argument put forward in Chapter 4, namely the importance of the time point of migrants’ departure 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union for the relationship building with the state and development actors.   
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The migrants’ comments on the association list illustrates some aspects of the global macro-
policy discourse on migration. The list is a concise example of how the macro-policy discourse 
of controlling migrants is put in practice, and reflects the shifts and dynamics in the Moldovan 
state’s attitude towards its emigrants; from an initial period of institutionalised contempt to an 
interest in controlling the state’s ‘absentees’. Additionally, the expressed exclusive interests in 
high-skilled members of migrant associations exemplifies how the Bureau follows international 
recommendations and prominent best-practices templates, which suggest, among others, to 
collaborate with ‘educated members of the diaspora’ (e.g. IOM and MPI 2012: 132). As argued 
above, this approach when applied in Moldova leads to considerable mismatches between 
migrants’ needs to carry out their transnational engagement and standardised top-down 
programmes and policies. 
 Lastly, migrants pointed to a central fact that has never been openly expressed in the 
narratives of civil servants within government ministries and IOs, namely that their remittances 
contribute to almost half of Moldova’s households, preventing the country from collapse. 
Migrants interpret this well-known ‘open secret’ as a political statement: the elite does not want 
social change. Natalia narrates her frustration in claiming greater recognition as social actors 
promoting positive change in Moldova: 
 
 Natalia (lecturer and businesswoman, 42, Rome): We remit more than 40% of the GDP, so we 
should also have more decision-making power. We need to affirm more political will, because we 
definitively don’t want to be reduced to percentages of the GDP anymore. We want to be 
accepted as actors of social change, but there is no comprehension of this. For instance, some 
consultants are afraid to say that we are active, or that we can be a motor of social change, 
because they know that the authorities don’t want to read that. 
 
Migrants’ belief that their active associational life is deliberately undermined so as not to disturb 
the ‘order’ by questioning the effectiveness of the political elite, reflects their viewpoints on the 
interplay between return migration and social change highlighted earlier. Consequently, these 
migrants deem it to be unlikely that the authorities aim to genuinely increase the associations’ 
engagement in Moldova’s development process (e.g. BRD 2014; EU 2013a). Rather, the state’s 
interest in its ‘absentees’ as social actors and their structural involvement in Moldova’s 
development is regarded as a way of wooing them for economic interests. In Diana’s account: 
 
Diana (care-worker, 45, Paris): The state has a responsibility towards us, because we are 
Moldovan citizens. The problem is that politicians don’t do anything for us citizens. So, in practice, 
it’s another story. They don’t want the system to change, because they have decided that we pay, 
so they don't need to work. 
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More generally, migrants’ viewpoints on this issue refer us back to the very essence of the 
discursive subject of the global mainstream migration–development policies, that is, the high 
interest in migrants as economic actors and to a lesser extent as socio-political actors (Raghuram 
2009). This is also mirrored in the dominance of the ‘financial migration–development 
programmes’ discussed above. For migrants to play an important role in Moldova’s 
development transformation as social actors, beyond private remitters, more political will would 
be required. Furthermore, the fact that Moldovan migrants are all but immune to contextual 
factors in Moldova for carrying out transnational development efforts brings to the fore the 
importance of not losing sight of the continuing significance of national and local factors in 
understanding transnational phenomena. Or, as Levitt and Jaworsky (2007) maintain, the state, 
in this case Moldova and its official state representatives in migrants’ countries of residence, 
remains an important factor in conditioning and shaping migrants’ motivations to engage in 
transnational practices. 
 
6.3.2 ‘From talk-shops to work-shops’: the evolution of the Diaspora Congresses 
 
After this rather pessimistic account of the migrants’ viewpoints on the newly created BRD, I 
end this chapter by briefly addressing migrants’ narratives on another institutionalised body of 
emigrant engagement, the Diaspora Congresses120. 
 In contrast to migrants’ rather negative attitude towards the BRD, the migrants’ narratives 
on the Congresses are somewhat more positive. This is partly because of a major shift in the 
reporting of the events that were carried out over the last six years. It can be characterised as a 
shift from ‘migrants having been invited’ to ‘migrants actively participating’, or as a shift from 
‘talk-shops to work-shops’. On one hand, migrants described the first three congresses as 
platforms for political parties to reach out to migrants for upcoming elections, and therefore as 
a waste of time and resources. Additionally, their experiences of attending these events were 
narrated as an invitation to ‘applaud the political parties’ in settings portrayed as ‘fake 
happenings’ or ‘surreal events’, in which certain obviously active migrant leaders were awarded 
medals by the party leaders. On the other hand, migrants positively commented on the 2012 
Congress, because they took part in its organisation, which gave them the opportunity to make 
                                                          
120 The first congress was held in 2004. Since then, the number of participants has doubled each year: 150 
chairpersons participated in the 5th Congress in 2012, organised by the IOM and financed by the SDC and the EU (EU 
2013a).  
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acquaintance with other presidents of associations from different host countries and to discuss 
potential collaborations. Below, Oleg and Vasile share their experiences of attending the 
Congresses: 
 
 Oleg (project-coordinator, 44, Padova): The first congresses were ‘election rallies’, first for the 
Communists, then for the pro-European Alliance. And I think these congresses were all about 
applauding. We were there to applaud the politicians and the organisers. Applauding and 
applauding [applauds]. Only in 2012, could we actually participate. 
  
Vasile (IT engineer, 48, London): The money for the congress in 2008 could have been spent on 
more urgent things. The politicians were talking way too much. Everything was surreal and out of 
time and reality. They tried to influence us in the last congress, too, but at least in 2012 these 
attempts happened in the hallways and not during the official conference programme. And I think 
that’s how it should be, because we are part of the civil society and not of a specific party. 
 
 Nonetheless, the nature of the Diaspora Congress per se remains controversial. For instance, 
research participants criticise the strong focal point of tediously honouring migrant associations’ 
achievements, a performance that is similar in style to the above-described Student Gala, 
instead of being awarded greater recognition as social actors and more sustainable support. 
Furthermore, the nature of the Congresses exhibits features of “the mechanisms by which 
people either in the country of origin itself or in the diaspora contribute to ‘development’ are 
complex and subject to lively debate stretched out over space” (Mercer et al. 2009: 156). Indeed, 
participants’ lively debates on the costs of the events, including migrants’ travel expenses, 
highlight a belief that the government and the donor community should not waste its funding 
on migrants. Rather, international financial aid should be allocated to vulnerable groups ‘there’ 
in Moldova, regarded by some migrants as less privileged than themselves, living ‘here’. Below, 
Anna shares her opinion on who ‘deserves’ humanitarian assistance: 
 
Anna (housewife and cleaner, 37, Paris): I didn’t go to the one in 2012. They wanted to pay me 
the flight, but I didn’t want to waste their money and my time. There are people in Moldova who 
need that money much more than we do. I am really ashamed of all this, and I feel ashamed of 
our government. These events make me angry, so much money is wasted to shake hands with 
the prime minister, and there are so many vulnerable people in villages who need this money.  
   
 Lastly, participants criticised the narrow focus on the topic of ‘promoting Moldovan culture 
abroad’, which they deem unsuitable for the format of the Congresses in particular, and for 
channelling migrants’ community efforts towards the benefit of Moldova, in general. As Svetlana 
noted: 
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 Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): We don’t need a conference on how to promote Moldovan 
culture. Those who want promote Moldovan culture, they do that already in the UK, in Germany 
or wherever they are. That’s no use to us. We just want to be able to continue our humanitarian 
activities and get more recognition and funds for that.  
  
 In conclusion, participants missed an outcome-oriented dialogue with state authorities that 
would establish defined commitments vis-à-vis their associations in terms of financial and 
administrative support, as outlined in the strategy of the Bureau. The Congresses, therefore, 
simply do not meet migrant leaders’ needs to empower their associations towards a greater and 
more sustainable development-oriented engagement. Instead, they are increasingly viewed as 
a new context for elite-building, for which many migrant leaders were invited, but few chosen 
to get financial or structural support. Or, as Lampert maintains in the Nigerian case: “The focus 
has extended little beyond attempting to co-opt a select elite of ‘diasporic professionals’ into 
federal-level government programmes” (2014: 842). 
 To conclude, in migrants’ viewpoints new policies and support structures had a positive 
impact on the migrant associations’ transnational activities at the time of their launch. However, 
today the majority of migrant leaders do not see them as an added-value for their collective 
transnational development interventions. Migrants do not feel Enabled, Engaged or Empowered 
in their capacity to carry out collective development activities, according to the ‘three E’s of 
diaspora engagement’, suggested in handbooks of governmental institutions (e.g. IOM and MPI 
2012). Despite that they participated in the policy-making of emigrant engagement, mostly on 
a voluntary basis.  
 
6.4 Conclusion and Key Findings 
 
After my discussion on how Moldovan migrants are imagined and construed as development 
policy agents in the last chapter, I identified in this chapter how the Moldovan authorities and 
official development actors seek to translate into action the policy idea of migrants’ engagement 
for development. Firstly, in keeping with the macro-policy discourse on migrants’ engagement 
for development, I reviewed how interlinkages between migrants and Moldova’s transformation 
are currently practised in policy strategies and large-scale programmes. My findings on how the 
Moldovan state engages with its ‘absentees’ and mobilises migrant associations for its 
development transformation can be summarised as follows.  
 After Moldova’s authorities revisited their assumption that emigration only makes sense for 
the country’s development and the migrants alike once its citizens are back in Moldova, the last 
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six years have been crucial for Moldova in building and extending a variety of initiatives to 
maximise the development impact of migrants and to integrate migrant associations into 
national development strategies (e.g. EU 2013a). However, similar to studies in other countries, 
the programmes and policies overly emphasise economic and financial aspects, and the 
expensive programmes are not very visible in Moldova (cf. Vullnetari 2013 in the case of 
Albania). Thus, the two first key findings of this chapter on Moldova’s formalised emigration 
policies are:  
The creation of two overarching parallel structures – ‘the mainstreaming migration into national 
development approach’ and the institutional approach in form of the Bureau, and the complex 
and over-competitive donor-driven environment with a large number of overlapping individual 
projects, resulted in a structure in which competences and accountability towards migrants’ 
transnational development efforts are blurred. Keeping Moldova’s political instability in mind, I 
argue that when new institutional mechanisms are built on too many weak foundations, placed 
in an incoherent way, they are bound to fail in the unpredictable political climate. 
 In section two, I discussed the general features of Moldovan migrant associations and their 
current state of ‘professionalism’. It was found that their capacity is still in the making, and their 
contribution to local development in Moldova is marginal. Furthermore, the mostly small and 
volunteer-run associations have organisational shortcomings, for instance in their decision- 
making processes. However, the associations are active in a wide range of transnational aid-
practices, covering a wide range of areas of interventions. 
The third and fourth key-findings of this chapter are that, despite the relative short-term aspect 
of Moldovan migration, a high share of transnational-oriented development activities was found 
among migrant associations, compared to other migrant groups, which took longer to develop 
transnational activities, and which are generally less committed in the domain of transnational 
philanthropy. However, internal constraints consisting of fractures along the lines of class 
formations, political engagement and first and second migration wave, negatively impact on 
migrants’ aspirations to team-up with other associations for development.  
This dual finding illustrates that is worth looking at smaller migrant communities, as their 
associational landscape can also show dynamic patterns of transnational philanthropic efforts 
towards their home countries. Additionally, it alludes to the need to revisit general assumptions 
about post-Socialist migrant communities and about Moldovans as less active compared to 
other migrant communities, as is commonly assumed in NGO reports and in the academic 
literature (e.g. Schwartz 2007).  
 Furthermore, few capacity-building measures would suffice to take migrant associations’ 
projects to a new level of their associational capacities and to ensure that their development 
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ideas and plans can be implemented. Yet, despite considerable efforts made by the state and its 
international development partners in extending their initiatives towards migrant associations 
shortly after the Twitter Revolution in 2009, Moldova’s formalised emigration policies have only 
very sporadically fostered structural or financial support for migrant associations, which would 
allow them to fulfil their transnational engagements. 
Thus, alongside constraints within the migrant community, external constraints, such as the 
relatively poor structural support provided by Moldova and its development partners, negatively 
affects migrant associations’ ability to carry out transnational development efforts. 
The structural support launched by the Moldovan Government has so far largely failed to 
support migrant associations in their development efforts, and the large sums of donor 
investment have not yet found their way to migrant associations. In this respect, the meta policy 
discourses on ‘diaspora involvement for development’, for instance the flagship theme ‘Taking 
action on Migration and Development – Coherence, Capacity and Cooperation’ by the Global 
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD 2011: 1), does not apply here.  
The novel state-led structures do not contribute to more policy coherence on migration-
development issues on a federal level, nor do they considerably strengthen the capacity of 
migrant civil society.  
Thus, it is going to be a difficult task to bundle and channel ‘the good spirits’ into Moldova’s 
development transition, and to maintain and convey the complex structure in an 
understandable way to migrants, so as to keep up their motivation to invest their time and 
energy for their home-country’s development transition.  
 Thirdly, I opted for a perspective that emphasised migrants’ participation experiences in the 
setting-up of formalised emigration policies. Given the large aid budget and migrants’ 
motivation to offer their time and ideas in the making of institutional structures, key-actors 
could have paved the way for creating a favourable environment that would allow migrants to 
engage in Moldova’s transformation efforts in a participative and sustainable way. The snapshot 
of migrants’ view of their participation in policy and programme mechanisms explains why they 
have only partially succeeded. First, the global macro-policy discourse of ‘diaspora involvement 
for development’ applied in Moldova in the form of standardised top-down policies and its 
efforts to control migrants and/or courting only high-skilled migrants, among others, has led to 
considerable mismatches between migrants’ expressed desire to carry out their development-
oriented activities and the need to improve their long-term functionality.  
Furthermore, the migrant leaders’ involvement in state-led development programmes and 
policies was carried out in form of an ‘alibi-participation’ – migrants were invited to participate 
at the launch of programmes without any actual influence on decision-making processes over 
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institutional forms and programmes of their engagement on a long-term. Entangled with this 
finding, migrants’ experience with the novel policy and programme structures has been 
described as an ‘asymmetrical relationship’, in which migrant associations provided ideas and 
contacts, but have not yet not received any recognition as professional development actors, nor 
as social actors within the Moldovan civil society. 
In general, I think that the state agencies’ constant request for contacts and for reaching out to 
migrants is a direct result of Moldova’s late but sudden interest in its migrants and the busy 
catch- up in initiating migration–development programmes, harnessing migrant associations’ 
activities for their newly-created programmes. This modality of an asymmetrical relationship 
strongly determines the current collaborations between the state and its development partners 
on the one hand and migrant associations on the other hand, and obstructs the migrant 
organisations’ scope for a more qualified development provision. As we shall see in Chapter 8, 
the finding of this asymmetrical relationship also applies to relationship patterns between 
migrants and IOs more broadly. This leads to the next central finding of this chapter.  
At the present state-of-the-art of Moldovan migrant associations, migrant leaders consider a 
supportive institutional context in Moldova more relevant for carrying out their development-
oriented efforts, than the local or national associative context in their host countries.   
Although the local associative community level in the host countries matters to some extent, for 
instance in terms of attractive opportunities for teaming up with local development NGOs in 
order to gain more skills in carrying out development efforts, migrant leaders consider the 
recognition of their transnational engagement by the Moldovan authorities and the 
international aid-agencies to be more important. This finding can be explained by specific 
Moldovan migration features, which I identified in Chapter 5 – namely migrants’ strong 
emotional commitment to their home country, the high intentionality of return migration, and 
the focus of this thesis on migrants’ collective development practices towards Moldova.  
 And last of all, migrants’ motivation to stay engaged in volunteer-run development 
contributions and state-led development efforts is dwindling, and frustration and resignation 
have set in, especially among those migrants who have volunteered their time and energy in the 
design of migrant association-led policies. 
The support or non-support by Moldova’s state authorities and its consideration or non-
consideration of migrants’ voluntary efforts in the creation of its policies and programmes 
reflects migrants’ general frustration and resignation with the political institutions’ development 
achievements up to now, and leaves little room for trust and mutual co-operation with 
authorities at ‘home’. 
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 After this exploration of the institutional framework of Moldova’s engagement with its 
‘absentees’, the two remaining empirical chapters look at patterns of migrants’ transnational 
development practices, the aid-workers’ view on the subject of study and the relationship 
dynamics between migrants and aid-agencies more broadly. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
‘Solidarity Not Charity’: Collective Transnational Development Practices of 
Moldovan Migrants 
 
 
This chapter informs the first dimension of my thesis, in which I seek to assess how migrants’ 
development efforts are negotiated among migrants, who is engaged in transnational 
development practices, and how collective development interventions are performed in 
practice.  
 I first take up the subject of the state-of-the-art on Moldovan migrant associations from 
Chapter 6, providing the reader this time with the migrants’ perspective on their capacity to 
carry out development-oriented projects. In line with Page and Mercer’s (2012) proposition to 
engage with Bourdieu’s ‘theories of practice’ and what the authors call ‘diaspora as a community 
of practice and everyday lives’, I discuss the social process of creating a ‘Moldovan diaspora’ or 
a ‘Moldovan community of collective practice’. I particularly emphasise the ‘construction’ of 
practices, which enable ‘here’ and ‘there’ to merge (Mavroudi 2015). In the main section of this 
chapter I identify different types of migrants’ transnational development practices aimed at 
supporting positive change in Moldova. Besides transnational engagements shaped by 
Moldova’s past, and the country’s marginal place within Europe, discussed in Chapter 4, I 
introduce forms of aid-practices that emerged from migrants’ everyday lives. I assess how these 
practices are performed within the transnational field of the migrant civil society and how they 
are governed by different logics and behaviour, whether strategic or habitual (Bourdieu 1990). 
Given that migrants’ border-crossing development practices refer to multiple social spaces and 
reflect different senses of belonging (Glick Schiller et al. 1999), I explore how ‘ways of being’ and 
‘ways of belonging’ affect ways of ‘collectively practising development’ in a reciprocal process. 
In the last section, I discuss in more detail migrants’ interpretations of ‘professional 
development practices’, and how they differ from those performed by the mainstream 
development establishment. And lastly, I briefly highlight some aspects of the complexities of 
relationship patterns between migrants and their non-migrant counterparts. 
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7.1. The Social Formation of a Community of Collective Practice 
 
According to Schatski et al. (2001: 89), practices consist of both doing and saying and thus entail 
that the analysis be concerned with both practical activities and their representations. 
Therefore, I first explore migrants’ self-reflections on the nature of their transnational civil 
society. Drawing on Mavroudi’s conceptualisation of ‘diaspora’ as a process (2007, 2015), I 
emphasise migrants’ estimates of power relations, inclusions and exclusions in the process of 
their ‘diaspora’ formation and their definitions of connectedness to Moldova. 
 
7.1.1 “From doing picnics in Italy and France to transnational-oriented development activities”: 
migrants’ self-reflections on their community of practice 
 
7.1.1.1 The viewpoints of non-members of migrant associations on collective activities 
 
The viewpoint of migrants, who are not active members of formal or informal collective helping 
practices, on migrant associations is generally positive. They are all familiar with activities carried 
out by migrant associations, contrary to some social NGOs and beneficiaries in Moldova, who 
have no or very little knowledge of migrant associations and their activities121. Migrants 
commonly underlined their affirmative portrait of migrant organisations with positive examples 
of development-oriented projects, helpful services in solving migrants’ manifold 
administrational problems, and their usefulness for creating new social networks in the host 
countries. Moreover, most of them expressed an interest in getting involved in migrant 
association-led development activities, but they lacked time or the opportunity to engage in a 
nearby association122. 
 In contrast, opinions about the members of associations were mixed. On one hand, 
associations are perceived as a means to alleviate nostalgia and to ‘keep the Moldovan spirits’ 
alive in migrants’ hearts. This is considered more common for migrants with a relatively long 
migration history, than for the ‘newcomers’. ‘Members of the diaspora’ are, therefore, 
predominantly perceived as migrants from the first post-Soviet Moldovan migration wave of the 
mid-late 1990s: 
 
                                                          
121 Cheianu-Andrei (2013) maintains that on average 20% of migrants are in regular contact with migrant 
associations.  
122 The main reasons for Moldovan migrants’ high interest in associative activities are further explained below (see 
also Chapters 5 and 6)  
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Dana (economist, 28, Paris): I think these are people who have lived here for many, many years, 
and they miss their Moldova. They are homesick, and I think the associations provide them with 
a good opportunity to meet other Moldovans and to quell their nostalgia.  
  
 However, migrants’ nostalgia, often wrongly reduced in the literature on post-communist 
countries to a longing for the Soviet past, does not entirely capture the emotions of these 
migrants (e.g. Mitja 2009). Therefore, I suggest opting for the German word Sehnsucht (longing) 
– a specific kind of longing that captures the articulated emotions more appropriately. Like the 
Portuguese expression saudade, Sehnsucht has a romantic and mystical connotation. It is the 
longing for ‘something’ we know not what – an ‘inconsolable longing’, which also describes a 
kind of loneliness. Sehnsucht can imply nostalgia – the longing for the past, or even for the Soviet 
past123, but it is not reduced to it. 
  Contrary to the assumption that migrants’ collective practices are shaped by the Sehnsucht 
of the middle-aged or elderly migrants’, members of migrant associations are perceived as 
dynamic young migrants. 
 
Susanna (au-pair, 28, Aarau): The elderly people are less socially involved in the diaspora, because 
they used to work a lot in Moldova, even on the weekends. They are not used to this kind of 
associative activities. That’s why I think younger people are more involved in associations, 
because they had more time to be active in Moldova than the generation of my parents, and they 
are generally more dynamic.  
 
Susanna’s estimate on socially active Moldovans takes us now to the ‘ideal type’ of a collectively 
engaged Moldovan migrant.  
 Migrant leaders exhibit similar characteristics across all countries under study. They have a 
high level of education – most chairpersons of associations have university-level education – and 
a high level of networking capacities. They are further described by non-members of 
associations as a ‘specific type of leader personality’ who maintains strong ties with Moldova.  
 In contrast to other migrant groups, a specific feature of Moldovan leaders is that only a few 
of them pursue high-skilled or medium-skilled jobs abroad (cf. Pirkallainen et al. 2013 on Somali 
associations in Finland). Thus, the majority of Moldovan migrant leaders are high-skilled 
migrants pursuing low-skilled jobs124. A further particularity compared to other migrant 
communities, is that the chairpersons of Moldovan migrant associations are not necessarily 
highly integrated in their host societies (cf. Lacroix 2011 on Polish migrant organisations in the 
UK).  
                                                          
123 It was found that Moldovan migrants’ nostalgia for the Soviet past is chiefly a criticism of the current authorities. 
124 For instance, they work in the care sector, in factories or in the building industry. 
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 The most significant common feature of the Moldovan migrant leaders is that they were all 
engaged in self-help groups or NGOs prior to emigration, either as professionals or as volunteers. 
Or, they expressed an interest in a volunteer engagement outside family obligations in Moldova, 
but lacked opportunities, time or resources. They exhibit specific personal qualities, often with 
a long-standing history of civic engagement enabling the formation of corporate interests in the 
civil society. They feel at home in the context of helping practices because of their habitus – their 
ability to use their educational provision and the social capital required for an introduction into 
the transnational space of migrant civil society (cf. Bourdieu 1990). The most determinant 
factors for taking up a transnational development engagement are, therefore, the migrants’ 
personal characteristics, interests and biographical aspects125. That being said, apart from the 
leaders’ strong orientations towards Moldova, any other type of reciprocal relationship between 
different degrees of integration and forms of transnationalism is less significant than the just-
described personal characteristics126. Being locally integrated in order to become transnationally 
engaged, for instance, is not by itself a determining factor for Moldovan migrants’ collective aid-
practices. 
 
7.1.1.2 “I have been in the diaspora for four years”: migrants’ self-reflections on being a 
‘diaspora’ with the analytical template of the migration–development discourse 
 
In this sub-section I explore how migrants reflect on their ‘diaspora’ from a collective point of 
view as a community of practice by adapting the analytical approaches of the migration–
development nexus, outlined in Chapter 2. As stated above, I opt for a processual 
conceptualisation of diaspora according to the definition of Mavroudi: “[...] a process in which 
space, place and time are not static but continuously used, imagined, and negotiated in the 
construction of both bounded and unbounded identities, communities, and nation-states” 
(2007: 473, 476). 
 Firstly, migrants define diaspora as their ‘space of associative life’. Liliana, who has been living 
in Paris for eight years, explains: 
 
 Liliana (freelancer, 34, Paris): I have been in the diaspora for four years now, and I have realised 
that being active in the diaspora gives me confidence. I gain confidence by organising events for 
deprived people back home. And in my experience, when you have more confidence in yourself 
                                                          
125 Possibly, this explains why there are no significant gender variations among the members of the core-group of 
engaged migrants in this study.  
126 See for instance Carling and Hoelscher (2013) on different degrees of transnationalism (remittance-sending 
practices) and integration.  
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and in the country where you come from, and where you are active – people here are also more 
open towards you.  
 
This definition of diaspora fits into Brah’s (1996) understanding of a ‘diaspora space’ – a lived 
experience of collective and associational activities. Being in the diaspora means being an active 
member of migrants’ associational life. That being said, migrants’ first definition of the diaspora 
as being their community of collective practice is narrower than the notion of ‘migrant 
community’ often synonymously used with diaspora in the migration policy discourse (see 
Chapter 2). Moreover, the space of collective engagement provides migrants with room to 
change their views towards other possible realities of migrants and/or beneficiaries in Moldova:  
 
Alina (student, 28, Paris): Before being in the diaspora, I only knew some students here, but 
through our activities in the diaspora, I have learned about the hard realities of other migrants.  
 
Romina (secretary, 49, Rome): Before I became a member of the diaspora, I already knew that 
the life of many Moldovans in the villages is hard. But I only realised how desperate their situation 
is today when I met our beneficiaries in the villages.  
 
 A second strong focus of migrants’ self-assessment on their own ‘diaspora’ and of their 
definition of a ‘diaspora’ more broadly is the 'transnational' character of their community. The 
migrants' strong emphasis on their capacity to cultivate links with Moldova is influenced by the 
development policy’s definition of ‘requirements’ for migrant communities to become 
‘diaspora-actors for development’. These include the capability to contribute to development in 
the countries of origin and a need for migrants’ ties to be beneficial for development (e.g. 
Brinkerhoff 2008; IOM 2012b). Accordingly, the core-group of migrant leaders wish to shift their 
objectives in orientation towards the country of origin, once they have attained more stability 
as a migrant community. Kiril’s definition of a diaspora is inscribed in this logic: 
 Kiril (internee and consultant, 28, Geneva): Diaspora is a good word, but we are not a diaspora 
yet. First we need to become a proper community, with a community spirit – a real soul, and only 
then we can become a diaspora. What I have just learned at the Diaspora Conference in Geneva 
is that a diaspora has links to the home country, and does activities there. So, first we need to 
form a community here, and then we can do our diaspora activities in Moldova.  
 
 The majority of migrant leaders considers their community morphology as still being too 
inward-oriented, despite the fact that migrant associations are already engaged in a variety of 
transnational aid practices (see Chapter 6). This is partly because of an on-going identity 
construction processes towards a ‘united Moldovan community’ in terms of a space of common 
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belonging. In this context, cultural activities are perceived as too dominant in relation to other 
activities (e.g. festivals, concerts). The relevance of the leisure side of migrant associations is 
well-recognised, and cultural activities can provide migrants with a welcome distraction from 
the everyday hardships many of them face abroad (e.g. Boccagni 2013). They can also generate 
much- needed emotional support, which most migrants do not receive in the local social 
environments of their domiciles – a means to escape from their loneliness and isolation, 
described in Chapter 5127: 
 
Christina (housewife, 29, London): We would like to have more events for us, like the Russian- 
speaking community has – receptions or concerts. Events where we can dress up nicely. Real 
evenings out, where we can forget about our everyday worries. Something nice for us, our 
community, not only charity happenings for people in Moldova. We are missing these kinds of 
events, because we are not fully integrated into the British society, and we don’t yet have our 
Moldovan society here.  
 
However, for the core-group of migrant leaders, communal activities like the ones described by 
Christina are a serious impediment for becoming a diaspora in the migrants’ second definition 
of the term: a community of transnational development practices. Community-related activities 
that create a ‘cosy space’ for meeting other co-citizens, for spending quality time or for stilling 
migrants’ Sehnsucht are in their view unacceptable collective practices. They do not fit into the 
common shared understanding of transnational development performances, and they are 
perceived as an ‘ethnic mobility trap’ that hinders a moving on towards transnational 
humanitarian practices (cf. Breton 1964)128. In these terms, narratives surrounding cultural 
activities are concise examples of struggles within the migrant space over shared commitments 
to the value of their common associative practices (cf. Schatski et al. 2001): 
Ion (translator and writer, 34, Paris): Most migrants are not well-integrated, because they think 
they will go back one day, and they feel lonely. That’s why they create associations, so they feel 
less isolated. But they have not yet understood that you don’t need to create an association for 
organising a barbeque or a picnic [laughs]! That’s ridiculous, and that’s why our activities remain 
so communal, and we don’t develop in a professional way. 
 
Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): If migrants have problems, or if they feel lonely they should go 
to local NGOs where people are paid for providing services to them. They shouldn’t create 
associations just for meeting up. It clearly hampers the development of our diaspora.  
                                                          
127 This function of associations is comparable to the so-called ‘expat bubbles’ of medium and high-skilled migrants, 
underlining the artificial nature and detached space from their host countries in which their social life can take place 
(e.g. Fechter 2012). 
128 Prior to the transnational turn in the 1990s, the term ‘ethnic mobility trap’ mainly referred to the transnational 
engagements of migrants as a barrier to their integration into the host society.   
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 Thirdly, migrants’ definition of a Moldovan diaspora as disposing a certain ethnic boundary 
maintenance, by which the diaspora defines itself, is contested (cf. Brubaker 2005). Some 
migrants do not consider the Moldovan ethnic identity as ‘distinct enough’ from the Romanian, 
because of their close cultural and historical links. Hence, they do not label themselves as a 
‘diaspora’. Despite migrants’ frequent references to the Romanian identity, however, the 
organisational relationship dynamics between Moldovans and Romanians are far from being 
self-evident in practice. In France and Switzerland, for example, both migrant communities 
frequently create partnerships or even mixed Romanian and Moldovan associations129, while in 
Italy and the UK, the two communities do not interact with one another. Migrant leaders in Italy 
strictly refuse to collaborate with Romanian associations, because of the negative public image 
of Romanians in the country130. In the UK and in Germany, the ‘too-official nature’ of Romanian 
associations was given as the main obstacle for joint collaborations.  
 And last of all, participants’ self-reflections on becoming a diaspora involve considerations 
about time. Most migrant leaders find it still too early to say if a shared identity of a ‘diaspora’ 
has fully passed on to the next generation. Given the rather short time of Moldovan migration 
in Western Europe compared to more historically embedded migrations, the core argument for 
not attributing the essential feature of a ‘diaspora’ is the lack of a historical continuity across at 
least two generations to their own community (cf. Dufoix et al. 2010): 
 
Lauren (journalist, 37, Bologna): I agree with our ambassador: we are not yet a diaspora. I think 
there really needs more time to pass before our migrant community becomes a diaspora.   
 
Practices developed over time by individuals engaged in that practice further implies that 
migrants recognise and refer to a contingent history of development of their activities to 
perform, improve and legitimate it (cf. Bourdieu 1990). It is precisely the lack of such a history 
of ‘common development practices’, and concerns that it might be already too late to create a 
shared agenda of transnational practices, that distresses some migrants: 
 
                                                          
129 Three Moldovan migrant associations implement joint humanitarian projects with Romanian associations in 
Romania and Moldova.  
130 Another possible reason for this observation is the relative large size of both migrant communities in Italy, each 
disposing a considerable number of associations compared to Switzerland and Germany, where partnerships were 
also built due to the lack of co-national associations in the immediate vicinity.  
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Oleg (project-coordinator, 44, Padova): Today, we are at a crossroad, either we continue to follow 
the road of cultural activities, or we take a turn towards a more charitable direction in our 
engagement. But if we don’t do anything now, it will be too late!  
 
Natalia (lecturer and businesswoman, 42, Rome): It is not going to be easy to teach migrants how 
to do proper development activities, because some associations which were created – let’s say 
up to four years ago – don’t understand the idea of development, and those who do understand 
it are tired, because they never received supported or encouraged. The new generation, born 
here, or brought here by their parents, is usually not interested in our activities. Neither group 
alone has a future. So, maybe it will never happen? 
 
 In conclusion, migrants are strongly preoccupied with the social process of creating a 
community of practice, which implies a common shared understanding of collective practices 
and a common definition of the nature of their relationship with Moldova. Similar to the 
academic literature on the concept of diaspora, reviewed in Chapter 2, migrants have different 
understandings of what exactly a ‘diaspora’ is, ranging from ‘an associative space’ to a 
‘transnational-oriented community’ as well as whether they should label themselves with the 
contested term ‘diaspora’ at all. Most importantly, in the migrants’ opinion, the morphological 
transformation of their community towards becoming a ‘community of transnational 
development practices’ is ‘in-the-making’ or at ‘a crossroad’. The capacity to attract newcomers 
and the second generation of Moldovan migrants, and to motivate them for a transnational 
development engagement will be crucial for perpetuating and increasing migrants’ collective 
development efforts. This finding shows that there exists a substantial divergence between 
migrants’ accounts on the cohesiveness of their ‘diaspora-development community’ and the 
perceptions of the aid-workers and civil servants within government ministries, who view the 
Moldovan diaspora as already ‘transformed’ in Sayad’s sense (1977) of a ‘third age of Moldovan 
migration’ (see Chapter 5).   
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Figure 7.1: The associative life of Moldovan migrants  
 
7.2 The Underling Logics of Collective Development Practices across Time and Space  
 
Following up my discussion on the building up of a ‘diaspora’ understood as a community of 
practice, I now identify in more detail forms of migrants’ transnational aid-practices, and how, 
within the field logics (nomos), specific categories of practice arise (cf. Bourdieu 1985). In line 
with Amelina and Faist (2012), I emphasise different temporalities, cultural aspects, and field-
specific symbolic, organisational and economic resources. And I draw on Page and Mercer (2012) 
who maintain that an analysis of migrants’ homeland-oriented development activities should 
take better account of migrants’ everyday lives and identities when analysing their propensity 
to support their country of origin. In these terms, I discuss the most significant underlining 
motivations of migrants to engage in transnational aid-practices, integrated into their 
biographical projects and generated by migrants’ everyday practices (Lave and Wenger 1991). 
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7.2.1 Regaining a name – online and offline 
7.2.1.1 On becoming a person again: development practices shaped by migrants’ professional 
skills  
As announced in Chapter 5, the phenomenon of de-skilling proved to be a determining motive 
for participants to engage in development-oriented practices. For many high-skilled migrants 
working in low-skilled jobs, transnational volunteer efforts towards Moldova present a welcome 
opportunity to employ their individual skills and resources, which they cannot use in their down-
graded professional occupations – a freedom to share their passions. The underlining mission of 
this category of development practice is to overcome discrepancies between migrants’ 
competences and social positions in the host countries as well as a temporal restoration of their 
professional skills and identities: 
  
Anna (translator/writer, 45, Rome): We are not only doing our activities for people in Moldova, 
but also for us. For all of us who are not able to draw on our full professional and individual 
potentials and our passions, because all of these resources are not in demand in our jobs.  
 
This finding is consistent with the broader literature on volunteerism, in which the opportunity 
to use one’s professional skills is found to play an important role in individuals’ choices for a 
volunteer engagement (e.g. Beck 2011). Further, numerous writers and scholars have referred 
to the importance of the restoration of migrants' identity by means of exercising their 
professional skills, by drawing either on their own biographies or on their scientific concepts. 
Consider, for instance, Musil’s (1934) ‘Man without qualities’, who steps up from his 
dependence on the outer world and his adaptability to form his character, which became his 
most typical attitude. Or, Simmel (1992b), who postulated that the more the ‘stranger’ is 
perceived as an individual and not as a stranger of a certain type, the lesser the risk he gets to 
be generalised or standardised as such. 
 Migrants’ use of social and human capital in their development projects is not restricted to a 
transnational commitment within the migrant community. Professional skills and interests are 
also determinant reasons for migrants’ choices to volunteer in development NGOs in their host 
countries, alongside or in lieu of an involvement in migrant-run development practices131. This 
form of engagement is often overlooked in the discussion surrounding migrants’ contribution to 
the development of their home countries, possibly because migrants’ participation in the local 
                                                          
131 Another frequently mentioned motivation to volunteer in local self-help groups and NGOs is the aspect of bridging 
with the host society (e.g. getting acquainted with ‘locals’).  
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or national voluntary sector of their domiciles, beyond their immediate migrant community, is 
less studied132. Vladimir, a member of a local law association in Turin, which provides free legal 
online-counselling for vulnerable groups in Moldova and Romania, explained how his activity 
makes up for his status-loss: 
 
Vladimir (car washer, 41, Turin): Ok, I am a car washer, that’s my job in Italy. But in Moldova I 
used to work as a lawyer for some years, and I want to keep a link with my profession. It’s good 
to be around lawyers in Italy. I enjoy it. It gives me the feeling to be a person again.  
 
 Likewise, professional interests are also determinant reasons for migrants’ choices to 
continue their engagement in Moldovan-based development NGOs, instead of taking up a new 
engagement within the migrant civil society or in the local development sector of the host 
country133. Mihail explains his decision to continue his activities for a Moldovan NGO: 
 Mihail (engineer, 29, Orléans): I didn’t find a migrant association nearby whose activities I would 
truly enjoy, which would fit me. That’s why I continue my voluntary work in our youth NGO that 
we created three years ago in Moldova, and for which I develop an interactive web page. I really 
enjoy doing this. Maybe later, I will do something for a migrant association.  
Whilst an involvement in development NGOs in the countries of residence might have escaped 
the broader discussion on migrants’ development efforts because it is not considered as a 
transnational practice per se, it surprises me that migrants’ continuing engagements in home- 
country-based NGOs, equally requiring transnational ties, are widely absent, too. The main point 
is that a non-engagement in migrant-run collective development interventions does not 
necessarily mean that migrants are not involved in development efforts towards Moldova. Thus, 
migrants generally, and Moldovan migrants particularly, might be more engaged in 
development practices than is commonly assumed. 
 7.2.1.2 To see and to be seen: belonging and self-representation  
In Chapter 4, I explored how migrants aspire to regain the ‘geographical centre of Europe’ by 
(re-)connecting their marginalised home-country via transnational development practices. In a 
similar way, but this time on a more personal level, some participants desire to regain the 
‘centre’ of the transnational space of the migrant community via humanitarian practices. While 
                                                          
132 E.g. the first time the Swiss-national volunteer survey included migrants in its annual survey was in 2012 
(Stadelmann-Steffen 2015). 
133 One third of the migrant participants simultaneously engages in migrant-led development activities and in NGOs 
located in their countries of residence or in Moldova. This points to the earlier discussed specific personality type of 
a highly engaged migrant.  
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living physically isolated in the spatial and material peripheries of European centres, in Paris, 
London or Rome, they aspire to claim a place in the heart of the transnational migrant civil 
society. The participants’ overriding motivation to engage in this type of collective transnational 
development practices is, thus, a ‘performative act of belonging’ (cf. Fortier 2000), or a form of 
‘re-grounding’ to the local or transnational migrant community (cf. Ahmed et al. 2003). That 
being said, the field logics (nomos) of these practices is the quest to belong to the migrants’ 
transnational field. 
 This motive strongly relates to two findings on Moldovan migration in the countries under 
study, discussed in Chapter 5. Firstly, for many Moldovan migrants their primary social 
connections and identifications are the transnational Moldovan community and less the social 
groups in the host-society context. This reflects Snel and his colleagues’ (2006) observation on 
Moroccan and Antillean migrant groups in the Netherlands, who have similar weak labour 
market positions as the Moldovans in Western European countries, and who identify more 
strongly with their country of origin and with their compatriots living elsewhere, than other 
migrant groups with slightly better socio-professional positions in the same country. Secondly, 
the majority of migrants anticipates return migration, which increases their tendency towards 
an engagement in activities reaffirming migrants’ collective identity (e.g. Faist 2010a). Thus, 
migrants’ pronounced ‘transnational ways of being’, for instance their high anticipated onward 
or return mobility, and their ‘transnational ways of belonging’, articulated in their desire to 
belong to the transnational migrant community, are both a prerequisite and simultaneously an 
expression of their ‘ways of doing’ transnational aid practices (cf. Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). 
 Related to this logic of getting engaged in collective development practices is the quest for 
self-positioning and self-affirmation. In the Moldovan cultural context of ‘recommendations’ 
and ‘clientelism’, one's reputation is of outmost importance to pursue professional goals. The 
personality cult in terms of ‘having a name’ also unfolds within the transnational migrant 
community. An engagement in the ‘diaspora’ provides some participants with a space for self-
performance and publicity, which most of them cannot achieve in the host society, because of 
their geographically and socially marginalised positions. The recognition of a personal 
engagement, which requires time and often a financial investment, is undoubtedly a legitimate 
request and important for keeping migrants’ motivations alive; pursuing a model of relentless 
self-promotion, however, is different. Anna explains:  
  
 Anna (translator/writer, 45, Rome): Every charity activity, even the smallest events, make very 
quickly the round in our diaspora and on the internet. Everybody is always extremely keen that 
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the other leaders see the pictures of their events and of the celebrities they invite in the 
Moldovan media.  
 
 This observation also applies to the virtual world. Transnational flows of migrants’ aid do not 
occur in a vacuum, but they require trans-border networks along which to travel. In the 
Moldovan case, I found them strongly present and visible in the virtual world. The observed 
attitude of self-interested online-posturing and the importance of face-to-interface 
relationships, I argue, is further encouraged by the online-communication and PR-hype of the 
Bureau, discussed in Chapter 6. In Goffman’s (1967) terminology, the main function of these 
practices is ‘actions within interaction’ – the possibility to gain through development actions the 
‘centre’ of attention in the migrant space and in the Moldovan media. Thus, it is no surprise that 
migrants whose engagement is guided by staging how they appear online and offline are usually 
presidents and board members of several associations. This allows them to maximise the use of 
associations for shaping their access to social capital within the migrant space or in Moldova134: 
 
 Laura (journalist, 37, Bologna): I often think that the associations are made for the presidents. 
That's why they only do what they want to do. Their associations and development projects are 
micro-businesses for self-publicity and for staying connected to important people in the diaspora 
or back home. They don’t actually care about the projects.  
 
 Needless to say, Lauren’s described leader-type is not able to create trust among other 
chairpersons of associations, and that the presidents of associations painted a more negative 
picture of migrant leaders than non-collectively engaged migrants, with fewer insights into the 
intra-associative social dynamics at play. In their opinion, personal idiosyncrasies, ‘the cult of 
self-positioning’ and parochial loyalties, are good examples that the mentality and practices of 
Moldovans do not much change abroad. Natasha, who collaborates with a French NGO, refers 
to some of these habitual behaviours that govern the associative practices: 
 
 Natasha (shop-assistant, 48, Paris): Our community is like Moldova. There are many bosses and 
very few workers. Everybody wants to be a leader and appear in the media, and nobody wants to 
actually do something. Moldovans can’t get rid of that mentality, not even here. They make the 
same mistakes as back home. I don’t work with Moldovans anymore. It doesn’t get you anywhere. 
 
 I argue that the migrant leaders’ personal characteristics and their interpersonal 
relationships are accentuated by the fact that Moldovan migrant associations are not centralised 
                                                          
  134 This practice is facilitated in France where the creation of an association does not require members.  
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around big associations, as other migrant communities are (cf. Lacroix 2011 on the Polish 
migrant associations in the UK). However, my empirical data also indicates that the 
organisational field is actually less fragmented and fraught with distrust and personal 
animosities, as commonly conveyed in mandated research, and thus must be put in a relative 
perspective (e.g. Cheianu-Andrey 2013). Especially given that personal idiosyncrasies were also 
found among the members of the second research group – the employees of development 
institutions in Moldova.  
 
  7.2.2 Compassion and moral compensation 
 
A third significant category of transnational development practices is shaped by altruistic and 
religious reasons. For instance, migrants’ compassion toward ‘poor people’ in migrants’ 
communities of origin encourages a volunteer development engagement. Moral reasoning also 
plays a significant role in the associative support of recent migrants, often marked by migrants’ 
own past difficult migration experiences. In particular, established migrants assist ‘newcomers’ 
with fewer migration experiences in administrative matters or with ‘moral support’135. 
 
Sandu (factory worker and actor, 42, Paris): Eleven years ago, I arrived with about 20 Euro at the 
Gare du Nord. I know how it feels. I just got a phone call from Chisinau before coming here [the 
interview venue]. Tomorrow, somebody from Moldova will arrive in Paris and needs help, so I will 
help, even if I don’t know the person.  
 
Anna (translator/writer, 45, Rome): We see our cultural activities as a moral support for the 
struggle and hardship many Moldovans face in Italy. We want to brighten their lives, to cheer them 
up, so they can forget about their difficult situations.  
 
Contrary to Werbner’s notion of ‘moral co-responsibility’ (2002) observed among the British-
Pakistani networks, this form of collective solidarity is not related to moral obligations or 
compulsion within the migrant community which reflects badly on migrants or renders them 
liable to social disproval if not carried out. Moldovan migrants’ practices of social collective 
remittances addressed beyond their immediate families and friends are decoupled from any 
                                                          
135 Vice-versa, other migrants do not want to support migrants in need, because they do not want to be reminded of 
their own exceedingly difficult experiences upon their arrival and, therefore, are more likely to support people in 
need in Moldova.  
193 
 
social obligations and are based on personal altruistic or religious motivations in the sense of 
‘we are just people who care’: 
 
Angela (care-worker, 32, Novellara): Lately, I was thinking why do I do that? Why do I spend my 
free afternoons with my friends in front of the Esselunga [supermarket] to organise help for poor 
families back home? And then I came to understand: We, the Moldovans, are Orthodox people, 
so we have this mentality to help. It’s normal. It’s like my personal moral duty to help.  
 
Although my sample is not representative, this form of transnational solidarity practice involves 
more women than men, and more middle-aged migrants in low-skilled jobs than their younger 
counterparts pursing high-skilled jobs136. This observation brings us now to the low-skilled 
migrants, which are generally absent in the overall debate surrounding migrants’ collective 
contributions to development.   
 On the one hand, migration scholars often undermine the engagement of low-skilled 
migrants in civic organisations in a fairly protective way, assuming that in most instances their 
tiring and insecure low-wage jobs and vulnerable life-circumstances do not allow time and 
resources for volunteer engagement137. Or, it could be that their mostly informal nature of 
helping practices organised in loose networks are not framed by the local or national 
associational structural context and thus escape research focusing on the structural opportunity 
contexts of host countries (e.g. Pirkkalainen et al. 2013). On the other hand, the development 
industry has neglected low-skilled migrants for fairly different reasons. Firstly, because these 
migrants are not considered as qualified enough for being an ideal ‘delivery oriented’ partner 
(e.g. IOM and MPI 2012). And secondly, the low-skilled migrants’ development activities 
necessitate less physical mobility than the development performances of the high-skilled 
transmigrant – constantly ‘on the move’ for successful business-oriented projects in 
promotional videos of aid-agencies (see Chapter 6)138. 
  An interesting case of low-skilled migrants’ humanitarian activities is given by a group of 
female care-workers in the Emilia Romagna region, whose volunteer-run humanitarian projects 
revolve around the support of vulnerable families and social institutions in their communities of 
origin. They initiate their small-scale projects without the mediation of formal associations, 
                                                          
136Although my qualitative data do not allow for robust generalisations on the issue of gender relations, I found a 
consistency with patterns of the volunteer sector of most European countries (e.g. Stadelmann-Steffen 2015). With 
the exception of migrants belonging to the core group of transnationally engaged migrant leaders, a clear gender-
division between men, typically engaged in political engagement, and women – more prone to engage in social 
activities, was found.  
137 I am aware that any type of volunteer engagement demands time, resources and energy, and that in many cases 
these are not available due to various reasons, such as abusive work conditions.  
138 E.g. collecting donations or sending material remittances does not require frequent border-crossing.  
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partly because they do not trust the chairmen of the nearby associations. Every Wednesday 
afternoon they meet in front of a supermarket in the district town to chat, exchange books and 
to discuss their humanitarian interventions139. Maria A., a former fulltime teacher explains:  
  
 Maria A. (factory worker and live-in care-worker, 46, Novellara): My engagement for vulnerable 
people gives me strength to resist my hard life here. Yes, my job is hard, but I have more freedom 
than back home where I needed to take care of my children, my parents, neighbours, in-laws [...] 
and of course of my husband [smiles]. Here, I can meet my friends in the evenings, and we discuss 
who is in need back home and how we can help. Last week, we collected money for a funeral of 
the father of a very poor family [...]. But this is not work, because we are all friends and we discuss 
things over a cup of coffee. Back home, I did not even have time to drink coffee.  
 
As Tyldum (2015) maintains in the case of female Ukrainian migrants, “Studies that frame female 
migrants as mothers tend to reproduce a narrative of an act of sacrifice at the cost of 
understanding female migration where women go abroad to improve their own lives. As a result, 
the focus is shifted from the women’s agency and reasons for leaving, to the consequences of 
their absence” (2015: 56). In the example of Maria A. and her colleagues, the women’s agency 
is invested in their informal helping practices, which are an example of their newly gained 
personal space and time opened-up by the migration experience. 
 Interestingly, while low-skilled migrants reported a positive correlation between their 
migration experience and time for collective social engagement, the high-skilled migrants 
pursuing qualified jobs have more difficulties in finding space for volunteering over time140. This 
observation points to the importance of temporality in the social process of migration. In line 
with Vertovec’s observation (2009) that, on a personal level, time spent in the destination 
country, financial stability and educational level are positively related with a transnational 
engagement, the Moldovan migrants’ development efforts vary over time, as they respond to a 
range of life- course, social and economic factors141. The greater stability migrants attain in the 
social fabric of the host-society and in the labour market, the greater their capabilities to engage 
in transnational development practices.  
                                                          
139 Similar observations were made in Geneva, Bologna and Padova. Vice-versa, in bigger cities (e.g. London, Rome) 
low-skilled migrants reported more time restrictions due to longer commutes. 
140 In cases where high-skilled jobs were insecure, time resources were regarded as the biggest challenge for taking 
up a humanitarian engagement (e.g. migrants feel less secure financially and work harder to protect their jobs).  
141 This finding is not specific to migrants, but also applies to the broader volunteer sector in the countries under 
study. Research on volunteerism has found, for instance that, mostly the middle class is involved in volunteer 
engagements and not the most deprived population with less time and financial resources available (e.g. Beck 2011). 
Considering the migrants’ volunteer engagement, this points to the importance of migration-policy frameworks that 
are not tied to a specific development goal (e.g. flexible citizenship laws, residency requirements and labour rights) 
(see Chapter 6). 
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 Maria A. and Dragomir’s migration trajectories illustrate well the importance of temporal 
aspects for migrants’ capability to engage in collective development activities. Both participants 
were undocumented migrants upon their arrival in the destination countries without a 
permanent residency. Maria A. worked as a carer and stayed overnight with her colleagues in a 
Catholic Church in Padova. Dragomir, with no permanent job upon his arrival, resided in a 
disused hangar in the outskirts of Paris. Tellingly, their personal economic hardship upon their 
immediate arrival made a volunteer engagement impossible. Over time, Dragomir and Maria 
A.’s life-conditions changed – for instance their legal status and housing situation – and they 
became engaged in collective humanitarian projects. In fact, they were among the most active 
migrants I encountered. However, because of the unchanged nature of their low-skilled jobs – 
Dragomir still works in construction and Maria A. as care-worker – they remain positioned 
outside the category of the migration–development actors’ target of high-skilled migrants, 
constituting the ‘diaspora–development community’, as discussed in Chapter 6. Subsequently, 
their personal development efforts remain invisible in the migration-development policy 
discourse. Keeping in mind that most Moldovan migrant leaders have experienced de-skilling, I 
argue that in the Moldovan case, the temporality of the social process of migration is more 
significant for migrants’ capabilities and choices to take up a development engagement than the 
dominant dual approach of low-skilled and high-skilled migrants, applied in migration–
development policies.  
 Lastly, though an in-depth elaboration of my findings on the role of the church is beyond the 
remit of this thesis, I would like to briefly stress that the Romanian Orthodox Church is an 
important social actor. The church members provide support for migrants and individuals in 
need in Moldova alike, mostly on a volunteer basis. Migrants turn often to the Romanian 
Orthodox church for assistance in housing, work possibilities, or for legal advice. The members 
of church-led humanitarian associations are highly active in Moldova and their engagement is 
chiefly driven by altruistic and religious motivations. On the other hand, the Russian-Orthodox 
Church concentrates entirely on the provision of religious services and is not involved in 
transnational solidarity towards Moldova142. 
 Religious motives also play a role in the next form of volunteer-run development practices, 
which does not involve a Moldovan counterpart in the classical understanding, and solely 
unfolds in a metaphoric way across time and space. 
                                                          
142 The church is highly politicised in Moldova and in the Moldovan migrant community. The interference of the 
Russian Orthodox Church into political elections in favour of a pro-Russian orientation of the country, for instance, 
caused a loss of popularity among the mostly pro-European oriented Moldovan migrants. 
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Figure 7.2: The church 
 
7.2.2.1 Metaphoric forms of transnational development practices 
   
 Some participants who are engaged in development NGOs and civic groups in their host 
countries – often alongside their engagement in migrant-run activities – view their local 
engagement as a ‘moral compensation’ for having left children or other family members back 
‘home’143. The underlying logic of this category of practice is that “if migrants help ‘here’, their 
families back home are helped, too”. Put differently, the logic of “if I do good here then good 
things come to those who remain back home” points to religious components. In Illa’s words: 
 
                                                          
143 To find out whether development practices generated by migrants’ compensation for their absence is gender- 
specific, in the sense that women feel guiltier for being separated from their families than men, would require a lager 
sample.  
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Illa (care-worker, 36, Novellara): [...] I strongly believe that if I do something good here, like 
my voluntary work as an ambulance driver at the Red Cross, my family back home will receive 
help, too. When I am absent, my daughter and parents need support from our neighbours, 
even for small things, for instance to use their computer. I am convinced that it is more likely 
that they continue to support my family, if I also do good things here.  
 
I propose to conceptualise this type of social engagement as a metaphoric mode of transnational 
practice, because it unfolds in a figurative sense across time and space. The socio-spatial unit of 
migrants’ engagement is fully located in the host society and neither physically nor 
materialistically linked to the home country. Yet, the desired impact of migrants’ engagement is 
‘there’, in Moldova, but without a logical consequence of migrants’ efforts ‘here’. The migrants’ 
reaching out beyond their immediate localised migrant-community through moral 
performances of volunteering is based on pure expectations which might or might not be 
fulfilled.  
 This metaphorically unfolding cross-border practice warrants remarks on two issues that I 
find usually sidelined in the broader migration–development debate. Firstly, migrants’ 
accentuation on the temporal dimension of migration – commonly paraphrased with ‘while we 
are gone’ – marks an individually lived spectrum of migration temporalities. Further, it implicates 
a personal feeling of guilt for being ‘gone’ or ‘absent’ for longer than anticipated. This alludes to 
the need to move towards a more nuanced approach of temporality, that takes better account 
of migrants’ individually experienced time-span of being ‘absent’ – beyond the reduced and 
static duality of temporary versus permanent migration. Secondly, migrants are embedded in 
multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields encompassing both those who move and 
those who do not (Levitt 2007). The relationships between migrants and those who do not move 
can change over time. As shown above, some migrants depend on the ‘goodwill’ and favours 
from their relatives, friends or neighbours ‘back home’. The various types of assistance provided 
by non-migrants  – such as taking care of migrants’ children or parents, might stretch over a long 
period of time. I propose, therefore, to pay more attention in future research to how these 
everyday life relations between migrants and non-migrants can generate specific forms of 
transnational development practices, and how they might influence migrants’ choices to engage 
in a certain type of aid-practice. 
 In summary, cross-border aid-practices performed by low-skilled migrants, who are often 
marginalised in their destination countries, reveal a remarkable local and transnational solidarity 
for their co-citizens and vulnerable individuals in Moldova. Their forms of solidarity, chiefly 
driven by altruistic motivations, enact like a transnational civil society in migrants’ micro-space 
of everyday life, rather than on some putative national or global stage. I personally think that 
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the development efforts of these migrants – enfolded in their exhausting everyday life – merit 
more research and policy attention.  
 
7.2.3 Transnational development practices and anticipated return migration 
 
After the exploration of development practices that emanate from migrants’ past and present 
migration experiences, I now address three interrelated categories of collective practices that 
emerged from migrants’ desire to return to Moldova. Migrants’ anticipated return as the 
underpinning motivation of these practices points to interlinkages between two habitually 
distinct subjects in the migration literature: anticipated return migration and transnational 
collective development practices.  
 
7.2.3.1 Re-establishing personal support-networks in prospect of return 
 
Firstly, the ‘culture of recommendation’ discussed earlier – the high importance of social ties for 
finding new employment in Moldova – is one reason why many Moldovans prefer to stay in 
Moldova, instead of migrating. In a similar way, the present category of practices emerges from 
migrants' concerns that they might lose their social positions in Moldova, because they are 
absent for long periods of time and unable to participate in important socio-cultural events (cf. 
Dannecker 2009). Because participants’ life-goal orientations upon their return were narrated 
rather vaguely, I propose to conceptualise this development practice as a ‘general making up of 
the loss of migrants’ social position and status in Moldova’. In this context, development projects 
initiated abroad serve migrants as a platform for gaining or re-establishing personal contacts to 
various important local drivers in Moldova (e.g. with political and administrative office-holders) 
for generating economic investments or career opportunities in prospect of return. 
 Rosa’s humanitarian engagement is a good example how migrants aspire to (re)build 
personal support networks via development efforts. She holds an MBA in business management 
from the USA and is the president of an active London-based migrant association that regularly 
implements development projects in Moldova. One of the association’s currently running 
projects is a food-festival in a suburb of Chisinau promoting a healthy life-style, in which Angela 
is her main partner. While Rosa provided me in London with a highly professional account of 
their project implementation, Angela presented another picture. When we were discussing 
Rosa’s implementation plan in Chisinau, Angela expressed her frustration over its 
‘unprofessionalism’. Indeed, a closer look at the project disclosed interesting patterns of 
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transnational aid-practices heavily inscribed in Rosa’s return scenario – a concealment of her 
self-interest in the development transaction, rather than a logic operational strategy.  
 
Angela (project manager for NGOs, 52, Chisinau): Her approach doesn’t make sense at all. Look, 
I am supposed to buy these things here, in this village, and that thing there, in another village. 
But these villages are far away from each other, and it goes on like this. Even here [in Chisinau] 
she wants me to print out the flyers at this place, and the T-Shirts at the other end of town, and 
that is definitively not professional. I think Rosa just wants people to remember her, because she 
wants to come back [...]. I will not follow her plan, because I have other things to do, and at end 
of the day - like last year, they will show her, and only her on TV.  
 
No doubt, Rosa wants to be remembered in the localities of her development intervention for 
her future career plan in Moldova, which is to work on ‘projects and other things’ during 
extended visits in Moldova once or twice a year for about three months. Her development 
engagement is a way to prepare her temporary return and to create a presence in Moldova 
while still being physically absent. This transnational case study shows that migrants’ 
arrangements for their temporary or permanent return to Moldova can become the field logics 
within the transnational space of migrants’ development engagement (nomos). This observation 
has implications for the development industry’s expectations on migrants’ collective 
behavioural practices, and for the relationship dynamics between migrants and their non-
migrant counterparts in Moldova, as we will see shortly. 
 
7.2.3.2 Humanitarian projects as a stepping-stone for future self-employment 
 
Secondly, some migrants use their development project as a stepping-stone for a future self-
employment upon their return. The underling function of this practice is to overcome 
discrepancies between migrants’ competences and social position in the host countries and 
strongly relates to the phenomenon of de-skilling (see Chapter 5). Like development practices 
guided by migrants’ professional skills, humanitarian inventions in this context are an 
opportunity to quit a low-skilled job abroad for a more fulfilling professional activity back in 
Moldova.  
 Ion initiated with his association a community development project in Estonia which he now 
intends to implement as a freelancer in two districts of Chisinau. For this reason, he makes 
regular short-term visits to Chisinau to meet local political drivers. On one of his visits he 
explained to me:  
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Ion (barman, 29, Tallinn): Yesterday, I had a meeting with the local authorities, and I showed them 
how such projects work in Estonia. They are interested, but I still need to do a lot of networking. 
But if everything goes well, I will come back for some time, or even for good, and try to make a 
living from the project. 
 
Ion seeks proximity via his humanitarian engagement to create a new viable livelihood in 
Moldova with potentially greater self-realisation. His civic engagement reflects de Certeau’s 
(1984) notion of ‘tactics’, which social actors use in a context of unequal social interaction to 
maintain levels of personal and social autonomy over social resources or meanings of action. 
This interpretation also fits neatly with the international migration–development debate and its 
‘key-migrant’, who makes rational choices in response to specific motivations – such as business 
interests (see Chapter 2). Vice-versa, this type of practice is highly disapproved of as being too 
‘business-oriented’ by migrants whose humanitarian interventions are driven by altruism, as we 
will see below. 
 
7.2.3.3 Addressing gaps in temporary return and employment programmes 
 
Thirdly, migrants with different professional backgrounds expressed high interest in temporary 
return employment schemes, which would allow them to return to Moldova for a period of 1-4 
months a year. So far, such temporary return and employment programmes, implemented by 
international donor agencies, exclusively address the small number of ‘elite’ movers, chiefly 
academics or entrepreneurs pursuing high-skilled jobs abroad (e.g. ASM 2009; CIM/GIZ 2012)144. 
To this end, participants who do not fit into this target group aspire to create their own, 
individually shaped temporary employment schemes through their abroad-initiated 
humanitarian projects. Natasha, president of an association that supports a local hospital 
narrated: 
 
Natasha (shop-assistant, 48, Paris): It would be really helpful to have more possibilities to return 
for a short period of time – let’s say for two or three months a year, and to get paid for our 
projects. I was lucky to receive financial support by a foundation for the hospital project last year, 
which allowed me to return for two months and to work fulltime on the project. I was not feeling 
well then, because I lost my job in Paris, and the project work in Moldova was good for me. I am 
                                                          
144 I am referring to temporary employment programmes, which co-finance a salary or an investment grant for a 
certain period of time (e.g. temporary return of representatives of Moldovan scientific diaspora, IOM 2012b). I am 
not referring to ‘voluntary’ return programmes aiming at migrants’ permanent return, and which are often ‘imposed’ 
upon migrants, rather than related to migrants’ actual wishes to return (e.g. other IOM programmes). 
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sure that other migrants would be interested to return for some time and to do different social 
activities if they had the chance.  
 
By and at large, many migrants perceived the restricted offer of temporary return schemes as 
an expression of a general lack of the Moldovan authorities’ response to migrants’ needs and 
individual migration plans. This calls for policy recommendations. Firstly, considering the 
estimates of both research groups that circular migration will increase with the new free travel 
treaties of 2014, due to fewer obstacles to mobility for Moldovans to EU countries, I see a need 
to create more adequate policies addressing circular migrants, beyond the target of high-skilled 
migrants. Secondly, a greater support and enrolment of migrant associations’ humanitarian 
projects in these programmes could be more beneficial for migrants and Moldova than the 
common practice of aid-actors, consisting of creating employment positions in Moldova with 
predefined candidate profiles. These, I argue, are often determined in a rather artificial way with 
questionable benefits for the wider society and the migrants alike (e.g. IOM 2012b; Varzari et al. 
2014). 
 In conclusion to this second section, migrants’ decisions to engage in transnational aid-
practices are multi-faceted and overlapping, ranging from communal belonging to the migrant 
space, to altruistic motivations, and to social-status maintenance ‘here’ and ‘there’. Collective 
aid-practices have different functions and purposes for migrants, which are influenced by 
changes in migrants’ social experiences – their daily cultural practices and the meanings 
attributed to such. Consequently, migrants’ motives to engage in development practices may 
also change over time, for instance from altruistic motivations to arrangements for return 
migration. The latter motivation shows that transnationally engaged Moldovan migrants do not 
necessarily follow a migration strategy of ‘long-term residence’, as observed in the majority of 
other studies on the subject (e.g. Düvell and Vogel 2006). 
 Lastly, migrants’ individual migration experiences can generate a wide range of transnational 
development performances, which do not all easily fit into the values and logic of the 
development establishment. This invites us to revisit one of the core assumptions underpinning 
migrant association-led development policies, namely that migrants’ newly gained knowledge, 
ideas and experiences abroad automatically lead to a ‘behavioural’ change in migrants' practices 
(e.g. Orozco and Rouse 2007). The assumption of the ‘homeland dissimilation’ (Fitzgerald 2012: 
1733) – in this case the process of groups and individuals becoming more ‘democratic’ or 
‘professional’ than those whom they left behind – is not necessarily applied in migrants’ 
collective practices to advance development in migrants' home countries. In some cases where 
the functions of migrants’ practices are, for instance, a quest for self-publicity in the migrant 
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space or a preparation for return, it is in the migrants’ best interests not to use their newly-
gained skills, because it could work against their personal interests. Thus, despite the finding 
that some migrants remoulded their development practices abroad, the claim that migrants 
stimulate the development of their home-countries by their contribution of ‘social remittances’ 
is not always a given (cf. Levitt 1998). Subsequently, migrants’ social practices might not always 
lead to the expected positive change in Moldova, as proclaimed in the policy discourse.  
Figure 7.3. Migrants’ collective development interventions 
 
7.3. “We Want to Keep It Human”: Migrants’ Understanding of Development Practices in 
Relation to Mainstream Aid-Giving 
 
This section sets the scene for the last empirical chapter – the exploration of aid-relationship 
dynamics between migrants and development actors in joint project settings. Meanwhile, here 
and now I discuss migrants’ perspectives on the aid-industry and on its mainstream aid-
practices, by focusing on migrants’ self-reflections on their development practices in relation to 
the development establishment’s ‘ways of doing development’.  
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7.3.1 Migrants’ perception of mainstream development practices 
 
7.3.1.1 The positive portrait of the aid-industry  
 
The migrants rarely mentioned aid-agencies as important players for Moldova’s future 
development, despite the fact that numerous development institutions try to advance the 
country’s transformation (see Chapter 4). This is surprising, because most migrants have a 
positive attitude towards foreign aid investments in Moldova145. Projects aiming to improve the 
living conditions of people in villages, for instance, were particularly positively received. 
Migrants also highlighted that any kind of improvements in the living conditions of Moldovans 
are always achieved with the support of international development institutions. Moreover, the 
activities of the donor community were also frequently commented on in migrants’ online-
discussion forums and social network websites. On a Facebook discussion group operated by a 
Geneva-based migrant association, for instance, the engagement of a Western European 
volunteer NGO in a Moldovan village received extremely positive resonance and was praised as 
a role model for the remaining local population146: 
 
 Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): It is very good to see how people come to our villages to help. 
It's good that they don’t only go to Africa, because we have very poor families and children, too. 
Some of these children are unhealthy, because they don’t have running water at home, and they 
work in the fields without shoes [...]. I saw that one foreign NGO created a health centre for them. 
Our association helped to renovate the school in the same village. But a big project like the health 
centre is too expensive for us, so we are very happy that foreign NGOs help.  
 
 The participants not only welcome international development projects, but they also closely 
follow their implementation, especially those carried out in their home towns and communities 
where their families live. Maria B. describes how the members of a network of care-workers 
follow the activities of aid-agencies: 
 
 Maria B. (live-in care-worker, 52, Novellara): If there is something good and new in our village, it 
is always done with foreign aid. For instance, in our village, we didn’t have light. So, this NGO 
installed street lights, and they constructed a bus station, so people don’t need to wait under the 
tree anymore when it's raining. There are pictures on the internet, and we follow these activities 
                                                          
 145 Presumably this is related to the dominance of migrants’ statements on the government’s default in its political 
commitments of positive change (see Chapter 4). 
146 From http://play.md/256837 [last accessed March 2016]. 
 
204 
 
together, when we have a couple of hours off, usually on Sunday afternoons at my place, because 
not all of us have internet access.  
 
7.3.1.2 The negative stances towards ‘professional’ aid-practices  
 
Migrants’ appreciation of the development industry’s valuable investments in Moldova does not 
necessarily mean that they also endorse the latter’s development practices. Similar to the 
finding that migrants’ development visions of Moldova can hold opposite views from those of 
the official aid industry, discussed in Chapter 4, migrants’ approaches to aid-practices differ from 
the ones performed by the development establishment. In fact, many migrant leaders expressed 
a rather negative stance towards mainstream development mechanisms and questioned the 
development establishment’s contemporary practices. They portrayed the ‘development set’ as 
being too bright and noble, highlighting that aid workers travel too much, use ‘posh’ words and 
spend the funds on fancy hotels, instead of on people in need. Consequently, these migrants 
clearly distance themselves from the help industry and its ‘professional’ practices: 
 
Anastasia (tour guide and translator, 46, Berlin): In Chisinau, you see the development people 
driving around in their expensive jeeps. That’s what they call charity. That's not what we do. We 
don't do charity. I don’t even like the word charity. We do real things, the most natural things, we 
help the poor and vulnerable. It’s more, ehm, solidarity.  
  
 Vasile (IT engineer, 48, London): I don’t believe in charity, and I don’t believe in charities as 
organisations. I don’t believe in any organisation that spends money without producing 
something and that lives only from donations. I have a Moldovan friend here in London who 
works for an international NGO and she is always flying. Absolutely, always! She is in Geneva and 
Bangkok, and in this and that fancy hotel. She is working for a charity! I don’t believe in all of this! 
Don’t these people know how to do online-media conferences? 
 
 In addition, the majority of the migrants think that too much donor funding is allocated to 
overarching political structures where it disappears into the pockets of corrupt government 
officials – a system of which they don’t want to be part of. The criticism that the donor 
community too strongly focuses on structural support echoes migrants’ general disappointment 
about the absence of funding for their own associative activities, which they expected to receive 
from the newly-created state-support structures (see Chapter 6): 
 
 Oleg (project-coordinator, 44, Padova): A lot of charity money goes into the overall structures like 
the ministries, and only a small amount reaches the beneficiaries – the vulnerable people in the 
villages. That’s why our human solidarity, the grassroots level, which actually reaches the 
individuals in need, is so important to us, and should receive more share of all this foreign aid.  
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As we see from the quotes above, some participants associate the concept of 'charity' with the 
development industry’s practices, while their own practices are regarded as ‘solidarity’. Most 
migrant leaders interpreted in a rather limited way 'charity practices' performed by 
development actors as top-down structural support, while the main function of their ‘solidarity 
practices’ lays in a bottom-up approach of aid-provision. Thus, one of the main issues that 
emerged as crucial in terms of migrants’ dissociation from mainstream development practices 
are the migrants’ self-reflections on their development interventions as ‘doing real things’, 
understood as 'people-to-people solidarity’ as opposed to doing ‘charity’. 
 Additionally, some of the migrant leaders do not agree with the contemporary practice of 
‘professional charity’ because of their ‘professional’ nature. Professionally run practices do not 
fit into the migrants’ understanding of ‘loyalty’ towards Moldova as ‘coming from the migrants’ 
hearts’, or as an engagement that should be ‘kept human’. In particular migrants whose main 
motivation for humanitarian interventions is driven by altruism are reluctant towards 
professionally-run organisations, be it development organisations or migrant associations. And 
they do not aspire to a developing professionalisation of their own associations; instead they 
wish to keep their collective activities voluntary-run. In Vasile’s and Ion’s words:  
 
Vasile (IT-engineer, 45, London): My interest in projects and charity activities for beneficiaries in 
Moldova is a personal interest. I am myself interested in the Moldovan community here, that’s 
why it is a personal interest. There are people who do it professionally, and they get grants. I 
don’t believe in this kind of people, because they are not genuinely interested in the migrant 
community or the beneficiaries in Moldova. They just want to earn money. 
 
Ion (translator, 34, Paris): I don’t want our association to become professional, because it would 
mean that I would do my activities just for money.  
 
These quotes reflect the opinion of migrant leaders who see the development professionals or 
the migrants as solely pursuing their self-interests by earning their living with development 
interventions, or by operating according to the modus operandi of ‘seen and being seen’, which 
is not considered as a genuine interest in the development cause. Like other non-migrant 
alternative development NGOs, they aim to pursue their associative activities as independent 
NGOs outside the official development field. This finding shows that migrants’ debate 
surrounding professionally-run activities is a concise example of struggles within the migrant 
space over a shared understanding of their ‘right transnational development practices’, similar 
to the earlier mentioned cultural practices, which are contested in migrants’ understanding of 
their ‘diaspora’ as a community of practice. 
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 Furthermore, migrants’ transnational charity engagement is mostly built on personal and 
close relationships, such as neighbourhood relations or kinship within the migrant space. The 
fact that personal contacts ensure a degree of trust is another significant reason why some 
migrants do not aspire to partnerships with mainstream development institutions. Diana, whose 
association helps to improve the roads in a Moldovan village, narrates: 
Diana (care-worker, 45, Paris): In Moldova, you need to have strict control over the money you 
send, otherwise you will never see any results. Because we only trust people we already know, 
we only cooperate with people we know. I don’t know any aid-workers, but I know the mayor of 
the village for years, and that’s why we work with him and not with the foreign NGOs in the 
village.  
 
In a positive light, the migrants’ local counterparts are mostly considered trustworthy. For that 
reason, the expectation of the development industry that through migrants’ personal contacts 
their support is more likely reach the beneficiaries than formal development organisations, got 
somewhat confirmed (e.g. Mazzucato and Kabki 2009 on this issue). On a more negative note, 
migrants’ strong emphasis on personal contacts as a guarantor of trust and quality means that 
they are less eager to team up with ‘unknown’ aid-workers. Other key criteria of development 
policy – such as the consistency of migrants’ projects with national development strategies – are 
irrelevant for these migrants (e.g. EU 2013b). 
 In sum, the practices and projects, imaginary or real, of these migrants demonstrate strong 
similarities among the group of migrants of the first Moldovan migration wave, in contrast to 
the migrants of the second Moldovan migration wave, who expressed more interest in 
integrating their activities into the transnational field of aidland. Possibly, this is due to the fact 
that they have more trust in institutions back ‘home’ than the migrants of the first migration 
wave who left Moldova around the Russian financial crisis in 1998, when Moldova hit rock 
bottom (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, migrants’ belonging to the second wave might have fewer 
personal ties to Moldovan villages and vulnerable people in need, and they do not share the 
same sense of obligation and identification towards the origin community as the first group of 
migrants. I therefore conclude that in the Moldovan case, migrants’ belonging to either the first 
or second Moldovan migration wave significantly influences their propensity to team-up with 
mainstream development organisations. It will be interesting to closely follow if recent migrants 
will shift the strong emphasis on the aspect of ‘personal trust’ towards a more thematic focus 
of interventions according to the preferences of development policy. 
 
7.3.2. “I am bored of pure idealism”: migrants’ development interventions as self-help practices 
207 
 
 
In this sub-section I briefly summarise narratives surrounding objects of aid. I explore migrant 
leaders’ struggles over definitions of the ‘collective productive use’ of material, social and 
economic remittances by taking into account the diverse motives of migrants to get involved in 
development-shaped engagements, explored in section 2.  
 Firstly, migrants reported that the practice of sending material goods to partner institutions, 
such as medicine or toys, is often complicated. Obstacles encountered included above all, the 
actual journey of the goods themselves, which is often hampered by bureaucratic hurdles (e.g. 
restrictive border controls and legal import restrictions) 147. Secondly, besides their immediate 
local NGO counterparts in Moldova, experiences of migrants with the recipients of objects of aid 
back home were often negative. Migrants criticised the passive attitude of ‘aid consumption’ by 
locals, and they illustrated misuse of sent goods. An often-mentioned example in this regard was 
that clothes, books or toys were resold by villagers for their own financial benefits. For this 
reason, some migrants no longer trust the inhabitants of rural communities who have become 
in their opinion jealous and greedy due to poverty. This echoes migrants’ perceptions of 
deteriorating values among Moldovans and their estimate of a general degrading social situation 
in their home country, discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Vitali (priest, 48, Paris): The problem is not our partner organisation but the wider society. 
Whatever is being sent to Moldova is misused. That’s why we don’t send things directly back to 
the communities anymore. It’s not ending up in the right hands. I think we should enhance more 
business relationships with Moldova. This would benefit Moldovans much more than sending 
second-hand clothes and charity stuff to Moldova.  
 
Because of these negative experiences, some participants prefer to carry out object and project-
bound development practices according to the principle of ‘help for self-help’. Diana and Sandra 
explain their conceptions of ‘helping people help themselves’.  
 
Diana (care-worker, 45, Paris): I always think it is nicer to make people realise what they can 
achieve from their own efforts. For example, in our project children develop their creativity. This 
is a form of aid that I am very passionate about, because I strongly believe that it should come 
from both parts, reciprocally. You know, with so many aid institutions working in the country and 
so many relatives abroad, I see somehow a risk that people start to think that they don’t need to 
do anything anymore. This also has to do with our migrant associations who just dump their 
second-hand clothes and toys in Moldova, assuming that they make children happy like this. 
 
                                                          
148 One UK-based migrant association and a London NGO are currently lobbying for the improvement of customs 
politics (e.g. facilitating the import of collected material goods, such as soft toys).  
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Sandra (factory worker and artist, 55, Munich): I am bored of pure idealism – of the idea to just 
give. People should be helped, yes. But they also should do something in return, like they do in 
our micro-credit projects. 
 
The same participants who encountered an attitude of ‘aid consumption’ in Moldova reported 
similar experience in the migrant community. In this context, 'the passive Moldovan mentality' 
is considered as negatively influencing their humanitarian efforts performed in the host 
countries: 
 
Dana (social worker, 46, Rome): I want them [the migrants] to stop thinking that somebody will 
organise everything for them. I want people to do it themselves: To participate or to do it 
together! Our association is like a framework. Other migrants don’t need to create new 
associations or a new website, if they want to do a development project. It’s all there. But they 
need to learn how to use these opportunities, rather than somebody else doing things for them, 
which is typical for Moldovans.  
 
Vice-versa, some migrant leaders reported that beneficiaries in Moldova were not used to 
receive something for nothing, and that partner organisations and beneficiaries have often 
found it difficult to accept aid. The reluctance of some Moldovan counterparts to accept aid was 
commonly narrated as a result of a historically embedded distrust towards free services. This 
refers back to the Moldovan social character of having been exploited in history by different 
players, highlighted in Chapter 4: 
 
Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): We wanted to build a playground for kids in a village because 
they stay at home in front of their TVs all the time. But no one supported our initiative at the 
beginning. The mayor was very suspicious and didn't except any gift, because he was afraid that 
we want something in return, as it was always the case in the past.  
 
 A last significant aspect is that migrants have often different or even antagonistic motivations 
to engage in transnational development than their Moldovan counterparts. A shared 
underlining function of a performed development practice was mostly missing in joint 
development settings. For instance, migrants’ altruistic and religious motivations are certainly a 
noble cause, and helping others in need is admirable, but it can be problematic in relationship 
dynamics with non-migrant counterparts. Larissa, for example, who implements a migrant 
association-led project in Moldova told me that she cannot afford to be a ‘do-gooder’ like her 
project partner in Germany:  
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Larissa (state agricultural minister, 56, Cantemir): A. always wants me to do things for almost free. 
But some time ago, I told her very clearly that I don't have a German husband like her. It's a luxury 
to do things for almost free in this country. I need to survive with two jobs and little spare time. 
So, I told her that I need more funding than just the coverage of the admin costs.  
 
 
Larissa’s reference to altruistic motivations being an unaffordable luxury in Moldova points to 
uneven socio-economic conditions and time-resources, which can arise between migrants and 
their non-migrant counterparts back ‘home’ in border-crossing development practices (e.g. 
Lampert 2014). In most of the cases, Moldovan migrants have more time and resources available 
than their counterparts, despite their time-consuming jobs abroad. This can create an imbalance 
between migrants’ altruistic motivations and the counterparts’ needs for financial 
compensation of their time and effort148.  
 To round off this last section, many migrant leaders do not want to become integrated into 
the field of professional development, because they have negative stances towards professional 
organisations. Moreover, some migrants’ definition of their own development interventions as 
an act of solidarity at distance – ‘from people to people’, according to the principle of ‘help for 
self-help’ – is perceived as the opposite practice to top-down official ‘professional charity 
practices’. That being said, the most pronounced struggles within the migrant space over shared 
commitments to the value of their transnational development practices and with regard to the 
professional development community are relational aspects of the binaries: ‘official’ and 
‘unofficial’ aid practices, and ‘professional’ practices versus ‘volunteer’ intentions. As we will see 
in the next chapter, due to the fact that migrant associations are predominantly viewed as 
‘formal’ development players in international migration-development-led programmes, the aid-
workers in charge of migrant association-led programmes are mostly unaware of their negative 
image attributed by migrants and of their diverging ideas about development practices 
(e.g.CIM/GIZ 2012). Also, I find the fact that some development-oriented migrant associations 
simply do not want to be part of the development industry – neither as volunteer associations 
nor as professional actors – as well as the fact that not all of them want to become professionally 
organised is somewhat tabooed in the broader migration–development debate.  
 
 
 
                                                          
148 The reverse scenario also occurred, as we saw in the example of Angela and Rosa’s project, in which the migrants’ 
counterparts disregarded migrants’ intentions of self-seeking interests via development efforts, while they stay out 
of the spotlight.  
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7.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter discussed Moldovan migrants’ manifold aspirations and motivations to engage in 
chiefly voluntary development practices.  
 In section one, I explored migrants’ community building as a social practice, emphasising the 
importance of the ‘everyday’ in understanding social life (Bourdieu 1985; Lave and Wenger 
1991). The main findings here can be summarised as follows: 
Migrants have different understandings of what exactly a ‘diaspora’ is, and on whether they 
should label themselves with the contested term ‘diaspora’ at all. The majority of migrant leaders 
view the state of Moldovan migrant civil society as still rather weak, due to considerable inward-
oriented efforts to create a common Moldovan migrant identity. The social process of building 
up a community of collective practice is itself considered as an important constraint for migrants’ 
desired development engagement at distance, alongside Moldova’s deficient infrastructure and 
the lack of structural support from the Moldovan authorities. Migrants’ definition of a ‘Moldovan 
development diaspora’, based on the analytical template of the migration–development 
approach, is perceived as ‘in-the-making’ or at a ‘crossroad’. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
perception of the development industry that views the ‘Moldovan diaspora’ as an already 
transformed ‘diaspora–development community’, set to be integrated into national 
development strategies. Thus, not only is Moldova ‘in transition’ but the Moldovan ‘diaspora’, 
too. And there exists not only a dynamic process of building up institutional structures to engage 
with migrants for development in Moldova, but also a lively process of defining within the 
migrant community shared commitments to the value of migrants’ common collective practices, 
including struggles over ways of how to engage with Moldova. 
 In the second section, I discussed migrants’ collective aid-practices as transnational social 
practices. I focused on the complex array of determinants operating across different social, 
spatial and temporal scales. Summing up the findings of section two:  
Migration processes not only reconstruct migrants’ development visions and ideas of Moldova, 
but they also shape development practices in a dynamic way. Migrants’ collective practices of 
social remittances emerge from a complex interplay of mostly understudied past, present and 
anticipated migration experiences, such as migrants’ rather weak socio-cultural integration in 
the host societies or their anticipated return migration. Aid practices are, thus, framed by both 
Moldova’s socialist past and new post-socialist realities – such as the country’s marginal place 
within Europe, and migration experiences, be they temporary or permanent.  
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 Furthermore, by stressing how the relational nature of how ‘here’ and ‘there’ are linked, my 
findings shed light on a variety of transnational development practices, including forms which 
have escaped the attention of the development industry and research – such as types of collective 
aid-giving performed by low-skilled migrants based on feelings of guilt for being ‘absent’. 
 By all, it was found that migrants’ transnational development practices are a complex of 
understandings, commitments and competences with different purposes and functions. These 
include moral satisfaction, self-esteem, personal development, social interactions and self-
interest in terms of gaining different types of capital in different socio-spatial contexts.  
This finding confirms Ward’s (2004: 21) interpretation of Bourdieu’s theory of practice: 
"Practices can account for aspects of everyday life and the conduct of a full range of activities 
and can delineate activity as a coordinated entity which is temporally unfolding and spatially 
dispersed".  
Therefore, individual experiences of migrants can generate a wide range of transnational 
development performances which do not necessarily fit into the values and logic of the 
specialised transnational field of the development industry.  
The core assumptions underpinning migrant association-led development policies, which are 
that migrants’ newly gained knowledge, ideas and experiences abroad are naturally displayed in 
migrants’ transnationally spanning development practices, thus need to be reconsidered (e.g. 
Orozco and Rouse 2007). 
As shown, in cases where collective practices are closely linked to migrants’ self-interests or 
multi-sited everyday life, for instance to their belonging to the transnational migrant community 
or to a preparation for return migration, their ways of doing collective development might not 
change much.  
This observation has implications for Moldova and its development partners’ intentions to 
integrate migrants’ development efforts into home-land development, as the creation of a 
transnationally active Moldovan community might prove more difficult than expected.  
 Because migrants’ lives and multi-sited identities are fluid and in constant transformation, 
individual functions of collective practices can also change over time, for instance from an 
altruistic motivation to arrangements for future return migration. Thus, migrants’ development 
practices are not a straightforward process, because the norms and values on which they are 
based on can be themselves subject to change and local adaptation in migrants’ everyday lives, 
embedded in changing interaction processes between various actors. They are a combination of 
individual qualities and processes influenced by situational human agency. The fact that 
migrants’ situation abroad might evolve over time, alludes to the need for a more sophisticated 
insight into the nexus between different temporalities of Moldovans’ migration and collective 
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practices of social remittances. Given that many Moldovan migrant leaders experienced de-
skilling abroad, I argue that migrants’ life-situations, for instance their legal stability as well as 
their personal characteristics and biographical aspects, are more significant for migrants to take 
up a development engagement than the common dichotomy of high-skilled versus low-skilled 
migrants. 
That being said, it is time to better account for the temporal dynamics of cross-border 
development practices in the Moldovan migration–development discourse. 
 In section three, we saw that different understandings of aid-practices exist between migrant 
leaders and mainstream development actors; for instance, between migrants’ self-reflections on 
their practices as ‘bottom-up solidarity’ and the ‘top-down professional charity practices’ 
performed by aid-agencies. I showed that migrants are generally rather reluctant towards 
professional development efforts. Consequently, they do not want to be associated with 
mainstream aid-practices nor do they aspire to integrate their development efforts into the aid-
establishment. Thus, some of the migrants’ understanding of their volunteer-run development 
practices based on the value of ‘solidarity’, do not per se easily fit into the ‘formal’ professional 
field of ‘charity’.  
 A second important aspect impacting upon migrants’ integration into formal development is 
the distinction I made between migrants belonging to the first wave of Moldovan migration and 
those belonging to the second wave, as they have different degrees of trust towards institutions 
‘back home’.  
Hence, alongside temporal aspects, more attention should be paid to the time point of migrants’ 
departure, which can impact upon Moldovan migrants’ aspiration to integrate their 
humanitarian projects into the professional development field.  
 And last of all, I explored some of the complexities of transnational co-operation patterns 
between migrants and their non-migrant counterparts.  
I showed that migrants’ underlying motivations to engage in transnational development projects 
can be antagonistic to those of their Moldovan counterparts – for instance migrants’ 
entrepreneurial-minded motivations can contradict their counterparts’ practices driven by 
altruism, which negatively impacts upon aid-relationship dynamics.  
 In sum, the results obtained in this chapter reflect the importance of the fact that migrants’ 
collective space of development practices towards Moldova is socially constituted by relational 
positions of all actors involved; migrants, non-migrants and development players (cf. Bourdieu 
1985).  
Thus, I see a need to move towards a more nuanced approach of migrants’ understandings of 
home-country development contributions and their propensity to team up with development 
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actors that also entails social-relational dynamics. For this reason, I propose to move beyond the 
dominant dichotomies of low-skilled and high-skilled migrants, temporary and permanent 
migrants, and the socio-political orientation of migrants either eastwards or westwards, as 
commonly postulated in policy documents and in the academic literature on the Moldovan 
migration–development nexus (e.g. IOM and MPI 2012: 132). 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Discomfort: Aid-Relationship Dynamics between Migrants and Development 
Actors 
 
This last empirical chapter debates the second and third dimension of my overall research 
rationale: how different interests and objectives are negotiated and performed between 
migrants and development agencies in practice. It aims to ‘capture’ the social processes of 
involving migrants as partners in formal development as well as processes of acceptance and 
exclusion of migrants’ collective development efforts ‘in the centre’ of the professional 
development field.  
 The chapter isstructured as follows. I first discuss the viewpoint of the aid-workers on migrant 
associations as agents of change. Their absent views – most studies mention aid-workers only 
en passant – present the basis for my analysis of the micro-relationships between migrants and 
development professionals in joint co-operations. Further, despite the development policy 
rhetoric of positive synergies between the migrants and the development establishment, I 
demonstrate how double standards apply for migrants in aidland. In section two, I engage with 
current mainstream aid-practices and struggles over the ‘right practices’ within the 
development field. I examine how the current conventional delivery-oriented and results-based 
practices shape the aid-workers’ relationships with migrants, and how they compromise the 
relationship building with migrants. Consistent with my conceptualisation of ‘diaspora’ as a 
social practice in Chapter 7, I draw on Bourdieu’s field theory to better understand the internal 
logic of interpretations, negotiations and performances around the involvement of migrants’ 
humanitarian engagement within the social field of development (1985; 1990). I emphasis ways 
in which social relationships between migrants and development actors are structured by power 
and agency. I also draw on Levitt and Glick Schiller’s definition of a transnational social field 
"[...]as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, 
practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed" (2004: 605). 
 In the remaining section, I discuss my findings on the smallest element of transnational social 
formations – the interaction patterns between the two social agents, the migrants and 
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development actors, in joint development settings. Given that paradoxically the micro-
relationship between migrant organisations and international development actors, who 
commission and publish most of the migration–development studies, has fallen short, I assess 
in more detail their mutual relations in development projects149. 
 
8.1 The Pure Versus the Selfish Altruists: Double Standards in Aidland 
 
8.1.1 The positive view of aid-workers on migrants’ humanitarian interventions 
 
In this first subsection, I address how the second research group, the aid-practitioners and civil 
servants working in the headquarters of development agencies and government ministries, 
portray migrants as their partners for positive change. To begin with, I find it crucial to illustrate 
that the discomfort of aid-workers with Moldova’s mass emigration, discussed in Chapter 4, is 
also strongly present in their day-to-day development practice:  
Martin (programme manager, 55, Berne): My colleagues of the Moldova country programme are 
uncomfortable with the topic of migration. They always tell me: please don’t turn my project into 
a migration programme! They had gender mainstreaming, the conflict-sensitive approach, and 
now migration mainstreaming. It’s like they have to wear several glasses one on top of the other, 
to a point where they go blind and become frustrated.  
 
Marco (programme manager, 55, Brussels): In Moldova migration has an impact on every sector, 
and that’s the way it should be an integral part of development thinking. But there is still a long 
way to go before the topic is present in all aspects of transformation. The problem is that our 
colleagues in Moldova are discouraged by the complexity of migration, and they are somewhat 
at unease with it. Because we still don’t know how to deal with it. For example: is migration 
positive or negative? Basically, we are still trying to find good indicators in our work.  
 
 The same malaise in how to deal with migration in daily development practice applies to 
migrant associations, as we shall see later in this chapter. But first, I address the development 
practitioners’ viewpoints on the positive aspects of collaborating with Moldovan migrants. 
These can be divided into two main domains.  
 The first pattern of aid-giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations. As 
Morrissey reminds us: "Aid works in good policy environments and good policy is a prerequisite 
for aid to be effective" (2000: 371). Due to this inner logic of the development industry, external 
                                                          
149 Despite their references in the titles, development manuals and handbooks seldom directly address the practical 
aspects of migrant–development actor relationships (e.g. ‘Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in 
Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries’, IOM and MPI 2012).  
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aid actors do not or very rarely intervene in Transnistria and in the semi-autonomous territory 
of Gagauzia. Both territories are considered difficult operating environments for international 
aid-organisations, because of their fragile and corrupt political structures150 (USAID 2013). 
Instead, they focus their activities on the already better-off and more favourable centre of 
Moldova, and thereby somewhat exacerbate structural gaps (see Chapter 4). Even if migrants’ 
remittances also flow to areas that involve neither the poorest areas nor the poorest people 
within those areas, the migrants’ projects carried out in these less favourable territories are 
considered as a welcome contribution to mitigating forms of inequality in post-communist 
Moldova. The migrants’ translocal engagements towards these areas are, therefore, perceived 
as an essential added value to official aid-interventions, worthy of attention and support.  
 A second positive aspect of migrants’ interventions in Moldova is their long-term 
commitment. Because migrants’ development engagements are usually based on family ties and 
responsibilities vis-à-vis their communities of origin, their development efforts are believed to 
be more sustainable than those implemented by aid-agencies: 
 
Markus (programme manager, 34, Brussels): The power gap between migrants and locals is 
smaller than between aid-workers and the local population, because in many cases the 
community invested in migrants and people expect a return of investment. Their mutual 
commitment is based on a longer time-frame. And because of strong family ties, sometimes over 
generations, migrants’ development projects risk less a sudden phasing out than those of 
international aid-organisations.  
 
 In general, aid-practitioners, especially those who do not yet collaborate with migrants, are 
open minded and positive towards the integration of migrants’ collective activities into their 
work. Max provides an illustrative example of how migrants’ potential involvement into their 
programmes is imagined:  
 Max (aid-worker, 63, Lucerne): I observe a growing interest from both sides. Considering our 
organisation, migrant associations could, for instance, send skilled migrants to Moldova to coach 
our local staff in the social field. In this case, we would think of how to remunerate such an 
engagement, and in what kind of concrete framework we want to put it. 
 
 Participants who already worked with migrant associations maintained that, over the last few 
years, migrants made good progress in their ‘integration process’ into ‘formal development’, 
chiefly in adapting the technical language and management skills required in the professional 
development field: 
 
                                                          
150 E.g. obstacles include restricted access for employees of Western aid organisations to the territory, no access to 
work facilities and no money transfers.  
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 Simone (programme manager, 41, Brussels): The trend in strengthening migrant associations for 
development is very positive. Things have changed a lot since 2008. Over the years, we could 
establish a ‘real’ policy dialogue between donor organisations and the migrant leaders. Migrants 
are now using the same vocabulary as we do, and their ability has tremendously developed. These 
days they know much better what a pragmatic engagement looks like and how to formulate policy 
making. Yes, we are talking the same language now, which we would not have expected a few 
years back. And I think that clearly shows the progress we made.  
 
However, to speak fluently the ‘official aid-jargon’ is not a guarantor for a smooth integration 
into aidland. For this reason, some associations include non-migrant members on their boards 
to widen their outreach with funding bodies and to enhance their chances to receive support. 
Sandra, president of an association that creates health centres and vocational schools, narrates 
the advantages of having a mixed board of Moldovans and non-Moldovans: 
 
 Svetlana (factory worker and artist, 55, Munich): You need to have somebody on the board with 
the right name. Without Dr Schmidt and his very German name on our board, we would have 
never obtained funds from the Schmitz-Hille Foundation for our vocational school. I am convinced 
that with only my signature on the proposal we would have gotten nowhere.  
  
  Further advances made by migrants were reported in the quality of tenders, especially on 
innovation-related issues. As Juriza, programme manager of a training scheme for migrant 
associations told me: 
 
 Juriza (programme manager, 38, Frankfurt): We are very pleased to see that the associations are 
making huge progress and that they are much more innovative now. At the beginning, everybody 
wanted to implement education programmes, but now their projects are getting more diverse 
and innovative. We can really select the best now. And today, we, ehm, see ourselves a little bit 
like an academy for migrant associations.  
 
The allusions of aid-practitioners to migrants’ language skills and other ‘integration 
indicators’ show similarities with debates surrounding migrants’ integration into a given 
geographical context. It also demonstrates that social dispositions, for example the ‘right 
language’, are deeply internalised and embodied by development actors and evident in their 
social practices (cf. Bourdieu 1990). As we will see shortly, migrants’ lack of these dispositions – 
such as for instance their management skills – puts them in a somewhat weak position within 
the transnational field of development.  
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8.1.2 Double standards in aidland 
 
8.1.2.1 The pure versus the selfish altruists  
 
In this sub-section, I argue that, despite the growing open-minded attitude towards migrants 
and the stated improvements in their ‘assimilation’ process, double standards apply for migrants 
in aidland. 
  A first double standard applies to migrants regarding their genuine interest in the 
development cause. Some aid-workers firmly doubt the migrants’ collective intentions to make 
a positive difference in Moldova and their role as ‘effective altruists’151. As I discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 6, in the simplistic version of the top-down policy discourse, an engaged 
individual migrant is described as a male rational actor with a small range of economic 
behaviour, and often without social obligations towards his family or friends back home. 
Conversely, chairpersons of migrant associations are described with a different, more human 
note. Alongside the migrants’ status or business interests, presidents of migrant associations 
have personal charisma, are driven by their own hidden agendas – chiefly by benefits for friends 
and families back home, and they even have personal feelings: 
 
Ionela (project officer, 34, Chisinau): In our collaboration with migrant organisations we are still 
trying to figure out what kind of hidden behaviours and agendas we are confronted with. The 
migrant leaders are just humans, they have their feelings and interests, and they might not match 
our goals.  
 
Oxana (project officer, 28, Chisinau): So, ehm the biggest challenges we had were the selection 
criteria: what kind of selection criteria should we apply? Which organisations should we choose? 
We weren’t really sure if the associations are what they claimed to be, because as I said, they 
have people, persons behind, with their own interests and the interests of their families.  
 
 Broadly speaking, the majority of aid-workers and civil servants depicted a less ‘harmony 
ideology’ of migrant associations than the dominant development discourse (e.g. Newland 
2010a). Similar to the majority of the academic literature on the topic, they were rather sceptical 
about migrants being development actors from ‘below’ and seldom viewed them as democratic 
grassroots organisations doing ‘pro-poor transnational aid’ (e.g. Anthias 1998; Orozco and Rouse 
2007). More importantly, the aid-workers’ views on migrant leaders as pursuing chiefly their 
                                                          
151 As alluded to in Chapter 7, migrants made the same remarks about professional aid-practitioners, suggesting 
that there is a mutual discomfort among the two actors.   
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self-interests somewhat contradict the development idea that collective remittances have a 
wider impact on the transformation of origin countries than the ‘altruistic’ individual 
remittances spent on their families back ‘home’ (see Chapter 2; also e.g. IOM and MPI 2012). 
Hereafter, large discrepancies between the development discourse and daily development 
practice exist:  
 
Martin (programme manager, 55, Berne): Development efforts of migrants are always linked to 
personal interests. A businessman who chairs an association in his spare time does not become 
all of a sudden an NGO. He remains a businessman. He sees a market in his home country and he 
wants to earn money, create employment and boost the local economy, also for his family. The 
international development scene still has a problem in accepting this. We still view them as NGOs, 
but they are not. We think that the migrant community is composed of do-gooders, whose money 
we can invest in their home countries in our good way, but we still fail to see the real character 
of migrant associations. 
 
 Secondly, double standards apply for migrant associations with regard to the control 
mechanisms over the origin and spending of their assets. The aid-practitioners commonly 
questioned the origin of the associations’ financial resources supposed to be fed into the formal 
channels of development. And some insisted on stricter accountability of migrants’ spending 
compared to more ‘traditional’ development actors:  
 
Martin (programme manager, 55, Berne): Important moral questions remain, especially on the 
associations’ financial resources, which we should strictly control. For instance, should we provide 
our links and contacts to migrant leaders who got rich here with criminal activities, for instance 
in the drug business, and help them do meaningful things in their country of origin? 
 
Ivan (aid-worker, 42, Chisinau): Other development NGOs need to show three-year plans. Yes, 
that’s right, but my feeling tells me that it is fair that migrants need to show a five-year project 
plan in our programme. Even if there is much insecurity in Moldova and there are always new 
legal frameworks for everything. I don’t know why. It’s just a feeling.  
 
Further, I argue that the donor community has two different benchmarks for allocating funds to 
migrants’ projects as opposed to projects carried out by development NGOs. That being said, I 
think we have in mainstream development practice a policy of one sauce for the goose and 
another for the gander. When reading through the descriptions of the country-programmes of 
donor organisations, I could not make out any significant differences between funded projects 
of development NGOs and migrants’ project plans described to me by aid-workers (e.g. SDC 
2014). The latter seem to have, however, fewer chances to receive funds. The following quote 
by a participant who regularly allocates funds to a range of social NGOs in Moldova exemplifies 
the reluctant attitude to support migrants’ requests:  
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Max (aid-worker, 63, Lucerne): We don’t give them [the migrant associations] just money. I don’t 
want them to present us with poor children in villages or social centres with the expectation that 
we will support them. We don’t want to be donors for their concerns. No, they shouldn’t just 
collect money from us. I would like to collaborate in a more equal development-oriented model, 
where we also get something back from them. Especially now that Moldova is one of the SDC’s 
focus countries, they could become our partners in large-scale projects. Or, we could train them, 
so they can do their own projects in the future – straightforward settings, but not just funding.  
 
In part, the distrustful attitude towards migrant associations needs to be considered in an 
atmosphere of wariness in the development field. In Eyben’s view (2006), the prevailing neo-
liberal ideology of everyone supposed to be pursuing their own self-interests has created a 
development environment of suspicion, reflected in the desire for quantitative data. This is also 
one of the reasons why a broad range of literature on trust has emerged in the development 
sector, especially on accountability, whose demand typically arises when there is lack of trust. 
Though control mechanisms certainly are important, the atmosphere I encountered vis-à-vis 
migrants in the development field reminded me of Luhmann’s statement on trust, namely 
“needing to mention trust already implies some degree of distrust” (1968: 99).   
 
 8.1.2.2 The malaise with the diversity of migrant associations 
 
 Entangled with the first two double standards regarding control mechanisms and migrants’ 
genuine interest in the development cause, a malaise was found in accepting migrant 
associations’ diversity.  
  Migrants’ chiefly voluntary development practices are personal commitments, based on 
individual world-views and on a variety of practical and emotional motivations (Chapter 7). Their 
manifold collective practices are carried out by means of different organisational forms, which 
is to some extent recognised on a discursive level. For example, the website of the EU and 
UNDP’s Joint Migration and Development Initiative states that: “Large communities of migrants 
have formed across countries and continents. These have materialized into umbrella 
organizations, development NGOs, community associations, welfare refugee groups, 
arts/cultural groups, etc.” (EU/UNDP 2014: 1). Civil servants and aid-workers depicted a similarly 
nuanced picture of migrant associations’ diversity. Their approach went beyond the narrow 
conceptualisation of migrant associations as transnational grassroots organisations or social 
movements – which we typically find in the majority of theorisation of the development 
discourse, equating migrant development organisations often with concepts of ‘participatory 
development’ (cf. Raghuram 2009). Yet, it is precisely this very diversity of migrants’ 
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development practices and the plurality of organisational forms that seem to cause aid-
practitioners unease in their work:  
 
Simone (programme manager, 41, Brussels): The diversity of associations is a real challenge – 
from one country to the other you can have very different associations, or even among migrant 
associations from the same country. [...] To put migrants on the same level, we tried to improve 
their technical competences. But not every migrant association should become professional. Like 
with other NGOs, there is an organic or natural selection process.  
 
As I argued above, the selection criteria for receiving donor funds for projects and capacity 
building are far less ‘naturally’ applied to migrant organisations than to ‘more conventional’ 
development actors, as the following interview extract with the organiser of a training workshop 
for migrants confirms: 
 
Igor (programme manager, 39, Chisinau): We organised a training workshop to improve the 
professionalism of migrant associations, which was very much appreciated by migrant leaders. 
We had about three times more applications than places //How did you select the participants? 
//We won’t tell you. //Would you mind if I ask you again how they were selected? //Ok I would 
not call it a selection it was more like ehm a hand-picking. You, you and you. //By whom? // I can’t 
tell you. //Maybe by the government? //Ok by the government, let’s say they wanted more 
constructive and less critical associations – include more associations rather than exclude them.  
 
  Apart from delicate aspects of ‘emigration politics’, a particular unease was found in how to 
deal with less professional migrant associations (e.g. informal self-help and advocacy groups, 
networks, etc.), and vice-versa with profit-oriented associations and hybrid forms of 
organisations (e.g. social firms, cooperative social development schemes)152. While the donor 
agencies foster a variety of organisational forms of development NGOs, some of which are even 
considered as promising and innovative new models in mainstream development practices (e.g. 
social business models), other standards seem to apply to migrant associations of the same type, 
size and/or professional degree. Considering migrant volunteer groups, the majority of the 
development literature suggests working with professional migrant organisations and does not 
provide much guidance on how to collaborate with volunteer associations (e.g. IOM/UNDP 201). 
Only a few aid-agencies encourage co-operation with voluntary-run migrant groups and 
networks – for example DEVCO states that: "[…] we call for stronger involvement of voluntary 
diaspora members in the development of their countries of origin" (EC/DEVCO 2011: 4). In 
general, any deviations from the ‘organisational norm’ of a professional NGO – such as a 
volunteer group or a profit organisation – seem to discomfort aid-workers in practice. This might 
                                                          
152 This observation also applies to other informal networks and groups in development more broadly.  
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also explain why all Western development practitioners in this study assume that migrant 
organisations naturally aspire to become professional development actors:  
 
 Juriza (programme manager, 38, Frankfurt): We now also provide structural support to migrant 
associations. We finance work space and fulltime employees, because we strongly aim to liberate 
migrants from their voluntary commitments and to put them into more professional settings. 
That's our new goal now.  
  
 As we saw in Chapter 7, some migrant leaders have a negative stance towards professional aid-
practices. They perceive them as being too ‘top-down’ or as too ‘blown up’, and thus do not 
want to be associated with the Western models of development. The main argument put 
forward is that, like other development organisations, migrants should decide themselves if they 
want to become actors of the development establishment, and how they want to be organised 
– as voluntary-based grassroots organisations or profit-run organisations. And migrants who 
wish to evolve from a volunteering engagement towards professional activities ought to have 
the same, fair chances for support as other ‘more conventional’ development-oriented 
associations. 
 
8.1.2.3 ‘Savoir and savoir faire’: migrants’ expertise and practical competences  
 
A last set of double standards relates to aspects of migrants’ ‘professionalism’, which I suggest 
summarising with the binary of migrants’ ‘savoir’ versus migrants’ ‘savoir faire’, according to 
Lyotard’s terminology (1979: 16). In other words, migrants’ attributed know-how versus their 
practical competences in the development field.  
The aid-workers consider migrants’ savoir – their main fields of expertise – in two domains. 
First, as expected, migrants have a country-specific expertise – the competence to understand 
‘the social, political and cultural complexities of Moldova’. This echoes with descriptions of 
migrants’ roles as cultural brokers and bridge builders, frequently emphasised in the 
development literature (e.g. EU/UNDP 2011). The IOM, for example, highlights: “They [the 
migrants] act as ‘ambassadors’ of their society of origin and facilitators of cultural exchange, and 
they can build bridges between states and between societies” (IOM 2013: 3). Migrants’ roles as 
providers of first-hand information from their countries of origin also neatly fits with Tvedt’s 
understanding of the role of NGOs in the contemporary development field more broadly. He 
maintains that: “NGOs in a donor-created and donor-led system have become a transmission 
belt of a powerful language and of Western concepts of development, carrying resources and 
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authority from the core to the periphery, and information and legitimisation from periphery to 
core” (2006: 681). 
The second domain of migrants’ expertise is economics. The aid-workers characterised 
Moldovan migrant leaders as gifted entrepreneurs with proven business know-how. Even so, 
the majority of them are ordinary people with different socio-occupational profiles, and a 
combination of specific personality traits and agency enables them to make changes in Moldova, 
as described in Chapter 7: 
  
Martin (programme manager, 55, Berne): Let’s be honest, most of us development workers have 
very limited knowledge of economics. We know how to account for our project funds. That’s 
about it. But most of the migrants have expertise in economics. Many of them are entrepreneurs, 
and some are even very successful. So, we could gain from their business know-how and their 
free market spirit. 
 
  Considering migrants’ savoir faire – their practical development competence – no causality 
between the declared positive attitudes towards migrants in the development policy discourse 
and aid-workers’ narratives and practices of involving migrants was found. To me, the situation 
in the development field resembles the phenomenon displayed in society more broadly, when 
people claim tolerance towards migrants, but still engage in discriminatory practices. In 
Valentine’s words, it is "the paradox relationship between values [that people declare having 
vis-à-vis other people] and [their actual] practices [vis-à-vis others]" (2008: 325). This is well-
captured in the next quote by a development professional who earlier on in the interview 
demonstrated openness towards migrants in his work environment:  
 
Herbert (head of department, 55, Frankfurt): We made negative experiences in our collaborations 
with migrant associations, especially with the quality of reports. So, we prefer to work with 
Germans, because in our sector reports need to be delivered on time, and that never happened 
with migrant associations [...] and often, migrants don’t know how to correctly plan big projects 
early on.  
 
 Though some aid-professionals stressed that migrants have made progress in the incorporation 
of ‘professional practices’, large gaps between aid-practitioners’ rather negative evaluations of 
migrants’ practical development ‘savoir faire’ and migrants’ expertise, their ‘savoir’, persist: 
 
Viorica (deputy director of a bilateral aid-agency, 41, Chisinau): I experience a lot of mutual 
incomprehension in my daily work. Migrant leaders see our projects and they think: Wow that’s 
great! And then they come to us with their ideas, which are often business-related. But their 
expectations are quickly dashed when they see our bureaucratic procedures, because they don’t 
know much about the practical side of the development work.  
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  To round off this sub-section, the divergences highlighted in aid-workers’ narratives of the 
positively attributed ‘savoir’ – their cultural understanding of the ‘Moldovan way’ and their 
personal experiences of actual Socialism – does not compensate their shortcomings in their 
professional development ‘savoir faire’. This observation invites us to rethink the development 
policy rhetoric of migrants, bringing their familiarity of their home place into the relationship, 
and the development actors the technical expertise and project-management skills. To reduce 
migrants’ role to cultural ‘brokers’ and ‘bridge builders’ with economic know-how – while 
simultaneously denying other forms of practical know-how, and to accentuate migrants’ 
differences, rather than their similarities with other development organisations – falls in my 
opinion too short. Especially if we consider that the notion of ‘culture’ is often used by 
development professionals as a proxy for ‘race’. That being said, I conclude that despite a mutual 
attraction between migrants and development actors, there remain substantial challenges in 
their daily relationship.  
 
8.2 Too Close for Comfort? Migrant Associations and Conventional Aid-Practices  
 
As I have highlighted in Chapter 2, ideas and practices of development are subject to the kinds 
of managerial and financial dictates that have long been characteristic of much of the private 
sector (Mooney 2009). Or, in Long’s words, “As a conceptual construct economics strives to 
subordinate to its rule and to subsume under its logic every other form of social interaction in 
every professional field it invades” (1992: 18). In these terms, I now discuss how conventional 
aid-practices, taken over by economic rules, compromise a satisfactory degree of migrants’ 
involvement in the development field. I show, with the examples of results-based and delivery-
oriented practices, how aid-workers position themselves in complex power structures and utilise 
their ability to mobilise social, cultural and economic resources in order to sustain their status 
and influence their collaborations with migrants (cf. Bourdieu 1990). I also draw on the broader 
framework of ‘civic engagement’, which started in the late 80s and 90s, in addition to the strand 
of studies that occurred with the discovery of migrants as ‘partners’ for development in the mid-
1990s, which seeks to determine forms of relationships between states and migrant associations 
– often in a state-regulatory and ‘educational’ way (see Chapter 2; and also e.g. Newland 2010a). 
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8.2.1. The confusion over migrant associations’ role and the search for the ideal migrant partner 
 
There is a continuous struggle over the theoretical framing of migrants in development on the 
macro level. Such struggles include debates regarding different approaches to migrants between 
institutions, for instance between the World Bank and the IMF, that opt for a narrower financial 
aspect of the nexus; and other institutions, such as the UN, opting for a broader participatory 
and rights-based approach by focusing on collective remittances (Laveneux and Kunz 2008). The 
discourse of ‘partnerships’ became ‘mainstream’ with the ‘rights-based approach’ (RBA), which 
overlaid earlier approaches rooted in ‘needs’ (Mosse 2011). It is in this discursive construction 
that migrants are considered partners of change in conventional aid-practices, and that they are 
recast as neither passive beneficiaries nor consumers but as agents: “the makers and shapers of 
their own development” (Cornwall 2002: 27). This practice is applied, for example, in the 
migrant-centred approach, a cross-cutting priority of EU actions on migration and development 
(EU 2013b), or in the EU’s “more ambitious and forward-looking broadened approach to 
migration and development” (EU 2013b: 3), which also includes the ‘local-to-local’ approach. It 
emphasises development planning by local authorities and actions based on the ‘multi-
stakeholder approach’, by bringing together relevant non-state actors, such as migrants (EU 
2011).  
 As Mosse states, “Perhaps never before has so much been made of the power of ideas in 
solving the problems of poverty, and an emphasis on partnership” (2011: 5). He goes on by 
saying that relationship building is not only essential to the constitution of development 
practices, but has become itself a ‘key idea’ of development. Below, Marco and Esperanta 
narrate this semantic change from the migrant beneficiary to the migrant partner in aid-
practices:  
 
Esperanta (aid-worker, 35, Chisinau): The traditional development cooperation is paternalistic, 
and partnership is a relatively new concept in international development cooperation. We still 
see migrants mainly as beneficiaries, but depending on the context, they are also increasingly 
partners. Unfortunately, we don’t yet have best-practice models for strategic alliances with 
migrants as partners.  
 
Marco (programme manager, 55, Brussels): The trend of dealing with migrants as a partner 
category is recent – that we are talking with them about development is very new, maybe two 
years now. Migrants understand that they are still beneficiaries of concrete projects, but they are 
willing to become partners, for instance in drafting policies in the migration–development field. 
They want to be involved and consulted when the ministers are planning new action plans in the 
field of migration. 
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 Practices and the mind-sets, contrasting concepts, language, and values that go with these 
in collective spaces are always provisional, and they need to be reinvented from time to time 
(Bourdieu 1989). The development practice of teaming up with migrants as partners for positive 
change does not occur in a strategic and linear way, but results from social processes of learning-
by-doing (cf. Grabowska 2016). Two participants working for operatively active donor agencies 
narrate their practice of experimenting their partnerships with migrants:  
Martin (programme manager, 55, Berne): In our cooperation with migrant associations it’s 
irrelevant if a project is successful or not. We just want to gain more experiences, so we can define 
at a later stage which questions we need to ask and what steps we want to take.  
 
Markus (programme manager, 34, Brussels): The question is how to get beyond an individual 
story to an approach that is more systematic and that includes other institutions, so that migrants 
see a real benefit for their integration, too. This demands a strong engagement from both sides. 
But I don’t think we always need to wait a hundred years in order to build up something new with 
migrants. We could steer such processes now, but first we need to figure out how we want to do 
that.  
 
By and large, it was found that aid-workers are still strongly preoccupied with identifying good 
practices and sharing information on how to create partnerships with migrants in their work. 
This observation stands in sharp contrast to the impression I got when reading migration–
development roadmaps and policy prescriptions of ‘best practices’ suggesting that the right 
formula has already been discovered (e.g. IOM/MPI 2012). Moreover, confusion over 
terminologies and migrants’ roles was particularly widespread in large aid institutions that 
simultaneously implement programmes for and with migrants. This confusion, I assert, results 
from the tension between top-down standardised practices that come along with the ‘result-
based’ and ‘delivery paradigm’, and the partnership approach (c.f. Eyben 2013). This can create 
conflict within the same institution and/or departments over migrants’ respective positions. For 
instance, a department implements a migrant association-led programme in which the migrants 
are beneficiaries. The underlining migrant beneficiary narrative – deeply embedded in the top-
down development paradigm – implies migrants do benefit. This may exclude equality, respect, 
listening and learning from the migrant partners153. That being said, participants who felt the 
greatest unease with migrants’ different roles were the ones working in the headquarters of 
donor agencies and IOs implementing programmes based on different aid-practices154. For these 
                                                          
153 These challenges are not specific to migrants but might also occur with other development NGOs and volunteer 
groups (Fowler 2005).  
154 The discomfort vis-à-vis migrants’ positions was less observed among employees of smaller Moldovan NGOs or 
development NGOs in migrants’ host countries, because migrants’ roles were clearly defined as partners or donors.   
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participants, it is not only vital to clearly define migrants’ roles, but also to have the flexibility to 
adapt to migrants’ different positions, and to switch between them in their daily practice. 
 
Max (aid-worker, 63, Lucerne): In our migration department, migrants are called clients and 
beneficiaries, and in the department of international development co-operation they are actors 
and partners. Somehow we need to manage to fuse these different perceptions, but this is not 
easy, because of institutional barriers and inhibitions. 
 
  And last of all, aid workers commonly raised the vital question of who exactly is an ideal 
migrant partner. The three main questions addressed were: Who is a good migrant partner? 
Who is a good diaspora? And do we have quality labels for diasporas? Even if these queries 
preoccupy project managers, I personally do not think that we need to find definitive answers 
to these questions, because the profile of the ideal migrant partner highly depends on the 
geographical context and on the development objectives. However, in conventional result-
based and multi-stakeholder practices, it seems that the ideal migrant partner has already been 
found. It is a migrant collective that is on good terms with the government of its home country 
and preferably with other members of the diaspora, too. Besides, a migrant collective is 
normatively ‘good’ if it contributes to the home countries’ official transformation policies, 
delivers results, and possesses the linguistic and technical development ‘savoir faire’:  
 
Simone (programme manager, 41, Brussels): You need to work with those migrant associations 
who want to become autonomous, but not in the sense that they can decide on their own. When 
they try to do things without being plugged in to the official policy of their home, then you have 
the wrong partners. 
 
Markus (programme manager, 34, Brussels): The most important aspect in our multi-stakeholder 
approach with migrants is the attitudes of the governments towards their migrants, how they 
control migrants, and how the migrants are linked to the government. If a migrant community is 
completely disconnected from the government, then it’s difficult to integrate migrants’ activities 
into national development frames. So, it is necessary that they complement the national strategic 
development achievements. Otherwise, we don’t work with them, because there is no outlook 
for good results.  
 
  In sum, just as the Moldovan ‘development diaspora’ is a social product, which is not simply 
‘there’, aid-workers’ spatial practices of relationships with migrants constitute a dynamic, 
humanly constructed social process shaped by dominance and power. The underlying broader 
practices and/or struggles over these practices in diaspora-programmes can result for 
development practitioners in a balancing act of coping with different interpretations of 
migrants’ roles and/or switching between roles in their daily development practice. This can 
create discomfort in their daily work. A last fundamental element that adds to the ambiguity of 
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migrants’ roles in aid-relationships are the state’s and development agencies’ versatile 
approaches to the spatial distance stretching between migrants and Moldova. Thus, I propose 
to have a closer look at migrants and distance.  
 
8.2.2 A closer look at migrants and distance  
 
Spatial relations are not only important determining conditions of relationships among people, 
but are also symbolic of those relationships (Simmel 1992b). A particular relationship of 
nearness and distance is found in every relationship, including the development actor’s 
relationships with migrants. In part, their perception of migrants’ spatial and symbolic distance 
to Moldova depends on whether migrant associations are their partners, beneficiaries or policy 
consultants. 
  First, I argue that there is a fine line between empowering migrants as beneficiaries for 
development efforts and steering or controlling them from a distance. In the first 
implementation round of diaspora programmes on an international level, migrant associations 
were chiefly beneficiaries of IOs and donor agencies – for instance as implementing partners of 
Western development NGOs in co-development programmes155. In this framework migrants’ 
transnational ties were emphasised. This meant a novel situation for many donor and aid-
agencies in terms of having the migrant beneficiaries outside the territory of their implementing 
bodies and traditional development interventions. Some aid professionals maintained that they 
found the transnational civil society space of migrants hard to grasp and more challenging to 
control than assumed. It is therefore not surprising that in the newest migration–development 
aid practices, for example in the earlier-mentioned decentralised approach, the focus of donor 
attention shifted from migrants’ transnational ties back to the local context of migrant home 
countries. Development’s ‘romance’ with migrants’ transnational social and symbolic ties is 
slowly dying out and the donor community’s attention has shifted towards the less fuzzy local 
synergies between migrants, non-governmental, state and development actors in the migrant 
home countries (EU/DEVCO 2011). Thus, migrant beneficiaries are preferably back in Moldova, 
partly because migrants’ activities can be monitored more closely, once the focus of their 
development-oriented activities is back in the home-country. Possibly, this is also one reason for 
the aid-industry’s sustained interest in return-programmes in Moldova, despite their modest 
results (see Chapter 6). In this respect, the development actors’ excursion into the transnational 
diasporic space of migrants’ humanitarian practices has been rather short. 
                                                          
155 For an overview of these programmes see Østergaard-Nielson 2011. 
229 
 
 Simultaneous to the slow ‘death of distance’ with migrant beneficiaries, policies and 
programmes addressing migrant partners emphasise the geographical and symbolic distance 
stretching between migrants and Moldova. A concise example of a programme that accentuates 
distance is a high-skilled programme of the Moldovan government and the Academy of Sciences 
of Moldova (ASM 2009). It aims to foster co-operation between the scientific community abroad 
and Moldovan-based scientists. In order to tackle corruption in academia, the scholar-migrants 
and their associations are considered as ‘external advisors’, or ‘neutral examiners’ for awarding 
research funds in Moldova. The programme manager told me that this policy is understood as a 
form of ‘international civic diplomacy’ to enhance Moldova’s transparency in science. In that 
regard, the migrants’ distance and otherness from their co-citizens in Moldova is accentuated – 
similar to Simmel’s (1992b) concept of the stranger (see Chapter 2). 
 Vice-versa, migrants are regarded as ‘insiders’ in development settings in which they act as 
policy consultants. In this type of relationship, the migrants’ proximity to Moldova is 
emphasised. Consequently, migrants’ development ideas are considered ‘insider suggestions’, 
prompted by Moldovan citizens. Migrants maintained that the IOs and the Moldovan 
governments’ perception of their development expertise as ‘insider knowledge’ is one reason 
why their initiatives and ideas are little noticed, including policy initiatives in the host-society 
context (e.g. propositions for bilateral agreements in the social security field). As Svetlana 
disconcertedly explains:  
 
Svetlana (journalist, 54, Geneva): Because of Moldovans’ low self-esteem, an idea or an expertise 
still needs to come from outside. But even if we live outside the country, our ideas are not 
seriously considered. For instance, we proposed to involve migrants as policy consultants in the 
new migration mainstreaming programme, but this was rejected. And then, what a surprise, an 
expat from Geneva proposed the same idea and now the UNDP does exactly our project. 
 
Other than pointing to culturally coined perceptions of distance, these examples also suggest a 
general lack of communication and knowledge-sharing between the two social actors in practice 
and struggles for positions regarding who’s ‘professional’ knowledge counts within the aid 
establishment (cf. Bourdieu 1985). Paraphrasing another migrant leader on the issue:  
Vasili (researcher, 39, Paris): Migrants should express more often their opinions on different 
aspects of Moldova’s transformation process, especially on social issues. We live in European 
countries where gender equality, tolerance or solidarity towards minorities are more advanced 
than in Moldova, where these topics are not understood at all. So, there are good practices to 
learn from. But we want to be taken more seriously when we express ourselves on these issues, 
better heard in a way.  
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  The last important aspect of migrants’ role in relation to their distance to Moldova relates to 
patterns of aid practices performed in the Moldovan aid sector. In general, I find that the 
literature on migrants’ collective remittances has paid little attention to the development sector 
in countries of origin, despite numerous scholars repeatedly stressing the importance of power 
dynamics in the wider local context of migrants’ interventions for shaping the nature and 
outcomes of transnational connections (e.g. Lampert 2012). 
  Moldovan migrant associations do not (yet) have direct influence on local development 
agendas and the resources allocated to their villages of origin in a way that other migrant 
communities have (e.g. Nigerian migrants, see Lampert 2014). Their role is mostly to assist public 
and private non-governmental actors, which do not receive any financial or technical support by 
the donor community, nor from the government. During a project visit in a remote village in the 
South of Moldova, an NGO worker told me about a typical case of this aid-modality. He wanted 
to improve the infrastructure of the community administration to carry out a community project 
in a sustainable way. To this end he applied for funding to administrative office holders in 
Chisinau. But his quest for technical support got repeatedly rejected with the argument that 
there is no need for technical equipment, like a computer, in a village. Thereupon he contacted 
migrant associations, and a UK-based association came forward to provide support. Similar cases 
were reported in informal talks with migrant leaders and/or key informants in the education and 
health sector. Generally speaking, development professionals of rural NGOs consider their 
colleagues in the headquarters of donor and/ or umbrella organisations in Chisinau physically 
and emotionally far away from their beneficiaries in other parts of the country. They are 
described as being caught in what is called ‘the capital trap’, where they are ‘held’ by important 
meetings and the like. Moreover, aid-practitioners outside of Chisinau deem their colleagues, 
especially the Moldovan development professionals, as being primarily interested in their own 
professional careers and indifferent to challenges they face in their development work in the 
countryside. Vice-versa, they perceived migrants as being ‘closer’ and more responsive to the 
needs of the rural population in general and of their work in particular. They reported more 
face-to-face contact and communication with migrants than with aid-workers based in Chisinau, 
which allowed them to build close and trustworthy relationships:  
 
Antonia (chairwoman of a local NGO, 58, Comrat): The local employees of umbrella organisations 
in Chisinau have no idea about our situation here. Nobody from Chisinau has ever turned up in 
person, and I don’t think they will ever come, because they don’t think it’s profitable for their 
careers to visit villages. [...] Vasili from Paris with his colleagues from the migrant association was 
already here twice this year, and we feel that they are really interested in our work.  
 
231 
 
 This observation sheds a somewhat different light on the geographical proximity of 
development agencies based in Moldova and questions their distinct advantage in ‘home’ 
development engagement compared to migrants’ spatial and symbolic distance to the 
development scene in their home countries (e.g. Mercer et al. 2009). I argue that the perception 
of NGO workers outside the capital on migrants as being ‘closer’ in their daily work than their 
colleagues in Chisinau is not really about physical distance. Rather, it is a consequence of post-
socialist class formations, generational aspects156and socio-cultural urban-rural gaps between 
‘Chisinau and the rest’. Hence, in the Moldovan case, migrants’ physical distance to Moldova is 
not as significant in concrete development practice as claimed in the broader debate 
surrounding the migration–development nexus. This finding possibly relates to the relatively 
frequent home visits of Moldovan migrants, and thus might be specific to the mostly 
understudied European migration–transformation nexus, compared to the diffusion of 
development practices between Western European countries and less developed African, 
Caribbean or Asian countries with greater spatial distances between migrants’ host and home 
countries (cf. Grabowska and Garapich 2016).  
  In conclusion, I found that migrants’ distance to Moldova and their corresponding attributed 
role is more contested in development practices than commonly assumed in the migration–
development policy literature (e.g. UNDP 2012). Further, like in any other human relationships, 
striking the right balance between proximity and distance is crucial for both partners. Migrants 
felt their role as policy consultants was compromised through them being seen as too close to 
Moldova, to a point where their ideas were not taken seriously, while the aid-workers’ 
discomfort with the ‘migrant partners’ gradually grows with migrants’ growing spatial distance 
to their home-country. Yet, no matter from which angle one approaches the relationship, it is 
always the dominant partner – ‘official Moldova’ and its key development agents – that defines 
it. Their conception of distance and proximity vis-à-vis migrants varies according to a complex 
interplay of socio-cultural dimensions and interests. Put briefly, migrants as partners, sponsors 
or contributors to Moldova’s transformation are preferably abroad, but as beneficiaries they are 
ideally back in Moldova. This leaves migrants with little room to shape their relationships with 
development agents on their own terms.  
 
 
                                                          
156 Especially between the the career-oriented young professionals in the head offices of IOs and NGOs in Chisinau, 
some of whom are educated abroad, and the mostly older rural NGO workers.  
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8.2.3 History repeating: Strengthening the migrant civil society with low degree of migrant 
involvement 
 
I see an interesting parallel between the initial aim of building up a civil society in Eastern Europe 
and the promotion of a migrant civil society in the region. This is particularly the case in the 
context of delivery-oriented development practice, which I argue significantly shapes migrants’ 
access to the transnational development field.  
 Linked to the development policy agendas of ‘good governance’, the period around the fall 
of the USSR in 1989-90 was seen as the zenith of civil society in Eastern Europe (Fowler 2005). 
The general claim that development practitioners and theorists made, was that civil society, 
particularly a certain type of NGOs, positively contributes to the transformation process from 
authoritarian to democratic regimes, for instance through stimulating participation in public 
affairs and creating space for the development of democratic attributes, such as respect for 
opposing views (Celichowski 2004). Likewise, the development policy rhetoric of the migrant 
civil society transferring tolerance and open-mindedness towards their home countries was, at 
least initially, emphasised on what ‘aid providers’ considered to be socio-political issues – 
advocacy, civic education and human rights (Celichowski 2004). It is not my aim to analyse if 
NGOs in Eastern Europe have fulfilled the hopes attached to them in the 90s, nor if migrant 
associations have so today. Instead, I emphasise the critiques, which have argued that in lieu of 
fostering grassroots activism and involving people, the practice of ‘strengthening civil society’ 
has created a class of NGO professionals much more attentive to donors’ wishes than to the 
opinions and involvement of their fellow-citizens (Fowler 2005). The role of NGOs was mainly 
limited to "act as incremental improvers within a technocratic, logical and linear framework 
allied to a ‘partnership’ or ‘harmony model’ of change employed by most official agencies" 
(Fowler 2005: 16). On these grounds, the Western business-models required for implementing 
civil-society projects strengthened primarily the management capacity of full-time employees, 
rather than the basic democratic inclusion and participation of volunteers, informal groups and 
beneficiaries (e.g. the European Union programmes on ‘promoting civil society’) (Celichowski 
2004). I argue that in the delivery-oriented development practices, some Western donor 
agencies unnecessarily replicated their failures of building up the Eastern European civil society 
in the creation of the migrant civil society. For instance, the Western donor community also 
prefers to collaborate with a small number of low-membership elite migrant associations – 
familiar with the development industry’s ‘rules of the game’, but is unable to mobilise migrants 
or people in Moldova. This type of collaboration was particularly well illustrated during an 
information evening on diverse services for migrants in Villeneuve Saint-George, near Paris, in 
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which I participated on my fieldwork. The event was organised by the Swedish Public 
Employment Service, the GIZ, and a migrant association, which was responsible for reaching out 
to the migrants. Out of approximately 150 expected participants only 7 migrants attended the 
event, albeit that the migrant organisation involved in the event was the ‘right’ collective 
migrant partner: its chairperson is fluent in the technical development language, knows how to 
write project proposals and shows commitment to working in the interests of the development 
establishment as a service deliverer. However, the association is not genuinely rooted in the 
migrant civil society and lacks relevant contacts. As this example shows, the earlier-stated 
economic and interventionist mechanisms are arguments why some of the professionally-run 
migrant associations involved in international development assistance remain relatively 
isolated, and not at the forefront of relation-building with migrants or beneficiaries back ‘home’. 
Therefore, I argue that, due to the negative consequence of the paradigm shift in the 2000s, 
which turned the focus from the ‘people’ to the ‘things’ by using a vocabulary of ‘delivery’, and 
the managerial dictates within the ‘development field’, the development actors’ preferred type 
of migrant partners are rarely close to the migrants or their beneficiaries (cf. Chambers 2012). 
 The strengthening of civil-society actors, including migrant associations, also requires, at 
least initially, a long-term commitment from donors: 
 
Viorica (deputy director of a bilateral aid-agency, 41, Chisinau): Migration is surely not a topic 
that will disappear in our field, but our problem is that we have not yet managed to build 
sustainable synergies between our work and the migrants’ initiatives. We will see what happens 
in the post-2015 development agenda, if we will move towards a more sustainable cooperation 
or not.  
 
A sustainable involvement of migrants’ development efforts is often compromised in the name 
of the inner mechanism of result-based practices. The Joint EU-UN Migration and Development 
Initiative (JMDI) launched in 2008 presents a concise example in this respect. The programme 
gradually increased the organisational capacity of Moldovan migrant associations through joint 
large-scale projects with international NGOs over a period of three years. In the first two 
programme rounds, a substantial 18% of the overall budget assigned to 27 countries was 
allocated to Moldova and its migrant community (EU/UNDP 2014)157. Moldovan migrant 
associations, however, will not be eligible in the next programme round, despite their achieved 
good project results, their strengthened capacity and Moldova’s high ongoing emigration rate. 
According to the programme manager, the political instability in Moldova eliminates the country 
                                                          
157 The programme had four priority areas: migrant remittances, migrant communities, migrant capacities and 
migrant rights (UNDP/EU 2014).  
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from the selective group of migrants’ home-states with the most promising outlooks for good 
results. This confirms once more the earlier statement that patterns of aid modalities are 
dictated by political and strategic considerations, which can mutate into coercive practices that 
reduce the space for migrants’ sustainable involvement in the development field.  
 Summing up this sub-section, under the guise of economic efficiency and its associated 
mechanisms, the emphasis of the donor community on promoting and strengthening Moldovan 
migrant associations has been chiefly put on ‘professional’ low-membership migrant 
associations. From a more radical perspective, in the delivery-oriented practice, the migrants’ 
narrowly predefined role as service providers also means that migrants’ increased involvement 
in formal development can compromise migrant associations’ performance in key areas, like 
their legitimacy as non-governmental actors from ‘below’, in the sense of co-optation. In this 
respect, migrants and aid-agencies might be too close for comfort. Hence, a strengthened 
enrolment of migrants into official development can come with both opportunities and threats. 
In order to breach the asymmetrical power relations between the two actors and to enhance 
migrants’ engagement in development in a sustainable way, more openness to a multiplicity of 
outcomes, more acceptance of a non-linear interpretation of social processes and an 
acknowledgement of diversity would be essential. Long maintained 24 years ago, when writing 
on the issue of NGOs and interest groups, that donors and recipient bureaucracies are ill-
equipped to improve such a “flexible, experimental, action-based, capacity-building style of 
development effort” (1992: 19). I think this is still true today.  
 
8.2.4 Worlds apart: the migrant civil society and the Moldovan civil society  
 
The last practice which, I assert, compromises migrants’ access to the Moldovan development 
landscape, is that members of the Moldovan civil society firmly associate migrant associations 
with government structures and not with the national civil-society scene. This negatively 
undermines the acceptance of development-oriented migrant associations as social civil-society 
organisations and affects the subject of my study in terms of relationship dynamics between 
migrants and the national development NGO sector. The new institutional dilemma or vicious 
circle that Moldovan migrants face is well reflected with migrant leaders’ personal experiences 
of participating in the National Moldovan NGO Participation Council158. A delegation of six 
                                                          
158 The National NGO Participation Council is composed of 40 NGOs, including the 10 largest and most influential 
umbrella organisations of the Moldovan social sector.  
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migrant leaders from Canada, France, Italy and the UK participated in the 7th annual congress 
of the National NGO Participation Council in 2013, with the long-term objective of becoming 
members. However, the migrant representatives were not welcomed among the members, 
because of their perceived strong affiliation with the government. Vice-versa, the Bureau did 
not support migrants’ membership, because it is in the nature of the Council to criticise the 
government. Vasile shares his impressions on the members’ attitudes towards migrants: 
 
Vasile (IT engineer, 48, London): There are very influential associations and important 
personalities in this forum, and they present somehow a control mechanism vis-à-vis the 
government, which explains why they are not interested in us. Basically, they think we are part 
of the government. So, when we joined the forum to lobby for our projects, we first wanted to 
see if they bring up their positions towards us, or at least an interest in our activities. But no, not 
at all. Nobody brought up the topic of diaspora. They are clearly not interested in our projects.  
 
Contrary to my assumption prior to fieldwork, the reluctance of the Council’s members towards 
migrants does not result from fear of competition for donor funds from the migrant actors. The 
third sector is one of the sparsely growing sectors in Moldova. The NGOs operating on a national 
level are financially fairly well-off, and they do not need migrant associations for financial gains 
(USAID 2013). In contrast, smaller NGOs expressed a strong interest in partnership building with 
migrants, because of the potential financial benefit. In this respect, thus, migrant associations 
and Moldovan civil society actors are not too close for comfort. 
 Furthermore, on an institutional level, the local civil-society sector in migrants’ home 
countries has been somewhat neglected in migration-related development programmes and 
policies. Only a few collaborations between Moldovan NGOs operating on a national level and 
the migrant civil society took place so far. This is also recognised by participants working in the 
headquarters of IOs and relevant donor agencies in Brussels and Geneva. The BRD (2014) states 
that it aims to change this situation by bridging the two apparent separate worlds. But the 
governments’ interest in maintaining ‘friendly’ ties with migrants for political interest 
compromises migrants’ entry into the institutional development scene (Chapter 6). Oleg, a 
participant in the NGO congress, expresses his view on the Bureau’s position vis-à-vis alliances 
between migrants and members of the national development sector:  
 
Oleg (project-coordinator, 44, Padova): The Bureau wants to keep the civil society here and there 
apart to better control us. I realised this when I saw their reaction about our interest in the NGO 
congress. They were not pleased at all, because the Bureau represents the government, and in 
that conference the government is criticised. So they refused to pay for our travel costs. But I 
found this rather, ehm, strange. The Bureau always publicly declares that they want to improve 
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our connections with the Moldovan NGO scene, but when there are opportunities like this, they 
back off.  
 
 Ultimately, a prominent element of migrants’ access to the development establishment is 
the static and nationally-bound geography of international aid. The Moldovan migrants’ access 
to development funds is compromised, for instance, by inflexible country-strategy frameworks, 
in which aid organisations are supposed to forge alliances with local Moldovan NGOs and not 
with associations based in Paris, Moscow or Rome. An interesting exception is a co-financed 
programme by the European Union, the Social ministries of Italy and Moldova and the IOM, 
pictured in Figure 8.1. It was carried out by a migrant association in 12 Italian regions and in 
Moldova. In its migration–development component, it provided migrant leaders with a first 
‘insight’ into Moldova’s development scene on their return visits. Unfortunately, such measures 
are in most cases insufficient for an institutional anchorage of migrant associations into the local 
development scene.  
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Figure 8.1: The donor community’s support of migrants  
 
 With this in mind, practices that aim to bring migrant associations closer to other regional 
non-state actors, for example the earlier-mentioned local-to-local approach, seem more 
promising. To focus on local actors as key actors and on locally-based migration–development 
initiatives could effectively increase strategic synergies between migrants, the national civil 
society and the local authorities, central for the impact of migrants’ interventions and their 
recognition in formal development (e.g. EU 2013b; EU/DEVCO 2011): 
 
Marco (programme manager, 55, Brussels): There are still only few co-operations between 
migrants and development NGOs. We would like to change that. We want the NGOs to be more 
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interested in migrants and their associations. With our new local approach, we hope that more 
local NGOs will get in touch with migrant associations.  
 
 Another advantage commonly pointed out by project managers of migrant association-led 
programmes, is that an engagement with the diaspora on the local or regional level is considered 
‘less politically loaded’ than an involvement with migrants in the capital. Though this approach 
seems somewhat promising, I see challenges ahead. First, a reduction in migrants’ influence to 
the regional level might be less attractive for migrants who seek more national political and 
development impact and an enhanced involvement in the national civil-society scene. Second, 
some aid-workers expressed concerns that donor agencies may pay less attention in the future 
to the cross-border professional nexus between migrants and Moldova’s NGO scene. They 
stated that professional connections between migrants and their formal employers in the civil 
society sector, prior to their migration, are mostly inactivate or even abruptly ‘cut-off’, although 
they would be particularly ‘beneficial’ for Moldova’s transformation. This observation leads aid-
workers to think that external players should foster professional links: 
 
Max (aid-worker, 63, Lucerne): It’s a real loss. I often observe that our counterparts are not 
interested how their former colleagues are doing abroad and their contacts with migrants are 
abruptly cut off. Maybe this is like a reflex, they don’t want to know that migrants are better off 
– they are jealous. But professional links with their former colleagues could be very beneficial for 
the NGOs, because some migrants do small projects where they are now, and they could also 
become private funders for the NGOs. 
 
 I conclude that the Moldovan migrant associations have succeeded in establishing 
themselves to some extent as agents for development vis-à-vis the policy makers and donors, 
but not within the national civil society. The members of the ‘established Moldovan civil society’ 
do not share the discursive construction of migrant associations as non-profit organisations or 
as civil-society actors. Consequently, the integration of migrant associations aspiring to be part 
of the national NGO scene is obstructed. Moreover, it puts migrant development organisations 
which do not want to be affiliated with ‘official’ Moldova in a double outsider position. Hence, 
as long as migrants are not fully recognised as competent social partners within the professional 
national development sector, new synergies with other development associations might not 
happen naturally, and migrant organisations are caught in a vicious circle that compromises the 
transfer of their transnational development efforts into Moldova’s third sector. One possible 
way to leave this vicious circle and to enhance migrants’ recognition as development actors, I 
propose, is to strengthen the visibility of migrants’ development interventions in the national 
and international development sector. Therefore, I find it vital to briefly address two relevant 
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questions, which I deem neglected in the debate surrounding migrant associations’ 
development contributions; namely where should migrants’ development contributions be 
visible and for whom?  
 In Moldova, there is a striking lack of visibility of migrants’ development efforts. I did not 
come across one single visible reference to projects implemented by migrant associations in my 
fieldwork. Yet migrants’ collective interventions are overly visible in some communities of 
African countries, for example with oversized billboards (e.g. Lampert 2014; Mazzucato and 
Kabki 2009 on the Nigerian and Ghanaian cases). The visible development drivers in Moldova 
are international aid organisations. Participants of social NGOs and local key informants could 
hardly name a specific migrant association, albeit they highlighted some significant diaspora 
contributions to Moldova’s transformation process (see Chapter 6). Related to the lack of 
visibility of migrants' aid-interventions is the observation that NGO workers outside Moldova’s 
capital frequently referred to diaspora activities as ‘something that happens chiefly in Chisinau’; 
even if migrants’ local interventions are nationwide, due to the fact that Moldovans emigrate 
from all parts of the country. The rather surprising reference to ‘the local’ as the capital city 
contradicts the common rhetoric of the development and migration literature of the ‘local’ as 
being migrants’ micro-spaces of their communities of origin (e.g. Brickell and Datta 2011; 
IASCI/Nexus 2014). 
 Besides, current aid-practices of international development institutions strongly emphasise 
strengthening the visibility of migrants’ development engagement in the host-country context 
(e.g. CIM/GIZ 2012). It is certainly true that migrants’ development efforts are rarely visible and 
recognised in the host countries under study, and that there is a need to “give development-
oriented migrant associations a face in the UK, in Germany or France”, as one participant put it. 
To the best of my knowledge, however, there are no programmes that explicitly address the 
visibility of migrants’ interventions in the development sector in migrants’ home-countries in 
general and in Moldova in particular. In my view, migrants’ recognition as local or international 
professional development partners can only be achieved if the impacts of migrants’ 
development efforts are also visible within the professional aid-community. Therefore, I suggest 
it is time that donor agencies also support the visibility of migrants’ development projects in the 
professional international aid-community and in the national development scene in migrants’ 
home countries. In the Moldovan case, this could be easily done by improving the Bureau’s PR 
activities. These, I argued in Chapter 6, are currently mostly addressed to promote the Republic 
of Moldova via migrants’ activities abroad, rather than to enhance the visibility of migrants’ 
humanitarian interventions in Moldova within the professional national and international 
development field. 
240 
 
 To conclude section two, I argue that the current inner logics of the transnational 
development field can compromise a full recognition of migrants as social partners for change. 
Additionally, struggles over these practices can further obstruct migrants’ contribution to 
development. Struggles exist between the top-down paradigm of things, with practices of 
standardisation and upward accountability (Eyben 2013), and the ‘rights-based approach’, with 
more downward accountability and diversity (Mosse 2011). Ultimately, in my view, the 
empowerment of migrant associations as development agents would require a more ‘open-
minded’ donor attention and a generally more flexible form of development practices, which 
cannot be without serious rethinking of practices that undermine the dynamic and sometimes 
unpredictable nature of the relatively ‘new’ migrant agents, less familiar with the rules and 
practices of the development field. Realistically, though, it is rather unlikely that these practices 
will occur in the current atmosphere of security concerns and financial cuts in Western Europe. 
 
8.3 “With the Russians it’s either a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’’’: Dynamics of Migrant–Development Actor 
Relationships in Joint Development Settings 
 
In this last section, I demonstrate the initial experiences migrants and aid-practitioners made in 
joint development settings. I discuss the micro-politics involved in mutual collaborations by 
accentuating this time the migrants’ different types of aid-partners: IOs, government-related 
institutions, and development NGOs in Moldova and in the migrant host countries. 
 
8.3.1 Collaborations between migrants and IOs and government-related institutions 
 
The most controversial narratives from both social actors on their aid-relationship emerged in 
development settings with IOs and government-related organisations and migrants.  
 On the one hand, a number of participants in head offices in Brussels, Geneva or in Chisinau 
said that they had positive experiences in working together with migrant associations:  
 
Valeriu (project coordinator, 44, Chisinau): The associations are more professional now, and they 
do a lot of things. They cooperated very effectively with us in our return-programmes and in some 
projects within the EU-partnership framework. For example, they organised job-fairs in Italy and 
Moldova. Our collaboration with migrants worked well. It’s worth continuing. We really had some 
success stories. 
 
Ionela (project officer, 34, Chisinau): There is this list of migrant associations. And as I already 
said, some of these associations are always willing to participate in all kind of activities, and we 
made very positive experiences with them. And you know, the interesting thing is that some of 
them do it for free, on a voluntary basis. 
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It goes without saying that the stated advantage of migrant associations as cheap and handy 
service providers was roundly criticised by migrant leaders. They stated that for the same 
services and ideas, the IOs receive financial rewards, while they go away empty-handed. This is 
similar to their experiences with state institutions in the building-up of emigrant policies, 
discussed in Chapter 6. The initiator of the just-mentioned job-fair explains: 
 
 Ion (translator, 34, Paris): Seriously, they get all the money and we do everything for free, even if 
they can’t do their projects without us, because they need our contacts. I get so many emails 
from the WHO all the time, asking for contacts, but I have never obtained any financial reward 
[...]. And the job fair was our idea in the first place. We even worked for free on our trips back 
home, but then the development organisation received all the grants.  
 
A similar example is provided by Dragomir, who organised a series of seminars for return 
migrants in a programme implemented by an international aid-agency: 
  
 Dragomir (construction worker, 48, Paris): I have been constantly doing small things for IOs back 
home, but it adds up, and then the development institutions get hundreds of Euros for their 
migration–development programmes. And we received 200 in our last collaboration. 
 
  The aid-workers also positively evaluated their joint collaborations in which migrants acted 
as policy consultants, especially within migration–development policy frameworks and in post-
2015 consultations (e.g. within the UNDP’s ‘Mainstreaming migration into strategic policy 
development’ programme, 2012). Yet, once again, migrant leaders view these collaborations 
differently. They made rather negative experiences and felt uncomfortable in joint meetings 
with government representatives. This points to a fundamentally unequal power distribution 
and the limits of the partnership concept in multi-stakeholder settings in concrete practice. For 
example, in a project meeting organised by the Bureau, five grant applicants for a migration-
development programme presented their proposals; two consortia of migrant associations, a 
government ministry and two international NGOs. Rosa, who represented the migrant 
consortium, recalled: 
 
 Rosa (entrepreneur, 45, London): The whole event was a big struggle. And honestly, I wasn’t 
feeling very well. The government was one of the grant tenants but its representative 
immediately wanted to chair the whole event without even asking us. We then all rejected this, 
because we didn’t think this was fair. The government is one of us, so why should they chair the 
meeting? And it went on like this.  
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 On the other hand, aid-practitioners narrated that working with migrant associations was 
demanding. The three quotes below provide an insight into the most pronounced challenges of 
employees of IOs in their collaboration with migrants, chiefly relating to issues of ownership and 
reliability:  
 
Martin (programme manager, 55, Berne): The most important thing is to let migrants have their 
ownership, but this is very tricky. I am not sure how much directive we should provide [...]. We 
had negative experiences in the past, because we interfered too much. At the end of our 
programme migrants had projects which fulfilled our criteria, but they had lost ownership. That 
was not good.  
 
Markus (programme manager, 34, Brussels): Our collaborations have been difficult, not only with 
Moldovan migrants but with all migrants. We had difficulties on the capacity level. The 
implementation of large-scale EU projects overstretches most of the migrant associations’ 
capacity […]. In general, the platform of African diaspora was one of the most difficult projects 
we ever had, with lots of delays.  
 
Beth (head of conference management, 59, Geneva): The diaspora conference was one of the 
most difficult conferences I have ever organised in my entire career. We invited 44 delegates of 
diaspora ministries and we ended up with 500 participants. Apparently, everybody is responsible 
for the diaspora. Some delegations had 21 representatives, and there were many representatives 
of migrant associations we didn’t invite. It got really complicated and chaotic.  
 
Further negative feedback was reported on technical aspects, mostly on financial reports: 
  
 Oxana (project officer, 28, Chisinau): In our grant programme, we were very pleased to notice a 
strong collaboration between the migrant associations. And overall, there were no negative 
aspects, except maybe of some legal issues related to migrant associations' registrations and 
some small technical issues of financial accountability in the final reports.  
Moreover, the transparency of migrant associations is generally disputed, as the statements 
of aid-workers on migrant organisations’ ‘hidden agendas’ at the beginning of this chapter 
showed. Interestingly, in co-operations with IOs and bilateral development agencies, the 
migrant associations’ transparency is not a necessary prerequisite. This is partly because 
development institutions rely on migrant associations for implementing their migration 
programmes and policies (e.g. to request contacts to migrants for reaching out to beneficiaries 
living abroad). Dora explains the somewhat ‘asymmetrical relationship’ between the two actors 
in this domain: 
Dora (consultant, 42, Chisinau): A big problem in our collaboration with migrant associations was 
their transparency. Six years ago, there existed only a limited number of well-functioning 
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organisations, so they didn’t need to fulfil the usual transparency requirements. They could 
basically do whatever they wanted to do, because the international organisations needed them 
for their programmes.  
 
 A last fundamental element of the relationship between migrants and donor agencies, which 
I find particularly interesting, is the preference of many migrant leaders to work with Russian 
donor agencies instead of Western development institutions. Contrary to what one would 
assume in the case of the politically divided Republic of Moldova, the migrants’ preference to 
engage with Russian donor organisations – outside the mainstream international development 
establishment – is not related to migrants’ personal political stances. It is a purely pragmatic 
choice, based on the criteria of the ‘simplest’ and most ‘uncomplicated’ ways to receive project 
support:  
 
Natasha (shop-assistant, 48, Paris): The EU always wants to see complicated and elaborated 
needs- and risk-assessments and this and that plan. And even if you do all these assessments, it 
is not clear what exactly they decide. And then they get back to you after a long time and tell you 
that they will not fund the project. With the Russians it’s different. They come and tell you straight 
away […] With the Russians it’s either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’.  
  
Migrants’ preferences for these ‘more pragmatic’, or ‘more down-to-earth partners’ compared 
to Western mainstream development agencies makes sense. Especially bearing in mind that 
most associations are volunteer-run with limited financial and time resources available, and that 
many of them want to hold onto ‘simple’ and ‘human’ development interventions (see Chapter 
7).  
 Migrant leaders also have a flair for teaming up with the fairly new development agencies of 
Central European countries, for example with the Czech, Polish or Bulgarian development 
agencies and their respective branches of international charities (e.g. the Czech Caritas). Their 
growing engagement in the migration-development domain in Moldova indicates that the 
transnational field of development is all but static, and that the donor landscape in the region 
has become more polycentric (cf. USAID 2013). While these actors have been widely ignored in 
the migration–development literature so far, all migrant leaders positively referred to them as 
being more receptive to their ideas and needs, compared to the more established Western 
European actors159.  
                                                          
159 Another reason why some of the migrant leaders seek alternative support from these actors is their frustration about 
domestic politics of the pro-Western government with its associated Western development alliance (see Chapter 4). 
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Ion (barman, 29, Tallinn): The Polish and Czech bilateral agencies are much more easy-going. They 
are less rigorous than the Western European aid-agencies, and they are more flexible. I mean 
they are also more open to learn from us. It’s more ehm reciprocal. When we have a choice, we 
always collaborate with them.  
  
  In contrast, Western European aid-practitioners pointed to Central European development 
actors as a part of ‘Moldova’s problem’ – its slow and politically turbulent development 
transition. They criticised the EU-experts and consultants from Central Europe for being too 
tolerant towards the ‘post-socialist laissez faire mentality’ – as some of them pejoratively 
described the project handling of their Moldovan counterparts. Rightly, this points out that the 
question of who is the ideal partner to team up with for development activities applies not only 
to migrants and their associations.  
 To conclude, the narratives of both aid-workers and migrants show that the optimistic 
development policy rhetoric of teaming up with migrant associations for fruitful collaboration 
proved often to be challenging in real-life situations, especially when the ‘real lives’ of both 
actors are challenging and unequal power geometries are at work, obstructing an equal 
relationship in practice. While the majority of representatives of IOs positively narrated their 
experiences of collaborating with migrants, migrants’ accounts were mixed. They do not 
perceive themselves as equal partners of IOs and government-affiliated aid-institutions in 
migration–development programmes, but rather as cheap service-providers. This negatively 
impacts upon migrants’ integration into the official development field, and upon their 
motivation to stay engaged in formal development activities.  
 
8.3.2 Relationships between migrants and development NGOs in Moldova and in host  
countries 
 
Collaborations between migrant associations and development organisations in migrant host 
countries or in Moldova happened in most cases ‘spontaneously’, without strategic planning:  
 
 Svetlana (factory worker and artist, 55, Munich): Our collaboration with Dr Müller from the 
German foundation started by pure coincidence one morning in the lift of the factory. Dr Müller 
asked me where I come from. And when I told him that I am from Moldova, he was immediately 
interested in my country. Later we met for coffee and then we started to work together.  
 
The participants’ descriptions of their collaborations as something that ‘just happened’ – often 
in a random and variable way – suggests that development NGOs do not necessarily think of 
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migrant associations as potential partners when designing their projects, despite their earlier 
highlighted openness towards migrants and their willingness to experiment in forms of joint 
collaboration. Where collaborations between migrants and development NGOs, trade unions or 
other civil- society organisations in both geographical contexts happened, they were always 
positively narrated by all research participants. Migrants, especially, benefited from these 
collaborations for the improvement of their organisational capacities and management skills 
(see also Chapter 6). This finding is consistent with the results of the majority of research on the 
earlier mentioned ‘co-development programmes’, that look at relationship patterns between 
migrant associations and local or national governmental or development actors in the receiving 
contexts (e.g. Østergaard-Nielson 2011). 
 Another fundamental element in the micro-relationship between migrants and aid-agencies, 
which I deem overlooked in the top-down approach in much research on the role of migrant 
associations in the migration–development nexus, is that the majority of large-scale diaspora-
led programmes in Moldova are implemented by local employees. This means that individual 
interactions between the two research groups occur mostly between migrants and their co-
citizens, employed in local or international aid-organisations, or with civil servants. The majority 
of migrants’ narratives on negative experiences in aid-relationships were precisely linked to their 
co-citizens’ general work ethos and the functioning of institutions headed by Moldovans. The 
negative portrait included complaints about clientelism in the allocation of funds, lack of 
genuine interest in their work and a ‘general unprofessionalism’ in their functioning (e.g. 
shortcomings in communication skills, delays, unreliability). In a nutshell, migrants criticise their 
Moldovan counterparts for the same reasons as the Western development professionals find 
fault with migrants. The quote below, referring to a fundraising event of a migrant association 
and a Moldovan branch of an international child organisation, exemplifies migrants’ descriptions 
of their communication with aid-agencies headed by local employees as being unnecessarily 
difficult and slow: 
 
Rosa (entrepreneur, 45, London): The woman who was sending us the handicrafts made by 
children for the charity event failed to tell us more about these children. We only knew that they 
were autistic children and orphans. It was once more a communication problem. I begged her to 
give us more information, because we wanted to better describe these children at the event, but 
she kept forgetting. Communication and information is always the biggest challenge we have with 
our partners in Moldova, although it would be very easy to improve.  
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 On the same note, migrants criticised the bureaucratic and administrative work culture of 
Moldovan-based counterparts, which is believed to be a central obstacle obstructing positive 
change in Moldova (see Chapter 4):  
 
 Dana (social worker, 46, Rome): They were very bureaucratic and slow. I understand that it's not 
something they do on purpose, it’s just they are still slow, and communication via email is almost 
impossible, because some people back home don’t yet have the culture of emails.  
 
 Natalia (lecturer and businesswoman, 42, Rome): At the end, the financial papers got ridiculous 
to the point that we were disputing over 17 cents, no, 18 cents in their favour actually [laughs], 
but I had to change the whole report. I was in Moldova at that time, and I just couldn’t believe it. 
 
In summary, co-operation between development NGOs in migrant host-countries and 
Moldova happened in most cases spontaneously. Notwithstanding, all research participants 
estimated these collaborations positively – with the exception of migrants’ ‘difficult’ experiences 
in work relationships with their co-citizens, mostly resulting from cultural aspects and/or 
discrepancies between migrants and Moldovans who have never migrated.  
 
8.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have critically examined dispositions, attitudes and practices that migrants and 
aid-workers display as processes in the complex system of power relations in the transnational 
field of development. Informed by the ‘social field approach’, I analysed the dynamics within the 
development field according to Bourdieu (1989) – as more or less differentiated institutional 
complexes that addressed both the discursive level and the level of everyday development 
practice. And I traced the discrepancies between the dominant policy discourse and the 
practices of integrating migrants’ development efforts into the professional field of aid-
establishment. In the first section, I introduced the development practitioners’ viewpoint on the 
topic. 
It was revealed that, despite Moldovan migrants' development efforts in general and their 
feeding into emigrant policy-making in particular, their role as legitimate development partners 
remains controversial. I illustrated this argument by highlighting the double standards applied 
to migrant organisations in the professional development establishment in several regards: to 
their genuine interests in the development cause, to their attributed development ‘savoir faire’, 
and to the allocation of funding and technical support. 
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 The future will show whether these double standards are just one step in the learning-by-
doing process of migrants’ integration into the formal development establishment. For now, 
they can serve as a reminder of the importance of being critically aware of how power sustains 
and reinforces practices of migrants’ involvement in the development field (cf. Bourdieu 1990).  
 Along these lines, a particular discomfort was found among aid-workers in how to cope with the 
heterogeneity of migrant organisations, be they professional NGOs, voluntary-run or profit-
oriented organisations – inside or outside mainstream development establishment. Although 
most aid-workers do recognise the diversity of migrant associations, they find it difficult to accept 
in practice.  
  As a self-criticism of my own theoretical framework, I agree with research participants that 
the conceptualisation of migrant associations as non-profit organisations or civil-society actors 
is too narrow and inaccurate to explain the diversity of migrant associations. In my view, the 
approach of migrant organisations as transnational grassroots organisations representing local 
communities (Smith and Guranizo 1998), or as a ‘diasporic civil society’ (Mullings 2012) adds to 
the uncertainty of how exactly to deal with migrants and their associations as newcomers in 
aidland.  
 Hence, more recognition of the variety of types of migrant associations could provide for greater 
clarity of their role on the micro-level of the development establishment, especially in regard to 
alternative migrant associations outside official mainstream development, and/or of voluntary-
run or for-profit organisations.  
  Furthermore, throughout Chapters 7 and 8 we saw that both transnational social fields – the 
migrant civil society and the formal development establishment – are created by relational 
positions of organisations which are involved in the struggle over the definition of their 
respective powers.  
 The most common struggles between the two fields regarding standards and competences in 
development efforts occur between professional development practices versus migrants' chiefly 
voluntary mode of development practices. Although this observation is not new, I personally find 
it insufficiently addressed in the literature on migrant associations.  
 In contrast to other volunteer development NGOs, informal networks and groups, which seem to 
have somehow found their place within or around aidland, development practitioners still need 
to socially constitute a similar approach to migrant associations.  
  In section 2, I showed the importance of critically examining currently dominant aid-practices 
in order to better understand the practice of involving migrants in development. I pointed to the 
limits of participatory spaces for migrants in the formal development field by examining how 
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mainstream results and evidence-based practices shape the development practitioners’ working 
practices with migrants. 
 The key argument put forward is that current conventional development practices and struggles 
over the right practices – for example between top-down measurements versus accountability-
to-people approaches emphasising relationships – are good to think with when analysing the 
relationship-building between aid workers and migrants, as they influence practices aimed at 
incorporating migrants’ development efforts into the professional development field. 
 Furthermore, these practices can create an additional uneasiness with migrants’ roles and 
expectations about their contribution to development. And they can also lead to a repetition of 
mistakes previously made in other development contexts, for instance in earlier attempts to 
build up a civil society in Eastern Europe.  
 The current dominant development practice of supporting only programmes and organisations 
claiming to deliver quick wins and easily measurable results can undermine a sustainable 
integration of migrants and their collective efforts in the transnational development field. Hence, 
despite the development establishment’s efforts put into relationship practices, the 
transnational space of the mainstream development community is far from being a community 
of solidarity, and questions of power and definitions over what is a ‘good aid-practice’ with 
migrants remain open.  
 An additional element contributing to the malaise of aid-workers with migrants’ role in the 
development establishment is their controversial approach to migrants’ spatial distance to 
Moldova.  
 Moldovan migrants are considered by rural NGOs in Moldova closer than the umbrella 
organisations and funding organisations in the capital, which I have argued points to 
understudied intra-European specificities of the migration–transformation nexus. I found that 
different development practices and socio-cultural perceptions of migrants’ distance to Moldova 
can shape migrants’ manifold roles in development practices. A more relaxed handling of the 
distance and nearness of migrants to their home countries and to development actors would be 
crucial for improving the relationship between migrants and aid actors. 
  And last of all, I showed that in the newest round of aid-practices, for example in the local-
to-local approach, a shift from fostering transnational ties to supporting local ties in the 
migrants’ countries of origin is currently ongoing (e.g. EU 2013b; EU/UNDP 2014). The strategic 
partnerships between donor organisations and local civil-society actors, including migrants and 
governments at a decentralised level, might be a chance for enhancing the sustainability of 
migrants’ projects, and for including the often-neglected structural context of migrants’ 
engagement in the migration–development debate (cf. de Haas 2012). Yet, it will be important 
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to find a compromise between the near and far and not to lose sight of the transnational 
component of the migration–development nexus – the space of migrant actors and their 
connections. Otherwise, these aid-practices might result in a relatively short excursion into the 
transnational Moldovan migrant space. Furthermore, I remain sceptical that the practice will 
increase the migrant civil society’s recognition as a valid member of the national Moldovan 
development scene, which in my opinion can only be achieved with a broader recognition of the 
associations’ development efforts by the professional development community. And it will 
certainly not solve the vital issue of political legitimacy in the allocation of development funds 
to migrant association-led programmes in Europe, given current shifts to the right in European 
politics that puts aid flows at risk in general.  
 The findings of this section reveal that the engagement of migrant associations in development 
cooperation turned out to be in many cases difficult to implement, and there is a profound 
uncertainty in how to deal with migrant associations in concrete development practice. Keeping 
in mind the complexity of transnational co-operation patterns of both migrants and development 
actors, there exists no single ‘best practice’ to engage, enable and empower migrants’ collective 
development engagement.  
 Thus, I fully agree with Page and Tanyi (2015) who maintain that migrants’ development 
engagement is a craft for all actors involved, a skill that is learnt over time, through practice, and 
without a simple recipe.  
  In section three I discussed the micro-relationship between migrants and development 
actors in concrete project settings.  
 A particular mixed picture of joint collaborations was presented by participants working in the 
head offices of donor institutions, IOs and bilateral development agencies. Vice-versa, 
experiences between migrant associations and Moldovan NGOs as well as development NGOs in 
the migrants’ countries of residence were narrated positively. This finding sheds light on the 
importance of migrants’ different aid-partners when analysing migrants’ working relationships 
with aid-agencies. 
  Moreover, the majority of migrant leaders do not yet regard themselves as bridge-builders 
or brokers between the East and the West in co-operations with mainstream aid-agencies, as 
commonly assumed in the broader literature. Similar to migrants’ experiences with the building-
up of state support structures, discussed in Chapter 6, they rather consider themselves as 
contact points and cheap service providers for IOs and bilateral agencies. That being said, the 
assumed advantage of migrants’ direct links to their home communities as less bureaucratic 
channels of aid – highlighted in the development industry’s theorisations – is also strongly used 
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by international aid-agencies for reaching out to Moldovan migrants for their migration–
development programmes.  
  And last of all, we saw that migrants’ relationships with co-citizens, the employees of local 
and international organisations in Moldova, were challenging.  
 The key-finding of this section is that migrants’ and aid-workers’ mutual experiences in aid-
relationships proved to be often challenging in real-life development settings. Especially, when 
the ‘real lives’ of both actors are characterised by despair and unequal power geometries are at 
work obstructing an equal relationship in practice.  
 Hence, it certainly remains a challenging task to match these life-worlds in concrete real-life 
situations.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
  
This thesis has explored how Moldovan migrant associations are involved in the social 
development of their home country from a multi-perspective, transnational approach. In this 
final chapter, I first give an overview of the main findings on each of the three main research 
dimensions introduced in Chapter 1, before I summarise the results garnered throughout the 
thesis across all research dimensions. I then share some general reflections on the overall thesis, 
and I discuss the findings in the light of the broader theoretical debates on migration–
development, social remittances and state–emigrant relationships. I conclude with a discussion 
of avenues for further research and policy recommendations.   
 
9.1 Synthesis and Discussion  
9.1.1 Findings obtained on each research dimension 
In this section I summarise the main findings of the thesis according to the three research 
dimensions and their respective research questions as set out in Chapter 1 and briefly set out 
again below for easy reference. A detailed summary of the findings can be found in the 
conclusions of the Chapters 4-8. 
Dimension 1:  the transnational field of Moldovan migrants 
How is the development policy and practice of actively involving migrants in development 
efforts perceived and negotiated among Moldovan migrants? 
 
The sub-questions in this first research dimension are: 
· What are migrants’ visions of Moldova’s transformation? 
· Who is engaged on a voluntary basis in collective transnational social practices regarding 
age, education and gender?  
· How do migrants define their role as agents of transformative change in Moldova? 
· What forms of collective transnational engagements do migrant associations implement, 
and how are these forms shaped by migrants’ everyday lives? 
· If the associations and networks are involved in development initiatives, how do they decide 
about strategic and organisational matters with regard to their concrete involvement in 
development donor programmes? 
 
First, I examined migrants’ perceptions of Moldova’s transformation process. I showed in 
Chapter 4 that the majority of migrant leaders have a bleak vision of their home country’s future. 
For them, Moldova is politically and economically unstable and governed by corruption. Their 
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distrust in the political elite negatively impacts upon their development efforts towards 
Moldova, despite a strong emotional attachment to their home country.  
I then marked, through a broadly deductive approach, the importance of a fresh perspective 
on Moldovan migration beyond remittances and ‘children left behind’ to understand the 
migrants’ transnational aid practices. I identified understudied current Moldovan migration 
features that significantly shape migrants’ transnational development practices: actual or 
anticipated onward migration towards North-Western Europe, lack of socio-cultural integration 
in the host society, delayed return migration and family reunification. Besides impacting upon 
migrants’ collective commitments towards Moldova, these migration features all show typical 
characteristics of the current complex and dynamic intra-European East-West migration, which 
have largely escaped the attention of the majority of studies on Moldovan migration.  
Further, I explored who is involved in collective development practices and why. Firstly, we 
saw that the common feature of migrant leaders is that they were all engaged in self-help groups 
or NGOs prior to emigration, either as professionals or as volunteers, or they showed a great 
interest in such activities. The group of collectively involved migrants is heterogeneous and 
gender-balanced, consisting of migrants with different socio-professional backgrounds. Many of 
them have a higher education background and experienced de-skilling either in Moldova or in 
their Western European destination countries. Secondly, I demonstrated that a variety of 
underlying motivations, individual meanings and attitudes account for migrants’ engagement in 
transnational aid-practices, which are strongly interwoven with their multi-sited social lives and 
can change over time. These are moral satisfaction, self-esteem, belonging, compassion, feelings 
of guilt for ‘being absent’, and personal development in terms of gaining different types of 
capital in different social and spatial contexts (Chapter 7). 
 The majority of migrant leaders welcomes policies and programmes to involve their 
initiatives into the formal development establishment. With the exception of a central group of 
migrant leaders, migrants’ motivations to engage in such initiatives are, however, chiefly linked 
to personal interests and individual life plans (e.g. to prepare for return migration), rather than 
to policies aimed at integrating migrants into homeland development. This resonates with the 
broader pleas made by scholars to ‘ground’ migrant communities in everyday acts and to unravel 
the repercussions of migrants’ many connections on their lives and identities (e.g. Christou and 
Mavroudi 2015; Page and Tanyi 2015). Hence, opportunity structures provided by international 
development agencies and the Moldovan authorities are not sufficient to explain the full reality 
of migrants’ collective development efforts.  
Most migrant associations are small and volunteer-run, and their role in Moldova’s 
development is still modest, due to shortcomings in their organisational and financial capacities. 
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Whether their influence on Moldova’s local development agendas will increase once they 
dispose more financial resources, remains to be seen. In most instances, the presidents of 
associations decide upon migrants’ development activities, rather than the members.  
Overall, the organisations engage in a variety of aid practices, covering a wide range of areas 
of intervention – from charity events in their places of residence to large-scale social projects of 
several years (see Chapter 6). Apart from a small number of migrant associations whose 
development activities span various host countries and regions in Moldova, development 
interventions in Moldova are chiefly carried out on a local level. Interestingly, despite the 
relative short time of Moldovan migration towards Western and South-Western Europe, 
Moldovan migrant associations dispose of a higher share of transnational-oriented development 
activities, compared to other migrant groups, who took longer to develop transnational 
activities (see Chapter 6).  
 In the course of the research, interesting forms of migrants’ collective development practices 
emerged that have largely escaped the attention of the migration–development debate. These 
include, for example, patterns of aid-giving shaped by Moldova’s socialist history, by the 
country’s marginalised place within the socio-spatial configuration of Europe or by the migrants’ 
individual past, present and anticipated migration experiences, and forms of aid-giving 
motivated by compassion and guilt for ‘being absent’ (see Chapters 4 and 7). These findings 
reflect Christou and Mavroudi’s statement that: “Development itself is a contested, expansive 
and a holistic process, which we see as part of everyday life, and which may be empowering for 
those involved in creating positive changes” (2015: 3). The aspect of empowerment applies in 
particular to migrants who excel their talents and skills in their development activities, which 
they cannot use in their professional occupations, to migrants who create employment 
opportunities via development projects in Moldova or abroad, and to female care-workers, who 
invest their increased agency gained from their own migration in transnational aid-giving (see 
Chapter 7).  
 Furthermore, despite the migrants’ critique of the Moldovan government, most migrant 
leaders regard a supportive institutional structure and a culture of recognition for their 
development efforts by ‘official Moldova’ and its development partners as more important for 
their development engagements than the local or national associative context in their host 
countries. Moreover, even if a national associational culture of self-help groups rubs off on 
Moldovan associations in some cases, the local support structures of their host countries were 
found more pertinent for their transnational engagement than national associative structures. 
The most favourable context for migrant associations are localities with a high civic 
organisational infrastructure and a receptive environment to migrants (e.g. migrant 
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participation in local political structures and decentralised integration policies), met for instance 
in Novellara, Padova and in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Bigger cities like London, 
Paris and Rome are less favourable for migrants’ development-oriented activities due to 
practical reasons (e.g. to find affordable premises, high spatial dispersion of their members).  
 Lastly, migrants’ various motivations to engage in Moldova’s development efforts generate 
a wide range of transnational development performances, which do not necessarily easily fit 
into the values and logic of the transnational field of the development industry. I see, therefore, 
important challenges ahead for state and development actors’ efforts to bundle and channel all 
the ‘good spirits’ towards national development strategies. We have to bear in mind that in 
migrants’ views a Moldovan transnational ‘development community’ is still in the making, and 
is presently obstructed by the creation of an ‘ethnic Moldovan diaspora’ in Western Europe 
itself. Thus, according to migrants, the role of their diaspora in Moldova’s development 
transition still needs to be defined. This takes us now to aid-workers’ perspective on the issue. 
 
Dimension 2:  the transnational field of development actors  
How is the ‘policy idea’ of involving migrants and their organisations imagined within the 
transnational field of development? 
 
· How do development actors (including local NGOs and the Moldovan state) view migrants 
and their associations; their activities, members and their role as development actors? 
· Are they seen as partners or beneficiaries?  
· How is the policy category of migrants’ involvement negotiated and sustained among 
development policy makers and practitioners? 
 
 
Firstly, the thesis showed that, despite a large amount of international donor funding allocated 
to Moldova's national migration–development programmes, the country's fragile political 
climate and its complex search for national identity hinder a sustainable structural and 
ideological engagement with its absentees.  
Secondly, I identified the rapid successive changes of how the Moldovan state and its key 
development partners pictured Moldovan migrants since the country’s independence in 1991 – 
from purely ignoring them, to the main cause of the country’s demographic and social distress, 
to victims of human trafficking and exploitation, and most recently as economic partners and 
‘sponsors’ for the country’s transformation. These shifts were accompanied by respective policy 
changes – from return policies to programmes addressing the ‘migrant victims’ to a wide range 
of migration–development policies. That being said, in a relatively short period of time, 
discourses on migration and development have moved to the centre stage of development 
policy in Moldova, and emigration is no longer a ‘Cinderella issue’.  
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My engagement with the lens of development policy makers and aid-practitioners reveals, 
however, that their perception of migrants’ life-worlds and of migrants’ roles in the country’s 
development transition remains controversial. For instance, the latest trend of the discursive 
subject of ‘the migrant self-entrepreneur’ – sustained by the macro-development policy 
discourse on diaspora engagement and subsequently adapted to the Moldovan contextre – 
reveals considerable gaps between the image of aid-workers and civil servants on the ‘ideal 
transnationally engaged Moldovan migrant’ and the most active migrants in practice. This 
discursive subject does not apply to the majority of Moldovan migrant leaders. It masks the 
reality of a relatively large number of migrants who still face difficult challenges in their daily 
lives (e.g. labour discrimination or challenges in family reunification) and raises unrealistic 
expectations about the migrants’ capacities to contribute to development. Consequently, at the 
meso level, the core assumption of development actors about a ‘new transformed Moldovan 
diaspora’, composed of ‘settled and well-off migrants’, ready to contribute to Moldova’s 
transformation, needs to be reconfigured, too. As shown, like the country, Moldovan migration 
is currently undergoing fundamental transformations (Chapter 5). The discrepancy between 
discourse and reality distorts the already contested views on Moldova’s mass emigration in 
general, and on the migrants’ realities in particular.  
 Not only do the interpretations surrounding the engagement of the migrant community for 
Moldova’s transformation remain controversial, but also the modalities of integrating migrants 
in the setting up of structural support mechanisms addressed to them. Even if the emergence 
of a migrant associational dynamic has taken shape, and some migrants were involved in the 
creation of state-led support structures, a certain reluctance of development actors to 
financially support migrant associations has thus far constrained migrant organisations’ 
development capacity (Chapter 6). This shows that there is not only a considerable gap between 
development policy rhetoric and practice, but also a practical uneasiness in empowering 
migrants as autonomous partners for Moldova’s development efforts and steering them from a 
distance. In order to avoid future costly mismatches between migrants’ expressed needs and 
services put in place – which I argued are rather complex and incoherent – the support 
structures need to be simplified and better adjusted to migrants’ needs.  
 Additionally, I demonstrated that some aid-workers are not yet equipped with the necessary 
attitudes and practices in dealing with migrants as their new development partners. The 
discomfort in the handling of migrants’ relatively new role as partners was particularly pertinent 
among aid-workers who implement both programmes with and for migrants. Moreover, their 
malaise is also expressed in double standards applied to migrants in aidland compared to more 
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established development actors, for instance over the allocation of funds for migrant 
associations’ projects or their organisational forms (Chapter 8).   
 Lastly, the multi-perspective approach allowed me to see that migrants’ physical and 
ideological distance to Moldova is contested in practice. Aid-workers’ perception of the distance 
stretching between the migrants and Moldova is not only culturally coined, but also varies 
according to migrants’ attributed roles in their development programmes. For instance, we saw 
that, as policy consultants, migrants are perceived as too close to Moldova to be consulted as 
experts, while as partners their distance is valued (see Chapter 8). 
 To conclude, the Moldovan authorities and their development partners have not yet 
succeeded in creating an enabling environment for collaborating with migrant associations, 
despite large aid-investments, aid-workers’ declared open-minded attitudes towards migrants 
and a diversification of migration–development policies. Similar to the malaise in dealing with 
Moldova’s mass emigration and the country’s uncertain future, engaging Moldovan migrants as 
their partners provokes unease. It will be interesting to monitor whether the situation improves 
in the years to come, once the programmes have been implemented over a longer period of 
time, and whether there will be a ‘new normal’ in how to deal with migrants in Moldova’s formal 
development policies. 
Dimension 3: the aid-relationship dynamics 
How are the aid-relationships between migrants and development actors shaped in 
practice? 
 
· How are migrants integrated into the field of transnational development policy? 
· How do migrants and development actors experience their collaborations? 
· Are migrants and their associations just ‘invited’ to participate or do they have influence on 
the decision-making processes of development policies and initiatives? 
 
My final objective was to focus on the existing connections between development actors and 
migrants within the transnational field of aidland. I showed that the field in which development 
practitioners and migrants operate exists in a context of complex power relationships. I pointed 
to the limits of participatory spaces for migrants in the formal development field by examining 
how mainstream aid-practice, based on a discourse of impact, results and evidence-based 
practice, shapes the development practitioners’ working practices with migrants. I argued that 
the politico-bureaucratic international development field often results in giving migrants voices 
without providing them with actual decision-making capacity. Further, I showed in Chapter 8 
that, in delivery-oriented practices, some of the Western donor agencies unnecessarily 
replicated mistakes in the support of the migrant civil society made in the building up of an 
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‘Eastern European civil society’ and its embedding into the formal development establishment. 
Additionally, struggles over conventional aid-practices can further obstruct migrants’ 
contribution to development, especially between the ‘paradigm of things’– which is top-down 
with practices of standardisation and upward accountability (Eyben 2013) – and the ‘rights-
based approach’, with more downward accountability and acknowledgment of diversity (Mosse 
2011). As long as there are tensions between flexible and responsive development practices that 
support truly empowering migrants and the obligation to demonstrate pre-defined results, the 
space for new creative relationships with migrants in official development is limited. 
 The majority of migrant leaders regard their involvement in state-led development 
programmes and policies as an ‘alibi-participation’ with little room for flexible and creative 
support. Their experiences in collaborating with Moldova’s key development partners are 
narrated as an ‘asymmetrical relationship’, in which they are cheap service providers of ideas 
and contacts, but have not yet not received the recognition as professional social development 
actors they were hoping for. This rather unexpected reversed asymmetrical relationship 
between migrants and the development industry originates from the attempted fast catch-up 
by the Moldovan government and its development partners in creating migration–development 
policies and programmes. In doing so, they relied upon migrant associations’ inputs and contacts 
with the migrant community. The migrant associations provided these services mostly for free. 
To this end, the assumed advantage of migrants’ direct links to their home-country as forming 
less bureaucratic channels of aid – highlighted in the development industry’s theorisations – are 
not only used for migrants’ home communities but also by international aid-agencies for their 
new programmes. Additionally, despite the fact that migrant associations could to some extent 
establish themselves as agents for development vis-à-vis the development policy makers and 
international donors in Moldova, the migrant civil society and the local Moldovan civil society 
scene remain in practice worlds apart (Chapter 8). This makes migrants’ integration into 
Moldova’s development field only a partial one.  
 On the other hand, the development actors’ working experiences with migrants were 
narrated positively, chiefly by representatives of IOs based in Chisinau. A somewhat more mixed 
picture was presented by participants working in the head offices of donor institutions, IOs and 
bilateral development agencies outside Moldova. These participants also pointed to negative 
aspects of their collaborations with migrant associations, such as migrants’ poor management 
skills, reliability and transparency. Vice-versa, collaborations between migrant associations and 
Moldovan NGOs and development NGOs in the migrants’ countries of residence were also 
described positively. These findings shed light on the importance of a more nuanced approach 
to migrants' different types of aid-partners when examining migrants’ integration into aidland. 
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  In sum, despite the development establishment’s improved efforts put on practices 
emphasising relationships, the migrants’ role as legitimate new partners in concrete 
development practice is not just fraught with complexity, but full of substantial contradictions, 
as shown with the example of migrants’ attributed ‘savoir’, their expertise, and their ‘savoir 
faire’, their practical development competences (Chapter 8).  
 
9.1.2 Summary of findings obtained across all research dimensions 
 
In this sub-section I summarise the overarching results and observations obtained across all 
three research dimensions. They all point to aspects of the broader Moldovan migration–
development debate to which I think we should pay more attention in research and policy-
making.  
 Throughout the thesis, I have deconstructed the development policy discourse on migrant 
associations’ engagement by introducing social and cultural dimensions including the migrant’s 
own perspectives on the migration–development discourse, the various social relational 
dynamics between migrants, their Moldovan counterparts and development players. I showed 
that, if development means improved living standards for everyone, the multidimensional 
perspectives of the migrants have to be considered much more carefully within the 
development concern under the label of ‘Diaspora’. The advantage of this multi-sited, multi-
layered approach was the interesting contributions I was able to make to the theoretical 
discussions surrounding the Moldovan migration–development debate. It allowed, for instance, 
the different underlining perceptions of development practices and values among migrants and 
non-migrant aid professionals, which thus far have not been explicitly materialised in the 
academic debate, to emerge. Notable here are migrants’ reluctance towards top-down 
approaches and professional ‘charity’. By including Moldovan migrants’ rationalities and values, 
which have been missed out in the debate so far, I demonstrated that migrants have different 
interpretations from the mainstream development agencies on Moldova’s political 
transformation process, either as an independent state or as a part of Romania. And lastly, we 
saw that diverging opinions about the ‘ideal’ development partners exist among migrants and 
aid professionals (i.e. migrants’ preferences to team up with partners from EEA states). Hence, 
I see a need to move towards a more diversified approach of what transformation(s) and 
transformative practice(s) might be, and towards acceptance of pluralistic understanding as a 
legitimate form of development knowledge formation (cf. Hettne 2009). 
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 A similar issue that emerged across all three research dimensions is to shift gazes: towards 
researching Moldovan migration and migrants’ transnational ties as a part of intra-European 
migration; towards the broader research agenda on intra-European inequalities; and towards 
supporting the visibility of migrants’ development engagement from the West to the East – from 
migrant host countries towards Moldova and the transnational professional aid-community.  
 Furthermore, I identified a mix of factors obstructing the integration of migrants’ collective 
‘development potential’ into the aid world, which have not been adequately addressed in the 
migration–development debate. These are: Moldova’s fragile political and structural context, 
including the migrants’ bleak vision of Moldova’s future; the still relatively poor structural 
support provided by Moldova and its development partners to migrant associations; current 
mainstream aid-mechanisms (e.g. the delivery-oriented development approach); the lack of 
migrants’ recognition as social development actors within the Moldovan development scene; 
the controversial cultural interpretations of migrants’ distance to their home-country, and 
internal fractures within the migrant community along the lines of new class structures; political 
and non-political engagement of migrants; and finally struggles over the building up of a 
(transnational) development diaspora. 
 In this context, diverse types of ‘temporalities’ emerged as crucial for migrants’ forms of aid-
giving and for their relationships with development actors: the time for ‘making’ a community 
of collective practice; the overall situation of Moldova at the time-point of migrants’ departure 
impacting upon migrants ways of looking back at Moldova and on migrants’ institutional trust; 
the individual time dimension of the migration process influencing migrants’ agency to engage 
with Moldova; and migrants’ individually perceived present and anticipated duration of their 
‘absence’. In this respect, the political or ideological stances of migrant leaders regarding the 
disputed future of Moldova, either towards the East or West, prominently highlighted in 
previous research as fundamental for migrants’ associative activities (e.g. Cheianu-Andrey 2013; 
Schwarz 2007), are found to be less significant than the differences between my suggested 
distinction of migrant leaders belonging to the first migration wave (those who migrated in the 
late 1990s) and migrants belonging to the second migration wave (those who left the country at 
a later stage). The assignation of migrants to either one of these waves impacts more 
significantly upon migrants’ disposition to cooperate with development actors in state-led 
development programmes than pure politics at ‘home’. In sum, the migrants’ collective 
development practices are shaped by an interesting and complex interplay of socialist-past and 
new post-socialist realities (e.g. emerging new class formations and past, present and 
anticipated migration experiences). Hence, even though some forms of migrants’ aid-practices 
emerged from migrants’ experiences of socialism, we should approach more sophisticatedly the 
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nexus between temporalities and collective practices of social remittances. This entails adopting 
an approach that goes beyond the perspective of a pure continuity of socialist legacy adopted 
by traditional studies on migrant formations in the Eastern European context, that mostly 
neglect change.  
The results obtained also reflect the importance of processes for the subject of study: the 
process of transformation and identity-building in Moldova; the dynamic process of creating 
structures to engage with the Moldovan community; the process of defining ways of 
involvement with the home country among the migrant community, including struggles over 
shared commitments to the value of their common associative practices; and the process of 
building up relationships with migrants from development actors’ perspectives. As shown across 
all three research dimensions, processes of defining the ‘right way of development practices’ 
and struggles over the power of definition and symbolic resources exist between the two social 
fields and within both social fields (cf. Bourdieu 1985). Furthermore, the relationships within 
both social fields and between them evolve over time, as they are learned processes. Hence, the 
question of how dispositions, attitudes and development practices that migrants and aid-
workers display as processes across their transnational networks, should be more carefully 
considered in migration–development discourses and policies.   
Finally, throughout the whole research, migrants expressed a great deal of frustration about 
their involvement in formal development policies and the concrete outcomes of their 
engagement. More broadly, they are deeply disappointed about the Moldovan government’s 
achievement in its development transitions since the political turnaround in 2009, which 
negatively impacts upon their ongoing engagement and on the expectations of institutional 
support. And last of all, migrants are highly sceptical about the usefulness of costly state-led 
migration–development programmes implemented by the international aid-community (i.e. 
investment and return schemes). In short, migrants’ initial enthusiasm about migration–
development policies, and their chiefly volunteer-run efforts in initiating collaborations with 
development actors and the state, are dwindling, due to lack of financial rewards and 
recognition as social actors.  
Despite this rather negative picture, my concluding argument of this summary is that it is 
truly insightful to also look at small and relatively young migrant communities, like the Moldovan 
one, when exploring the migration–transformation nexus. Similar to larger and more established 
migrant communities, they can display interesting social processes of collective development 
practices and knowledge, and they can have dynamic relationships with their home states and 
development actors. 
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9.2 Discussion and Recommendations  
  
In this last sub-section, I sketch the wider theoretical contributions of the thesis, and I indicate 
some avenues for further research and policy recommendations. I start by sharing some general 
reflections on the research process.  
 In the course of my data analysis and in the writing-up stage, interesting findings emerged, 
which proved that the ambitious research design – consisting of three research dimensions, two 
research groups and a multi-sited approach bringing together international and local 
development actors and migrants in a single analytical framework – was worth the effort. It 
allowed me to examine the correspondence of discourse and everyday life, and to trace the 
limits of the policy discourse of migrants’ enrolment into the development establishment. In 
retrospect, however, the choice for a multi-perspective research design entailed some 
difficulties. Firstly, constantly switching between the perspectives of the two seemingly 
disparate research groups across several different geographical contexts was intellectually 
challenging. Secondly, even if the thesis is quite long, the scaffolding of three research 
dimensions, two research groups, seven countries, including a frozen conflict zone, as well as 
Moldova’s complex socio-political situation and the lack of up-to date research on Moldovan 
migrants meant little space for a fuller and more personal discussion of my empirical material. 
Consequently, I was not able to present a ‘personal story’ or an account of the subject matter in 
a more creative and exciting narrative style.   
 Another challenge I faced – and which I find insufficiently addressed in the literature on multi-
sited research – is that it proved far more challenging to write up a multi-sited thesis with a 
transnational angle, than doing the actual multi-sited fieldwork. My analysis bore the risk of 
falling into the trap of becoming too ‘comparativist’ in the sense of comparing the geographical 
sites of migrant host-countries, rather than to focus on the transnational links. To strike the right 
balance between the transnational aspects of the research subject (e.g. migrants’ transnational 
links and transnational development policies) and to simultaneously consider the data collected 
in the different sites (e.g. structural conditions for migrant associations, or migrants’ everyday 
challenges) was more difficult than anticipated. With these general remarks, I now round off the 
thesis with references to the wider theoretical contributions of my results and with a more 
policy-oriented discussion of the main findings.  
 Firstly, the results obtained on how the phenomenon of mass emigration reveals itself in 
today’s Moldova contributes to the wider research field on the impact of mass emigration on 
transformative social change in countries with high outward migration. The ethnographic 
approach to the unfolding of migration–development relationships at different social scales 
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illustrated that Moldova’s substantial post-socialist migration is both an important cause of the 
country’s difficult post-socialist development transition and a vital resource for the young 
country. Today, the migrants are the key providers of foreign investments in Moldova, and not 
official aid assistance or traded goods. The high amounts remitted by migrants to their families 
and their collective aid-giving show a great solidarity towards the deprived economic and social 
situation of their communities of origin. These observations show that migrants have already 
taken initiative into ‘their own hands’. However, as long as the country’s survival depends 
essentially on external funding, either from migrants’ private remittances or from foreign aid-
investments, and endemic corruption in Moldova persists, migrants’ transnational development 
contributions have realistically little prospect to effect structural change in Moldova. Moreover, 
the country’s current official approach towards ‘Europe’ implies a process of establishing a new 
relationship with Europe. This involves a political act. It entails, among other aspects, a common 
new vision of the country – which takes time. Thus, as I argued in Chapter 4, a ‘transformed 
Moldova’ requires a new shared story, and a crucial minimum of shared values, both necessary 
steps for a real social and political transformation. The Moldovan authorities are somehow still 
in the grip of old stories featuring the idyllic Moldovan village, but they have missed out the 
chances of a ‘new definition’ of Moldova in terms of a future common vision – as altering the 
very nature of something, both radically and sustainably. Transformation does not mean to 
neglect the mystical and historical image of a rural country, but it should equally feature notions 
of modernity and/or connections to the global world. The missing intention to create such a 
‘new common Moldovan national narrative’, supported by the elites and Moldovan civil society 
alike, confirms Moldovan citizens’ distrust in the genuine interest of Moldova’s authorities in 
positive change and in synergies with migrants beyond their financial contributions. Hence, in 
light of the new visa-free regime for EU member-states, which seems to provoke a new increase 
of emigration towards the West160, Moldova’s ‘unofficial’ national strategy, heavily based on 
migrants’ financial remittances, needs to be altered. An imminent danger is that otherwise the 
country will soon have no more working population.  
 In this context, I suggest more in-depth research on the impact of emigration on the social 
cohesion of Moldova’s society, especially on the adaptation of public policies to the rising socio-
economic effects of its large-scale emigration, including the role of the relatively new EEA actors 
in Moldova’s migration–development field, and on the impact of migrant-run projects in 
Moldova itself.  
                                                          
160 This is solely a first non-confirmed estimate by key informants. Presently, to my knowledge, no reliable data 
exists.  
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 Secondly, considering Moldova’s migratory patterns and migrants’ everyday lives, I see a 
need for future investigations on aspects which have largely escaped the attention of studies on 
Moldovan migration. These include, for instance, circular migration, which will most likely 
increase with the new visa-scheme, and the creation of adequate policies addressing circular 
migrants, beyond targeting high-skilled migrants. A further important step for progressing 
Moldova’s emigrant policies is to improve the data on Moldovan emigrants, including 
understudied aspects of emigrating from the de facto unrecognised territory of Transnistria, and 
on generational aspects – such as on the transnational ties of the second generation, especially 
if we keep in mind migrants’ estimates on their ‘development diaspora’ as being at a ‘crucial 
point’ (Chapter 7).  
 Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the broad realm of discussions on state–diaspora 
relationships. The long-overdue calling-in of migrants’ views on the relationship with their home 
country to the dominant policy and theoretical focus in this research field generated original 
findings on migrants’ perceptions of relationship-building with their home state and on their 
experiences of participating in the implementation of emigration policies at different moments 
(see my earlier discussions on the unexpected reversed asymmetrical relationship). In this 
context, the thesis clearly shows the important role of international organisations and Western 
donor countries in building up diaspora–state relationships. As I illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6, 
international aid-agencies were the main drivers for Moldova’s state interest in creating new 
relationships with emigrants and in shaping them according to their norms and best-practice 
models. It is also the international development community that defines who belongs to the 
entity of the Moldovan ‘development diaspora’. The so-called low-skilled migrants with less 
mobile capital, for instance female migrants and their development efforts, do not belong to 
this category. Yet, I was personally much more impressed by the success stories of development 
projects carried out by the mostly excluded low-skilled migrants with often difficult life 
circumstances, than by the well-documented success stories of high-skilled migrants. I think the 
informal aid-efforts and networks of low-skilled migrants in general and female migrants in 
particular, merit, therefore, more public recognition, research and policy attention.  
 Additionally, the internationally defined rules of competition/collaborations and patterns of 
inclusion/exclusion in emigration policies do not do enough justice to the complexity and 
variations of social remittances practices - often embedded in migrants’ everyday lives, nor do 
they pay sufficient attention to migrants’ specific motives to engage in development practices, 
such as religious incentives. Besides, the stated historical, geographic, ideological and political 
components at play in the Moldovan context are neglected, too. One explanation for the lack of 
policy and research attention to these aspects is that transnational research approaches have 
264 
 
not been applied in the development policy debates to the same degree as the concept of the 
static entity of ‘diaspora’, used as a policy tool for policy-makers to co-opt (e.g. Newland 2010b). 
Hence, international standards and best-practice models of how to engage with emigrants for 
development seem problematic, and better tailored ‘diaspora’ policies are needed.  
 Fourthly, the results of this first in-depth study of Moldovan migrants’ patterns of collective 
development practices offer interesting insights into the mapping of migrants’ social remittance 
practices. The results show that migrants’ aspirations to get involved in transnational 
development practices and to use their social and human capital reflects different socio-spatial 
units and different senses of belonging. The processes by which these transnational 
development practices – be they volunteer-run or on a professional basis – can enable migrants 
to create a combination of belonging to different social spheres and to a multi-sited process of 
integration warrant more research, in my opinion. As shown, a variety of underlying motivations, 
individual meanings and attitudes account for migrants’ engagement in transnational aid-
practices, which are strongly interwoven with their multi-sited social lives and can change over 
time. Moreover, social remittances are also embedded into a complex array of cultural and social 
determinants operating across different spatial and temporal scales, for instance the national 
historical context of the country of origin and broader geographical core-periphery dynamics. 
Also, the subjectivities and identities we typically find in the literature on volunteerism and civic 
participation of non-migrants in Western Europe are equally important for shaping migrants’ 
transnational development engagement (e.g. specific personal characteristics and professional 
identities). Despite a growing academic interest in migrants’ transnational linkages, these 
findings challenge the still dominant binary theoretical approach of transnationalism and 
integration applied in the analysis of migrants’ social remittance practices (see for instance 
Marini 2014; Triandafyllidou 2016). As I demonstrated throughout the thesis, viewing migrants’ 
attachments from the perspective of the places they create – the transnational migrant space 
of development engagement – allows for an understanding of transnational development 
engagements with the host society as processes with their own dynamics, rather than reducing 
them to purely complementary, contradictory or simultaneous aspects of their integration 
process into one host society. The fact that the reciprocal relationship between different 
degrees of integration and forms of transnationalism is not always significant means that there 
is much more to the story of migrants’ social remittance practices than what commonly fits into 
the binary interplay of integration and transnationalism. In part, one explanation for the lack of 
research on how migrants’ collective aid-giving is interwoven with their ‘multi-sited social lives’, 
is that transnational research approaches have not been applied in the migration policy debates 
to the same degree as the concept of integration. Thus, I suggest it is time to widen up the 
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limited conceptual prism of migrants’ integration into a host-society context when examining 
patterns of social remittance practices.  
 Additionally, parallels can be drawn between the policy discourse on migrants’ social 
remittance practices and the policy rhetoric of financial remittances. Both discourses 
prominently highlight in neat models how migrants are urged to practice in a ‘productive way’ 
their financial and social remittances, and how they are supposed to show their loyalty towards 
their families and communities back home (see Chapter 2). In each case, the prescriptive policy 
discourse, based on normative assumptions, does not do enough justice to migrants’ 
transnational lives and the private nature of their collective financial or social investments. 
Undoubtedly, additional parallels and interactions between economic transfers and social 
remittances in the context of Moldova present a fruitful area for future research - see for 
instance Meseguer, Lavezzolo and Aparicio’s (2016) comparison of the impact of financial 
remittances with that of social remittances in Latin America, or Mata-Codesal (2011) on material 
and social remittances in highland Ecuador. 
 Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if the heterogeneity of collectively engaged 
Moldovan migrants regarding gender, education and professional backgrounds also applies to 
other Eastern European migrant communities. In the same vein, some of my findings point to 
possible intra-European specificities of the migration–transformation nexus: the migrants’ 
motivation to engage in development activities to connect their marginalised country with 
‘Europe’, patterns of collective practices that emerged from migrants’ experiences of socialism, 
or the fact that migrants are perceived as ‘closer’ to the needs of the rural population and of 
smaller development NGOs than the aid-agencies in Chisinau (Chapters 4 and 8). That being said, 
the broader area of linkages between transnational practices of other Eastern European 
migrants in Western Europe and the transition of their home countries, and migrants' roles in 
balancing out the structural inequalities between the different European regions remains open 
for future research. Or, in Meeus’ words: “Scholars only hardly emphasised the connectivity 
between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’” (2016: 87).  
 Lastly, turning once more to the wider debate on the migration–development nexus, my 
novel bottom-up approach, with the lens of the aid workers’ viewpoints on migrant associations 
as their development partners, generated interesting insights into the substantial struggles 
between migrants and development actors over the authority to be a genuine ‘do-gooder’ in 
development issues, or over what could be called ‘moral capital’. That being said, one of the key 
issues is to take on board more ethnographic-driven research on the micro-relationships 
between migrants and development professionals, and on the reciprocal image both social 
actors have of one another. Particularly the interactions between migrants and their co-citizens 
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– the employees of local and international aid-agencies – warrants more academic attention. 
Issues of power and legitimation between the two social actors were most prominent in these 
aid-relationships. How migrants’ experiences abroad influence the quality of aid-cooperation 
with their co-citizens in Moldova, who might not have experienced migration, could be further 
researched, as these aspects have not been adequately taken into account in the mainstream 
academic migration–development debates.  
 In all, it certainly remains a challenging task to match the life-worlds of both actors in 
concrete real-life situations, particularly when the ‘real lives’ of both actors are disparate, and 
unequal power geometries obstruct the teaming up with migrant associations for successful 
win-win collaborations in practice. For this reason, I concur with de Haas (2012) who stresses 
that, after the peak of the ‘high hopes’ period of migrants’ transnational engagements by 
international development agencies and governments on a discursive level, overly positive 
expectations need to be adjusted. Even if there has been a slight shift of donor attention back 
to the countries of origin, the migration–development boom is not over yet. In this respect, a 
better mutual understanding of both actors will remain essential for an enhanced insight into 
the different socially mediated ways in which development is imagined and/or enacted and for 
the clarification of migrants’ roles in the transnational development industry. Yet, 
‘comprehensive’ formal and informal dialogues and forums with migrant leaders – highlighted 
in the contemporary policy discourse as important prerequisites for future collaborations 
between migrants and development actors – are not only rare in practice but also often 
inefficient (e.g. EU 2013b; IOM 2013). As we saw in Chapter 6, a development policy based on 
genuine dialogue with the migrants, funders and aid-agencies at ‘home’ was put forward in 
Moldova. But it proved to be insufficient, partly because not all discussants were fully willing to 
convert the outcomes of this dialogue into practice. Hence, I see not only a need for more 
outreach to migrants in order to gain more knowledge about the Moldovan migrants' 
understudied lives and for adjusting migration–development practices, but also more 
willingness to support migrants’ collective development activities by all actors involved.  
 Gamlen (2011) maintains that diaspora engagement is increasingly common and should be 
normalised in both contexts – the home and host countries. In my opinion, a first step of such a 
‘normalisation’ of migrants’ development contributions needs most of all recognition in the 
transnational professional aid-community. More concrete support actions for migrants – 
beyond empty rhetoric – will only occur if there is a ‘normalisation’ in recognising the migrant 
development actors as professional partners with development ‘savoir faire’.   
 Furthermore, the migrant-centred approach, a cross-cutting priority of EU actions on 
migration and development emphasising more strongly the micro-dimension of migrants (e.g. 
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migrants’ rights, see EU 2013b), should also take into account that migrants’ chiefly voluntary 
engagements are always personal commitments, based on individual worldviews and a variety 
of personal, practical and emotional motivations in different social spheres. Similarly, the other 
current mainstream development practice of the ‘broadened approach to migration and 
development of the EU’, the local-to-local approach addressing regional development policies 
(EU/DEVCO 2011), should be reconfigured, too. Even if this approach seems promising for 
increasing the links between migrants and the local political, economic or civil-society actors in 
Moldova, and for improving the sustainability of migrants’ development impact, it remains 
crucial not to lose sight of the transnational component in the migration–development nexus – 
the transnational space of the migrants’ connections. In the light of these aid-modalities, 
struggles over the ‘right’ development concepts of dealing with migrants and their physical and 
symbolic distance to their home-countries will certainly not vanish into thin air.  
 Furthermore, we saw that a stronger engagement of migrants in official development can 
come with both opportunities and threats in terms of ‘becoming too close’ to official 
development actors and state authorities (Chapter 8). Thus, I find it is also time to address more 
openly the potential negative aspects of migrants’ enrolment into the development 
establishment, and mainstream aid-mechanisms that might fuel potential negative aspects. In 
this context, I see a need to allow a more realistic approach to migrant associations’ manifold 
roles in development, and a greater recognition of their diversity and different degrees of 
professionalism, especially of collectives who do not want to be associated with formal 
development and who do not anticipate to become ‘native’ in the ‘help industry’. Consequently, 
the narrow conceptualisation of migrant associations as non-profit organisations or as civil- 
society actors also needs to be broadened out and include different types of organisation, such 
as business associations, social economy organisations, etc. In all, ‘migrant association’ is still a 
catch-all category for various types of organisations with diverging degrees of impact potential 
on the development of migrant home countries. As an auto-critique of my own research design, 
I conclude that these classifications are inaccurate to explore the diversity of migrants’ networks 
and associations, and they add to the unease of aid-workers and scholars (including myself) 
about how to approach migrants as newcomers in formal development. Thus, I suggest that 
future studies should achieve a more nuanced approach to migrants’ actual collective 
development practices and a finer distinction of the varied professional degrees of their 
associations – be they voluntary-based and/or professional. In this respect, the intersection of 
migrants’ development efforts, embedded in their everyday practices, with the work of 
development professionals, is ripe for further investigation. Such investigations, I suggest, 
should employ a stronger relational thinking by emphasising the social relations that bind 
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professional aid-workers and migrant associations of different types in one transnational field 
of thoughts and actions. This logical next step on the research agenda might also help in finding 
a more nuanced use of terminologies employed in the academic literature on migrants’ 
collective development engagement (including this thesis). Currently, the terminologies to 
describe migrants’ collective development efforts are highly variegated: transnational 
philanthropic efforts, transnational aid-giving, collective humanitarian practices, transnational 
charity practices and so on. Taking into account the earlier-stated finding that some migrant 
leaders do not want to label their development efforts as ‘charity’ engagements or charity 
organisations (see Chapter 7), these research investigations might offer a new terminology 
based more strongly on the criterion of migrants’ perceptions on their engagement.  
The transnational, ethnographic approach to the broader policy-oriented discussion on 
migration–development also revealed that different actors relate migrant associations to 
different fields. We saw, for instance, that Moldovan NGOs associate migrant associations with 
government policies, rather than recognising them as professional local civil-society actors. 
Meantime, the international donor community tries to fit migrants’ mostly volunteer 
development engagement into mainstream development practices. In the light of these 
observations, migrant associations are often caught between different roles; as civil society 
actors and as allies of the government of their home countries. This means that they need to 
fulfil requirements of emigration policies on the one hand, and of development policies on the 
other. This can obstruct their overall development engagement (Chapter 8).  
 Lastly, the recognition of the simultaneous existence of different cultural concepts of ‘doing 
development’ in or outside the mainstream development field involves putting aside the 
historical baggage that assumes that good development ideas and expertise travel from the 
‘West’ to the ‘East’. And I think that is exactly the crux of the matter. To work towards such a 
cultural transformation is perhaps the biggest challenge of all in transforming ‘development’ 
into a new era of global development partnerships in which migrants can play a role, if they want 
to. I personally remain sceptical about an easy way on how to agree upon such flexible 
development approaches, including aid practices addressing migrants. We have on one side a 
persistent push from migrants’ home countries to steer emigrant communities for political and 
economic interests, and on the other side the development industry’s urge to match migrants’ 
aid-efforts with their own development practices in order to get tangible and quick results for 
further funding. In spite of the rather unsuccessful experience in the Moldovan case until now, 
I still think a next step to a more diversified global landscape of the aid-industry is that both 
subjects become more engaged in discussions with their funders and they enquire into their 
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own practices, for instance how they present themselves to the public and enhance reflexive 
practice. 
 Ultimately, a necessary advancement in broadening the research focus of the migration–
development debate should be to approach more strongly the issue of how migrant associations 
as transnational formations change other transnational development organisations. This 
question can only be addressed if transnational approaches not only look at migrants’ 
transnational networks and practices per se, but if they also gauge how they challenge the local, 
national and international development institutions and their ‘epistemology’ of transformation 
in migrants’ home countries (cf. Faist 2010). This might also lead to more attention to migrants’ 
continuing engagements in development organisations in their home countries or to their new 
involvements in development NGOs in the host countries, both absent in the current debate 
(see Chapter 7). Presently, the associative capacity of the Moldovan migrant community is, 
however, too weak to influence the development community’s dominant aid-practices and to 
set their own agenda in state-led development policies. In the Moldovan case, therefore, the 
question of how the development actors are being reconstituted through the field of migrants’ 
engagements is too early to evaluate. A much more realistic approach is the issue of how to 
create convergent goals and alliances, starting from the disparate and asymmetric power 
positions of the two subjects at stake. Either way, it will be interesting to follow if and how 
migrants on a global scale can trigger a shift towards more tolerance for cultural diversity within 
aidland, and whether their relationship with mainstream development actors will grow into a 
more stable long-term synergy.   
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APPENDIX 1: Profiles of Principal Informants 
 
A: List of migrant participants interviewed in each site  
                                                          
161 Years spent abroad in total, not necessarily in the indicated place.  
UK: London and Oxford (n=3) 
No  Pseudonym Sex Age Employment in Country of 
Residence/Education  
Time of 
Residence
161  
Function in Migrant Association/ Migrant 
network   
1 Rosa f 45 Entrepreneur and consultant 15 Founder and president of an association, 
member of the Diaspora Council  
2 Christina f 29 Housewife and mother, 29 
(unemployed, searching for a 
job as shop assistant, former 
banker) 
4 Non-member 
3 Vasile m 48 IT-Engineer 7 Founder and president of an association, 
member of the Diaspora Council 
France: (n=16) 
No Pseudonym Sex  Age Employment in Country of 
Residence/Education 
Time of 
Residence  
Function in Migrant Association/ Migrant 
Network   
4 Mihail m 29 Civil Engineer  3 Non-member, but takes regularly part in 
activities organised by migrant associations  
5 Dragomir m 48 Construction worker, former 
professor of mathematics 
6 President of one association, co-president of a 
second association and member of a third 
association 
6 Vitali  m 48 Real estate agent, Romanian 
Orthodox priest  
16 President of one association 
7  Vasili m 39 Physician, researcher 15 Founder and president of two migrant 
associations, member of a third association, 
member of the Diaspora Council 
8 Alina f 28 Master student in International 
Relations  
2 Founder and president of a migrant association, 
member of the Diaspora Council 
9 Liliana f 34 Intercultural communication 
specialist, freelance journalist 
8 Founder and president of a migrant association 
10 Diana f 45 Care-worker  4 President of a migrant association  
11 Sandu m 42 Actor and factory worker 
(unemployed at the time of the 
interview)  
11 Member of an association 
12 Natasha  f 48 Shoe shop assistant 
(unemployed at the time of the 
interview), former linguist  
12 Co-president of one association, 
member of a second association  
13 Dima m 47 Taxi driver, former senior 
manager of the national border 
guard 
10 Non-member of an association 
14 Dana  f 28 Economist  3 Non-member of an association 
15 Ion m 34 Freelance translator and writer   Founder and president of a migrant association, 
member of the Diaspora Council  
16 Alex m 42 Professor for political sciences  6 Co-president of an association  
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17 Anna  f 38 Housewife and part-time 
cleaner  
16 Co-president of a migrant association  
18 Kiril m 38 IT-engineer  6 President of a migrant association 
19 Magdalena f 34 Care-worker, former teacher  2 Member of an informal network of care-workers 
Germany 
No Pseudonym Sex  Age Employment in Country of 
Residence/Education 
Time of 
Residence 
Function in Migrant Association/ Migrant 
Network 
20 Anastasia f 46 Tour-guide and translator  17 Founder and President of an association 
21 Svetlana  f 55 Factory worker and Artist  16 President of an association 
Italy  
No Pseudonym Sex  Age Employment in Country of 
Residence/Education 
Time of 
Residence  
Function in Migrant Association /Migrant 
Network 
22 Angela f 32 Care-worker  2 Non-member  
23 Natalia  f 42 Lecturer and business woman 9 President of a migrant association  
24 Anna f 45 Translator/writer, linguist and 
philosopher 
13 Board member of an association 
25 Ilia m 48 Russian Orthodox priest  16 Board member of an association 
26 Laura f 37 Journalist and freelance project 
coordinator of migration-led 
programmes  
11 Founder and president of an association, 
member of the Diaspora Council 
27 Oleg m 44 Project manager of migration-
led programmes  
8 President of an association, member of the 
Diaspora Council 
28 Nicolai  m 31 Unemployed/ former import-
export logistic employee 
2 Member of an association and member of the 
local migrant assembly 
29 Mihail m 55 Owner of a transport firm and 
entrepreneur in retail trade  
17 President of a migrant association, co-president 
of a second association  
30 Ivan m 41 Factory worker 4 Non-member 
31 Dana f 46 Social worker, translator and 
mediator  
17 President of a migrant association  
32 Jure  m 52 Electrician, writer and poet 18 President of an association 
33 Romina f 49 Secretary 16 President of an association  
34 Maria A. f 46 Factory worker and care-
worker  
12 Active in an informal transnational helping 
network  
35 Maria B. f 52 Care-worker  10 Member of an informal network 
36 Alina  f 52 Care-worker  13 Non-member 
37 Illa f 36 Care-worker  13 Member of an in informal network  
Moldova  
No Pseudonym Sex  Age Employment in Country of 
Residence/Education 
Time of 
Residence  
Function in Migrant Association/Migrant 
Network 
38 Ion  m 29 MA in international relations, 
currently barkeeper, Estonia 
7 President of a migrant association 
39 Vladimir m 41 Car washer, Turin, former 
lawyer  
8 Non-member of a migrant association  
40 Flurin m 48 Owner of a small car repair 
shop, Rome  
15 Member of a migrant association 
41 Stefan  m 33 Entrepreneur, London 4  Member of a migrant association  
Switzerland 
No Pseudonym Sex Age  Employment in Country of 
Residence/Education 
Time of 
Residence 
Function in Migrant Association/Migrant 
Network  
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B: List of development participants interviewed in each site  
 
 
 
Belgium: Brussels 
No Pseudonym Sex Age Organisation Function 
1 Simone f 41 UNDP Programme manager EU/UNDP, 
Migration and Development 
Initiative 
2 Markus m 34 European 
Commission, 
DEVCO 
International cooperation officer 
migration, DG 
3 Marco m 55 European 
External Action 
Service (EEAS) 
Head of Department Eastern Europe 
Germany: Frankfurt  
No Pseudonym Sex Age Organisation Function 
4 Juriza m 38 CIM Programme manager: fostering 
migrant associations' potential for 
development 
5 Herbert m 55 GIZ Migration–Development senior 
consultant 
 
 
42 Kiril m 28 Internee and consultant, MA in 
International law 
5 Founder and president of an association, board 
member of a second association  
43 Svetlana  f 54 Journalist  19 Founder and president of a migrant association 
44 Susanna f 28 Au pair, formal employee in a 
mobile phone company  
2 Non-member 
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Moldova including Transnistria 
No Pseudonym Sex Age Organisation Function 
6 Valeriu  m 44 Hilfswerk Austria  Project coordinator large-scale migration–development 
programmes 
7 Viorica f 41 Swiss Development 
Cooperation Office 
(SDC)  
Deputy Director of Cooperation, programme manager 
migration–development programmes 
8 Natascha f 48 Pestalozzi Children's 
Foundation  
Country representative Moldova,  
independent consultant in the educational field 
9 Pius  m 42 LED (Liechtenstein 
Development Service) 
Head of country Office, Chisinau  
 
10 Oxana f 28 IOM Programme manager ‘Small Grant Diaspora Programme’ 
11 Dora  f 42 East-West Foundation Consultant for IOM, author of the Diaspora list, and principal 
organiser of the Diaspora Congresses in 2012  
12 Ionela f 34 ICMPD (International 
Centre for Migration 
Policy Development)  
Project officer  
13 William m 56 International Agency for 
Source Country 
Information (IASCI) 
Director, project manager of ‘Nexus’ (a migration-
development programme)  
14 Antonia  f 58 Social NGO VESTA  Director  
15 Esperanta f 35 Delegation of the 
European Union  
Project Manager migration–development programmes 
16 Marta  f 39 NGO Interaction Chairwoman, Implementing partner of different migration-
development–programmes 
17 Victor  m 45 Public Association 
'Demos' 
Social worker and legal expert, responsible for the 
department of victims of human trafficking, vulnerable 
children and Youth  
18 Vitalie 
 
m 35 Academy of Sciences of 
Moldova 
Senior project manager of ‘high skilled diaspora programmes’, 
department for European Integration and International 
Cooperation(DECI) 
19 Olesea f 30 Bureau for Migration 
and Asylum 
Head of department policy and  
legalisation   
20 Ghenadie m 32 Bureau for Relation with 
the Diaspora 
Principal consultant for migrant associations  
21 Igor  m 39 IOM, Moldova Head of migration–development programmes 
22 Ivan f 42 Hilfswerk Austria Programme manager ‘diaspora programme’ 
Switzerland: Berne, Lucerne, Geneva, Zürich 
No Pseudonym Sex Age Organisation Function 
23 Max m 63 Caritas Switzerland Europe/CIS Desk Programme coordinator  
24 Martin m 55 SDC Migration expert, Programme manager ‘Global Programme 
Migration and Development’  
25 Beth f 59 IOM Head Office Geneva Organiser of an international daspora conference (held in 
Geneva, June 2013) 
26 Brigitte f 39 Alliance Sud Responsible for the migration topic within the umbrella 
organisation of Swiss development NGOs  
27 Camille f 45 Cinfo Headhunter for aid workers 
28 Jean m 61 Protéstants Swiss Counterpart in development project with a Moldovan 
association 
France: Paris  
29 Françoise  f 42 Médecins du monde Programme manager Moldova 
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Italy: Bologna  
30 Margaritha  f 32 Donna  In charge of programmes for care-workers and anti-human 
trafficking programmes  
 
 
 
C: List of key participants  
 
Moldova  
No  Pseudonym Sex Age Profession Function  
1 Diana f 46 Social worker  Counterpart of a matched sample project, 
collaborates with different NGOs from Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK in the social field 
2 Larissa f 56 State agricultural minister 
and teacher 
Counterpart of matched sample project 
3 Vitali m 34 Unionist 'Moldovan 
Agricultural Trade Union', 
engineer  
Project manager ‘transformation of agricultural 
sector’, counterpart of a matched sample project 
4 Nicolai m 52 City mayor  Counterpart of matched sample project 
5 Angela  f 52 Freelance project 
coordinator and NGO-
worker 
Counterpart of matched sample project 
6 Carmen f 16 Pupil Beneficiary of a volunteer programme 
Italy: Novellara and Rome  
No Name Sex Age Profession Function 
7 Dimitri m 41 Agricultural worker, care-
worker  
Intercultural mediator for the city council for Russian, 
Ukrainian and Moldovan migrants  
8 Pia f 51 Municipal employee Responsible for intercultural activities and integration  
9 Oleg m 55 Ambassador  Moldovan ambassador in Italy 
France: Villneuve-Saint-Georges  
No Name Sex Age Profession Function 
10 Sandra  f 46 Municipal employee Collaborates with migrant associations  
 
 
 
